Tag: Balkans
What happens in Ukraine won’t stay in Ukraine
Here are the speaking notes I prepared on the Balkans and Middle East for this noon’s event on “What’s Next for Russia, Ukraine, and the World?” It featured Johns Hopkins/SAIS faculty:
Balkans
- American policy since the end of the Cold War has aimed at “Europe whole and free.” That isn’t going to happen so long as Putin or someone of his ilk rules Russia.
- Serbia claims neutrality, but its current leadership advocates a “Serbian world” akin to Putin’s “Russian world.” Belgrade also refuses to sanction Moscow. De facto Serbia is siding with Russia.
- That puts Bosnia, Kosovo, and NATO member Montenegro at risk from Serb irredentism.
- The line between democracies and autocracies will therefore also be drawn through the Balkans unless Belgrade changes its inclinations.
Countering Russian ambitions and Moscow’s Serb proxies needs higher priority:
- Deployment of an additional 500 EU troops to Bosnia is a good first step. But more are needed. The UK should augment that deployment. The US should beef up the military presence in Brcko and move some troops to northern Kosovo .
- The EU should tell Serbia that continued adherence to neutrality in Ukraine will result in a halt to the EU accession process.
- The US, UK, and EU should end bilateral and multilateral assistance to Republika Srpska and threaten likewise to Serbia.
Middle East
In the Middle East, the situation is more ambiguous. The interests at stake are less compelling and US policy more accepting of autocracy:
- Syria backs Russia and Iran is attempting the Chinese straddle (for peace but against Ukrainian membership in NATO). Egypt, the UAE, and other small Gulf monarchies are ducking for cover. Saudi Arabia so far has decided to enjoy high oil prices.
- Israel has backed Ukraine, but cautiously to avoid Russian retaliation against its interests in Syria and domestic political complications. Turkey has also backed Ukraine, less cautiously.
- Ultimately, the Middle East will go with the flow. If Russia is successful, no one in the Middle East will refuse to maintain diplomatic relations with a puppet government in Kyiv.
- OPEC+ will gain traction and Russian inroads in the Middle East will expand.
- But if Russia fails, the Middle East countries, democracies and autocracies alike, will claim they supported Ukraine, even if OPEC+ suffers irreparable damage.
Belgrade and Banja Luka should draw the right conclusions
Here is an interview I did for Rasim Belko of Patria, a Sarajevo-based news agency, on the repercussions of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Q: Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, you announced that Russia would continue to destabilize the Western Balkans. Will Putin go to war with the West in another hotbed such as the Balkans?
A: Russia isn’t going to war in the Balkans, where it has few military resources. But it uses its proxies there to de-stabilize: Serb nationalist organizations, Dodik, and Vucic.
The danger of Bosnian collapse is not the issue
Q: Bosnia and Herzegovina is a key focal point of the Balkans. In your opinion, how real is the danger of its collapse?
A: I would not call the risk “collapse.” There is a real possibility that Dodik will go too far and provoke a response.
Nor is NATO membership for now
Q: Many believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be admitted to NATO under a shortened procedure. Do you think it is realistic that this will happen soon?
A: The pre-condition is consensus within the Bosnian leadership. So far as I can tell, that does not exist. I doubt NATO be interested in enlargement so long as the crisis with Russia continues. But eventual NATO membership is certainly possible. I have no problem with Bosnians pressing for a “shortened procedure.”
Separatism demands a vigorous response
Q: Milorad Dodik’s separatist policy is Putin’s dangerous extended arm in the heart of Europe. Have the US and the EU missed the chance to address this threat to peace in the Western Balkans in time?
A: They have waited too long, but there is still time. What has been lacking is political will. The invasion of Ukraine may help the US, UK, and EU find the political will.
Q: Is it time for more concrete and stronger measures of the West towards such a policy of Milorad Dodik?
A: Yes. All international funding that finds its way to Republika Srpska should be cut off.
Serbia has reason to hesitate
Q: Serbia and its President Aleksandar Vučić sided with Russia, and at the same time they are continuously working from Serbia against the sovereignty and integrity of BiH. In your opinion, does Europe have grounds for fear of a Serbian invasion of BiH, like Putin on Ukraine?
A: Nothing about the Russian invasion of Ukraine so far should encourage Serbia. Even Milosevic opted not to intervene openly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I imagine Vucic will not want to take the risk.
Q: How do you see the outcome around Ukraine and what are the possible consequences for Europe, and especially in relation to the Western Balkans?
A: A quick Russian victory in Ukraine would have been bad news for the Balkans, as it would have encouraged Serb irredentism. In addition, many Serbs in Republika Srpska and in northern Kosovo would welcome an invasion more than the Ukrainians did. That said, things have gone so badly so far for Russia that even a victory would not be very rewarding. And Western solidarity has been strong. Belgrade and Banja Luka should be able to draw the right conclusions.
Stevenson’s army, February 26
-WH wants Ukraine supplemental.
– Administration debates arming a Ukrainian insurgency.
– Former CIA official describes such an insurgency.
– NYT sees Russian attack slowed.
– NYT sees pro-Russian sentiment online.
Good background: WaPo ticktock on Biden actions in 2 weeks before the invasion
– NYT annotates Putin war speech.
For people under 30, most of Europe [Balkans excepted] has been at peace, democratic, with freedom of movement of people and goods. That era has ended. We’re back to 19th century politics with 21st century weapons. The first sad lesson about Ukraine that comes to me is what the Indian defense minister said right after the Gulf War in 1991: “Never fight the U.S. without nuclear weapons.” Ukraine surrendered theirs in return for security guarantees from the US and Russia.
On domestic politics, see this centrist Democratic critique of the party’s direction.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Geopolitics will take its revenge
One thing is clear this morning: Russian President Putin has chosen war as an instrument of national policy. He has been unequivocal: Ukraine is not a real state, it should not be allowed to choose its own allies, and Russian security interests require that it be under Moscow’s control. The blah-blah about genocide against Russian speakers is nonsense. There is no evidence for it. Putin is attacking Ukraine today because he wants to and can.
Fog of war means we need to await the outcome
Ukraine will be defending itself, without allies. Kyiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, and other cities have been attacked. Civilians are streaming west to areas they hope will be relatively peaceful. It is hard to miss the analogy to Hitler’s March 1938 Anschluss against Austria, which Fiona Hill noted yesterday on NPR. Most Ukrainians will not welcome the Russians, but their army is far weaker than Russia’s. If the outcome the balance of forces decides the outcome, it will be in Moscow’s favor.
But will to fight and persistence are important factors as well. We just don’t know how strongly the Ukrainians will resist and how long that resistance will last. Putin has signaled that his forces will be brutal, but Ukrainians in the past have proven remarkably resilient, including against the Soviet-perpetrated Holodomor famine that Stalin imposed in the early 1930s. Some of the people fighting now will be descendants of Ukrainians who resisted collectivization then.
We are still in the fog of war and will need to wait to learn the outcome.
Western sanctions are vigorous but won’t have immediate effect
Europe, the UK, and the US are reacting with strong sanctions and in a far more unified way than many had expected just a few weeks ago. Russian banks, oligarchs, and the state will be cut off from Western funding. The Nordstream 2 pipeline to carry natural as from Russia to Germany is suspended if not defunct. The West will be blocking advanced technology from transfer to Moscow.
None of this will change Putin’s mind. He has already taken sanctions into account. Rarely do economic sanctions quickly change any autocrat’s mind about security issues. It is only when you negotiate relief from sanctions, not when you impose them, that you have any real hope of getting what you want. We are witnessing that in the Iran deal negotiations right now.
The world should be on alert
Russia’s irredentist war on Ukraine should alert everyone worldwide to the possibility other autocrats will seek to enlarge their borders, citing cultural affinity, historic claims, or humanitarian goals. In the post-Soviet space, that means all the former republics, but it also extends to the Balkans. There Kosovo as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina need worry about Serb revanchism.
Moscow could also be thinking about going beyond Ukraine, if this initial invasion is successful. The Baltic members of NATO understand this perfectly well and did their best to arm Ukraine against Russia. They are also welcoming additional American and other NATO forces.
Farther afield, Taiwan needs to worry about China, whose claim to sovereignty over the island is stronger than Russia’s claims against Ukraine. Pakistan should worry about its Durrand Line border with Afghanistan, which even the American-supported governments in Kabul contested. India needs to worry about its longstanding border dispute with China. There are dozens of other border disputes in Asia that could be aggravated if one country or another decides to settle them by force.
The revenge of geopolitics
A geopolitical world in which military power decides issues of territorial control may eventually reach some sort of equilibrium, but it could take a long time. If things go well for Russia, it may be decades before the world settles down. But if things go well for Ukraine, the Russian Federation will be in big trouble. Its people won’t appreciate defeat and will try to change their government. Its many minorities will seek their own territorial control.
Geopolitics will take its revenge, one way or the other.
PS: The criminal falsely citing law:
The voice of reason, to which Putin will not listen:
Convergence is desirable but not magical
My SAIS colleague Ed Joseph argues that recognition of Kosovo by the four NATO member non-recognizers would weaken Serbia’s position and improve the negotiating position of Pristina in its dialogue with Belgrade. He is correct about that. Even one or two additional recognitions would be helpful. All four would open the door of NATO membership to Kosovo.
Wrong about Serbia’s reaction
But he is unfortunately wrong about Serbia’s reaction to such recognitions. They will not happen in a “big bang,” all together. At best they will happen over several years. And NATO membership won’t be feasible until 2027 at the earliest, when Kosovo is scheduled to have a fully qualified army. As recognitions happen, Belgrade will stiffen its resistance, not soften it.
The evidence for this is plain and apparent. As Ed emphasizes, Serbia regards Kosovo as its most important security risk. Each additional recognition will raise the alarm level in Belgrade. Serbia will intensify its opposition to recognition with the remaining non-recognizers. Russia and China will back this resistance. The EU will do nothing to soften it, as there will still be one hardline non-recognizer member state, Cyprus. Nicosia will prevent any consensus within the EU to shift away from its “status-neutral” position on Kosovo, which in any case is essential if the EU is to continue convening the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue.
NATO membership is not more important to Kosovo than UN membership
Ed also states that “A pathway to NATO membership is far more meaningful for Kosovo than UN membership.” It is unquestionably easier, since Cyprus is not a member of NATO. But it is just as unquestionably not more meaningful. Remember: NATO-led forces already guarantee Kosovo’s sovereignty and terrritorial integrity, which is what NATO is all about. This seems to be the crux of Ed’s argument:
Without the leverage to sustain its isolation of Kosovo, Belgrade’s strategic calculus will change. The Russian and Chinese vetoes of Kosovo at the United Nations Security Council will be of negligible value on what Belgrade deems its “main political-security challenge.” No longer will the Vucic regime be able to prosecute its aggressive “non-recognition” campaign against Kosovo, or leverage Kosovo to advance ‘Serb World’, or dodge accountability for the regime’s assault on Serbian democracy. With no express demand from the West to recognize Kosovo – and no meaningful backing from Moscow or Beijing on Belgrade’s most important issue – the regime will struggle to exploit convergence domestically, and struggle to explain to citizens how it squandered Serbian leverage.
Even if Serbia were not the home of inat (read “spite, stubborness, persistence”), this would be fantasy. Belgrade’s strategic calculus will not change, at least so long as it is governed by people who claim sovereignty over Kosovo. The Russian and Chinese vetoes will increase in value, as they will be the only insurance against UN membership, which is the universally established symbol of sovereignty in our world. I can’t see any reason why Belgrade would drop its nonrecognition campaign, but even if it did that would make no difference. Serbia’s claim to sovereignty over Kosovo would not be abandoned. NATO troops in Kosovo haven’t changed Belgrade’s attitude, so why would a few more NATO member recognitions or even NATO membership for Kosovo?
Recognitions are desirable but not magical
Let me make clear. I’m all in favor of getting non-recognizers to recognize Kosovo, especially the NATO and EU non-recognizers. Each recognition will improve Kosovo’s position, including in the dialogue with Serbia. But Belgrade will not drop its antirecognition campaign or its opposition to Kosovo membership in the UN. To the contrary, those efforts will be redoubled. What Ed calls “convergence” is desirable, but not magical.
Recognition can weaken Serbia’s leverage
Edward Joseph, a Senior Fellow at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute, writes:
It’s the Newtonian law of policy debate: every idea that challenges orthodoxy produces an equal and opposite reaction.
We, the co-authors of the recent SAIS-Wilson Center report, ‘From Crisis to Convergence: A Strategy to Tackle Instability at its Source’, welcome debate on our approach, which has generated at least 16 articles, interviews and two controversies, along with interest in key capitals. At the very least, it represents an original way of thinking about a region where the West has struggled for too long, despite holding the strategic advantage.
We will host a live critique of our recent SAIS-Wilson Center report – along with an assessment of just how bad the situation in the Balkans is — on-line this Tuesday, 15 February at 9:30AM ET. Sign up here.
This event will feature leading experts from: Bosnia-Herzegovina – Srecko Latal (Balkans Crossroads); Kosovo — Engjellushe Morina (ECFR); Serbia – Igor Bandovic (BCSP); Albania – Albert Rakipi (AIIS.) They will explore: ‘Balkans 2022: How Bad Can It Get? Is a Breakthrough Possible?’
The report’s co-authors — who hail from the countries most affected by the strategy, including two respected experts from Serbia and Kosovo – will respond.
One of the more thoughtful critiques of our report appeared in Dan Serwer’s Peacefare post of 19 January. To summarize, Dan supports convergence by the European states that don’t recognize Kosovo, and, critically, he acknowledges the threat from “Serbian irredentism” in the Balkans. Dan then questions the impact of convergence – even NATO membership for Kosovo – on Belgrade’s policies. Instead of altering Serbia’s “strategic calculus,” as we state, Dan believes it will “incentivize Serbia in the opposite direction.”
Anti-democratic Serbia is the problem
Dan’s post raises essential and under-examined questions: what drives Serbia’s posture in the Balkans? Why does only Serbia (and its proxies) reject the liberal Western order for the region?
Let me begin with a challenge to Peacefare readers:
How do you explain that more than three-decades after the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia began, the region is not just stagnant – but going backwards, with open talk of “war” from responsible international and regional figures alike? Bear in mind that, unlike in Ukraine, the US, NATO and EU hold the strategic advantage in the Balkans.
We give our answer in the report. The Balkans is not a ‘morass’ of intractable ethno-national tensions. Instead, those ethno-national tensions – which stand in the way of the fight against corruption and the fight for rule of law and democracy – are a function of two factors: national power and strategic orientation.
And that’s the crux of the problem: the largest Western Balkans state – Serbia – has polities in four neighboring states, and is oriented towards the illiberal powers: Russia and China. In power for a decade, the Vucic regime has methodically rolled back Serbia’s weak democracy. The regime is protected within the EU by the leading European illiberal power: Hungary.
In sum, no matter how many Special Envoys are sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, fundamental reform will remain out of reach as long as this condition in Serbia continues. To put it another way, don’t expect democratic progress in BiH or its neighbors, with an anti-democratic Serbia.
Serbia’s leverage
But that only addresses Serbia’s strategic orientation. Where does the Vucic regime get the power to subvert its neighbors – and confound US and EU diplomats? Why do capable, dedicated US officials assail corruption and organized crime in Bosnia, Albania, and Kosovo – but are generally quiet on official corruption in Serbia? Why do US officials in Serbia repeatedly laud a regime that openly – on billboards – promotes Beijing, and backs Moscow over Ukraine as, “the political and economic leader” in the region? Why was Serbia invited to the ‘Summit for Democracy’ after US officials stated clearly that it would not be invited? Why did the EU give Serbia a pass on rule of law standards?
The source of the leverage
We believe the answer is clear: Serbia has leverage over Kosovo, and through it, over the US and EU. The source of that leverage is the four NATO non-recognizers. The best way to understand Serbian leverage is by comparison with Bulgaria and North Macedonia. As an EU member, Sofia can unilaterally block the opening of Skopje’s EU accession negotiations. Similarly, Belgrade can unilaterally block Pristina’s pathway to NATO and the EU – even though it’s not a member of either organization. The reason: the non-recognizers have, effectively, handed their proxy to Belgrade: ‘we won’t recognize Kosovo, until Serbia does.’
Kosovo cannot advance until Belgrade, with the proxy of the non-recognizers, says so. The status quo – no settlement between Pristina and Belgrade – inflicts pain on only one side. Indeed, the status quo is beneficial for the Vucic regime as it insulates it from Western scrutiny.
In short, the West is participating in Vucic’s charade. Belgrade’s main aim in the EU-led Dialogue is simply to avoid being blamed for lack of progress, so that the Vucic regime can continue the pretense of interest in making EU reforms and becoming a member. Meanwhile, the regime draws Western praise, even as Vucic – through others – promotes what they call the ‘Serb World.’
The way forward
The way forward is also clear: Western strategy should focus on eroding Serbia’s leverage, reducing the illiberal Vucic regime’s ability to project its destructive vision in the region and domestically. Rather than “incentivizing Serbia in the wrong direction,” we see precisely the opposite: reducing regime power incentivizes it to scale back its destructive aspirations and cooperate. In other words, this is about power dynamics, not incentives. EU membership has incentives ample enough to attract Serbia’s neighbors, Albania and North Macedonia. Tirana and Skopje are desperate simply to have the same right that Belgrade already enjoys and exploits.
Eroding Serbian leverage is not a binary event, i.e. either full recognition by the four NATO non-recognizers, or nothing. Instead, we see Belgrade’s obsessive bid to isolate and weaken Kosovo – evidenced in its own words and actions – as proof of its vulnerability. That’s why senior Serbian officials run nervously to Greece and Spain to shore up – as officials openly state – non-recognition of Kosovo. That explains why at a time of grave European crisis, Serbian Foreign Minister Nikola Selakovic last week visited – of all places – Equatorial Guinea! – praising the country for not recognizing Kosovo. Same with the visits to dangerous countries like Iran and obscure ones like Suriname – all mainly in the name of isolating Kosovo.
Our strategy
Our strategy is entirely pragmatic. Steps towards ‘convergence’ beginning, for example, with returning Slovak and Spanish troops to KFOR, bringing Kosovo into NATO’s Partnership for Peace, aided by continuing movement from Greece, and steps by Romania as well, will have immediate impact on the regime’s posture. Greece’s role is particularly significant because Athens has its own clearly stated strategic reasons for moving toward recognition of Kosovo.
The Russian and Chinese vetoes in the Security Council are no match in this regard. A pathway to NATO membership is far more meaningful for Kosovo than UN membership.
Let’s finally bring the curtain down on the three-decade crisis over Yugoslavia, where it began – in Kosovo. Convergence is the way. Most current approaches, including the fight against corruption, and building a regional common market, continue under convergence — empowered by a US and EU that can finally apply the same standards across the region. Join us on Tuesday to hear how experts from the region process this argument!