Tag: Balkans
Kosovo under pressure needs a strategy
Arbnore Zhushi of Bota Sot asked questions. I replied:
Q: Recently, we have seen frequent visits by people of the most important allies of Kosovo (emissaries and government officials) whose main message was the progress of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. How do you see their visits?
A: Kosovo’s friends are trying to encourage progress in the dialogue. That’s their job and I wish them success. It is not clear however that they are producing the kinds of responses in Belgrade that would enable Pristina to reciprocate. Both capitals seem to me unready for compromise.
Q: The US and the EU have asked Kosovo to postpone the deadline for the re-registration of vehicle license plates for a period of 10 months. Prime Minister Kurti said today that the deadline for this is October 31. Do you think that Kurti is wrong with this decision? Should he postpone the deadline?
A: Kurti is exercising Kosovo’s sovereignty. I hope he is prepared to deal with the consequences. I certainly understand his impatience–I’ve even suggested that 10 minutes is too long. But being right works only if the move you make does not create bigger problems.
Q: EU envoy Lajcak mentioned 2024 as the last time Kosovo and Serbia should sign a comprehensive agreement. When do you think an agreement will be reached based on recent developments, when do you think an agreement will be reached?
A: Whenever Pristina and Belgrade decide it is in their interests. They are not there yet. I have no idea whether they will be ready in 2024.
Q: Should Kosovo accept a non-recognition agreement?
A: I can imagine lots of agreements short of recognition that would be advantageous for Kosovo. Even with recognition, there will be a need for many other agreements. I see no reason to wait for recognition to get things done that will improve the lives of citizens in both countries. That was the philosophy behind the “technical” phase of the dialogue. While many of those agreements have not been fully implemented, some did result in real benefits.
An idea: why don’t the US and EU constitute a commission for implementation of dialogue agreements (like the International Civilian Office that supervised implementation of the Ahtisaari plan after independence). With assistance from knowledgeable NGOs in both Kosovo and Serbia as well as the two governments, such a commission could make real progress in implementing the agreements and improving relations between Belgrade and Pristina.
Q: In Kosovo, there is also talk of a possible fall of the Government. Do you think that the Kurti Government can fall under pressure to sign the agreement with Serbia?
A: In a parliamentary system it is always possible for the government to fall. In this instance, that would require a break in the governing coalition, either within Vetevendosje or with the other coalition partners. You know better than I do whether such a break is likely. Those who would like to engineer the fall of the government should remember however that last time they did it Albin returned to parliament strengthened.
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Geopolitics after the Russian aggression
I was unable to travel to Pristina for this FAS Forum conference focused on implications for the Balkans today, but I provided a video and talking points for the occasion.
- It is a pleasure to join you remotely, much as I would have liked to be with you in person. But obligations here have kept me from traveling.
- I’ll make just three points.
Russia will lose
- First, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a serious blow not only to Ukraine but also to the existing world order. If Putin were to succeed, we would see more efforts of this sort in the future, including in the Balkans.
- The concept of the “Serbian World” is no less dangerous than the “Russian World.”
- Second, the Russians are on the path to a strategic defeat. Even if they were to win the war, or keep some Ukrainian territory, which is unlikely, they would lose the peace, as they haven’t got the resources or even the population required to rebuild Ukraine.
The right track is clear
- Third, those in the Balkans who are building liberal democracies and aiming for NATO and EU membership are on the right track and need to redouble their efforts.
- It would be a serious error to allow yourselves to be side-tracked into any effort that slows accession to the key Western institutions.
- That raises key questions about the Open Balkans initiative. Will it accelerate progress towards EU accession, or is it going to become an indefinite waiting room? Will it contribute to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all its participants, or will it favor the preferences of one?
So is the objective
- If, as I believe, Russia is defeated in Ukraine and forced back at least to its February 23 lines, if not all the way to its 2013 lines, EU enlargement will return as a serious proposition, if only because of Ukraine’s candidacy.
- I know how disappointing the EU’s performance in the Balkans has been. It has unjustifiably blocked even the visa waiver for Kosovo and accession talks for Albania.
- But that is all the more reason why those who want to be in the EU should not miss the political window next time it opens.
- Russia’s defeat in Ukraine will initiate that opportunity.
- It is not too early to begin preparing.
Not only rules but values
- In short, it means adopting European values, not only European rules and regulations.
- This is hard, not easy. Politicians even in democratic settings seek power and resist giving it up. You’ve seen that recently even in the United States.
- But going into opposition is a key role in any democratic system. It is the opposition that helps to ensure transparency and accountability.
- The institutions of the state should belong to no single political party. They need to serve, and hold accountable, whoever comes to power.
- To their credit, both Kosovo has seen peaceful alternation in power. May it ever be thus!
Autocracy will fail
- This is where autocracies like Russia and China fail.
- They mistake the strength of their temporary leaders for the strength of the state.
- That idea is suffering military defeat in Ukraine. Its defeat will open new opportunities in many parts of the world, but especially in the Balkans.
- Fortune favors the well-prepared. I hope you will be ready.
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Life is unfair, so you need a strategy
Bledë Krasniqi from Television Tëvë 1, based in Prishtina, Kosovo, asked questions. I responded:
Q: As an expert on the issues of the Western Balkan, how have you seen the frequent visits to Kosovo and Serbia by the US emissary for the Western Balkans, Gabriel Escobar, and the EU emissary, Miroslav Lajcak? Are these visits an indication that the final agreement between the two countries is near the end?
A: The envoys are trying to deliver a substantial agreement, but I’ll be happily surprised if they deliver a “final” one.
Vucic is not committed to stabiliity
Q: Escobar said that the president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, is committed to regional stability? Do you agree with this statement?
A: No, I don’t agree. I think Vucic is committed to what he calls the Serbian world, in other words de facto greater Serbia. This threatens instability in both Bosnia and Kosovo [I should also have said Montenegro].
Why not ten minutes?
Q: The United States of America has asked the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, to postpone the implementation of the decision on the issue of license plates for another 10 months. In your opinion, should Kosovo take such a step?
A: Ten minutes is too long in my view. What is the reason for this American request?
No, the dialogue won’t end this year
Q: Do you believe that the Kosovo – Serbia dialogue will end this year? If so, under what conditions? Do you see relations between the two countries as tense recently?
A: Relations are certainly tense. I doubt the dialogue will end this year.
Yes, to the Association with conditions
Q: Should Kosovo establish the Association of Serbian Municipalities?
A: Yes, but only as part of a package that includes recognition and only with two conditions: 1) reciprocity for Albanian communities in Serbia and 2) compliance with the Kosovo Constitutional Court criteria.
Q: If the Association of Serbian municipalities is conditioned by the internationals, should the leaders of Kosovo accept this condition or do they have to look for other solution.
A: See my response above.
Q: Recently, the European Commission has also asked Kosovo to implement the Association without delays and obstacles? Should this count as a condition for visa liberalization?
A: I hope not.
Life is unfair
Q: Is it unfair to Kosovo the non-liberalization of visas by the European Council?
A: Yes it is unfair, but life is often unfair. Kosovo needs an improved strategy for getting what it wants from the EU.
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Support for Putin does not serve Belarusians
Miodrag Vlahovic, former Montenegrin ambassador to the Holy See and now president of the Montenegro Helsinki Committee, writes:
Alexander Lukashenko struggled to contain his anger as he gesticulated wildly at Vladimir Putin.
At a summit in the Black Sea city of Sochi last month, the tyrant of Belarus publicly reassured the tyrant of Russia not to worry about the hundreds of thousands of Russians who have fled the country since the Kremlin imposed partial conscription on its people.
What Belarus has lost
Lukashenko has some experience in this matter. He lost – and then stole – the election in his own country in 2020. Since then, Belarus has experienced significant brain drain, with thousands of Belarusian companies setting up shop in neighboring European countries.
“Alright 30,000, 50,000 (Russians) have fled,” Lukashenko advised Putin. “Let them leave. I do not know what you think about it, but I was not particularly worried when a few thousand left in 2020. They asked to go back, most of them want to go back. And these people are coming back.”
Unfortunately for the Belarusian economy and its remaining residents, this is not true.
Since Lukashenko ordered his secret police to overturn the peoples’ electoral will, more than 4,000 Belarusian small and medium sized businesses have relocated. They have gone mainly to countries inside the European Union, notably Poland. Many more have simply disappeared.
The details are dramatic
The crackdown has had a devastating effect on business confidence and inward investment. Leading Belarusian businessmen took fright, particularly those involved in the Hi-Tech Park (HTP). It was once one of the leading innovative technology clusters in Central and Eastern Europe.
For years, there was an unspoken contract between the Belarusian regime and an IT sector that funded so much of the country’s growth. We do not touch you, and you do not meddle in politics. The stolen 2020 election has disintegrated that tacit agreement.
Viktor Prokopenya, a Belarus-born fintech entrepreneur, criticized the assaults on democratic protestors. He then moved currency.com, a global web and app based trading platform that disrupted traditional finance, out of the country. Viktor Kisly, the billionaire chief executive of Wargaming, the company behind the popular online game World of Tanks; Arkady Dobkin, the owner of EPAM; Mikhail Chuprinsky, founder of robot manufacturer Rozum Robotics; and Mikita Mikado, CEO of PandaDoc, which provides document automation software, quickly followed.
The damage will be longterm
I know the damage that an exodus of humans and capital can do to a country’s prospects. I was foreign minister of Montenegro when it re-gained its independence in 2006, later becoming our first ambassador to the United States.
By the time we gained independence, the bitter Balkans War of the 1990s had wrought a devastating toll on the economies of south-eastern Europe, Montenegro included.
Figures from the World Bank suggest we lost around 12% of our population. Many of the emigrants were highly-educated managers, professionals, scientists, researchers, and technicians, together with young people striving for better training, education, careers and living prospects.
Montenegro is still feeling the effects today. The “brain drain” has undermined local democracy and social cohesion. Unemployment is around 15% – more than twice as high as the EU average.
This year’s Russian aggression on Ukraine and the effects of Western sanctions on Belarus – Russia’s key ally – have made Lukashenko’s reassurance to Putin in Sochi even more dubious.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in late February, the outflow of businesses and entrepreneurs from Belarus has grown rapidly. In June alone, the number of newly registered businesses in Poland backed with Belarusian capital amounted to 254 companies. Last month, Polish president Andrzej Duda said that 150,000 Belarusians have received asylum and work in Poland, including thousands of protesters.
Back in Belarus, it is estimated that up to 80% of the vital IT industry will disappear. According to experts, this will cause a 4% drop in GDP.
If Lukashenko continues to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine then Belarus will continue to suffer gravely. The president of Germany’s digital association Bitkom recently admitted: “By bringing IT specialists from Russia and Belarus to us, the aggressor will be noticeably weakened.”
Ominous signs
The latest signs are ominous. In recent days, Lukashenko has said that Belarus and Russia are to deploy a joint military group and that thousands of Russian troops will be arriving in his country for drills.
It is extremely unlike the tyrant of Minsk will reconsider, opt for peace and start making decisions that support the citizens of his own country – and not Putin and Russian aggression on Ukraine.
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Reciprocity is vital, but not everything
A visit last Saturday from a group of Albanian citizens of Serbia got me thinking again about the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue. It is stuck. While French President Macron and German Chancellor Scholz are supposedly working on a new grand proposal, I’m inclined to think that neither President Vucic nor Prime Minister Kurti (this originally said ”Thaci,” apologies to both!) wants to do anything big at the moment. They are both busy consolidating power, using their mutual hostility as a means. I’ll be the first to applaud if the Macron/Scholz initiative succeeds. But if something big isn’t possible, smaller propositions may be worth considering. Here are a few, ranging from the mundane to the daring.
Reciprocity should be the rule
Reciprocity is a fundamental diplomatic principle. My visitors told me people at the State Department prefer the term “symmetry.” I confess I don’t understand the difference. The point is that whatever you ask of someone else you should be willing to give something equivalent in return, if an equivalent exists. So if there are ten reserved seats for Serbs in the Kosovo parliament (there are), Belgrade should be prepared to offer some proportional number of reserved seats to Albanians in the Serbian parliament (where there are none today).
This principle should apply as well to the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities, which Belgrade wants formed inside Kosovo. It should have no more executive authority than a comparable association of Albanian communities inside Serbia.
Reciprocity should also apply to military forces along the boundary/border between Serbia and Kosovo. The international community has restricted Kosovo from deploying its Security Force in the northern Serb-majority municipalities. Serbia should be likewise restricted from deploying its Army in Albanian-majority municipalities of southern Serbia. That is not the case today:
Lack of reciprocity is a mistake
The international community violated the principle of reciprocity/symmetry in establishing the Special Chambers to investigate crimes that occurred 1998-2000. Their mandate was limited to the territory of Kosovo. That was a serious mistake, not only for Kosovo but also for the United States. Serbian forces killed three Albanian American brothers (the Bytyqis) shortly after the war on Serbian territory. Despite Belgrade’s many promises, its prosecutors have not indicted those who ordered the murders. Two lower-level indictees have been acquitted. Washington should be telling Belgrade that it expects Serbia to prosecute the commanders or to accept the jurisdiction of the Special Chambers.
Some more reciprocity propositions
Here are a few more reciprocity propositions that would enliven the moribund dialogue process. They could also become steps towards eventual mutual recognition in any future Macron/Scholz proposal. Belgrade and Pristina should
- initiate military to military relations consistent with OSCE principles. Their chiefs of staff should be meeting regularly to exchange information on equipment, training, and deployment of their forces.
- agree and demarcate the boundary/border between them, without prejudice to the ultimate outcome of the dialogue. Good fences make good neighbors, as Kosovo discovered when it agreed and demarcated its border with Macedonia.
- base the Open Balkans initiative on equality among the entities participating, again without prejudice to the ultimate outcome of the dialogue. Kosovo would participate without the infamous asterisk (*) and footnote.
It’s not all about reciprocity
Reciprocity won’t settle everything between Pristina and Belgrade. There are some inherent asymmetries.
Belgrade has persistently harassed Kosovo Serbs who join the Kosovo Security Forces. The Serbian secret services and their proxies threaten both them and their families. The EU should be telling Belgrade that if the harassment doesn’t cease Serbia’s progress towards EU accession will stop. The Americans should end Serbia’s cooperation with the Ohio National Guard if the harassment continues.
The rape of tens of thousands of Kosovo women and girls by Serbian forces during the 1999 war has no comparable crime committed by Albanians in rebellion against Serbia. Belgrade should make a formal apology and offer compensation. The 1998/99 expulsion of Albanian civilians from Kosovo, and the murder of close to 10,000 of them, was a clear breach of the laws of war. On that issue too an apology and compensation would go a long way.
The historic Serb churches, monasteries, and other monuments in Kosovo have no comparable Albanian equivalent inside Serbia. The Kosovo government needs to be prepared not only to protect them from harm but also to convince the remaining Serb population in Kosovo that they will be fairly treated.
It’s not all about reciprocity. These items require political courage and unilateral action. But Serbian apologies and compensation would vastly improve Kosovo Albanian attitudes towards the country’s Serb population as well as its religious institutions. If Vucic is truly concerned about the welfare of Serbs in Kosovo (as he claims), he should consider apologies and compensation as a means to that end.
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Embellishing reality isn’t helpful
Genc Pollo, former minister and member of parliament in Albania, reacts to this “debrief” with US Ambassador to Belgrade Chris Hill:
“War is too important to be left to the generals” is a bon mot attributed to Georges Clemenceau. As French Prime Minister, he oversaw the victory of his country and the Entente Alliance in the First World War.
I would hesitate a lot to apply his wisdom to diplomats dealing with the Balkans, especially with former Yugoslavia problems. Diplomats here means primarily European and US officials trying to find solutions to challenges ranging from bloody conflicts to dangerous political impasses.
We ought to be thankful for their well-meaning efforts and should celebrate the ones with successful outcomes.
Still listening to this interview of Christopher Hill, the US Ambassador to Serbia, with the Atlantic Council I was a bit perplexed. Disclosure: he’s a good friend of mine from the early 90s when he was a cooperative a helpful Deputy Head of Mission in Tirana. Chris Hill is connoisseur of the region with a lot of experience in difficult situations. He is right in most of what he says. But some of his assertions could be problematic. Let us take these issues one by one.
Issue 1: “There is a criticism that you sometimes hear in the Balkans that somehow this is some effort by Serbia which is so big to dominate the others. That’s the kind of criticism you might have heard in the European Union decades ago about Germany….I’m not sure it’s that valid a criticism.”
Germany is big for sure, but in the initial EEC of six and the actual EU of 27 member states, she finds herself in a balanced structure in terms of political power, economic weight, and population. Berlin carries much weight but can’t and doesn’t rule single-handedly. Look at the European Central Bank.
Besides post-war Germany is a friendly democracy.
By contrast, within the Open Balkans trio (Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia) Serbia would rule unchallenged.
Issue 2: “[Open Balkans] does support EU standards, in terms of the rule of law, in terms of regulations.”
It remains a mystery to many why supporters of Open Balkans are silent about the Common Regional Market of the Berlin Process. Or trash it along with defunct initiatives. The Berlin Process has all the pretended virtues of Open Balkans and none of its serious downsides. Simple question: would you trust the observance of EU standards in a Western Balkans initiative where the EU is institutionally involved rather than in a local get-together hosted by two corrupt autocrats? Lobbyists might paint a Potemkin village, but Serbia and Albania are well advanced in their latest trajectory towards one-person rule.
Issue 3: “I would say that the Serbian relationship with Albania is as good as it’s probably ever been in history.”
The relationship between Albania and Serbia has generally been always excellent or normal, Including during the rule of Enver Hoxha and Josip Broz Tito. It went awry when things in Kosovo turned terrible. The current rapprochement between Prime Minister Rama and President Vučić is solves a problem that doesn’t exist. It hasn’t contributed in any meaningful way to “normalization” between Kosovo and Serbia, let alone mutual recognition, which is the crux of the matter!
Issue 4: “But I think, if you look at the broad sweep of this issue and the broad arc of where Serbia is going, it’s heading West. You point out the opinion surveys that suggest that Serbia that many Serbs have sympathies that lie further east. …if you look at where Serbian young people are going for their education for jobs, for their training and what type of model they see themselves focusing on, it’s very much toward the West.”
Past are the days when people in the West should believe globalization and economic engagement wwill tame China and Russia, nudging them towards becoming responsible actors in the rules-based world order. We’ve seen Chinese and Russians, including the nomenclatura’s offspring, enjoying life or studying in the West only to return home to embrace autocracy and imperial revisionism.
This to some reasonable extent applies to Serbia. Because the nature of the Serbian regime has not changed much, and its propaganda has worsened.
If the model of post-Milosević Serbia applied to post-war Germany, it would mean having Joseph Goebbels as West Germany’s chancellor in the 60s. He would have refused to adopt Western policies toward the Soviets.
This is reality, and embellishing it isn’t helpful.
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