Tag: Balkans
Bosnia’s citizens are its future
I have joined colleagues and friends in this Bosnian-initiated appeal to Secretary Blinken. I have reservations about the HiRep instituting constitutional changes, but I agree with the citizen-focused reforms proposed:
August 19, 2022
The Honorable Antony J. Blinken
Secretary of State
US Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, DC 20520
Dear Secretary of State Blinken,
First and foremost, we are grateful for the pivotal role of the United States in ending the war and bloodshed in our country and brokering the Dayton Peace Agreement, which has kept peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina to date. Now, twenty-seven years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, that hard-won peace is threatened. Ironically, the very structures of the Dayton Peace Agreement have become an obstacle to Bosnia’s political survival. The mantra repeated by numerous international officials that Bosnia is composed of two entities and three constituent peoples has led us to the current existential crisis.
Due to the lack of international intervention, especially since 2006, Dayton’s structures have devolved into divisive ethnonationalist rhetoric and threats of secession that are destabilizing Bosnia and the region. Bosnian Serb member of the Presidency Milorad Dodik has threatened secession and consistently speaks of Bosnia as a failed State. He wields hate speech against Bosniaks and denies the Srebrenica genocide with impunity. Bosnian Croat party leader Dragan Čović, for his part, has threatened to boycott the election and form a third entity. Both separatist leaders have exploited the concept of “constituent peoples” so as to create further divisions and hatred. These separatist agendas have found their strongest support from the Russian Federation, whose Embassy in Sarajevo insisted in April 2021 that Bosnia fundamentally consists of two entities rather than a unified State.
So, it is clear that the time has come for a fundamental revisioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Constitution so that our country may fulfill the conditions to join NATO and the European Union. Once again, Secretary Blinken, we look to the United States for leadership, guidance, and assistance. We need support from the U.S. to help Bosnia transition from a system that gives priority to constituent peoples and ethnic divisions, to a nation of citizens with equal rights and dignity.
The first step in this process should be the genuine implementation of the five judgements of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): Sejdić-Finci, Zornić, Pilav, Šlaku, and Pudarić and the retirement of BiH’s ethnic-based election model in favor of a model where the individual citizen of BiH is front and center of the electoral process with the guiding principle of “one citizen, one vote”. A person’s ethno-national identity should not be the sole determinant of governance processes. Implementation of these ECtHR judgements is crucial for Bosnia’s future.
Indeed, it was the expectation of the ECtHR judgements that the contested “constituent peoples” category and all ethnic-based discrimination be removed from the Bosnian Constitution. In Paragraph 43 of the ECtHR judgement in Zornić vs. Bosnia Herzegovina (Application 3681/06), the EU Court asks for both equality of all Bosnia’s citizens and the elimination of the “constituent people” as an outdated concept rooted only in the ceasefire signed in to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing:
The nature of the conflict was such that the approval of the “constituent peoples” was necessary to ensure peace (ibid.). However, now, more than eighteen years after the end of the tragic conflict, there could no longer be any reason for the maintenance of the contested constitutional provisions. The Court expects that democratic arrangements will be made without further delay.
The phrase “constituent peoples” is part of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), but the way in which this term evolved does not conform to the spirit of the DPA. Further, Citizens and Others are also clearly noted in the Constitution, foreshadowing the reform and evolution that the Court references in the statement above.
Without a fundamental restructuring of the Dayton-rendered Constitution, change will not be possible for Bosnia. Hence, we, the resident as well as non-resident citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with our allies, dear friends and several NGOs from abroad, propose two ways the U.S. Government should constructively engage.
First, we encourage the U.S. to initiate and support a process of creating a completely new social contract for the 21st century in Bosnia. Instead of a complicated and extremely costly governance system involving the State government, two entities and 10 Cantons, governance would be transferred to Bosnia’s municipalities, resulting in a more locally based democratic model that is citizen-centered. The State of Bosnia would ensure the equitable provision of essential public services, including health care and education.
Second, we appeal to the U.S. to encourage the Office of the High Representative to use Bonn powers to implement constitutional and electoral reform across the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with all judgements of the ECtHR including the judgement in the Zornić v. BiH Application. This would mean that any and all citizens would be eligible to stand for election for any office in their municipality, and would, in turn, be eligible to stand for election to represent their municipality in the national parliament. Finally, according to the terms of Bosnia’s restructured democracy, all citizens would elect one President from among a field of candidates.
Secretary Blinken: what we are proposing would represent a fundamental shift in American foreign policy with respect to reform of the election law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus far, Mr. Palmer’s and Mr. Escobar’s diplomatic efforts have sought to appease the HDZ, an ethnonationalist political party seeking to insure the election of one of their members to the Presidency –a so-called “legitimate” Bosnian Croat representative. However, such a result would only further entrench ethnic divisions and produce a situation in which two members of the Presidency would be seeking to undermine Bosnia’s sovereignty. Thus we urge you to support genuine constitutional and electoral reform that will ensure a sustainable democratic political culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With international meddling in Bosnia’s internal affairs from Croatia, Serbia and the Russian Federation, and with the exacerbation of social divisions within Bosnia through the rise of hate speech, genocide denial, and the glorification of convicted war criminals, along with threats of secession and third entities, there is no time to lose.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Azra Zornić, citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, plaintiff before the European Court of Human Rights,
Jakob Finci, citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, plaintiff before the European Court of Human Rights,
Dervo Sejdić, citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, plaintiff before the European Court of Human Rights,
Zlatan Begić, Ph.D., applicant before the European Court of Human Rights (application pending), Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Tuzla,
Slaven Kovačević, Ph.D., applicant before the European Court of Human Rights (application pending), Assistant Professor of Political Systems and European Integration, University of Sarajevo,
David Pettigrew, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy, Southern Connecticut State University, New Haven, CT, Member, Working Group for Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Aida Ibričević, Ph.D., Global Fellow – Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO),
Bojan Šošić, ABD, psychologist, member of Presidency of Association of independent intellectuals “Circle 99”, Sarajevo,
Kurt Bassuener, Ph.D., Senior Associate, Democratization Policy Council (DPC),
Hazim Bašić, Ph.D., member of Presidency of Association of independent intellectuals “Circle 99”, Professor, University of Sarajevo,
Samir Beharić, human rights activist, Research Officer at the Balkan Forum, PhD Candidate at the University of Bamberg,
Azra Berbić, human rights and peace building activist, Project Coordinator Center for Youth KVART Prijedor,
Vildana Bijedić, MSc. Mandala Academy Foundation,
Sonja Biserko, President of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia,
Janusz Bugajski, Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC,
Tanya Domi, Assistant Professor of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University,
Štefica Galić, Editor-in-Chief Tacno.net web portal,
Carole Hodge, Ph.D., Research Fellow Glasgow University (retired),
Marion Kraske, political scientist and analyst,
Adil Kulenović, President of Association of independent intellectuals “Circle 99”, Sarajevo,
Senadin Lavić, Ph.D., Professor, University of Sarajevo,
Satko Mujagić, Survivor, Omarska and Manjača Concentration Camps,
Dr. Emir Ramić, Director of the Institute for Research of Genocide Canada,
Daniel Serwer, Scholar, Middle East Institute; Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Institute, and Professor, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University,
Munira Subašić, President, Association of Mothers of Srebrenica and Žepa Enclaves,
ReSTART Bosnia and Herzegovina, informal group of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Samir Vranović, President, Association of Istina Kalinovik ’92
cc: The Honorable Jeanne Shaheen, United States Senator
The Honorable Bob Menendez, United States Senator
The Honorable Ben Cardin, United States Senator
The Honorable Chris Murphy, United States Senator
The Honorable Steve Cohen, United States Representative
The Honorable Greg Meeks, United States Representative
The Honorable William Keating, United States Representative
The Honorable Ann Wagner, United States Representative
The Honorable Michael J. Murphy, United States Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina
Karen Donfried, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs. US Department of State
Dereck J. Hogan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Molly Montgomery, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, US Department of State
Robert Hand, Senior Policy Adviser at the U.S. Helsinki Commission
For further information contact Azra Zornić, zornicazra@gmail.com, or David Pettigrew, depettigrew@gmail.com. Alternatively, correspondence may be directed to: David Pettigrew, Ph.D., Philosophy Department, Southern Connecticut State University, New Haven, CT, 06515, or to Bojan Šošić, Asocijacija nezavisnih intelektualaca “Krug 99”, Vrazova 1, 71000 Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Reaching for the Heights, but failing
I enjoyed a discussion today at USIP prompted by Fred Hof’s Reaching for the Heights. The book treats Fred’s ultimately failed negotiation for peace between Israel and Syria. It would have returned the Golan Heights (and more) to Syria in exchange for Syria’s strategic reorientation away from Iran, Hizbollah, and Hamas. Chet Crocker presided. Barbara Bodine and Bernie Aronson provided perspective on Yemen and (mostly) Colombia. My assignment was the Balkans. Here are the talking points I prepared, but used only in part:
- First: compliments to Fred for this forthright, interesting, and well-written account of an important but failed negotiation. We need to understand what makes things go wrong, even when so much has been done to make them go right.
- My role here is to comment on how Fred’s experience compares and contrasts with that in the Balkans. I am struck in the first instance by the stark differences.
Stark contrasts
- Both the Bosnia and Kosovo outcomes happened in the unipolar moment when the U.S. could do pretty much whatever it wanted, at least when it came to countries with a few million inhabitants. Working after America was weakened in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fred dealt with a potent ally and a substantial adversary, backed by Iran, Hizbollah, and Hamas.
- Richard Holbrooke in the 1990s wielded all the levers of American power—not only diplomatic but also political, military, and economic. Fred at no time had all the levers of American power in his hands: his role was diplomatic and vaguely economic, not military or even political.
- Holbrooke’s objective in Bosnia was to end a war both sides were tired of fighting. Fred was trying to do something harde. After a long but not very hurting stalemate, entice Syria to reorient itself strategically, cutting ties with Iran, Hizbollah, and Hamas that had helped the Assads survive in power for four decades. He was also trying to get Israel to give up attractive real estate on which it had settled tens of thousands of citizens.
- Other contrasts: the soft-spoken, detail-oriented, and considerate George Mitchell and Dennis Ross vs. the bold, egotistical, and bombastic Holbrooke, the zero-sum territorial equation in the Middle East vs. the identity-focused Bosnian conflict and the sovereignty-focused Kosovo one, the static stance of the Middle Eastern protagonists vs. the rapidly changing situations on the ground in the Balkans, the deep knowledge of Syria that Fred brought to the challenge vs. Holbrooke’s comparatively superficial grasp of the Balkans.
Parallels: the negotiating framework
- But there are also some enduring parallels. Most important is that negotiations need a mutually agreed framework. Holbrooke achieved this in a series of meetings leading up to Dayton that defined basic parameters: one country, two entities, mutual diplomatic recognition, return of DPs and refugees, a powerful international intervention.
- Fred achieved it by building on a framework that John Kerry initiated. Holbrooke likewise often used Congressional pressure from both sides of the aisle to good advantage in the Balkans. State Department officers often complain about Congress but woe to the American diplomat who hasn’t learned to use Congressional clout with foreign governments!
Parallels: key US roles
- The agreed frameworks in both the Balkans and the Syria/Israel negotiation were vulnerable to mutual mistrust and to domestic politics. The U.S. as guarantor was vital in both. Washington needed to be ready to play a major role not only in the negotiations but also in the implementation of any agreement.
- In Bosnia, Holbrooke delivered America’s friend, Izetbegovic, to an unsatisfactory agreement. Only the side-agreement equipping and training Bosnian forces made that possible. The side-letter between Israel and the U.S. would have played a similar role in the Syria negotiation, but delivering Israel was certainly a heavier lift.
- Fred notes the importance of “top cover,” protection from those in your own government who might have ideas of their own or not like yours. Holbrooke frightened off potential meddlers. That is different from the protection rooted in respect that Dennis Ross provided to Fred, but the effect was similar. Without top cover, no American negotiator can survive. It seems half an international negotiation is always with Washington.
- Relief from sanctions played a key role in the Balkans, as it would have had to do also vis-à-vis Syria. Lifting sanctions is at least as important as imposing them if you want to get results.
Failure is always an option
- It was Bashar’s violent crackdown on the demonstrators that made lifting sanctions impossible for Washington. Milosevic’s violent repression of the Kosovo rebellion did likewise in the Balkans. We shouldn’t expect autocrats to behave differently when challenged domestically. .
- One concluding thought, admittedly beyond my remit.
- Fred hasn’t entirely convinced me, or himself, that Bashar would have been able to reorient Syria in the Western direction, even if he regained every inch of territory he sought. The Iranians and Hezbollah would have made Assad’s life—and maybe his death—very difficult if he tried. Nor am I, or Fred, convinced that Bibi was prepared to give up the Golan Heights.
- Such re-orientations more often come before international agreements, not because of them. That is what happened with Sadat’s Egypt. That also happened throughout Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War and with Ukraine, though of course in Ukraine we haven’t yet seen whatever international settlement will emerge.
- My reservations about Fred’s assessment of the situation only increase my admiration for what he tried to do. Negotiations are never a sure thing. The Dayton agreements were completed in penalty time. Kosovo was settled only after a negotiation failure at Rambouillet.
Courage merits admiration
- Fred faults himself in the end for failing to convince American policymakers of the contribution a Syria/Israel peace agreement would have made to U.S. national interests and to a more comprehensive Israel/Arab peace.
- My bottom line is different. Fred Hof is a courageous man who tried to do the right thing on the issue entrusted to him. This book enables his substantial successes and his ultimate failure to educate those who come next. I am grateful for the book and admire the courage.
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Albania’s strange support for Serbia
Former Albanian government minister and member of parliament Genc Pollo writes:
The meeting of the EU leaders in Brussels on Thursday, 23 June, took place against the backdrop of Putin’s bloody aggressive war. They correctly showed solidarity with Ukraine, the current victim, and Moldova, the next potential one, by granting both the status of candidate for membership in the Union. But a wartime European Council should have dealt with closing ranks in front of the enemy.
The only wayward state within the EU orbit that has rejected the sanctions against Putin’s Russia and has reconfirmed its friendship with the aggressor has been Serbia. Belgrade has been negotiating EU membership for eight years and has closed several chapters. It is already treaty-bound to align itself with the EU’s foreign and security policy. But Serbia’s President Vučić has has failed to adopt any EU measures against Putin’s past transgressions.
Strangely there wasn’t much fuss about this in the Council meeting or in the preceding summit of EU leaders and their Western Balkans counterparts. In addition, Vučić got help from someone who wouldn’t generally be expected to be an ally: Albanian Prime Minister Rama.
Vučić first tried to deflect attention. He proposed to the Prime Ministers of Albania and North Macedonia to boycott the upcoming summit as there was little chance for them to get a date for the start of EU membership talks. This EU decision has been due for the last two years but is still blocked by a Bulgarian veto unrelated to the EU membership process. How such a boycott would have been helpful in resolving the problem remains a mystery. And why Serbia should propose such a course of action to her neighbors needs explaining.
Prime Minister Rama however was quick to announce that he would agree with the boycott. Such an unprecedented gesture became the talk of the day in the mainstream media. It continued to echo even after the boycott was called off the day after. Along with the Bulgarian veto it sharpened the sense of drama in Brussels and left little room to discuss the pressing issue of a possible fifth column in their midst.
In the Western Balkans summit, Rama both in his published speech and in the following press conference with Vučić, went to great lengths to justify the Serbian position towards Russia. Referring to distorted interpretations of historical and economic facts, Rama criticized the West for its pressure on Serbia.
Such a stance is a novelty in post-Communist Albania, where leaders, supported by public opinion, have always aligned themselves with the EU and the West in security matters. It comes in the wake of the controversial Open Balkans initiative championed by Belgrade and Tirana but disowned by the other states of the Western Balkans. The initiative is considered an “unhealthy competition to the EU integration” by European Commission officials but has received recently the rhetorical support of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
Both Rama and Vučić have been consolidating their personal power over the last decade. dismantling constitutional checks, muzzling the media, and politicizing the state bureaucracy. Scandals of grand corruption and collusion with the underworld have abounded. The latest twist adds, at least for Albania, an additional concern. The re-energized political opposition in Tirana has been denouncing the suspect rapprochement with Belgrade, as they see it being done at the expense of Kosovo. There will be more on their plate for the weeks and months to come.
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Stevenson’s army, June 23
– Defense authorizers and appropriators split on how much money for Pentagon.
– Popular bill for veterans with toxic exposure blocked because it violates the Constitution — which requires bills with tax provisions to originate in the House.
– SAIS prof Ed Joseph reports on the political struggle in Bulgaria.
– 140,000 Cubans have come to US borders recently
– Historians and journalists suggest how to report on threats to democracy by issuing The Authoritarian’s Playbook.
-I’m sending this Economist article on Biden’s Middle East policy mainly because it has an extraordinary color picture of FDR’s meeting with the Saudi king in February 1945.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stagnation is not the worst or the best
The Balkans region is stagnating. Talks for normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina have stalled. Belgrade, after promising changes in its policy on Ukraine, is still siding with Russia. Electoral reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a dead letter. Montenegro has a new caretaker government whose mandate is to prepare for elections a year hence. Bulgaria is blocking EU accession negotiations with both Macedonia and Albania.
It could be worse
The law of bicycles prevails in the Balkans. If things aren’t moving, balance is difficult and collapse more likely.
Serbia could try to copy Russia’s playbook, by claiming genocide against Serbs in northern Kosovo as justification for a military move to the Ibar River. Belgrade’s mobilization of its army in response to a spat over license plates some months ago should serve as a warning. Not to mention its substantial deployment of forces along the boundary/border with Kosovo.
Bosnia’s Serb member of the collective presidency, Milorad Dodik, could run out of the thin salami slices he has been taking to deprive Sarajevo of sovereignty and try a big move like seizing Brcko, the more or less autonomous northeastern Bosnian town that links the two wings of Republika Srpska.
The Croat nationalists in Bosnia could try to constitute their own entity and withdraw from the country’s central institutions. Unrest in Macedonia could bring down a reform-minded, pro-EU government and even precipitate interethnic conflict.
It could also be better
Sad to say, the idea of Europe “whole and free” is dying, not only in Ukraine. In the Balkans, there are countries truly committed to a liberal democratic, European future and some that aren’t. Under today’s Alexandar Vucic, Serbia is not. Nor is Bosnia and Herzegovina, all of whose ethnic nationalist political parties oppose one person/one vote. Montenegro is on the fence, due largely to russophilic, pro-Serb political parties and the Serbian Orthodox Church, both of which have gotten a lot of traction lately. Macedonia and Albania want to move in the European direction. It is Bulgarian ethnic nationalism, which denies the existence of Macedonian identity, that is creating problems.
Making things better will require a concerted European and American effort to champion liberal democracy in the Balkans. There is no reason for Bosnia and Herzegovina to have a tripartite presidency and tripartite everything else more than 25 years after the war the ethnic nationalists perpetrated on its territory. That is a constitutional, not an electoral law, issue. Montenegro needs a government that can retake the lead in pushing implementation of EU requirements. Bulgaria needs to back off its obstruction of accession talks with Macedonia and Albania. There will be plenty of opportunity before those are complete to resolve the language and identity issues.
The EU and US are aligned but not punching at their weight
To make good things happen in the Balkans has always required the US and EU to be aligned. They now are. With Trump’s silly nonsense gone, serious American and European negotiators are in charge again. The current problem is the heavy lifting required is not readily available. Europe is too divided. Five EU members don’t recognize Kosovo. One, Hungary, is sympathetic to Russian and Serbian nationalist goals. Another, Croatia, is blatantly interfering in Bosnia’s internal affairs to benefit a political party it controls.
The Americans face a steep climb to get the President and Secretary of State to pay more than lip service to Balkan issues, which fall well down the list of priorities. NATO allies Hungary, Bulgaria and Croatia need some high-level pounding.
Risks are real even if not imminent
The risks are real, but not necessarily imminent. NATO is presumably alert to Serbian military moves. Dodik is on a shorter leash than at times in the past. Serbia doesn’t want him to move toward Republika Srpska independence, for fear of screwing up Belgrade’s cozy relationship with Brussels and Washington. Bosnia’s electoral law is still in force. If nationalist Croats boycott October’s vote, that will be counterproductive for them in terms of representation and might even offer an opportunity for constitutional reform, which is really what is needed. Montenegro is capable of muddling through. Macedonia and Albania could well use the delay Bulgaria has caused to prepare themselves better to meet EU requirements, especially for rule of law.
Washington and Brussels have decided to focus their immediate attention on the Bulgaria/Macedonia issues. That is understandable, as resolving (or postponing) those would enable both Macedonia and Albania to proceed with EU accession negotiations and give a boost to pro-EU forces throughout the Balkans. But it is not enough. The US and EU need to improve their own performance in exacting better diplomatic results in the Balkans across the board. I’m a professor. B in the 21st century is not a good grade.
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Albania has come a long way
The President of Albania, Ilir Meta, honored me yesterday with the George Kastrioti Scanderbeg Medal. His citation reads as follows:
As a token of appreciation and gratitude for his previous contribution in promoting and aggrandizing the Albanian cause in the United States.
For serving as a powerful voice defending the human rights and freedoms, especially during the difficult years which our nation went through, and also for being a supporter of Kosova’ sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The occasion was a meeting and lively chat with Ambassador Genc Mucaj, President Meta’s senior international advisor, at Dacor-Bacon House here in DC. Also present were my wife and the Atlanic Council’s Riley Barnes, who accepted an award on behalf of former Senator Brownback, with whom he worked at the State Department. We all spoke briefly with President Meta by phone.
Albania and Scanderbeg
My first acquaintanceship with Scanderbeg was in 1977, in Rome. The tiny piazza that bears his name lies in the shadow of the Quirinale, the Italian President’s massive residence. We called in a building opposite on Italian friends of friends, who soon became ours as well. I think they tried to explain Scanderbeg to us. But we spoke little Italian then and they little English. It was only later that I learned of Scanderbeg’s role as the Albanian national hero who fought against the Ottomans and for the Pope in the 15th century.
My familiarity with Albania then was minimal. A product of the Cold War, I’d been taught that Albania was Communist China’s isolated friend, not America’s. I also knew that the two lovers in Mozart’s Cosi fan tutte disguise themselves as wild-looking Albanians to try to seduce each others’ girlfriends, on a wager.
American Embassy Tirana
It was not until 1991 or so that Albania found me as Deputy Chief of Mission at US Embassy Rome. That summer, while I was Charge’, more than ten thousand Albanian refugees fleeing the collapse of the Communist regime arrived in Italy on a single ship:
The Cold War was over. Washington instructed Embassy Rome to tell the Italians that more than 50 years of their possession of the American Embassy in Tirana would come to an end a year hence. The Americans had entrusted the building to the Italians, in return for maintaining the premises, in 1939. I was told to evict them, the sooner the better but in any event within the year.
I did my best. But the Italian Ambassador in Tirana would have none of it. A “bad character,” his colleagues at the Foreign Ministry explained to me, he behaved like a rent control tenant in a Rome apartment. He would not move. The Italians offered to buy the building, telling us it was decrepit and far too small to serve the US.
The embassy has grown
I discovered in my office a coffee-table crushing volume of photographs of Italian embassies around the world, published by the Foreign Ministry. The little building in Tirana was beautiful, I said as I flipped the pages for the Italian Political Director. But the Italians were right about its physical condition and size. The premises had to be renovated after the Italian Ambassador yanked everything he could from the building, leaving gaping holes where air conditioners and electrical conduits had been. He didn’t leave until the last day of the one-year notice.
The State Department rejected the offer to buy, declaring there would never be more than ten or so employees in Tirana. A model Small Embassy they said. There are now well over 100. The State Department had to not only renovate the original building but also build several annexes.
Albania has come a long way
Of course Albania isn’t today what was it was in the 1990s. Then the collapse of government-sponsored pyramid schemes led to a virtual state collapse. That gave me my first opportunity to visit Tirana, in 1997 to observe elections. The city was still mostly unrenovated from Mussolini’s imperial pretensions and Communist decrepitude. There was more gunfire than in Sarajevo during the 1990s war.
Those elections nevertheless marked the beginning of Albania’s recovery and its transition to more serious democracy. It joined NATO in 2009. Albania now aspires to European Union membership. It is currently stalled because of a dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia. Once that is resolved, Tirana still faces many hurdles. Not least is in meeting EU standards for rule of law. But qualification for EU membership within the 2020s is certainly feasible.
I won’t get into trouble by commenting on current events. Albanian politics are like rugby, frighteningly rough but not usually fatal. I’d like to keep my status as an interested spectator, not a participant.
But I am grateful and honored, Mr. President Meta and Ambassador Mucaj. And I hope to see you in Tirana in the not too distant future.
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