Tag: Balkans
Stagnation is not the worst or the best
The Balkans region is stagnating. Talks for normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina have stalled. Belgrade, after promising changes in its policy on Ukraine, is still siding with Russia. Electoral reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a dead letter. Montenegro has a new caretaker government whose mandate is to prepare for elections a year hence. Bulgaria is blocking EU accession negotiations with both Macedonia and Albania.
It could be worse
The law of bicycles prevails in the Balkans. If things aren’t moving, balance is difficult and collapse more likely.
Serbia could try to copy Russia’s playbook, by claiming genocide against Serbs in northern Kosovo as justification for a military move to the Ibar River. Belgrade’s mobilization of its army in response to a spat over license plates some months ago should serve as a warning. Not to mention its substantial deployment of forces along the boundary/border with Kosovo.
Bosnia’s Serb member of the collective presidency, Milorad Dodik, could run out of the thin salami slices he has been taking to deprive Sarajevo of sovereignty and try a big move like seizing Brcko, the more or less autonomous northeastern Bosnian town that links the two wings of Republika Srpska.
The Croat nationalists in Bosnia could try to constitute their own entity and withdraw from the country’s central institutions. Unrest in Macedonia could bring down a reform-minded, pro-EU government and even precipitate interethnic conflict.
It could also be better
Sad to say, the idea of Europe “whole and free” is dying, not only in Ukraine. In the Balkans, there are countries truly committed to a liberal democratic, European future and some that aren’t. Under today’s Alexandar Vucic, Serbia is not. Nor is Bosnia and Herzegovina, all of whose ethnic nationalist political parties oppose one person/one vote. Montenegro is on the fence, due largely to russophilic, pro-Serb political parties and the Serbian Orthodox Church, both of which have gotten a lot of traction lately. Macedonia and Albania want to move in the European direction. It is Bulgarian ethnic nationalism, which denies the existence of Macedonian identity, that is creating problems.
Making things better will require a concerted European and American effort to champion liberal democracy in the Balkans. There is no reason for Bosnia and Herzegovina to have a tripartite presidency and tripartite everything else more than 25 years after the war the ethnic nationalists perpetrated on its territory. That is a constitutional, not an electoral law, issue. Montenegro needs a government that can retake the lead in pushing implementation of EU requirements. Bulgaria needs to back off its obstruction of accession talks with Macedonia and Albania. There will be plenty of opportunity before those are complete to resolve the language and identity issues.
The EU and US are aligned but not punching at their weight
To make good things happen in the Balkans has always required the US and EU to be aligned. They now are. With Trump’s silly nonsense gone, serious American and European negotiators are in charge again. The current problem is the heavy lifting required is not readily available. Europe is too divided. Five EU members don’t recognize Kosovo. One, Hungary, is sympathetic to Russian and Serbian nationalist goals. Another, Croatia, is blatantly interfering in Bosnia’s internal affairs to benefit a political party it controls.
The Americans face a steep climb to get the President and Secretary of State to pay more than lip service to Balkan issues, which fall well down the list of priorities. NATO allies Hungary, Bulgaria and Croatia need some high-level pounding.
Risks are real even if not imminent
The risks are real, but not necessarily imminent. NATO is presumably alert to Serbian military moves. Dodik is on a shorter leash than at times in the past. Serbia doesn’t want him to move toward Republika Srpska independence, for fear of screwing up Belgrade’s cozy relationship with Brussels and Washington. Bosnia’s electoral law is still in force. If nationalist Croats boycott October’s vote, that will be counterproductive for them in terms of representation and might even offer an opportunity for constitutional reform, which is really what is needed. Montenegro is capable of muddling through. Macedonia and Albania could well use the delay Bulgaria has caused to prepare themselves better to meet EU requirements, especially for rule of law.
Washington and Brussels have decided to focus their immediate attention on the Bulgaria/Macedonia issues. That is understandable, as resolving (or postponing) those would enable both Macedonia and Albania to proceed with EU accession negotiations and give a boost to pro-EU forces throughout the Balkans. But it is not enough. The US and EU need to improve their own performance in exacting better diplomatic results in the Balkans across the board. I’m a professor. B in the 21st century is not a good grade.
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Albania has come a long way
The President of Albania, Ilir Meta, honored me yesterday with the George Kastrioti Scanderbeg Medal. His citation reads as follows:
As a token of appreciation and gratitude for his previous contribution in promoting and aggrandizing the Albanian cause in the United States.
For serving as a powerful voice defending the human rights and freedoms, especially during the difficult years which our nation went through, and also for being a supporter of Kosova’ sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The occasion was a meeting and lively chat with Ambassador Genc Mucaj, President Meta’s senior international advisor, at Dacor-Bacon House here in DC. Also present were my wife and the Atlanic Council’s Riley Barnes, who accepted an award on behalf of former Senator Brownback, with whom he worked at the State Department. We all spoke briefly with President Meta by phone.
Albania and Scanderbeg
My first acquaintanceship with Scanderbeg was in 1977, in Rome. The tiny piazza that bears his name lies in the shadow of the Quirinale, the Italian President’s massive residence. We called in a building opposite on Italian friends of friends, who soon became ours as well. I think they tried to explain Scanderbeg to us. But we spoke little Italian then and they little English. It was only later that I learned of Scanderbeg’s role as the Albanian national hero who fought against the Ottomans and for the Pope in the 15th century.
My familiarity with Albania then was minimal. A product of the Cold War, I’d been taught that Albania was Communist China’s isolated friend, not America’s. I also knew that the two lovers in Mozart’s Cosi fan tutte disguise themselves as wild-looking Albanians to try to seduce each others’ girlfriends, on a wager.
American Embassy Tirana
It was not until 1991 or so that Albania found me as Deputy Chief of Mission at US Embassy Rome. That summer, while I was Charge’, more than ten thousand Albanian refugees fleeing the collapse of the Communist regime arrived in Italy on a single ship:
The Cold War was over. Washington instructed Embassy Rome to tell the Italians that more than 50 years of their possession of the American Embassy in Tirana would come to an end a year hence. The Americans had entrusted the building to the Italians, in return for maintaining the premises, in 1939. I was told to evict them, the sooner the better but in any event within the year.
I did my best. But the Italian Ambassador in Tirana would have none of it. A “bad character,” his colleagues at the Foreign Ministry explained to me, he behaved like a rent control tenant in a Rome apartment. He would not move. The Italians offered to buy the building, telling us it was decrepit and far too small to serve the US.
The embassy has grown
I discovered in my office a coffee-table crushing volume of photographs of Italian embassies around the world, published by the Foreign Ministry. The little building in Tirana was beautiful, I said as I flipped the pages for the Italian Political Director. But the Italians were right about its physical condition and size. The premises had to be renovated after the Italian Ambassador yanked everything he could from the building, leaving gaping holes where air conditioners and electrical conduits had been. He didn’t leave until the last day of the one-year notice.
The State Department rejected the offer to buy, declaring there would never be more than ten or so employees in Tirana. A model Small Embassy they said. There are now well over 100. The State Department had to not only renovate the original building but also build several annexes.
Albania has come a long way
Of course Albania isn’t today what was it was in the 1990s. Then the collapse of government-sponsored pyramid schemes led to a virtual state collapse. That gave me my first opportunity to visit Tirana, in 1997 to observe elections. The city was still mostly unrenovated from Mussolini’s imperial pretensions and Communist decrepitude. There was more gunfire than in Sarajevo during the 1990s war.
Those elections nevertheless marked the beginning of Albania’s recovery and its transition to more serious democracy. It joined NATO in 2009. Albania now aspires to European Union membership. It is currently stalled because of a dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia. Once that is resolved, Tirana still faces many hurdles. Not least is in meeting EU standards for rule of law. But qualification for EU membership within the 2020s is certainly feasible.
I won’t get into trouble by commenting on current events. Albanian politics are like rugby, frighteningly rough but not usually fatal. I’d like to keep my status as an interested spectator, not a participant.
But I am grateful and honored, Mr. President Meta and Ambassador Mucaj. And I hope to see you in Tirana in the not too distant future.
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Stalemate isn’t very ispirational
A post about why I haven’t been writing a post is odd, but here it is.
Reason one:
I’m working on a book. It focuses on a particularly strong set of international norms that have achieved global legitimacy despite frequent controversy. For more than 85 years, the world has accepted the recommendations of a non-governmental group with no legal authority as definitive. Why and how does that happen? The norms in question protect you and me from ionizing radiation. More on that as the work progresses.
Reason two:
I’ve pretty much exhausted what I have to say about the two wars I am most interested in. Syria’s multi-sided war reached stalemate a couple of years ago. The Russians, Turks, Americans, Israelis, and Iranians all lack the will to push harder against their adversaries. All can live with the present situation, at least for a while. The Syrian regime lacks the capacity to do what it wants: exert its control over the entire country.
The Ukraine war is not so much stalemated as grinding on, with the Russians consolidating control over some areas and the Ukrainians winning back others. Ukraine’s acquisition of better artillery and Russia’s prevention of Ukrainian agricultural exports via the Black Sea are the two big deciding factors at the moment. Russia’s army has proven inept at best, but its navy still controls the sea, despite the sinking of its flagship. In the meanwhile, civilians suffer. Watch the video above.
Reason three:
Stalemate also characterizes the Balkans. Serbian President Vucic and Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti are both unwilling to take the steps required to normalize relations between the two countries. Even smaller agreements and their implementation are not moving ahead rapidly. In Bosnia, Serb and Croat leaders have frozen the legislative and electoral processes, in order to gain political advantages for their ethnic nationalist political parties. Croatia and Serbia are doing nothing to help improve the situation. Even people who know a lot about the Balkans do not have a lot of ideas what to do, though they do have some good ones.
To make matters worse, EU member Bulgaria is still preventing North Macedonia from starting the process for EU accession. There, too, the problem is ethnic nationalist claims to history and language. Stalling North Macedonia also stalls next-in-line Albania, which in turn demoralizes Bosnia and Kosovo.
Reason four:
The Iran nuclear talks are also stalled. The ostensible reason is US refusal to remove the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from its sanctions lists, but my guess is that the IRGC is none too happy with the prospect of return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Tehran is now much closer to having the material it needs for nuclear weapons than when the agreement was signed in 2015. Why go backwards? Tehran has improved its sanctions evasion, oil prices are high, and Israeli military action would rally Iranians to defend a government that many of them dislike.
Not much to be said
But there are moments when there isn’t much to be said. We need to hope diplomats are trying to resolve all these stalemates in a positive way. The best we can do is await developments, publishing whenever a decent idea comes across the neurons. Stalemate isn’t very inspirational.
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Maybe smaller is better, for now
I’ve been getting questions lately about the EU-sponsored dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. Will it restart in earnest? Is it just moribund or stone cold dead?
Certainly it has been unproductive. We are approaching the 10th year since the Brussels “political” agreement of 2013. A decade of stasis in the Balkans risks unraveling regional peace and stability. Just listen to Dugin:
So is there hope for progress?
The moment is not propitious. Serbia has aligned itself with Russia, not only on Ukraine, and the Serb-ruled 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina is Moscow’s lap dog, as Dugin makes clear. The US, UK, and the European Union are preoccupied with helping the Ukrainians respond to Russian aggression. The Balkan region is way down the list of urgencies.
Besides, the 2022 and 2024 US elections will soon focus American attention on domestic issues. Everyone in the Balkans will be holding their breath to see if Donald Trump has a real chance of returning to the White House. If it looks good for him, Serbia will want to continue to pause the dialogue with Kosovo, as Trump was sympathetic to Belgrade’s territorial ambitions. If Pristina wants anything from the dialogue, it needs to get it soon.
Acknowledgement of abuses may be a non-starter
Listening to both Kosovo President Osmani and Prime Minister Kurti’s public statements, my sense is that they would both like Serbian President Vucic to acknowledge the abuses of the Milosevic regime in Kosovo in the 1990s. Vucic, who served in that regime, has been unwilling, both in public and in private. He suffers from a severe case of amnesia and “bothsideism.” Kurti, who spent time reading Sartre in a Serbian prison during the 1999 war, remembers well. Neither has a domestic political constituency that yearns for an agreement.
But Vucic’s acknowledgement of the Serbian effort to ethnically cleanse Albanians from Kosovo and of the thousands of rapes by Serbian forces would open the way to improved cooperation, as exhorted in the 2010 General Assembly resolution that launched the dialogue. Kurti would need to acknowledge Albanian abuses against Serbs and Roma, even if much smaller in number. Such acknowledgements would need to be coupled with as full accounting for missing people by both governments as possible. That would clear the way for exchange of bodies and provision for appropriate memorialization in both countries.
License plates should be easier
There should be room to resolve the issue that caused a brouhaha last fall: mutual acceptance of license plates. So far negotiations for a permanent solution have failed, due to Serbia’s refusal to allow Kosovo plates to enter the country with indications of where they originate. The current practice–covering state symbols on both Kosovo and Serbian plates before allowing entry–is a modest improvement on Serbia’s prior requirement that Kosovo plates be replaced with Serbian ones, but it is still wasteful and juvenile.
Accepting license plates and Kosovo documents is not the same as recognizing Kosovo as a sovereign state. The five non-recognizing members of the EU accept lots of Kosovo documents and also maintain diplomatic representation in Pristina. Serbia should do likewise.
Electricity is harder
Pristina wants the Serbs in northern Kosovo to start paying for electricity, which a Kosovo entity has provided free since 1999. This is reasonable, but if Pristina insists Belgrade may supply the electricity from Serbia, further detaching the northern municipalities from Pristina’s governance, an important Serbian objective. As tens of millions of euros are at issue, this one won’t be easy to resolve on its own. A broader financial settlement may be possible.
Hedging and bandwagoning
While these issues eat away at mutual confidence, Serbia has been re-arming itself and deploying forces near and around Kosovo. Belgrade tells Washington Serbian cooperation with NATO is much deeper and more important than cooperation with Russia. But the Defense Ministry vaunts a historical maximum in defense cooperation with Russia, which has provided fighter jets and tanks as well as lots of other goodies. Vucic has increasingly aligned himself politically and militarily with Moscow and Beijing, not only on Ukraine. He claims non-alignment, but hedging is difficult in an era of geopolitical tension. He has tilted way over to the East. Dugin knows of what he speaks.
By contrast, Kosovo has no hedging option so bandwagons with NATO, which is still responsible for defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pristina’s army, which the US and UK mentor, is slated to be fully operational in 2027. It will be NATO compatible. A few of its soldiers have already deployed with the Americans. Kosovo quickly welcomed Afghan and now Ukrainian refugees, aligns solidly with sanctions on Russia, and is providing de-mining training to Ukrainians.
So the dialogue is not just between Kosovo and Serbia, but also between West and East. As Lenin put it: “show me who your friends are, and I will tell you what you are.”
Maybe smaller is better for now
The situation is not “ripe” for a big agreement. Before 2010, when the more political version was launched, the dialogue focused on small, “technical” issues like Kosovo’s international calling code, return of cultural artifacts, and mutual recognition of diplomas. Maybe it is time to go back to those–including missing persons and license plates. Another possibility is a regional negotiation of basic principles of mutual behavior, which are sorely lacking. Neither idea is as grand as “normalizing relations” or mutual recognition. But maybe smaller is better for now.
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The Senator needs to go deeper
Senator Murphy of Connecticut is just back from a quick trip to the still troubled parts of the Balkans (Belgrade, Sarajevo, and Pristina). He has written a literate and interesting account of the trip. Would that all Codels could do likewise.
The Bosnia mistake
That said, I think he makes serious mistakes. Jasmin Mujatovic has pointed out one on Twitter:
Very specifically, Sen. Murphy frames the scene in the Bosnian presidency as a kind of war of each against all. Clearly, not the case, as it’s Dzaferovic & Komsic attempting to hold the line vs. Dodik’s constant provocations & threats, as D’s own subsequent comments make clear. Bosnia is not a land on intractable, tribal feuds. It’s a place where a decades-long attempt to break up the country along sectarian lines by extremist actors, backed by Belgrade primarily but now also Russia, is being necessarily opposed. Let’s be clear about the politics of it.
Jasmin is also concerned that the Senator is too chummy with Serbian President Vucic.
The Kosovo mistake
The root of that chumminess is clear in the Senator’s account: Vucic often dines with Murphy when the President is in Washington. It would be hard for Murphy to have the same relationship with Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti, who is Vucic’s functional equivalent in Kosovo. Kurti has not been permitted an official visit to Washington since taking office. This is because Washington blames him for the lack of progress in the dialogue with Belgrade. The Senator seems to agree with that characterization.
I don’t. The only obstacle to achieving what the Senator identifies as the main objective of the dialogue–mutual recognition by the two sovereign and independent states–is Serbia’s refusal to consider the proposition. The dialogue would just be a normal conversation between neighbors except for that.
Irredentism in the Balkans is just as bad as in Ukraine
Serbia has offered only one alternative to mutual recognition: Belgrade de jure control (either through a land swap or through an Association of Serb Municipalities with executive powers) over the Serb-majority population north of the Ibar river in Kosovo. This irredentist ambition is just as dangerous in the Balkans as Russia’s comparable ambition to control the Luhansk and Donetsk provinces of Ukraine. And Serbia’s irredentism is less well-founded. The pre-war population of the largest and most important municipalilty north of the Ibar was not majority Serb. Most Serbs in Kosovo still live south of the Ibar.
There is no sign in the Senator’s account of his visit to Belgrade that he admonished Vucic for his territorial ambitions in Kosovo or his support for Milorad Dodik’s secessionism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I hope that when he convenes his task force in the Congress, the Senator will ensure that these issues are top priority in the discussion. They should also be on the menu when he next dines with President Vucic. The Senator needs to go deeper.
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The Ukraine war creates risks and opportunities for Kosovo
I gave interviews late last week to two Kosovo outlets. Both were published in the past couple of days:
Arbnore Zhushi, Bota Sot:
Q: Do you believe that with the arrival of Christopher Hill as US Ambassador to Serbia, a final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia will be accelerated?
A: I might hope so, but we’ll have to wait and see. There are no signs yet that either Serbia or Kosovo s read for a “final” agreement.
Q: Seeing the Russian aggression in Ukraine, Kosovo is wanting to join the EU and NATO, how realistic are these demands?
A: They are realistic in the long-term. The right strategy is to implement the requirements of membership, then wait for the political window to open.
Q: How did you see the developments of the war in Ukraine so far?
A: Putin is losing in strategic terms even when Russian forces advance on the ground. Ukrainians will not accept Russian rule or hegemony. NATO has strengthened and unified in response to the invasion. Russia will remain under sanctions for a long time and lacks the resources needed to rebuild in Ukraine.
Q: How do you define the reaction of NATO and the West to the Russian aggression in Ukraine and do you think that enough is being done in this direction to help the Ukrainian people?
A: NATO and the West have reacted well. They need to do more, but the will seems strong.
Q: What will be the end of Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine, what do you think will be the scenario?
A: I hope the war in Ukraine will end with the downfall of Putin in Moscow.
Q: US President Joe Biden says Putin should leave. How close to collapse is the Russian leader actually?
A: We won’t know until the day after. There is no sign of sufficient rebellion yet in the security services, the oligarchs, or among the public.
Q: The Prime Minister of Kosovo Albin Kurti is worried that the conflict in Ukraine will affect Kosovo as well. How much of such a risk actually exists?
A: The risk is serious. If Russia succeeds in partitioning Ukraine it will encourage Serbia to once again pursue the partition of Kosovo.
Q: Serbia has not imposed sanctions on Russia for the occupation of Ukraine, how do you assess the attitude of the EU and the US towards Serbia in this case? Should Serbia be sanctioned, because it did not become an ally of the West in imposing sanctions on Russia, and its diplomacy continues to cooperate openly with Russia?
A: Serbia has chosen to side with Russia. The Americans need to recognize this and do what they can in response.
Q: Another crisis expert, Mr Bugajski, has called for talks with Serbia to be suspended because it is a party to Russia and has refused to impose sanctions on Russia. Kosovo has imposed sanctions on Russia and has adopted a resolution in the Assembly. How do you comment on this?
A: I think Kosovo should continue to talk with Serbia, mostly to avoid being blamed for failure of the Dialogue. There is little hope it will produce much under current conditions.
Q: If a Ukraine-Russia agreement is reached, which nevertheless favors Russian interests in Ukraine, such as the remaining Crimea under Russia, the recognition of a special status of the Donbas (or Luhansk and Donetsk provinces), could it complicate Kosovo’s position in the talks, and which seemed more favorable as a general war continues in Ukraine, due to the positions of Kosovo and Serbia towards the war there?
A: Let’s wait and see what the Ukrainians will agree to. My reading is that President Biden is aiming for a complete defeat of Russia in Ukraine, provided that is what the Ukrainians are willing to fight for.
Sokol Berisha, Periskopi:
Q: The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is in the middle of nowhere. Do you belive that this blockade is in favour of Serbia more than in Kosovo (taking into consideration that the dialogue is crucial for Kosovo if we mention the fact the “5” EU states do not still recognize Kosovo and from the fact that Kosovo is not member of almost any important international organizations). What is your assessment regarding the importance of the dialogue?
A: The dialogue is important to Kosovo for three reasons. It puts Kosovo on an equal and symmetrical basis with Serbia. It has the potential to resolve many outstanding problems between the two countries. When it goes well it pleases the Europeans and Americans.
Q: Should the Kosovo side be more interested in the dialogue? Is Serbia benefiting from the “status quo” in this process? Although it seems like we- the people of Kosovo- are being isolated from “status qou”.
A: Serbia has played the blame game well. While offering little in the dialogue, it has convinced the EU and US that the stalemate is mostly the fault of Pristina. I thought Kosovo’s non-aggression proposal was a good way of countering that impression. Kosovo needs to come to the table with more ideas and more openness to discussion of others’ ideas. In the end, agreement will depend on whether the quid pro quo is an advantageous one. But the process is important as well.
Q: Kosovo’s isolation- without visa liberlisation and no new recognition. Is the blockade in the dialogue to be blame for this?
A: The stalemate in the dialogue doesn’t help,. But visa liberalization and new recognitions were blocked well before the current stalemate in the dialogue.
Q: The Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, has made it clear the Association of Serb Municipalities will not be established? According to his public statements, he has not left any other option that would lead to a final solution to the dialogue? What would be your recommendation for the Government of Kosovo for this issue?
A: I share the concern that the Association should not become an executive body or create a “Republika Srpska” inside Kosovo. But I think Pristina should look for a formula within the Constitutional Court’s parameters.
Q: Since it seems like every option in the dialogue is almost cancelled, where do you see the light at the end of the tunnel?
A: I think the problem may be a generational one. But I also think there are things to be done now that will improve the situation in the future. First and foremost are improved relations between the Serb population of Kosovo and the Pristina government, starting with implementation of the Constitutional Court decision on the monastery property in Decan/Decani but going far beyond that. Vucic has given the Kosovo Serbs reason to be loyal to Belgrade. Pristina has to give them reason to be loyal to Pristina. The Serb presence in Kosovo is a vital element in its independent statehood. Any Kosovo patriot should want the rights, property, and presence of Serbs to be vigorously protected.
Q: Recently there have been some rising voices about a possible conflict in the Balkans following the war in Ukraine. Kosovo’s interior minister last week said that the police officers have been attacked in an “act of terrorism” close to the border with Serbia. Do you believe that our region can be in danger of another armed conflicted?
A: Yes, I do. Serbia is a de facto ally of Russia, with which it shares autocratic pretensions and irredentist ambitions. If Moscow is successful in Donbas, you can expect Serbia to try military force in northern Kosovo. Kosovo should be seeking, and the Americans should be transferring, Javelins and other defensive weapons to the Kosovo Security Force, so that by 2027 Kosovo will be able to defend itself without a KFOR presence.
Q: Our leaders like President Osmani and the Prime Minister Kurti are giving interviews for some prestigious news channels (such as CNN and Sky News). Ironically our doors are open for them. On the other hand, Prime Minister Kurti has not paid yet an official visit to the United States and this postponement is being looked at with great concern from the public opinion in Kosovo. What is your opinion about this?
A: Your President and Prime Minister merit being heard in the international media. They are doing a good job there. But on the question of a visit to the U.S., you’ll have to ask the Prime Minister and the Americans. I am pleased to recall that Albin spoke at Johns Hopkins, where I am a professor, many years ago, as has President Vucic. I would like to see Prime Minister Kurti back in the U.S., but such visits usually entail negotiation and conditions before they can take place.
Q: Ex-Swiss prosecutor Dick Marty, whose report was key in establishing KSC (Kosovo Specialist Chambers), has been under armed guard for nearly a year-and-a-half following death threats he believes originate from Serbia to put the blame on the Kosovars. How do you explain that this information came out recently even though it had happened some months ago? Can these claims have any impact on the overall process of Kosovo Specialist Chambers?
A: I don’t know why this news came out recently and I don’t know who is behind the death threats. Marty’s report was highly favorable to Serbia’s perspective. The Kosovo Specialist Chambers should proceed, like any respectable court, without regard to current events but focused instead on the charges and evidence before it. Its mandate should be extended to crimes committed inside Serbia, like the murder of the American Bytyqi brothers.
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