Tag: Balkans
Why thin gruel is still progress
The Balkans world is breathing easier today, after Belgrade and Pristina reached agreement to accept each other’s identity documents. Heretofore, Belgrade has been issuing its own identity documents to Kosovars crossing into Serbia, based on Pristina’s documents. That was done to avoid implied recognition of Kosovo’s statehood and independence. It has already announced it will issue a disclaimer at the border asserting the new agreement is for practical purposes and does not imply recognition:
Thin gruel is still progress
While Belgrade’s disclaimer suggests the larger issues at stake, the agreement is pretty thin gruel. It is only half the original problem, which also concerned license plates. These will presumably continue to have their state symbols covered to cross the border/boundary. We measure progress in the Balkans in millimeters. Still: compliments to the diplomats involved–especially EU negotiator Miroslav Lajcak and American Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Gabe Escobar!
There is encouragement to be found in the method: the US collaborated visibly with the EU. That kind of tandem effort is responsible for most progress in the Balkans in the past three decades. Balkanites will tell you nothing has changed. But there is a deep chasm between genocide and ethnic cleansing and quarreling over state symbols on license plates.
Zeno’s paradox applies
The reward for virtue is heightened expectations. Energy is perhaps the next subject to tackle. The existing agreement that enables a Kosovo subsidiary of a Serb firm to collect fees from Serbs who live in the Belgrade-controlled north of Kosovo needs implementation. It is common for people not to pay for utilities during wartime. Twenty years of free electricity is at least a decade too long. Kosovo Electric will also gain access to facilities in the north.
This kind of step-by-step, incremental progress is really what is needed right now. Neither President Vucic nor Prime Minister Kurti is ready to make the compromises required for what Balkanites call a “final” agreement between Pristina and Belgrade. Vucic resists recognition. Kurti resists the creation of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities he thinks would violate Kosovo’s sovereignty. The day will come, but in the fashion of Zeno’s paradox. If you halve the distance between two human bodies every year, they should never touch. But for practical purposes, they do.
Not with Vucic however
“AVucic” is unlikely to be the signature on the final agreement. He has turned definitively in the ethnonationalist direction domestically and eastward internationally. While he still mouths platitudes about seeking EU membership, he is far more welcoming to Russia and China than to the EU and the US. Serbia has steadfastly refused to levy sanctions on Russia for the invasion of Ukraine and has welcomed the Chinese into its infrastructure, including telecommunications. Vucic is capable of extraordinary contradictions. As he renominated Serbia’s lesbian prime minister, he also announced cancellation of Belgrade’s Europride celebration in September.
Unfortunately, the West (that’s US, UK, and EU for Balkan purposes) has come to treat Vucic on most days with kid gloves, fearing that he will tilt even further east and doubting that any better is available in today’s Serbia. But the agreement on identity documents is a good lesson. Squeeze him hard and he yields. I hope the West’s diplomats haven’t exhausted themselves–they are going to have to continue to work hard to get both Vucic and Kurti to yes.
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Tempest in a license plate
President Vucic squirmed through a BBC interview this morning, denying the use of obviously inflammatory language he had just (and has repeatedly) used. He sounded unnerved and desperate to claim persecution of Kosovo Serbs. He also threatened military intervention to protect them. Unfortunately, I can’t find the interview on the Newshour website.
Kosovo Foreign Minister Gërvalla-Schwarz replied with focus on mutual recognition and the threat of Russian meddling in the aftermath of Moscow’s (assumed) defeat in Ukraine.
No, agreement does not appear imminent but it is not impossible
I’m often asked whether a “final” agreement is imminent. It certainly doesn’t appear so. Vucic has reverted to Milosevic-style claims of Serb victimhood and focus on the agreed (but not implemented) Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM). Gërvalla-Schwarz won’t settle for less than progress towards mutual recognition. In the particular case of license plates, that would mean a system that is strictly reciprocal.
But it is not really about license plates. It is about sovereignty. Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti is insisting on reciprocity because that is the rule between sovereign states. Vucic rejects reciprocity because that is the rule between sovereign states. This circle can, I think, be squared. The ASM Vucic wants will look different in the context of mutual recognition. The Kosovo constitutional court has already made clear it can have no executive functions. With recognition, ASM may be helpful to calming Kosovo’s northern municipalities. Without executive functions and with recognition it is not a likely threat to Kosovo’s sovereignty.
You can’t get there from here
The problem is the route to this solution is not clear. Neither Vucic nor Kurti has anything to gain in domestic politics from a settlement. Neither thinks he has to yield to gain advantage internationally.
Serbia has slid back into anocracy. Its democrats are divided and weak. Its filo-Russian ethnonationalists are strong. The media environment is less than free. Public discourse all too often focuses on the “Serbian world,” a remake of 1990s Greater Serbia, recycled via Putin’s “Russian world.” The Serbian world threatens the territorial integrity of not only Kosovo but also Bosnia and Montenegro. Belgrade mouths EU ambitions, but in practice it hedges its bets. It has strengthened ties with Russia and China, even during the Ukraine war. It has failed to align with many EU foreign policies, including Russia sanctions. Progress toward EU accession has slowed to a crawl.
Kosovo is a lively democracy, with free media and vigorous political competition. The electorate is impatient for an agreement with Serbia. Kosovars hope that would get the EU to fulfill its commitment to waiving visas, encourage five EU states to recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty, and enable faster progress towards NATO and EU accession. Still, Kurti has ample domestic support for insisting on reciprocity, which many Kosovars see as a sina qua non. He lacks international options. Neither Russia nor China is interested in befriending Kosovo. Of necessity, Kosovo enthusiastically bandwagons with NATO and the EU, which pressure Kurti mercilessly.
If all you have is lemons, make lemonade
So for now, no “final” agreement seems imminent. But interim ones should be possible. Serbia’s problem with Kosovo plates boils down to an “R,” for “republic.” Belgrade doesn’t want to accept for travel in Serbia plates that display that dread symbol of sovereignty and the documentation that comes with it.
Kosovars have spent ten years covering up the R and getting alternative documentation for the sake of not offending Serb sensibilities. At the same time, Belgrade wants Serbs in Kosovo to be able to keep their Serbian license plates and drive wherever they want. Reciprocity for that would mean Albanians who live in southern Serbia using Kosovo license plates to drive where they like in Serbia. How would that go over in Belgrade? If there really were any risk of violence against Serbs in Kosovo, Vucic wouldn’t be encouraging them to use Serbian license plates.
It is time for Vucic to recognize that this license plate tempest is unworthy of an EU aspirant. When living in Kosovo, Serbs should do as the Kosovars do. Drive with an R on their license plates. It’s not that hard.
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Bosnia’s citizens are its future
I have joined colleagues and friends in this Bosnian-initiated appeal to Secretary Blinken. I have reservations about the HiRep instituting constitutional changes, but I agree with the citizen-focused reforms proposed:
August 19, 2022
The Honorable Antony J. Blinken
Secretary of State
US Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, DC 20520
Dear Secretary of State Blinken,
First and foremost, we are grateful for the pivotal role of the United States in ending the war and bloodshed in our country and brokering the Dayton Peace Agreement, which has kept peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina to date. Now, twenty-seven years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, that hard-won peace is threatened. Ironically, the very structures of the Dayton Peace Agreement have become an obstacle to Bosnia’s political survival. The mantra repeated by numerous international officials that Bosnia is composed of two entities and three constituent peoples has led us to the current existential crisis.
Due to the lack of international intervention, especially since 2006, Dayton’s structures have devolved into divisive ethnonationalist rhetoric and threats of secession that are destabilizing Bosnia and the region. Bosnian Serb member of the Presidency Milorad Dodik has threatened secession and consistently speaks of Bosnia as a failed State. He wields hate speech against Bosniaks and denies the Srebrenica genocide with impunity. Bosnian Croat party leader Dragan Čović, for his part, has threatened to boycott the election and form a third entity. Both separatist leaders have exploited the concept of “constituent peoples” so as to create further divisions and hatred. These separatist agendas have found their strongest support from the Russian Federation, whose Embassy in Sarajevo insisted in April 2021 that Bosnia fundamentally consists of two entities rather than a unified State.
So, it is clear that the time has come for a fundamental revisioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Constitution so that our country may fulfill the conditions to join NATO and the European Union. Once again, Secretary Blinken, we look to the United States for leadership, guidance, and assistance. We need support from the U.S. to help Bosnia transition from a system that gives priority to constituent peoples and ethnic divisions, to a nation of citizens with equal rights and dignity.
The first step in this process should be the genuine implementation of the five judgements of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): Sejdić-Finci, Zornić, Pilav, Šlaku, and Pudarić and the retirement of BiH’s ethnic-based election model in favor of a model where the individual citizen of BiH is front and center of the electoral process with the guiding principle of “one citizen, one vote”. A person’s ethno-national identity should not be the sole determinant of governance processes. Implementation of these ECtHR judgements is crucial for Bosnia’s future.
Indeed, it was the expectation of the ECtHR judgements that the contested “constituent peoples” category and all ethnic-based discrimination be removed from the Bosnian Constitution. In Paragraph 43 of the ECtHR judgement in Zornić vs. Bosnia Herzegovina (Application 3681/06), the EU Court asks for both equality of all Bosnia’s citizens and the elimination of the “constituent people” as an outdated concept rooted only in the ceasefire signed in to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing:
The nature of the conflict was such that the approval of the “constituent peoples” was necessary to ensure peace (ibid.). However, now, more than eighteen years after the end of the tragic conflict, there could no longer be any reason for the maintenance of the contested constitutional provisions. The Court expects that democratic arrangements will be made without further delay.
The phrase “constituent peoples” is part of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), but the way in which this term evolved does not conform to the spirit of the DPA. Further, Citizens and Others are also clearly noted in the Constitution, foreshadowing the reform and evolution that the Court references in the statement above.
Without a fundamental restructuring of the Dayton-rendered Constitution, change will not be possible for Bosnia. Hence, we, the resident as well as non-resident citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with our allies, dear friends and several NGOs from abroad, propose two ways the U.S. Government should constructively engage.
First, we encourage the U.S. to initiate and support a process of creating a completely new social contract for the 21st century in Bosnia. Instead of a complicated and extremely costly governance system involving the State government, two entities and 10 Cantons, governance would be transferred to Bosnia’s municipalities, resulting in a more locally based democratic model that is citizen-centered. The State of Bosnia would ensure the equitable provision of essential public services, including health care and education.
Second, we appeal to the U.S. to encourage the Office of the High Representative to use Bonn powers to implement constitutional and electoral reform across the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with all judgements of the ECtHR including the judgement in the Zornić v. BiH Application. This would mean that any and all citizens would be eligible to stand for election for any office in their municipality, and would, in turn, be eligible to stand for election to represent their municipality in the national parliament. Finally, according to the terms of Bosnia’s restructured democracy, all citizens would elect one President from among a field of candidates.
Secretary Blinken: what we are proposing would represent a fundamental shift in American foreign policy with respect to reform of the election law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus far, Mr. Palmer’s and Mr. Escobar’s diplomatic efforts have sought to appease the HDZ, an ethnonationalist political party seeking to insure the election of one of their members to the Presidency –a so-called “legitimate” Bosnian Croat representative. However, such a result would only further entrench ethnic divisions and produce a situation in which two members of the Presidency would be seeking to undermine Bosnia’s sovereignty. Thus we urge you to support genuine constitutional and electoral reform that will ensure a sustainable democratic political culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With international meddling in Bosnia’s internal affairs from Croatia, Serbia and the Russian Federation, and with the exacerbation of social divisions within Bosnia through the rise of hate speech, genocide denial, and the glorification of convicted war criminals, along with threats of secession and third entities, there is no time to lose.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Azra Zornić, citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, plaintiff before the European Court of Human Rights,
Jakob Finci, citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, plaintiff before the European Court of Human Rights,
Dervo Sejdić, citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, plaintiff before the European Court of Human Rights,
Zlatan Begić, Ph.D., applicant before the European Court of Human Rights (application pending), Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Tuzla,
Slaven Kovačević, Ph.D., applicant before the European Court of Human Rights (application pending), Assistant Professor of Political Systems and European Integration, University of Sarajevo,
David Pettigrew, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy, Southern Connecticut State University, New Haven, CT, Member, Working Group for Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Aida Ibričević, Ph.D., Global Fellow – Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO),
Bojan Šošić, ABD, psychologist, member of Presidency of Association of independent intellectuals “Circle 99”, Sarajevo,
Kurt Bassuener, Ph.D., Senior Associate, Democratization Policy Council (DPC),
Hazim Bašić, Ph.D., member of Presidency of Association of independent intellectuals “Circle 99”, Professor, University of Sarajevo,
Samir Beharić, human rights activist, Research Officer at the Balkan Forum, PhD Candidate at the University of Bamberg,
Azra Berbić, human rights and peace building activist, Project Coordinator Center for Youth KVART Prijedor,
Vildana Bijedić, MSc. Mandala Academy Foundation,
Sonja Biserko, President of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia,
Janusz Bugajski, Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC,
Tanya Domi, Assistant Professor of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University,
Štefica Galić, Editor-in-Chief Tacno.net web portal,
Carole Hodge, Ph.D., Research Fellow Glasgow University (retired),
Marion Kraske, political scientist and analyst,
Adil Kulenović, President of Association of independent intellectuals “Circle 99”, Sarajevo,
Senadin Lavić, Ph.D., Professor, University of Sarajevo,
Satko Mujagić, Survivor, Omarska and Manjača Concentration Camps,
Dr. Emir Ramić, Director of the Institute for Research of Genocide Canada,
Daniel Serwer, Scholar, Middle East Institute; Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Institute, and Professor, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University,
Munira Subašić, President, Association of Mothers of Srebrenica and Žepa Enclaves,
ReSTART Bosnia and Herzegovina, informal group of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Samir Vranović, President, Association of Istina Kalinovik ’92
cc: The Honorable Jeanne Shaheen, United States Senator
The Honorable Bob Menendez, United States Senator
The Honorable Ben Cardin, United States Senator
The Honorable Chris Murphy, United States Senator
The Honorable Steve Cohen, United States Representative
The Honorable Greg Meeks, United States Representative
The Honorable William Keating, United States Representative
The Honorable Ann Wagner, United States Representative
The Honorable Michael J. Murphy, United States Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina
Karen Donfried, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs. US Department of State
Dereck J. Hogan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Molly Montgomery, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, US Department of State
Robert Hand, Senior Policy Adviser at the U.S. Helsinki Commission
For further information contact Azra Zornić, zornicazra@gmail.com, or David Pettigrew, depettigrew@gmail.com. Alternatively, correspondence may be directed to: David Pettigrew, Ph.D., Philosophy Department, Southern Connecticut State University, New Haven, CT, 06515, or to Bojan Šošić, Asocijacija nezavisnih intelektualaca “Krug 99”, Vrazova 1, 71000 Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Reaching for the Heights, but failing
I enjoyed a discussion today at USIP prompted by Fred Hof’s Reaching for the Heights. The book treats Fred’s ultimately failed negotiation for peace between Israel and Syria. It would have returned the Golan Heights (and more) to Syria in exchange for Syria’s strategic reorientation away from Iran, Hizbollah, and Hamas. Chet Crocker presided. Barbara Bodine and Bernie Aronson provided perspective on Yemen and (mostly) Colombia. My assignment was the Balkans. Here are the talking points I prepared, but used only in part:
- First: compliments to Fred for this forthright, interesting, and well-written account of an important but failed negotiation. We need to understand what makes things go wrong, even when so much has been done to make them go right.
- My role here is to comment on how Fred’s experience compares and contrasts with that in the Balkans. I am struck in the first instance by the stark differences.
Stark contrasts
- Both the Bosnia and Kosovo outcomes happened in the unipolar moment when the U.S. could do pretty much whatever it wanted, at least when it came to countries with a few million inhabitants. Working after America was weakened in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fred dealt with a potent ally and a substantial adversary, backed by Iran, Hizbollah, and Hamas.
- Richard Holbrooke in the 1990s wielded all the levers of American power—not only diplomatic but also political, military, and economic. Fred at no time had all the levers of American power in his hands: his role was diplomatic and vaguely economic, not military or even political.
- Holbrooke’s objective in Bosnia was to end a war both sides were tired of fighting. Fred was trying to do something harde. After a long but not very hurting stalemate, entice Syria to reorient itself strategically, cutting ties with Iran, Hizbollah, and Hamas that had helped the Assads survive in power for four decades. He was also trying to get Israel to give up attractive real estate on which it had settled tens of thousands of citizens.
- Other contrasts: the soft-spoken, detail-oriented, and considerate George Mitchell and Dennis Ross vs. the bold, egotistical, and bombastic Holbrooke, the zero-sum territorial equation in the Middle East vs. the identity-focused Bosnian conflict and the sovereignty-focused Kosovo one, the static stance of the Middle Eastern protagonists vs. the rapidly changing situations on the ground in the Balkans, the deep knowledge of Syria that Fred brought to the challenge vs. Holbrooke’s comparatively superficial grasp of the Balkans.
Parallels: the negotiating framework
- But there are also some enduring parallels. Most important is that negotiations need a mutually agreed framework. Holbrooke achieved this in a series of meetings leading up to Dayton that defined basic parameters: one country, two entities, mutual diplomatic recognition, return of DPs and refugees, a powerful international intervention.
- Fred achieved it by building on a framework that John Kerry initiated. Holbrooke likewise often used Congressional pressure from both sides of the aisle to good advantage in the Balkans. State Department officers often complain about Congress but woe to the American diplomat who hasn’t learned to use Congressional clout with foreign governments!
Parallels: key US roles
- The agreed frameworks in both the Balkans and the Syria/Israel negotiation were vulnerable to mutual mistrust and to domestic politics. The U.S. as guarantor was vital in both. Washington needed to be ready to play a major role not only in the negotiations but also in the implementation of any agreement.
- In Bosnia, Holbrooke delivered America’s friend, Izetbegovic, to an unsatisfactory agreement. Only the side-agreement equipping and training Bosnian forces made that possible. The side-letter between Israel and the U.S. would have played a similar role in the Syria negotiation, but delivering Israel was certainly a heavier lift.
- Fred notes the importance of “top cover,” protection from those in your own government who might have ideas of their own or not like yours. Holbrooke frightened off potential meddlers. That is different from the protection rooted in respect that Dennis Ross provided to Fred, but the effect was similar. Without top cover, no American negotiator can survive. It seems half an international negotiation is always with Washington.
- Relief from sanctions played a key role in the Balkans, as it would have had to do also vis-à-vis Syria. Lifting sanctions is at least as important as imposing them if you want to get results.
Failure is always an option
- It was Bashar’s violent crackdown on the demonstrators that made lifting sanctions impossible for Washington. Milosevic’s violent repression of the Kosovo rebellion did likewise in the Balkans. We shouldn’t expect autocrats to behave differently when challenged domestically. .
- One concluding thought, admittedly beyond my remit.
- Fred hasn’t entirely convinced me, or himself, that Bashar would have been able to reorient Syria in the Western direction, even if he regained every inch of territory he sought. The Iranians and Hezbollah would have made Assad’s life—and maybe his death—very difficult if he tried. Nor am I, or Fred, convinced that Bibi was prepared to give up the Golan Heights.
- Such re-orientations more often come before international agreements, not because of them. That is what happened with Sadat’s Egypt. That also happened throughout Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War and with Ukraine, though of course in Ukraine we haven’t yet seen whatever international settlement will emerge.
- My reservations about Fred’s assessment of the situation only increase my admiration for what he tried to do. Negotiations are never a sure thing. The Dayton agreements were completed in penalty time. Kosovo was settled only after a negotiation failure at Rambouillet.
Courage merits admiration
- Fred faults himself in the end for failing to convince American policymakers of the contribution a Syria/Israel peace agreement would have made to U.S. national interests and to a more comprehensive Israel/Arab peace.
- My bottom line is different. Fred Hof is a courageous man who tried to do the right thing on the issue entrusted to him. This book enables his substantial successes and his ultimate failure to educate those who come next. I am grateful for the book and admire the courage.
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Albania’s strange support for Serbia
Former Albanian government minister and member of parliament Genc Pollo writes:
The meeting of the EU leaders in Brussels on Thursday, 23 June, took place against the backdrop of Putin’s bloody aggressive war. They correctly showed solidarity with Ukraine, the current victim, and Moldova, the next potential one, by granting both the status of candidate for membership in the Union. But a wartime European Council should have dealt with closing ranks in front of the enemy.
The only wayward state within the EU orbit that has rejected the sanctions against Putin’s Russia and has reconfirmed its friendship with the aggressor has been Serbia. Belgrade has been negotiating EU membership for eight years and has closed several chapters. It is already treaty-bound to align itself with the EU’s foreign and security policy. But Serbia’s President Vučić has has failed to adopt any EU measures against Putin’s past transgressions.
Strangely there wasn’t much fuss about this in the Council meeting or in the preceding summit of EU leaders and their Western Balkans counterparts. In addition, Vučić got help from someone who wouldn’t generally be expected to be an ally: Albanian Prime Minister Rama.
Vučić first tried to deflect attention. He proposed to the Prime Ministers of Albania and North Macedonia to boycott the upcoming summit as there was little chance for them to get a date for the start of EU membership talks. This EU decision has been due for the last two years but is still blocked by a Bulgarian veto unrelated to the EU membership process. How such a boycott would have been helpful in resolving the problem remains a mystery. And why Serbia should propose such a course of action to her neighbors needs explaining.
Prime Minister Rama however was quick to announce that he would agree with the boycott. Such an unprecedented gesture became the talk of the day in the mainstream media. It continued to echo even after the boycott was called off the day after. Along with the Bulgarian veto it sharpened the sense of drama in Brussels and left little room to discuss the pressing issue of a possible fifth column in their midst.
In the Western Balkans summit, Rama both in his published speech and in the following press conference with Vučić, went to great lengths to justify the Serbian position towards Russia. Referring to distorted interpretations of historical and economic facts, Rama criticized the West for its pressure on Serbia.
Such a stance is a novelty in post-Communist Albania, where leaders, supported by public opinion, have always aligned themselves with the EU and the West in security matters. It comes in the wake of the controversial Open Balkans initiative championed by Belgrade and Tirana but disowned by the other states of the Western Balkans. The initiative is considered an “unhealthy competition to the EU integration” by European Commission officials but has received recently the rhetorical support of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
Both Rama and Vučić have been consolidating their personal power over the last decade. dismantling constitutional checks, muzzling the media, and politicizing the state bureaucracy. Scandals of grand corruption and collusion with the underworld have abounded. The latest twist adds, at least for Albania, an additional concern. The re-energized political opposition in Tirana has been denouncing the suspect rapprochement with Belgrade, as they see it being done at the expense of Kosovo. There will be more on their plate for the weeks and months to come.
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Stevenson’s army, June 23
– Defense authorizers and appropriators split on how much money for Pentagon.
– Popular bill for veterans with toxic exposure blocked because it violates the Constitution — which requires bills with tax provisions to originate in the House.
– SAIS prof Ed Joseph reports on the political struggle in Bulgaria.
– 140,000 Cubans have come to US borders recently
– Historians and journalists suggest how to report on threats to democracy by issuing The Authoritarian’s Playbook.
-I’m sending this Economist article on Biden’s Middle East policy mainly because it has an extraordinary color picture of FDR’s meeting with the Saudi king in February 1945.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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