Tag: Balkans
Long live the dialogue, even if it is stalled!
Two interviews I gave last month were published in Kosovo, in Serbian and Albanian respectively, over the weekend.
Veljko Nestorovic of Kosovo Online did this one:
Q: Was 2021 an unsuccessful year when it comes to the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina?
A: Yes the dialogue is stalled and will continue to be stalled at least until after the Serbian elections in 2022.
Q: With the appointment of the UK Special Envoy, as well as two US Envoys for the Western Balkans, will the US and the UK take the lead in dialogue?
A: The US continues to want the EU to lead, but I think both the UK and US will be more prepared to work in tandem with the EU than was at times true in the past.
Q: How do you view US sanctions. Are you expecting new names on the US list?
A: Yes, I imagine there will be more people named.
Q: Prime Minister Kurti has repeatedly stated that the issue of the missing must be resolved. At the moment, about 1,600 people are listed as missing, but in addition to Belgrade, given that one-third of the missing are non-Albanians, most Serbs, does Pristina have a responsibility in the search for those missing?
A: Yes of course. Pristina should be accounting for any missing on which it has information. That should include any victims of the KLA or of other Albanian armed groups.
Q: Is there a possibility for an agreement and a new meeting between Kurti and Vučić during 2022?
A: There is always a possibility, but I doubt it before the Serbian elections.
Q: Do you expect visa liberalization for Kosovo in 2022?
A: I’d be foolish to expect it, but I do hope it will happen in 2022. The French and Dutch need to tell Pristina why they have hesitated and give Pristina an opportunity to satisfy them.
Q: Do you expect a greater role of the USA in the Western Balkans during 2022 when it comes to dialogue, but also BiH [Bosnia]?
A: The US is already more focused on BiH than it has been in the past and will likely continue its diplomatic efforts there in 2022. But let me be clear: the right direction for the US should be more respect for individual rights in BiH. Nothing the US does should strengthen the stranglehold of ethnic nationalist political parties on power. They are the problem, not the solution. A more civic state would be a more functional state in BiH.
Besnik Gashi of Lajmi.net did this one:
Q: The first issue that I would like to discuss is the steps that Kosovo has taken in recent years in the framework of the dialogue with Serbia. I would like to ask what do you consider to be the most progressive and regressive agreements since the beginning of the technical dialogue between the two countries, where they were mediated by Brussels?
A: I’m not going to answer your question, for a good reason. There is no definitive evaluation of the agreements and their impact, despite the laudable efforts of civil society organizations in both Kosovo and Serbia.
This is not good. I believe the US and EU should regularly issue progress reports on implementation, obstacles to implementation, and impact. These should be based on close cooperation with civil society and government organizations in both countries.
Speaking more broadly, I think the dialogue has had a positive impact on Kosovo’s international standing by putting it on an equal and symmetrical basis with Serbia in the EU context, even though it has had a negative impact by allowing Serbia to encourage countries to delay recognition while the dialogue proceeds.
Q: Since we are talking about Brussels, it should be noted the achievement of the Agreement on the formation of the Association of Municipalities by Kosovo is facing full opposition from the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti. According to him, the agreement has been achieved by previous governments and is endangering the “Bosnianization” of Kosovo, in the sense of building a new Republika Srpska.
What is your opinion about the Association and the opposition that is being made to it by the Prime Minister?
A: The Prime Minister is doing something I think is a good negotiating tactic: holding back on Serbia’s top priority because Serbia is holding back on Kosovo’s top priorities, namely recognition and UN membership. The Association issue would look very different if Serbia were prepared to recognize Kosovo and tell Moscow and Beijing to allow Pristina into the UN.
Q: On the other hand, the US has issued a sort of ultimatum to Kosovo to reach a comprehensive agreement with Serbia during the term of the current Kosovo government, which culminates in mutual recognition of the two countries. What do you think, can the mentioned agreement be finalized within 3 or 4 years?
A: It can be finalized in 3 or 4 months once there is the political will on both sides to make the necessary compromises. But there is no sign at all of that from Serbia, and little of it from Kosovo.
Q: There has also been rumours of active US involvement in the dialogue, or even direct, in order to speed up a final agreement. Do you think such a thing should happen?
A: It can happen, but if it triggers Russian involvement it would not be a good thing.
Q: The US, namely the U.S Department of the Treasury, has recently targeted smuggling and criminal groups in Kosovo, some of them politicians. Do you think that there is a example of similar actions that the US has implemented in other countries and will follow them in the case of Kosovo, as well as whether the politicians of the countries in the region can be spared?
A: My understanding is that the US sanctions for corruption are and will continue to be global, not just the Balkans. No one guilty should be spared.
Q: In an interview last year, you told that Grenell is not a friend of Kosovars. Does this opinion still stand, given that Grenell during this year, following the diplomacy in the shadow of Kosovo, came to visit and said that he would take care of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue and the implementation of the Washington Agreement?
A: Grenell should be avoided by anyone in either Serbia or Kosovo who wishes the dialogue well. He is a grifter, not a diplomat. The Washington Agreement isn’t worth much more than the two separate pieces of paper it was typed on.
Q: We are nearly in the end of this year and next year is expected to be more promising for Kosovars when it comes to visa liberalization. Hope has been raised with the arrival of a new chancellery in Germany, which in their political program for the Western Balkans also envisage visa liberalization for Kosovo. Do you think that Germany will be active enough to convince the skeptical countries of the EU Council?
A: I certainly hope so. Kosovo merits the visa waiver. Germany is the de facto leader of the EU in the Balkans. Berlin needs to make its weight felt.
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Want to make an impression? Send the airborne
Last month’s threat by Serb political boss Milorad Dodik is fading into the holiday mist. No one who watches Bosnian poitics should relax. He has made it clear his goal is de facto secession of Republika Srpska. This regional entity’s authority extends to 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory.
Dodik is moving small step by small step. Each time he slices the salami to get closer to what he wants. Last month the RS National Assembly convened to begin planning for withdrawal starting in six months from Bosnia’s security, justice, and taxation institutions. These were all established in the aftermath of the 1992-95 war that ended in the Dayton peace agreements. American efforts “to walk Bosnia back from the cliff” at least made Dodik stop at the edge.
The plan is to eviscerate the minimal Bosnian state
He is unlikely to step much farther back or to declare independence. Dodik’s plan is to eviscerate the Bosnian state, minimal though it is. He wants the RS to withdraw from Sarajevo’s vital institutions under a veil of legislative approval. He would then be all-powerful and unaccountable in his own fief. Failing that, he wants his threat of secession to prevent any further strengthening of Sarajevo governance.
Russia will support Dodik’s moves and try to protect him. Moscow is already denying the authority of the High Representative in Bosnia, who is responsible for civilian implementation of the Dayton agreements. Serbian President Vucic will be more circumspect, as he fears EU and US disapproval. But his minions, including Interior Minister Vulin, cheer more openly. The RS is an important component of what they call the “Serbian world.” That would be a Greater Serbian state incorporating neighboring Serb populations.
The ethnic authoritarian paladin
Dodik is the embodiment of the ethnic authoritarian ideal. He started political life as a relative moderate in the Bosnian context. But he has become a denier of crimes (including genocide) the RS committed during the 1990s war. He is now a champion of Serb exceptionalism, a subservient puppet of Moscow, and a deeply corrupted pocketer of ill-gotten gains. The Dayton agreements divide the Bosnian pie along ethnic lines. That reduces political competition and incentivizes predatory behavior. Most people in Washington and Brussels understand that Dodik is irredeemable. So their diplomats work hard instead to get Serbian President Vucic to restrain him, offering mostly carrots and few sticks.
That is no longer working as well as once it did. Like his genocidaire predecesssor Radovan Karadzic, Dodik regards himself as a political competitor to Vucic in Belgrade, not just a provincial party chief in Banja Luka. The time is coming for a showdown between these Serb paladins.
Vucic is unquestionably more powerful, but Dodik is more useful to the Russians. They would regard de facto RS secession as a useful precedent and bargaining chip for breakaway provinces in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Moscow would also enjoy derailing a Western triumph of the 1990s unipolar moment: the negotiated end of the Bosnian war.
What is to be done?
Dodik is making it impossible for the US and EU to continue ignoring his moves towards de facto independence. The question is: what can they do about it? Next time he slices the salami, how should they react?
First, the EU and US need to nullify any decisions in the RS Assembly that contradict the Dayton accords and subsequent decisions of the High Representative. This the HiRep can do with the stroke of a pen. But then what? How do his decisions get enforced?
Once upon a time, the HiRep would not have hesitated to remove Dodik from office. But is that any longer feasible? Another possibility is his arrest for insurrection against the Bosnian state, of which he is blatantly guilty. But Bosnia’s prosecutors seem unwilling and likely incapable of doing that.
The US and EU will need to act
If nothing can be done inside Bosnia, then the burden falls to Washington, Brussels, and European capitals (if the EU fails to act jointly). They will need to levy punishing sanctions on Dodik personally, all members of the RS Assembly who vote for withdrawal from Bosnian institutions, and the RS institutionally, including an end to all World Bank and IMF as well as bilateral assistance and access to international financial markets. If the RS has de facto seceded from Bosnia, it shoud not benefit from grants or loans available to its sovereign. It would be rank hypocrisy to allow any international financiing or official development assistance to reach the RS.
There are other possible moves. Brussels and Washington could shut down RS representational offices. The international military presence, EUFOR, could move troops to the vital northeast town of Brcko while the UK and US deploy NATO troops there, to prevent any effort by either Sarajevo or Banja Luka to seize it. Want to make an impression? The British and Americans could arrive in the hundreds by parachute outside Banja Luka, in a NATO training exercise.
Dodik and any other politicians supporting de facto secession could be barred from Sarajevo and any requirements for Serb approval of Bosnian government actions there could be abrogated. Any funding for the RS from Sarajevo could stop. Bosnia could revert to its pre-war constitution, or devise a new one that erases the RS as well as the Federation and its cantons, relying on municipalities for local governance.
Dodik should not be ignored
This is an illustrative, not an exhaustive, list of options, not recommendations. The main point is that Brussels and Washington should no longer downplay or ignore Dodik’s moves. If they do, patriotic Bosnians, who were the main victims of the 1992-95 war, will take matters into their own hands, seizing Brcko before Dodik does.
That too, would mark a failure of Dayton, but one that would preserve the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as its multi-ethnicity. For anyone thinking democracy is a preferable system of government, it would be better than secession by genocide-denying political and ideological successors to Radovan Karadzic, bent on ethnic authoritarian rule with Moscow’s support and on creation of Milosevic’s Greater Serbia.
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Blunter would be better
In a tweet this morning, I called these words about the Western Balkan non-EU members harsh but true:
…they do not fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, despite an accession process that has lasted around 20 years: They have neither stable democratic institutions nor functioning market economies….Another factor…against early accession to the EU: their unwillingness to establish good neighbourly relations…German European policy should change course here and make it clearer that these states have no place in the EU without making efforts towards peaceful coexistence.
https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/german-foreign-policy-in-transition#fn-d57704e4133
Of course there are nuances. Here I’ll try to explore some of them.
None of the Balkan states, even the current EU members, has achieved a truly independent, honest, judiciary. I’m hard put to distinguish among them, as is the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index. But there Kosovo and North Macedonia are headed in the right direction and Serbia in the wrong direction, which jibes with my own impression. Montenegro isn’t rated, but wouldn’t depart much from the regional average. Albania is worse than that average, despite decades of reform efforts.
When it comes to freedom and democracy, I depart from Freedom House’s rating of Kosovo as less free and democratic than the other non-EU members, which are all clustered together. Kosovo has perhaps the freest press in the region, has repeatedly seen alternation in power (unfortunately viewed as instability by many outside observers), and has a relatively free economy. Corruption is a big problem (one the current government is targeting) but it is also a big problem in the other countries.
As for the other countries, Serbia lacks a free press and power is concentrated in the hands of its current president, who has drifted towards autocracy rather than democracy. The most significant institutional governance issues are in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which at Dayton was given a constitution that makes democratic governance impossible. One person one vote is inconsistent with the group rights that the warring parties insisted on at Dayton and afterwards. Montenegro and Macedonia have both struggled with alternation in power, but both have managed it, with some violence. Albania has improved its electoral performance and has a vigorous political competition between government and opposition.
As for good neighborly relations, the main issue is between Serbia and Kosovo, since the former does not recognize the latter and has even recently menaced the use of military force. Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo (the first three NATO members and the last defended by NATO-led forces) are for now getting along pretty well, partly because they are all feeling the heat from Serbia’s Russian-sponsored re-armament. Kosovo has issues also with Bosnia and Herzegovina, but those are entirely derivative of Belgrade’s non-recognition. SWP would have done better to point the finger towards culpability rather than resort to generalities.
All that said, the SWP basically has it right. The Western Balkan countries are all looking for easy ways into the EU, but even those that have adopted and implemented much of the acquis communautaire do not completely meet the Copenhagen criteria. Besides, the EU member states have gotten more particular about accession, due in part to their own domestic politics (and economics) and in part to the poor performance of some of the more recent members, especially Bulgaria and Romania. The reforms the EU wants should be the reforms aspiring members want as well. The benefits of EU membership largely precede accession for aspirants who are serious. Germany and the EU should indeed get blunter about this.
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Friends in need can get you in big trouble
A young colleague asked some questions this week. I replied. I’ll have a longer piece on these issues and what should be done about them in the next day or two:
Q: What do you believe Dodik realistically hopes to gain from his increasingly alarming proposals to pull RS from the federal government and to establish parallel institutions in Banja Luka? As many have noted, complete secession is highly unlikely. Thus, is he trying to erode federal institutions to gain concessions for greater RS autonomy?
A: I wouldn’t rule out secession, if circumstances permit, but even if they don’t he is trying to achieve de facto independence.
Q: Is it possible that Dodik, as he’s done in the past, is making such claims in an effort to posture for the upcoming elections in 2022?
A: Sure, but more or less democratically validated politicians come under a lot of pressure to deliver what they promise.
Q: Over the past month, much has been written about the West’s loss of focus in the Balkans, and the resulting failure of its deterrence. Many observers have called for greater involvement from the West and its institutions. Few, however, have offered concrete suggestions on what the West’s response should look like. I am curious if you have any thoughts
A: You are seeing the emergence of one prong of Western engagement in the sanctions levied yesterday. I hope to see them extended to people in Belgrade and Pristina, along with clear US and EU denunciations of the authoritarian drift in Belgrade. More direct engagement with the issues, both in the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue and in the discussion of constitutional reform in BiH, could be another prong. So too could be a joint US/EU effort to monitor implementation of dialogue agreements similar to the International Civilian Office, which monitored implementation of the Ahtisaari plan after Kosovo independence.
Q: I assume that Dodik’s antics put Vucic in a difficult position. For one, he has to maintain the nationalists in his base by continuing to act as the figurehead for all Serbs, and thus, at least apathetically, support the plight of the Serbs in Bosnia. At the same time, however, Vucic knows Serbia’s economic future lies with the West. Serious derailment of Dayton in Bosnia, especially with his public support, could further hinder Serbia’s economic future with the West. So, that leads me to ask, can Vucic play a positive role in mitigating Dodik’s brinkmanship?
A: Yes, and that’s what Brussels and Washington count on. But Dodik, like Karadzic, regards himself as a potential rival to Vucic in Serbia, not only as a provincial chieftain in Banja Luka. With Russian encouragement, Dodik may go further than Vucic would like.
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Getting back to the nuclear deal is the best option, the sooner the better
Iran is arguably already a threshold nuclear state. American withdrawal from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, aka Iran nuclear deal) in 2018 has allowed Tehran to enrich uranium to 20%, develop more advanced centrifuges, and likely make other technological process. It is now well within one year of being able to fabricate a nuclear weapon. What difference does that make?
Not much, yet. Possession of nuclear weapons is not a major factor in today’s geopolitics, because they are unusable. As Richard Burt put it a decade ago:
The currency of power has changed from [nuclear] military power to economic, technological competitiveness.
http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1230/the-new-geopolitics-why-nuclear-weapons-no-longer-serve-us-interests
Israel’s growing power in the Middle East is not due to its nuclear weapons, which represent a guarantee of its existence rather than a means of projecting power. Arab states are now cozying up to Israel because of its economic and technological prowess, built on top of its military strength. Nuclear weapons have given Pakistan a means of deterring a conventional Indian invasion but have not made Pakistan India’s equal even within South Asia. India is by far the greater economic and technological power. Russia’s resurgence as a great power is not based on its nuclear weapons, which Moscow possessed in the 1990s when it was an economic basket case, but rather on its economic recovery and willingness to project conventional military force into Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria as well as hybrid warfare in the Balkans, Belarus, and elsewhere.
Nuclear weapons are still important for deterrence, but they do little more than guarantee mutual destruction.
So what’s wrong with Iran getting nuclear weapons, or the technology to make and deliver them within a few months time? The answer lies in Turkey and Saudi Arabia, not in Israel. Iran becoming a threshold nuclear state will inspire, if it has not already, its regional rivals to do likewise. Both President Erdogan and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have both said as much. I’d guess Turkey is technologically capable on its own. Saudi Arabia may need to buy experts and technology abroad, but it is capable of doing so. Once four countries in the Middle East go nuclear, the risks of intentional or accidental nuclear warfare rise exponentially.
Bilateral deterrence works reasonably well, judging by experience not only with the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States but also with India and Pakistan, India and China, as well as China and the US. Multilateral deterrence poses much more complex issues, especially with countries that lack second strike capabilities and are geographically proximate. Preparation for launch of Iranian missiles that might (or might not) carry nuclear weapons could trigger responses not only from Israel, which in its submarines has second strike capability, but also from Turkey or Saudi Arabia, depending on the crisis du jour. Miscalculation is a key factor in war. The odds of a mistake are much higher the more countries are involved.
The question remains: can the world manage with Iran as a nuclear-threshold or even a nuclear country? The answer is yes, at least for a while, but that circumstance will not be in Iran’s favor. If it fails to negotiate a return to the JCPOA, the US will tighten its economic sanctions and apply them with more vigor. Israel will continue its “dirty war” of cyber attacks and assassinations of Iranian scientists. Europe and the UK will go along with the Americans, as their financial institutions and companies have too much to lose by displeasing Washington. Moscow won’t want Iran to go nuclear, but its companies may well be prepared to surreptiously help Tehran evade sanctions. Beijing may do likewise, as it has much to gain from acquiring Iranian oil at sanctions-induced relatively cheap prices.
The negotiations on return to the JCPOA adjourned Friday without progress and bitter words from both Washington and Tehran. Failure of the negotiations, whose aim is to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear threshold state, will thus aggravate East/West tensions and vastly complicate US relations with both Russia and China, which won’t take kindly to the tightening of sanctions. Iran’s economy, already well on the way to ruin, will deteriorate further. Israel will find its dirty war progressively more difficult and less effective as the Iranians learn how to counter it. Washington will want try to restrain Ankara and Riyadh from acquiring all the technology needed for nuclear weapons but will find it increasingly difficult to do so.
Getting back to the nuclear deal is the best option. The sooner the better.
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Admire Russia’s provocative statecraft, even if its objectives are odious
Russian President Putin is feeling his oats. He is pushing against the West along a front that extends from the Baltics to Syria and possibly beyond. Here is an incomplete account of his maneuvers:
- The Baltics: Russia has concentrated troops along its border with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Moscow is also conducting menacing exercises and violating Allies’ airspace.
- Belarus: Again lots of military exercises, but more inventively Putin has encouraged President Lukashenko to import Kurds from Iraq and try to push them across the border into Poland and thus the EU. This constitutes intentional weaponization of third-country nationals.
- Ukraine: Moscow has (again) concentrated military forces on the border with the apparent intention of threatening an expansion of Russian-controlled territory inside Ukraine beyond Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea. Moscow is also raising gas prices and shipping more gas to the West avoiding Ukraine and thus reducing its revenues.
- The Balkans: Russia is giving and selling arms to a vastly re-armed Serbia, is financing the Serb entity inside Bosnia and Herzegovina and encouraging secession talk there, and has gained vastly increased influence through proxies inside Montenegro.
- Turkey: Moscow has sold its advanced air defense system to Turkey, which as a result has lost its role in manufacturing components of the American F-35 fighter and will likely look to Russia for modernization of its fighter fleet.
- Syria: Russian air forces intervened in Syria in 2015, when rebels were seriously threatening the regime in Damascus. Russian forces have occasionally tested their mettle against the Americans and US-supported forces in the northeast.
Russian military forces have also taken on a “peacekeeping” role inside Azerbaijan after its 2020 clash with Armenian-supported secessionists in Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow’s troops were already stationed inside Armenia. Prior Russian interventions in Georgia and Moldova were explicitly aimed at preventing NATO and EU membership, respectively, and have resulted in separate governance of Russian-controlled territories within those states.
For Putin, not only NATO but also the EU is an enemy. He is right: the EU and NATO are committed to open societies, democratic governance, and the rule of law, which are anathema to Putin. He wants none of their members on Russia’s borders or even nearby. The Eurasian Economic Union is intended as the economic dimension of his fight against the West. He is also seeking to weaken the EU and NATO from within. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is Russia’s handmaiden within the EU. Montenegro risks becoming one inside NATO.
It is difficult to know how the West should respond to all this. Neither the EU nor NATO is skilled at anticipating and preventing trouble. Nor can they coordinate and focus resources as quickly as an autocrat can. But it is important to recognize that for Russia all these pieces are part of the same puzzle. Obsessed with being surrounded, Russia responds by trying to expand and establish autocratic hegemony in what it regards as its near abroad, even if that designation is no longer so commonly used. You have to admire Russia’s provocative statecraft, even if the objectives are odious.
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