Tag: Balkans
Problems and solutions: perceptions matter
What you do about a problem depends on how you perceive the forces at work creating it and the possibilities for solution. Perceptions often diverge. Here are some issues in the Balkans today where that is the case, including my own views:
Did President Vucic control this month’s Serb rebellion in northern Kosovo?
He claimed not. He told Western diplomats that if they press him too hard about northern Kosovo without offering him something he might lose control there. That would presumably make things worse. Vucic is expert at playing this game. What he wants is the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM). That would be an institutional vehicle for maintaining Belgrade’s control over the Serb population in Kosovo permanently.
In my view, it’s nonsense to pretend Vucic doesn’t control what happens among the Serbs in northern Kosovo. It is true Vucic is not liked by many of them, because he has delivered nothing they want. But the barricades erected there in recent weeks came down the day, nay the hour, in which he said so. The Serbian security services and organized crime they control are the main instigators in the north. Anyone who bucks them will be arrested, beaten up, fired, or worse.
Is the problem Kurti?
Many American and European officials dislike Albin Kurti, the prime minister of Kosovo. There are several reasons for this. In opposition, he was a firebrand and his political movement used violence both inside and outside the parliament. He has advocated a referendum on union with Albania, something Washington and Brussels won’t permit. He is often uncompromising, or as he says “principled.” He does not, as his predecessors did, bend easily to American and European preferences.
In my view, Kurti is a sovereigntist. Kosovo declared independence in 2008, but it is still not completely sovereign. A NATO-led force defends its territorial integrity. Foreigners still play roles in its judicial system. Kurti wants to establish Kosovo’s sovereignty, in part by reaching a “final” agreement with Serbia that includes strict reciprocity in all matters and mutual recognition. He doesn’t want to settle for the half measures Washington and Brussels encourage. That frustrates their diplomats.
Can KFOR solve the current crisis?
The NATO-led force in Kosovo, KFOR, now has about 3800 troops from 27 countries. In principle, that force concentrated in the north and properly equipped and trained could have readily taken down the barricades and calmed the situation. Its responsibilities also include Kosovo’s territorial defense. Serbia mobilized its forces along the border/boundary with Kosovo. Were the Serbian Army to enter Kosovo, KFOR (not the still nascent Kosovo Security Force) would be responsible for pushing them back.
In my view, KFOR is lacking what it needs for both its civil and territorial defense roles. Its troops are not all in the north, they are not all trained and equipped for civil unrest, and many of the troop-supplying countries would not want to see their forces in violent conflict. Belgrade understands this and exploits KFOR’s weaknesses. KFOR needs more capacity, not just to push back demonstrators (Albanian or Serb) and the Serbian Army but also to negotiate from a position of strength.
Is the solution two Germanies?
Paris and Berlin have been working for months on a proposal for a half measure that is usually referred to as the “two Germanies” model. The Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic in the early 1970s agreed to live and let live, without mutual recognition. The idea to use this as a model for Kosovo and Serbia has been around for a long time. A version of the French-German proposal leaked in November, but there is said to be a more recent version that includes the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities.
In my view, the leaked document isn’t too bad, but it is not two Germanies. Both Germanies became members of the United Nations in 1973. No one thinks Serbia will concede on UN membership for Kosovo. Even if Belgrade were to cave, Moscow won’t without exacting a high price from the West. The model discussed is “two Germanies minus.” It might have some virtues, but the ASM should be included only in a final agreement that provides for mutual recognition. In that context even a sovereigntist like Kurti should be open to considering the proposition.
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A 10 point peace outline for the Western Balkans
Veton Surroi writes:
In the last week of 2022, the Western Balkans again produces narratives about unfinished conflicts and about those that are expected to happen. I will not go delve into the explanation neither why nor since when nor who is responsible. The fact that this is happening 21 years after the last war (North Macedonia), 23 years after the NATO historic intervention in Europe (Kosovo and Serbia) and 28 years after the first genocide in Europe after World War II (Bosnia and Herzegovina) speaks for itself. It also speaks that there are many ways for perpetuation of conflict and war, but that the way of peace has not yet been found. And in the hyper-production of scenarios for one or the other solution (how to remove the barricades, how to solve the constitutional impasse in this or that country, how to unlock the ethnic veto…) here is a (perhaps) simple ten-point outline for peace for the entire region of the Western Balkans.
1. The six countries of the Western Balkans (WB6) will become (in 2028) part of the European Single Market, with equal access rights to the four European freedoms. They will be equal to the rights enjoyed today by non-EU countries, Norway, Switzerland and Iceland.
2. In order to gain the right of access to the single European Market, the Six Western Balkans must establish (in 2024) the space of the four European freedoms in their own region, i.e. establish the Common Regional Market. It is not about free trade, because that we more or less have. This is about inter-institutional agreements for a shared space.
3. Those WB6 countries that are prepared for EU membership on their own merits will be invited to sign the accession. The six partners are responsible for the preparation of the WB6 for entry into the four European freedoms (that is, group integration into the European Common Market) and at the same time for integration based on their own merits for membership in the EU (based on the regatta principle, where the first the one who is the most prepared) . The principle of regatta and that of “big bang” group action are mutually conditioned.
4. The European Union, in addition to ambitious transformative funds (such as that of the Green Agenda), will establish the Fund for Peaceful Cohesion in the Western Balkans, directed towards the infrastructural, economic, cultural and other cohesion of the Western Balkans. The money of the Fund will also be used to achieve the two concentric circles of the four European freedoms, the Common Regional Market and the Common European Market.
5. Kosovo and Serbia will establish inter-institutional relations derived from the needs of establishing the common regional market and the single European market. The legal format of inter-institutional relations will be equal for all WB6 Six.
6. Kosovo and Serbia will negotiate and agree on the powers of the “protecting state”. This will regulate, according to the best European standards, the necessary role of Serbia for the protection and development of the Serbian people and Serbian culture in Kosovo. At the same time, the role of Kosovo will be regulated for the protection and development of the Albanian people and their culture in the Preshevo Valley and other parts of Serbia.
7. The WB6 will actively participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace. Countries that are ready for NATO membership and want to do so in 2028 will receive an invitation for membership. The six countries of the Western Balkans, regardless of their status as NATO members or not, will sign the Western Balkan 6 Cooperation and Security Agreement 2028.
8. The six countries of the Western Balkans will establish Common Memory Centers in their capitals under the direct sponsorship of their governments. In all these centers, the memory will be built for the civilian victims of the war, those “on the other side”. The Culture Centers will also serve as points of knowledge of the cultures of the “other side”.
9. The six countries of the Western Balkans will build the compact of the rights of the non-majority peoples, relying on the best practices of the region (such as the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001). The basis of the compact will be the non-territorial rights of the non-majority peoples, that is, the rights that are equivalent wherever the non-majority citizens live.
10. The Roma language will be the language in official use in the municipalities where x percent of the Roma population lives. The sixth of the Western Balkans will create the joint institutional body for the unification and standardization of the Romani language in the region.
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Aggression needs a firm and effective response
Albioneta Ademi of Kosovo’s Gazeta Express asked questions. I replied:
Q: NATO-KFOR still did not respond to Serbia’ s request on deploying military in Kosovo. Why do you think it took so long to “analyze” such request?
A: I doubt they will ever answer. It’s a question that was asked as a provocation, not to get an answer.
Q: In November, Prime Minister Kurti said that Serbia aims to destabilize the north of Kosovo to cover the EU proposal rejection. Do you agree with Kurti? What’s hidden after the Serbia’s actions?
A: Albin knows better than I do. I think the evidence is in favor of what he says. Nothing is hidden. Serbia is trying to make it impossible for serious normalization talks to occur.
Q: Kosovo is waiting for KFOR to act saying Kosovo Police is ready and capable to take off the barricades but still Kurti is giving time to KFOR. Why so?
A: Because he is wise. It would be far better not to risk his police in a direct confrontation with people whose sole purpose is to destabilize.
Q: N1 (a CNN affiliated media in Serbia) reported on Monday that Serbia deployed its military close to Jarinje cross border. This can remind one what Russia did before Ukraine’s invasion. Is this a ‘benign’ threat, a show of force for internal use in Serbia or Kosovans should be really concerned?
A: Whenever military forces are deployed in an offensive mode, it is wise to take it seriously. There are no benign threats.
Q: Do you think the US and EU are doing enough in de-escalation? DAS Escobar and other EU’s representatives visited Kosovo and Serbia in mid-December. What is your comment on their way of addressing to tensions?
A: The US and EU have tried to appease Serbia by talking up the Association of Serb-majority municipalities. That appeasement has failed to produce moderation. Instead it has whetted Belgrade’s appetite. Brussels and Washington need a course correction.
Q: With all these developments, are you optimistic that spring will come with an Agreement or all of this will lead elsewhere?
A: I always hope to be wrong, but I see no prospect of an Agreement by spring. Serbia is playing the Milosevic/Putin game of threatening a neighbor. We know where that led in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Georgia, and Ukraine. How many lessons before we learn? Aggression needs a firm and effective response.
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Trouble in Kosovo comes from Serbia
I did this interview for Spat Blakcori of Pristina’s TV1 yesterday:
Q: It has been more than 2 weeks since there are barricades in the North of Mitrovica. KFOR has yet to make a move and remove the barricades. Do you think they should act immediately?
A: They should not have allowed the barricades, but now that they are there they need to proceed with caution.
Q: What do you think about the criminal groups in the North of Mitrovica. Should Vucic be responsible for their actions?
A: Yes, they are agents of the Serbian secret service for which he is responsible. None of this would be happening without Vucic’s approval. Brnabic’s tweets are confirmation of that.
Q: Do you think that the approach of the West is too soft towards the Serbian president?
A: Yes. I don’t understand why the West has failed to react appropriately to Vucic’s provocations, which are blatant and obvious. I fear there are those in both Washington and Brussels who sympathize with Belgrade’s effort to establish separate governance for Serbs in northern Kosovo.
I also did this one for Luli Gajtani of RTV Dukagjini:
Q: How do you see the situation created in the north of Kosovo, what do you think would be a long-term solution that would no longer produce tensions?
A: The long term solution will be mutual recognition and decentralized governance in Kosovo, which already exists.
Q: Should the forces of KFOR or the Police of Kosovo forcefully remove the barricades located in the northern municipalities of Kosovo, or do you see another solution?
A: They should not have allowed construction of the barricades, but now they need to be cautious in removing them. Negotiation from a position of strength would be my preference.
Q: Serbia has admitted that the barricades were placed with their permission, how do you think the international community should act?
A: There should be consequences. Brussels and Washington are better equipped than I am to figure out what those should be.
Q: Do you think that Miroslav Lajcak and Josep Borrell should intensify the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue? Do you think that the dialogue would speed up the solution of the problems in the north of Kosovo?
A: I doubt they can speed up the dialogue without levying consequences for Belgrade, which has intentionally destabilized northern Kosovo in order to block progress in the dialogue.
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Don’t let aggression by destabilization pay
Northern Kosovo is in its third week of chaos. Serb houligans block the roads, attack journalists, and shoot at police and KFOR troops. The houligans are not random thugs. Belgrade pays and controls many of them. Whatever the initial justifications for this rogue behavior, the net effect is to undermine the dialogue with Pristina and prevent serious consideration of the still unpublished and therefore hazy French-German proposal for interim “normalization.”
What Belgrade wants
What Belgrade wants is Pristina’s commitment to its much-vaunted Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM) inside Kosovo. But the disorder is proving beyond any doubt that yielding on that point under current conditions would be disastrous for the Kosovo state. The powers behind the barricades would then become the powers running an institution the Kosovo state had recognized and accepted. It would be beyond foolish to do that. Not least because those powers are criminal and tied to Serbia’s secret services.
The US and EU should be embarrassed
This should embarrass all those American and European diplomats who have pushed the ASM. Prime among them is Gabe Escobar, the State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Western Balkans, but State Department Counselor Derek Chollet and EU Foreign and Security Policy chief Josep Borrell share in the ignominy. They thought giving Belgrade the ASM would moderate its views. That was foolhardy. What they got instead were Vucic’s efforts at destabilization. They also got a series of truly offensive tweets from his Prime Minister, aimed at the Germans and other Europeans. These include a push to deploy Serbian troops to Kosovo and make it clear Belgrade is uninterested for now in pursuing its declared ambition of EU membership.
What is to be done now
Hotter heads in Kosovo want KFOR to tear down the barricades, in cooperation with the Kosovo police. Unless carefully prepared and executed, that could make a first-rate mess and bring opprobrium on all involved. Far better, is to build up the forces in the north and negotiate an end to the disorder from a position of strength. Only if that negotiation fails should force be used, decisively and effectively. The ringleaders of the disorder should be arrested and either tried in Kosovo or expelled to Serbia, provided Belgrade promises convincingly to prosecute.
That is not enough
Europe and the US need to make it clear to Serbia that the promotion of disorder in Kosovo has consequences. I like Jasmin Mujanović‘s proposal:
Specifically, the 5 EU non-recognizers must see how they’re facilitating Serbia’s brinkmanship. Fully recognizing Kosovo’s sovereignty and allowing it to begin its EU/NATO membership processes is something the West can do today, req no input from Belgrade, Moocow, or Beijing.
This makes sense. Even if one or two of the non-recognizers were to proceed as Jasmin suggests it would make a big difference to Belgrade’s belligerency. This way or another, the West needs to show that destabilization is not in Serbia’s interests and should never be repeated.
Why should anyone care?
Even I find it hard to focus on Kosovo while Ukraine is suffering a Russian war of aggression. We should however care about Kosovo, because Vucic is pursuing in Kosovo Vladimir Putin’s 2014 strategy in Donbas. Putin was challenging Slobodan Milosevic’s 1993 strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Any ambiguity about the Western reaction in Kosovo will feed similar moves elsewhere. Vucic has chosen to align himself with Russia in the tradition of Milosevic. Aggression by destabilization anywhere cannot be allowed to pay.
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The north is not Kosovo’s only problem
Naile Ejupi of Bota Sot asked questions, I replied Monday:
Q: One-on-one attacks on police officials, EULEX, and journalists from Kosovo, now since Saturday, the border points of the north of Kosovo with Serbia have been blocked by groups of Serbs, how do you comment on this situation?
A: This is Vucic pursuing his ambition of the “Serbian world.” The criminals conducting these operations in northern Kosovo are under Belgrade’s control.
Q: Kosovo has postponed the elections in the north of the country, which is why the attacks in the north first started, but Serbia still continues to block that part, now they demand the release of the ex-policeman arrested as a suspect for the attack on the Kosovo policemen and on the officials of the CEC. What is the Serbian president, Aleksander Vučić, trying to achieve?
A: He already has de facto control over the north. He is trying to ensure impunity for his criminal gangs and continued Belgrade control in the north.
Q: The Serbian president, Aleksandër Vucic, has threatened to send the Serbian army to that part of Kosovo, why does Serbia continue to be pampered by internationals and do not respond to its actions?
A: You’ll have to ask the “international community,” but in my opinion they have unfortunately a good deal of confidence in Vucic’s good intentions. I have no reason to confirm that. Certainly there is nothing about the current behavior of criminals in the north that confirms good intentions.
Q: The Russian Embassy in Tirana has supported Serbia for these actions, are we at risk of another war?
A: Not another war, but some serious instability. Russia has only a few troops in Serbia and the Serbian Army won’t want to enter any Albanian-majority parts of Kosovo. But Serbian security forces exist throughout the Serb-majority municipalities, especially in the north. They can cause a lot of trouble.
Q: On the other hand, Serbia’s actions have been condemned by European countries, even the Netherlands has voted in the Parliament to restore Serbia’s visas, how do you see this Dutch action, would this be an appropriate punishment?
A: You will have to ask the Dutch this question.
Q: The EU’s special envoy for the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue met with Prime Minister Kurti on Tuesday and requested the implementation of the Association of Serbian municipalities, as a solution to the situation. The Association of Serbian municipalities gives competence to the Serbs and contradicts 23 points of the Kosovo constitution, how should Kosovo act?
A: I think the Association is something that cannot be implemented until Serbia recognizes Kosovo. If done earlier than that, there is a serious risk to Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Q: The Franco-German proposal, initially unacceptable to Serbia, now with improvements. It is not yet known exactly what it contains, but it is reported that it is one of the other reasons that the situation in the north is tense, how do you evaluate this proposal?
A: I find it hard to evaluate something I haven’t seen. An earlier published version wasn’t so bad from Kosovo’s perspective. It did not include the Association or recognition.
A: Before the situation in the north happened, Prime Minister Kurti declared for a comprehensive agreement with Serbia in March 2023, can there be a solution to this dialogue and what would be the best solution?
A: Yes, there can be a solution, but someone will have to tell Serbia to pay attention to its own problems and leave Kosovo to deal with its problems, including those of its Serb population.
Q: The leaders of Kosovo have submitted the document for membership in the EU on Wednesday, how do you see this action and how much support will Kosovo have on this path.
A: It is an important symbolic gesture that reflects the real ambitions of Kosovo’s citizens. Support for Kosovo will depend on two things: Pristina instituting the necessary reforms and convincing current EU member states, including the non-recognizers, that the EU will be better off with Kosovo than without it. Those are tall orders.
Q: How do you evaluate the governance of Prime Minister Kurti and President Osmani, what should they do more for Kosovo?
A: It is not for me to evaluate their governance. Kosovo’s citizens will do that at the next election. But the two things I just cited will be important factors in that evaluation: reforms and diplomacy within the EU.
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