Wow! The roads in north of #Kosovo are blocked with the trucks donated from EU-funded projects.
In an appearance at the Atlantic Council early last week, State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Balkans said:
Any intelligent observer or analyst will recognize that Russia will not be a credible partner, that Putin will not be a respected figure in the world. So that betting on that relationship is a losing bet. I think you are seeing at least some very intelligent people pivot away from that relationship. Now that’s not to say that Russia isn’t working very desperately to keep some of the players in the Western Balkans within their orbit, but it’s really economically, politically, and geographically they are in a losing battle.
He is of course correct that the EU is a far better bet than Russia in the long term. For good reasons Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia have definitively chosen Brussels over Moscow. Albania and Macedonia are slated to begin accession negotiations with the EU. Despite the dim immediate prospects, Kosovo intends to submit its application for membership before the end of the year. Tirana, Skopje, and Pristina have made their ambitions clear. In all three, most of the opposition as well as the governing parties support EU accession. There is more likelihood of EU reluctance to enlarge than reluctance to join in these three prospective members.
But the situation is not good elsewhere
The situation differs however in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia. I’m not seeing so many “very intelligent people” there pivoting away from Russia. In Bosnia, the de facto boss of half the country, Milorad Dodik, is a corrupt Russian asset. Croatia, already an EU member, is cozying up to Moscow, which supports its ethnic nationalist aims inside Bosnia. The result is a de facto alliance with Dodik that makes a mockery of Bosnia’s NATO and EU prospects. Montenegro, a NATO member, has a pro-Russian Prime Minister and governing coalition. They bend easily to Belgrade’s preferences, including recently in treatment of the Serb Orthodox Church.
Most important: Serbia has moved definitively in the Russian direction, even during the Ukraine war. Just to cite last week’s events, Serbia refused again to align with EU sanctions on Russia, its leadership denounced Kosovo’s Albanian leaders and Serbs willing to participate in its government in racist and scatalogical terms, and Belgrade’s minions trashed an office responsible for holding municipal elections in the Serb-majority part of the Kosovo. It is now the scene of a risky stand-off between Serbia’s gangster allies and the Kosovo special police forces. President Vucic has demanded that Serbian troops return to Kosovo. That would trigger serious violence. Vucic’s friends in Moscow are pleased.
The US needs to get real
American diplomacy has been betting on Belgrade making a definitive choice in favor of liberal democracy and the West. That isn’t happening. Serbia’s main opposition and most of its population are not pro-EU and certainly not America-friendly. They far prefer Russia and China, in the guise of a “neutral” stance. President Vucic hedges, on most days skillfully.
A large lithium deposit in Serbia is the latest prize he is toying with. In January the Serbian government cancelled the Rio Tinto licenses to develop it. He is now trying to entice the Chinese to take over, despite European protestations. Deals with Russia and China come without transparency, allowing lots of skimming. Serbian “neutrality” has a definitively corrupt and authoritarian bent.
As does Serbia. Freedom House now ranks it “partly free” (five years ago it was “free”). Belgrade has been slipping in a more autocratic direction throughout President Vucic’s presidency. There is limited political opposition. Media are government friendly and use hate speech on a daily basis (mainly against Kosovo Albanians). Courts are not independent. The government has a strong hand in the economy. The political opposition is hamstrung and risible, even if the intellectual opposition is courageous and serious.
Getting real
The Americans have not adjusted their policy to take into consideration the current reality: Serbia is lost to the West for now. Belgrade is not really pursuing EU membership, which Vucic regards as too far off to compensate for the power he would need to give up to meet its requirements. Instead he is pursuing the “Serbian world,” an effort to bring under Belgrade’s control the Serb populations in neighboring countries. He has succeeded at this in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. None of these countries will be able to pursue their EU dreams so long as Belgrade uses their Serb citizens to make them dysfunctional states.
The Americans need to get real. That means returning to a policy that energetically supports the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and state functionality of Serbia’s neighbors. Today’s Serbia threatens those goals. Placating Belgrade will get the Americans nothing. Delusions don’t make reality.
With best wishes for a quick recovery to State Department Counselor Derek Chollet, who has had to postpone a trip to the Balkans this week because of a COVID infection,
Nevena Bogdanovic of REF/RL asked for my view of today’s failed dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. I replied:
The “emergency” talks appear to have failed to reach agreement both on the specific issue of license plates and on the broader French-German proposal that would normalize relations between Belgrade and Pristina. The EU has blamed primarily Kosovo for the failure on license plates and is hoping that the proposal will be implemented despite the lack of agreement.
I hope so too. My understanding is that it includes an end to Serbia issuing license plates for communities inside Kosovo as well as delay in Kosovo’s crackdown on those who do not use the correct license plates. That would be progress.
The far more important issue is normalization. My understanding has been that Belgrade has rejected the French-German proposal for normalization, which of course would have to include exclusive Pristina authority to issue license plates on its territory. Certainly the license plate issue on its own is not worth risking violence that the Pristina authorities might be unable to control. The consequences have already been negative, with Serb withdrawal from Kosovo institutions.
Pristina needs now to consider how it might defuse the situation and prevent itself from being blamed by the EU for a breakdown on the lesser issue, when it is the greater issue that really counts.
Kosovo also needs its Serb citizens back in its institutions. Belgrade controls them. The EU and US should be doing everything they can to ensure that they re-enter the Kosovo institutions if Pristina shows flexibility on the license plates.
Vucic meeting the special envoy of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov: “The Russian people are our brotherly people, and centuries of history have proven this more than once. Therefore, Russian-Serbian relations cannot be destroyed under any pressure.”
I like the hat.
Washington is sending strange signals in the Balkans. It has supported a decision by the international community High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina instituting a post-election change in the way votes determine outcomes. This favors ethnonationalist political parties aligned with Moscow. The Americans are canceling Kosovo ministerial visits with US officials. Washington wants their Prime Minister to delay insisting on Kosovo license plates in the Serb-majority northern municipalities of his country, without assurance that further delay will bring compliance.
All this seems disconnected, maybe even random and unimportant. It is neither.
It’s all about Belgrade
The through line here is Belgrade. Joe Biden was a strong supporter of Kosovo’s fight for liberation from Serbia. But he long ago decided Belgrade was the heavyweight in the Balkans. I testified in the Senate more than 15 years ago in front of him. He made it clear he supported getting Serbia into the EU accession process, even though it was patently unqualified at the time. Biden believed that would constrain Belgrade to move in the European direction.
He and his White House have now delegated responsibility for the Balkans to the State Department. There key players believe Serbian President Vucic is seriously committed to the EU accession process and also seriously concerned about the welfare of Serbs in neighboring countries. Pacifying Serbia has become a US policy objective. It welcomed recently a Serbian diplomat who used the occasion for notably undiplomatic remarks about Montenegro, a recent NATO member that has endured prolonged political instability. State cheers for Vucic’s unnecessary and divisive Open Balkans Initiative. That mostly empty box pretends to do things better done in other fora.
Too bad it isn’t so
There is little evidence that Vucic is serious about the EU. Serbia has made progress in recent years in implementing the technical requirements of the acquis communautaire. That is the easy part of qualifying for EU accession. The hard part is meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Those include democratic institutions, free media, an independent judiciary, rule of law, and an open, market-based economy. Serbia has made little progress on these and marched backwards on some. It has also failed to align its foreign policy with that of the EU, especially but not only on Russia sanctions.
On Serbs living in neighboring jurisdictions, Vucic’s minions advocate what they call the “Serbian world.” Yes, that’s just like the “Russian world” slogan that led Moscow to invade Ukraine. Vucic has sought and largely achieved dominance over Serb communities in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In all three, Russian “hybrid warfare” is helping Serbia push for de facto if not de jure partition. Vucic aims to limit the authority of his neighbors’ state structures and create an intermediate level of Serb-dominated governance Belgrade controls. That is what the license plate issue is really about.
The new dividing line in Europe
America after the end of the Cold War hoped for a Europe whole and free. It is not going to happen any time soon. Europe is dividing between a NATO sphere in the west and a Russian-dominated sphere in the east. Serbia is opting to remain in the Russian-dominated sphere, along with Belarus and whatever Moscow can hold onto in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Belgrade is also hoping to maintain the pipeline of EU accession funds it receives from Brussels. That is supposed to finance preparation for eventual membership, but Serbia uses it to fuel a state-dominated economy.
A Serb-controlled level of governance in its neighbors will be especially useful to Moscow. It The Russians will use it to de-stabilize present and prospective NATO members. That will make further Alliance enlargement a risky affair.
Ill-conceived and poorly executed
So what’s wrong with Washington policy on the Balkans? It is ill-conceived because based on faulty assumptions about Serbia’s EU ambitions and its activities in neighboring jurisdictions. US policy is also poorly executed. There is no excuse for changing the rules of vote counting after an election or failing to recognize the “Serbian world” for the peril it presents to Serbia’s neighbors and potential US allies.
The US needs to return to a Balkan policy that would support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each of the Balkan states, as well as respect for the human rights of their citizens. That should include their right to decide democratically, without interference from Belgrade, on which side of the new line dividing Europe they choose to be. We can hope Serbia will change its mind about alignment with Russia, but that will require strategic patience, not pacifying Belgrade.
Arbnore Zhushi of Bota Sot asked questions. I replied:
Q: Recently, we have seen frequent visits by people of the most important allies of Kosovo (emissaries and government officials) whose main message was the progress of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. How do you see their visits?
A: Kosovo’s friends are trying to encourage progress in the dialogue. That’s their job and I wish them success. It is not clear however that they are producing the kinds of responses in Belgrade that would enable Pristina to reciprocate. Both capitals seem to me unready for compromise.
Q: The US and the EU have asked Kosovo to postpone the deadline for the re-registration of vehicle license plates for a period of 10 months. Prime Minister Kurti said today that the deadline for this is October 31. Do you think that Kurti is wrong with this decision? Should he postpone the deadline?
A: Kurti is exercising Kosovo’s sovereignty. I hope he is prepared to deal with the consequences. I certainly understand his impatience–I’ve even suggested that 10 minutes is too long. But being right works only if the move you make does not create bigger problems.
Q: EU envoy Lajcak mentioned 2024 as the last time Kosovo and Serbia should sign a comprehensive agreement. When do you think an agreement will be reached based on recent developments, when do you think an agreement will be reached?
A: Whenever Pristina and Belgrade decide it is in their interests. They are not there yet. I have no idea whether they will be ready in 2024.
Q: Should Kosovo accept a non-recognition agreement?
A: I can imagine lots of agreements short of recognition that would be advantageous for Kosovo. Even with recognition, there will be a need for many other agreements. I see no reason to wait for recognition to get things done that will improve the lives of citizens in both countries. That was the philosophy behind the “technical” phase of the dialogue. While many of those agreements have not been fully implemented, some did result in real benefits.
An idea: why don’t the US and EU constitute a commission for implementation of dialogue agreements (like the International Civilian Office that supervised implementation of the Ahtisaari plan after independence). With assistance from knowledgeable NGOs in both Kosovo and Serbia as well as the two governments, such a commission could make real progress in implementing the agreements and improving relations between Belgrade and Pristina.
Q: In Kosovo, there is also talk of a possible fall of the Government. Do you think that the Kurti Government can fall under pressure to sign the agreement with Serbia?
A: In a parliamentary system it is always possible for the government to fall. In this instance, that would require a break in the governing coalition, either within Vetevendosje or with the other coalition partners. You know better than I do whether such a break is likely. Those who would like to engineer the fall of the government should remember however that last time they did it Albin returned to parliament strengthened.
I was unable to travel to Pristina for this FAS Forum conference focused on implications for the Balkans today, but I provided a video and talking points for the occasion.
It is a pleasure to join you remotely, much as I would have liked to be with you in person. But obligations here have kept me from traveling.
I’ll make just three points.
Russia will lose
First, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a serious blow not only to Ukraine but also to the existing world order. If Putin were to succeed, we would see more efforts of this sort in the future, including in the Balkans.
The concept of the “Serbian World” is no less dangerous than the “Russian World.”
Second, the Russians are on the path to a strategic defeat. Even if they were to win the war, or keep some Ukrainian territory, which is unlikely, they would lose the peace, as they haven’t got the resources or even the population required to rebuild Ukraine.
The right track is clear
Third, those in the Balkans who are building liberal democracies and aiming for NATO and EU membership are on the right track and need to redouble their efforts.
It would be a serious error to allow yourselves to be side-tracked into any effort that slows accession to the key Western institutions.
That raises key questions about the Open Balkans initiative. Will it accelerate progress towards EU accession, or is it going to become an indefinite waiting room? Will it contribute to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all its participants, or will it favor the preferences of one?
So is the objective
If, as I believe, Russia is defeated in Ukraine and forced back at least to its February 23 lines, if not all the way to its 2013 lines, EU enlargement will return as a serious proposition, if only because of Ukraine’s candidacy.
I know how disappointing the EU’s performance in the Balkans has been. It has unjustifiably blocked even the visa waiver for Kosovo and accession talks for Albania.
But that is all the more reason why those who want to be in the EU should not miss the political window next time it opens.
Russia’s defeat in Ukraine will initiate that opportunity.
It is not too early to begin preparing.
Not only rules but values
In short, it means adopting European values, not only European rules and regulations.
This is hard, not easy. Politicians even in democratic settings seek power and resist giving it up. You’ve seen that recently even in the United States.
But going into opposition is a key role in any democratic system. It is the opposition that helps to ensure transparency and accountability.
The institutions of the state should belong to no single political party. They need to serve, and hold accountable, whoever comes to power.
To their credit, both Kosovo has seen peaceful alternation in power. May it ever be thus!
Autocracy will fail
This is where autocracies like Russia and China fail.
They mistake the strength of their temporary leaders for the strength of the state.
That idea is suffering military defeat in Ukraine. Its defeat will open new opportunities in many parts of the world, but especially in the Balkans.
Fortune favors the well-prepared. I hope you will be ready.
Q: As an expert on the issues of the Western Balkan, how have you seen the frequent visits to Kosovo and Serbia by the US emissary for the Western Balkans, Gabriel Escobar, and the EU emissary, Miroslav Lajcak? Are these visits an indication that the final agreement between the two countries is near the end?
A: The envoys are trying to deliver a substantial agreement, but I’ll be happily surprised if they deliver a “final” one.
Vucic is not committed to stabiliity
Q: Escobar said that the president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, is committed to regional stability? Do you agree with this statement?
A: No, I don’t agree. I think Vucic is committed to what he calls the Serbian world, in other words de facto greater Serbia. This threatens instability in both Bosnia and Kosovo [I should also have said Montenegro].
Why not ten minutes?
Q: The United States of America has asked the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, to postpone the implementation of the decision on the issue of license plates for another 10 months. In your opinion, should Kosovo take such a step?
A: Ten minutes is too long in my view. What is the reason for this American request?
No, the dialogue won’t end this year
Q: Do you believe that the Kosovo – Serbia dialogue will end this year? If so, under what conditions? Do you see relations between the two countries as tense recently?
A: Relations are certainly tense. I doubt the dialogue will end this year.
Yes, to the Association with conditions
Q: Should Kosovo establish the Association of Serbian Municipalities?
A: Yes, but only as part of a package that includes recognition and only with two conditions: 1) reciprocity for Albanian communities in Serbia and 2) compliance with the Kosovo Constitutional Court criteria.
Q: If the Association of Serbian municipalities is conditioned by the internationals, should the leaders of Kosovo accept this condition or do they have to look for other solution.
A: See my response above.
Q: Recently, the European Commission has also asked Kosovo to implement the Association without delays and obstacles? Should this count as a condition for visa liberalization?
A: I hope not.
Life is unfair
Q: Is it unfair to Kosovo the non-liberalization of visas by the European Council?
A: Yes it is unfair, but life is often unfair. Kosovo needs an improved strategy for getting what it wants from the EU.
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