I did this interview for Spat Blakcori of Pristina’s TV1 yesterday:
Q: It has been more than 2 weeks since there are barricades in the North of Mitrovica. KFOR has yet to make a move and remove the barricades. Do you think they should act immediately?
A: They should not have allowed the barricades, but now that they are there they need to proceed with caution.
Q: What do you think about the criminal groups in the North of Mitrovica. Should Vucic be responsible for their actions?
A: Yes, they are agents of the Serbian secret service for which he is responsible. None of this would be happening without Vucic’s approval. Brnabic’s tweets are confirmation of that.
Q: Do you think that the approach of the West is too soft towards the Serbian president?
A: Yes. I don’t understand why the West has failed to react appropriately to Vucic’s provocations, which are blatant and obvious. I fear there are those in both Washington and Brussels who sympathize with Belgrade’s effort to establish separate governance for Serbs in northern Kosovo.
I also did this one for Luli Gajtani of RTV Dukagjini:
Q: How do you see the situation created in the north of Kosovo, what do you think would be a long-term solution that would no longer produce tensions?
A: The long term solution will be mutual recognition and decentralized governance in Kosovo, which already exists.
Q: Should the forces of KFOR or the Police of Kosovo forcefully remove the barricades located in the northern municipalities of Kosovo, or do you see another solution?
A: They should not have allowed construction of the barricades, but now they need to be cautious in removing them. Negotiation from a position of strength would be my preference.
Q: Serbia has admitted that the barricades were placed with their permission, how do you think the international community should act?
A: There should be consequences. Brussels and Washington are better equipped than I am to figure out what those should be.
Q: Do you think that Miroslav Lajcak and Josep Borrell should intensify the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue? Do you think that the dialogue would speed up the solution of the problems in the north of Kosovo?
A: I doubt they can speed up the dialogue without levying consequences for Belgrade, which has intentionally destabilized northern Kosovo in order to block progress in the dialogue.
Northern Kosovo is in its third week of chaos. Serb houligans block the roads, attack journalists, and shoot at police and KFOR troops. The houligans are not random thugs. Belgrade pays and controls many of them. Whatever the initial justifications for this rogue behavior, the net effect is to undermine the dialogue with Pristina and prevent serious consideration of the still unpublished and therefore hazy French-German proposal for interim “normalization.”
What Belgrade wants
What Belgrade wants is Pristina’s commitment to its much-vaunted Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM) inside Kosovo. But the disorder is proving beyond any doubt that yielding on that point under current conditions would be disastrous for the Kosovo state. The powers behind the barricades would then become the powers running an institution the Kosovo state had recognized and accepted. It would be beyond foolish to do that. Not least because those powers are criminal and tied to Serbia’s secret services.
The US and EU should be embarrassed
This should embarrass all those American and European diplomats who have pushed the ASM. Prime among them is Gabe Escobar, the State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Western Balkans, but State Department Counselor Derek Chollet and EU Foreign and Security Policy chief Josep Borrell share in the ignominy. They thought giving Belgrade the ASM would moderate its views. That was foolhardy. What they got instead were Vucic’s efforts at destabilization. They also got a series of truly offensive tweets from his Prime Minister, aimed at the Germans and other Europeans. These include a push to deploy Serbian troops to Kosovo and make it clear Belgrade is uninterested for now in pursuing its declared ambition of EU membership.
What is to be done now
Hotter heads in Kosovo want KFOR to tear down the barricades, in cooperation with the Kosovo police. Unless carefully prepared and executed, that could make a first-rate mess and bring opprobrium on all involved. Far better, is to build up the forces in the north and negotiate an end to the disorder from a position of strength. Only if that negotiation fails should force be used, decisively and effectively. The ringleaders of the disorder should be arrested and either tried in Kosovo or expelled to Serbia, provided Belgrade promises convincingly to prosecute.
That is not enough
Europe and the US need to make it clear to Serbia that the promotion of disorder in Kosovo has consequences. I like Jasmin Mujanović‘s proposal:
Specifically, the 5 EU non-recognizers must see how they’re facilitating Serbia’s brinkmanship. Fully recognizing Kosovo’s sovereignty and allowing it to begin its EU/NATO membership processes is something the West can do today, req no input from Belgrade, Moocow, or Beijing.
This makes sense. Even if one or two of the non-recognizers were to proceed as Jasmin suggests it would make a big difference to Belgrade’s belligerency. This way or another, the West needs to show that destabilization is not in Serbia’s interests and should never be repeated.
Why should anyone care?
Even I find it hard to focus on Kosovo while Ukraine is suffering a Russian war of aggression. We should however care about Kosovo, because Vucic is pursuing in Kosovo Vladimir Putin’s 2014 strategy in Donbas. Putin was challenging Slobodan Milosevic’s 1993 strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Any ambiguity about the Western reaction in Kosovo will feed similar moves elsewhere. Vucic has chosen to align himself with Russia in the tradition of Milosevic. Aggression by destabilization anywhere cannot be allowed to pay.
Naile Ejupi of Bota Sot asked questions, I replied Monday:
Q: One-on-one attacks on police officials, EULEX, and journalists from Kosovo, now since Saturday, the border points of the north of Kosovo with Serbia have been blocked by groups of Serbs, how do you comment on this situation?
A: This is Vucic pursuing his ambition of the “Serbian world.” The criminals conducting these operations in northern Kosovo are under Belgrade’s control.
Q: Kosovo has postponed the elections in the north of the country, which is why the attacks in the north first started, but Serbia still continues to block that part, now they demand the release of the ex-policeman arrested as a suspect for the attack on the Kosovo policemen and on the officials of the CEC. What is the Serbian president, Aleksander Vučić, trying to achieve?
A: He already has de facto control over the north. He is trying to ensure impunity for his criminal gangs and continued Belgrade control in the north.
Q: The Serbian president, Aleksandër Vucic, has threatened to send the Serbian army to that part of Kosovo, why does Serbia continue to be pampered by internationals and do not respond to its actions?
A: You’ll have to ask the “international community,” but in my opinion they have unfortunately a good deal of confidence in Vucic’s good intentions. I have no reason to confirm that. Certainly there is nothing about the current behavior of criminals in the north that confirms good intentions.
Q: The Russian Embassy in Tirana has supported Serbia for these actions, are we at risk of another war?
A: Not another war, but some serious instability. Russia has only a few troops in Serbia and the Serbian Army won’t want to enter any Albanian-majority parts of Kosovo. But Serbian security forces exist throughout the Serb-majority municipalities, especially in the north. They can cause a lot of trouble.
Q: On the other hand, Serbia’s actions have been condemned by European countries, even the Netherlands has voted in the Parliament to restore Serbia’s visas, how do you see this Dutch action, would this be an appropriate punishment?
A: You will have to ask the Dutch this question.
Q: The EU’s special envoy for the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue met with Prime Minister Kurti on Tuesday and requested the implementation of the Association of Serbian municipalities, as a solution to the situation. The Association of Serbian municipalities gives competence to the Serbs and contradicts 23 points of the Kosovo constitution, how should Kosovo act?
A: I think the Association is something that cannot be implemented until Serbia recognizes Kosovo. If done earlier than that, there is a serious risk to Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Q: The Franco-German proposal, initially unacceptable to Serbia, now with improvements. It is not yet known exactly what it contains, but it is reported that it is one of the other reasons that the situation in the north is tense, how do you evaluate this proposal?
A: I find it hard to evaluate something I haven’t seen. An earlier published version wasn’t so bad from Kosovo’s perspective. It did not include the Association or recognition.
A: Before the situation in the north happened, Prime Minister Kurti declared for a comprehensive agreement with Serbia in March 2023, can there be a solution to this dialogue and what would be the best solution?
A: Yes, there can be a solution, but someone will have to tell Serbia to pay attention to its own problems and leave Kosovo to deal with its problems, including those of its Serb population.
Q: The leaders of Kosovo have submitted the document for membership in the EU on Wednesday, how do you see this action and how much support will Kosovo have on this path.
A: It is an important symbolic gesture that reflects the real ambitions of Kosovo’s citizens. Support for Kosovo will depend on two things: Pristina instituting the necessary reforms and convincing current EU member states, including the non-recognizers, that the EU will be better off with Kosovo than without it. Those are tall orders.
Q: How do you evaluate the governance of Prime Minister Kurti and President Osmani, what should they do more for Kosovo?
A: It is not for me to evaluate their governance. Kosovo’s citizens will do that at the next election. But the two things I just cited will be important factors in that evaluation: reforms and diplomacy within the EU.
Wow! The roads in north of #Kosovo are blocked with the trucks donated from EU-funded projects.
In an appearance at the Atlantic Council early last week, State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Balkans said:
Any intelligent observer or analyst will recognize that Russia will not be a credible partner, that Putin will not be a respected figure in the world. So that betting on that relationship is a losing bet. I think you are seeing at least some very intelligent people pivot away from that relationship. Now that’s not to say that Russia isn’t working very desperately to keep some of the players in the Western Balkans within their orbit, but it’s really economically, politically, and geographically they are in a losing battle.
He is of course correct that the EU is a far better bet than Russia in the long term. For good reasons Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia have definitively chosen Brussels over Moscow. Albania and Macedonia are slated to begin accession negotiations with the EU. Despite the dim immediate prospects, Kosovo intends to submit its application for membership before the end of the year. Tirana, Skopje, and Pristina have made their ambitions clear. In all three, most of the opposition as well as the governing parties support EU accession. There is more likelihood of EU reluctance to enlarge than reluctance to join in these three prospective members.
But the situation is not good elsewhere
The situation differs however in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia. I’m not seeing so many “very intelligent people” there pivoting away from Russia. In Bosnia, the de facto boss of half the country, Milorad Dodik, is a corrupt Russian asset. Croatia, already an EU member, is cozying up to Moscow, which supports its ethnic nationalist aims inside Bosnia. The result is a de facto alliance with Dodik that makes a mockery of Bosnia’s NATO and EU prospects. Montenegro, a NATO member, has a pro-Russian Prime Minister and governing coalition. They bend easily to Belgrade’s preferences, including recently in treatment of the Serb Orthodox Church.
Most important: Serbia has moved definitively in the Russian direction, even during the Ukraine war. Just to cite last week’s events, Serbia refused again to align with EU sanctions on Russia, its leadership denounced Kosovo’s Albanian leaders and Serbs willing to participate in its government in racist and scatalogical terms, and Belgrade’s minions trashed an office responsible for holding municipal elections in the Serb-majority part of the Kosovo. It is now the scene of a risky stand-off between Serbia’s gangster allies and the Kosovo special police forces. President Vucic has demanded that Serbian troops return to Kosovo. That would trigger serious violence. Vucic’s friends in Moscow are pleased.
The US needs to get real
American diplomacy has been betting on Belgrade making a definitive choice in favor of liberal democracy and the West. That isn’t happening. Serbia’s main opposition and most of its population are not pro-EU and certainly not America-friendly. They far prefer Russia and China, in the guise of a “neutral” stance. President Vucic hedges, on most days skillfully.
A large lithium deposit in Serbia is the latest prize he is toying with. In January the Serbian government cancelled the Rio Tinto licenses to develop it. He is now trying to entice the Chinese to take over, despite European protestations. Deals with Russia and China come without transparency, allowing lots of skimming. Serbian “neutrality” has a definitively corrupt and authoritarian bent.
As does Serbia. Freedom House now ranks it “partly free” (five years ago it was “free”). Belgrade has been slipping in a more autocratic direction throughout President Vucic’s presidency. There is limited political opposition. Media are government friendly and use hate speech on a daily basis (mainly against Kosovo Albanians). Courts are not independent. The government has a strong hand in the economy. The political opposition is hamstrung and risible, even if the intellectual opposition is courageous and serious.
Getting real
The Americans have not adjusted their policy to take into consideration the current reality: Serbia is lost to the West for now. Belgrade is not really pursuing EU membership, which Vucic regards as too far off to compensate for the power he would need to give up to meet its requirements. Instead he is pursuing the “Serbian world,” an effort to bring under Belgrade’s control the Serb populations in neighboring countries. He has succeeded at this in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. None of these countries will be able to pursue their EU dreams so long as Belgrade uses their Serb citizens to make them dysfunctional states.
The Americans need to get real. That means returning to a policy that energetically supports the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and state functionality of Serbia’s neighbors. Today’s Serbia threatens those goals. Placating Belgrade will get the Americans nothing. Delusions don’t make reality.
With best wishes for a quick recovery to State Department Counselor Derek Chollet, who has had to postpone a trip to the Balkans this week because of a COVID infection,
Nevena Bogdanovic of REF/RL asked for my view of today’s failed dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. I replied:
The “emergency” talks appear to have failed to reach agreement both on the specific issue of license plates and on the broader French-German proposal that would normalize relations between Belgrade and Pristina. The EU has blamed primarily Kosovo for the failure on license plates and is hoping that the proposal will be implemented despite the lack of agreement.
I hope so too. My understanding is that it includes an end to Serbia issuing license plates for communities inside Kosovo as well as delay in Kosovo’s crackdown on those who do not use the correct license plates. That would be progress.
The far more important issue is normalization. My understanding has been that Belgrade has rejected the French-German proposal for normalization, which of course would have to include exclusive Pristina authority to issue license plates on its territory. Certainly the license plate issue on its own is not worth risking violence that the Pristina authorities might be unable to control. The consequences have already been negative, with Serb withdrawal from Kosovo institutions.
Pristina needs now to consider how it might defuse the situation and prevent itself from being blamed by the EU for a breakdown on the lesser issue, when it is the greater issue that really counts.
Kosovo also needs its Serb citizens back in its institutions. Belgrade controls them. The EU and US should be doing everything they can to ensure that they re-enter the Kosovo institutions if Pristina shows flexibility on the license plates.
Vucic meeting the special envoy of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov: “The Russian people are our brotherly people, and centuries of history have proven this more than once. Therefore, Russian-Serbian relations cannot be destroyed under any pressure.”
I like the hat.
Washington is sending strange signals in the Balkans. It has supported a decision by the international community High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina instituting a post-election change in the way votes determine outcomes. This favors ethnonationalist political parties aligned with Moscow. The Americans are canceling Kosovo ministerial visits with US officials. Washington wants their Prime Minister to delay insisting on Kosovo license plates in the Serb-majority northern municipalities of his country, without assurance that further delay will bring compliance.
All this seems disconnected, maybe even random and unimportant. It is neither.
It’s all about Belgrade
The through line here is Belgrade. Joe Biden was a strong supporter of Kosovo’s fight for liberation from Serbia. But he long ago decided Belgrade was the heavyweight in the Balkans. I testified in the Senate more than 15 years ago in front of him. He made it clear he supported getting Serbia into the EU accession process, even though it was patently unqualified at the time. Biden believed that would constrain Belgrade to move in the European direction.
He and his White House have now delegated responsibility for the Balkans to the State Department. There key players believe Serbian President Vucic is seriously committed to the EU accession process and also seriously concerned about the welfare of Serbs in neighboring countries. Pacifying Serbia has become a US policy objective. It welcomed recently a Serbian diplomat who used the occasion for notably undiplomatic remarks about Montenegro, a recent NATO member that has endured prolonged political instability. State cheers for Vucic’s unnecessary and divisive Open Balkans Initiative. That mostly empty box pretends to do things better done in other fora.
Too bad it isn’t so
There is little evidence that Vucic is serious about the EU. Serbia has made progress in recent years in implementing the technical requirements of the acquis communautaire. That is the easy part of qualifying for EU accession. The hard part is meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Those include democratic institutions, free media, an independent judiciary, rule of law, and an open, market-based economy. Serbia has made little progress on these and marched backwards on some. It has also failed to align its foreign policy with that of the EU, especially but not only on Russia sanctions.
On Serbs living in neighboring jurisdictions, Vucic’s minions advocate what they call the “Serbian world.” Yes, that’s just like the “Russian world” slogan that led Moscow to invade Ukraine. Vucic has sought and largely achieved dominance over Serb communities in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In all three, Russian “hybrid warfare” is helping Serbia push for de facto if not de jure partition. Vucic aims to limit the authority of his neighbors’ state structures and create an intermediate level of Serb-dominated governance Belgrade controls. That is what the license plate issue is really about.
The new dividing line in Europe
America after the end of the Cold War hoped for a Europe whole and free. It is not going to happen any time soon. Europe is dividing between a NATO sphere in the west and a Russian-dominated sphere in the east. Serbia is opting to remain in the Russian-dominated sphere, along with Belarus and whatever Moscow can hold onto in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Belgrade is also hoping to maintain the pipeline of EU accession funds it receives from Brussels. That is supposed to finance preparation for eventual membership, but Serbia uses it to fuel a state-dominated economy.
A Serb-controlled level of governance in its neighbors will be especially useful to Moscow. It The Russians will use it to de-stabilize present and prospective NATO members. That will make further Alliance enlargement a risky affair.
Ill-conceived and poorly executed
So what’s wrong with Washington policy on the Balkans? It is ill-conceived because based on faulty assumptions about Serbia’s EU ambitions and its activities in neighboring jurisdictions. US policy is also poorly executed. There is no excuse for changing the rules of vote counting after an election or failing to recognize the “Serbian world” for the peril it presents to Serbia’s neighbors and potential US allies.
The US needs to return to a Balkan policy that would support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each of the Balkan states, as well as respect for the human rights of their citizens. That should include their right to decide democratically, without interference from Belgrade, on which side of the new line dividing Europe they choose to be. We can hope Serbia will change its mind about alignment with Russia, but that will require strategic patience, not pacifying Belgrade.
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