Tag: Balkans
Here is what Bosnia needs
I don’t think I know any of the signatories of this paper, but what they say makes sense to me (I’ve made a few minor editorial amendments to the English):
Changes to the highest legal act of a state – the Constitution, represent the most complex social political endeavor. In BiH, this process is even more complicated because it is an integral part of our constitutional legal order and the OHR, that is the “international community”, made up of representatives of the world’s most influential forces united in PIC, which do not have the same political views towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.
It is undeniable that the BiH Constitution must be changed. Amendments to the BiH Constitution are no longer a matter of will, desire or compromise of domestic political parties, but an international legal obligation of Bosnia and Herzegovina resulting from the final judgments of international courts adopted from 2007-2020., as well as judgmenta of the Constitutional Court and the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
For more than two decades, our NGOs have held the position that all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, all nations and minorities must have equal rights and obligations on the territory of all of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This principle is contained in the Dayton Constitution of BiH, which also contains as its integral part the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which is directly applicable and takes precedence over any other law in BiH.
The existing ethno-national concept in BiH, which is particularly exemplified through the role of the houses of peoples at the level of BiH and the entities, is unsustainable because the institutution of vital national interest is abused in most cases. This institution is mainly not used for the vital national interest of a people but for the “vital interests” of nationalist political parties. It also completely suppresses civil rights guaranteed by BiH’s existing Constitution, leading to complete ethnic segregation.
On the other hand, the practice showed that entity voting had a much more disastrous effect on BiH’s (non)development than protecting vital national interest. The main problem lies in the fact that Annex VII, that is, the return of expelled and displaced persons has not been complited and, therefore, we have a situation that the entity voting has simultaneously become the ethnic voting.
In February 2007, a verdict was delivered by the UN International Court of Justice in The Hague in the case of BiH vs. Serbia and Montenegro, which found Serbia responsible for not preventing genocide against Bosniaks in Srebrenica, and then a series of judgments by the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights is in five separate judgments (2009 in favour of Sejdic-Finci vs. BiH, 2014 judgment in favour of Azra Zornic vs. BiH, 2016 judgment in favour of Ilias Pilav vs. BiH, Samir Slaku vs. BiH, and 2020 judgment in favour of Svetozar Pudaric vs. BiH) found the BiH Constitution discriminatory, practically towards all BiH citizens, from all peoples and the Others , despite the guarantee of all the rights under the United Nations General Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It is important to point out that since 1st January 2009, the European Court of Human Rights has adopted 395 judgments against Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), with the lawsuits being brought by both individuals and groups. The ruling parties, even after more than a decade, have not implemented the verdicts.
The adopted judgments, which are obligatory for the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, represent the international legal basis for amending the BiH Constitution. The ethnic principle has been imposed by the flagrant violations of all human rights, aggression, ethnic cleansing and genocide.
We have no ambition or pretension to propose concrete solutions or texts of constitutional amendments, however, we want to offer principles that should be the starting basis for drafting a proposal for amendments to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The principles should be minimal common denominator for all progressive political forces of BiH, which can be presented as a common interest to friendly states and signatories of the Dayton Agreement who are jointly responsible for BiH’s state-of-affairs and the future. This primarily concerns the U.S. administration, which played a decisive role in establishing peace in our country 25 years ago. It is important to emphasise that in December 1995 we did not have judgments of the international courts.
In the context of what has been stated above, we propose the following principles for the changes to the BiH’s Constitution:
- The elimination of systemic discrimination that is widespread throughout the constitutional regulation. The enumerated judgments of the European Court of Justice oblige the state to remove existing constitutional provisions because of which all citizens who do not declare themselves members of constituent peoples are denied elementary civil and political rights. Those rights are also denied to members of the constituent peoples if they do not live in the “appropriate” entity. Discrimination is widespread also on other bases, such as gender, religious affiliation, social status, level of education received and so on.
- The entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as administrative forms, were established on the basis of the “facts on the ground” caused by the international armed conflicts and as such are overcome today, as stated by the Venice Commission in 2005, while the biggest problem in practice has been, it has been shown, the entity voting in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In its 2005 opinion, the Venice Commission states, at point 34: “.:. This veto, which in practice seems potentially relevant only for the RS, appears redundant having regard to the existence of the vital interest veto.”.
- Failure to implement final court judgments by international and domestic courts clearly shows that in BiH there is a suspension of the rule of law, and in this regard it is necessary to insert all needed amendments in the Constitution to establish the rule of law and ensure the full political independence of BiH’s judicial institutions. Four separate atunomous legal and judicial systems operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina – at the level of BiH, in both entities and in Brcko District of BiH. This leads to uneven and even conflicting legal solutions and uneven case-law, and thus to inequality of citizens. Therefore, constitutional solutions must be created so that this does not happen.
- Define the principle of sanctioning the denial of holocaust, genocide and crimes against humanity by the Constitution.
- It is necessary to precisely determine the rights protected by the institution of Vital National Interest/National Veto in the legislative bodies of the State and lower levels of government.
- The amendments to the Constitution must specify the disabling of the paralysis of its institutions and affirm the civic character of society and the strengthening of a democratic state modelled on all democratic states in Europe and the world.
The decisions on constitutional changes must be brought back into the institutions of the system, into the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH which will include the NGO sector in the debate, academia, the media and the widest circles of citizens.
Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a multiconfessional and multinational country for hundreds of years, where the riches of diversity have been an advantage. Unity of diversity is still in the most part the way of life in it today. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitution must contain it, promote it and enable it.
| Stipe Prlić president Croatian People’s Council of BiH | Zoran Jovanović president Serb Citizens’ Council – Movement for Equality in BiH | Miro Lazović president Forum of 1992-1996 Parliamentarians | Nedžad Mulabegović president Council of the Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals |
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The Balkans got its due, but there are bigger issues
Deputy Assistant Secretary Gabriel Escobar, in charge of relations with the Western Balkans, testified this morning at the House Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber. He toed the traditional US lines: EU accession within a foreseeable timeframe of all the Western Balkan states, maintenance of their sovereignty and territorial integrity, and countering the malign influence in the region of Russia and China. The specifics included
- a start to EU accession negotiations for Albania and Macedonia before the end of this year,
- support for the EU “normalization” dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade with the aim (ideally) of mutual recognition,
- insistence on sovereignty, inclusiveness, and democracy in Montenegro,
- hope for electoral, economic and rule of law reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
- sharp criticism of those who want Republika Srpska’s 49% to secede.
The House members were supportive but questioned Escobar on whether US the negotiator for electoral reforms was too close to the ethnic nationalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whether enough is being done to counter China and Russia, what more might be done on energy and trade, and how the Adminstration’s authority to impose corruption-related sanctions will be used. Escobar asserted that the US push for Bosnian electoral reforms will aim at ensuring all citizens are treated equally (as required by European court decisions), he emphasized the US lacks the autocratic tools that China uses to penetrate the region economically, he elaborated on energy issues (especially the prospects for liquified natural gas), and he pledged vigorous use of the new sanctions authority.
It was a fine performance, but I would fault it on a few details: even a lukewaram endorsement of the Open Balkans initiative that Serbia is pursuing should be conditioned on the requirement to treat all prospective members, including Kosovo, as equal partners. Failure to mention the EU’s long delay in granting Kosovo a visa waiver program is an important error of omission, as it has caused the most EU-positive country in the region to suffer increasing doubts about whether its government can deliver. I am also skeptical of the pursuit of electoral reforms within a flawed constitutional structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We’ll just have to wait and see whether that will work well or simply solidify the ethnic nationalist hold on power. Russian progress in penetrating and instrumentalizing its relationship with Serbia was not, I think, adequately appreciated, especially in the military sphere as Serbia massively re-arms to the consternation of its neighbors.
All that said, the big missing piece was how we get to the Administration’s goals–EU membership for all the countries of the Western Balkans–from where we are. The EU quite rightly has tightened requirements for membership, based on its not entirely happy experience with new members who slide backwards in their commitments to accountable and transparent government, individual rights, foreign policy alignment, and other important dimensions of joining the EU. The Western Balkan countries are complaining bitterly that enlargement lacks political support among many member states. The result has been a seemingly ever-more-distant horizon for accession, over which the US has precious little leverage.
One parting note: the House members may not be able to pronounce “Podgorica,” but their questioning was apt and even perspicacious. Two of the members have significant numbers of Bosnians resident in their districts, one has been involved with the region in various capacities for decades, and others just seemed well-staffed. But no one should be fooled: this hearing will get little or no ink in tomorrow’s papers, which are much more interested in the torturous trajectory of President Biden’s budget proposals. Today’s hearings on climate change will attract a lot more attention. The Western Balkans got its due, but there are a lot bigger issues out there.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina: time to stop the nonsense
Milorad Dodik, the Serb member of the tripartite presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has been threatening withdrawal from the state’s army, its taxation authority, its intelligence and law enforcement apparatus, and its judiciary. Dodik also denies the authority of the international community’s High Representative, who under the Dayton agreements that ended the Bosnian war 26 years ago is responsible for their civilian implementation. If passed in the Republika Srpska (RS) parliament, or implemented without formal legislative approval, Dodik’s moves would amount to secession, even if no declaration of independence is issued. Dodik appears to have the support of both Serbia and Russia, though there is some dissent within Serb ranks inside the RS.
Last weekend in a visit to Belgrade Dodik ambiguously backed off his most extreme threats, as he has often in the past, but his overall goal remains clear: sovereignty and independence for Republika Srpska.
How should the US and EU react?
They should not be fooled. Dodik will be back with his threats. The West should not wait until Dodik gets the legislative approval he seeks or acts on his own. Prevention will be far better than cure when it comes to secession. Prevention requires a military move. The EU should move, as many have advised many times, all its 600 or so forces to Brcko, the northeastern Bosnian town that was the center of gravity of the last war and will be also of the next one. NATO should reinforce the EU with a few hundred US and UK troops, which in the Balkans is still an unequivocal signal of seriousness. Without Brcko, no RS move toward secession can succeed because the RS would be split into two disconnected wings and the land line of communication with Serbia cut.
Russia will try to prevent any move of this sort. Its best bet is to veto the UN Security Council authorization for the
“Althea” European forces in Bosnia required in November. The US, UK, and EU will need to be prepared to keep their forces in Brcko whatever happens at the Security Council. While Dodik over the weekend backed off from demands that the Althea operation end, that should not fool anyone: NATO needs to make it clear it will stay in Bosnia and Herzegovina no matter what happens at the Security Council, whether in November or in six months. This can be done under authority granted by the Dayton agreements.
But the military move to Brcko will not be sufficient to end secession or the threat of secession quickly. The notoriously corrupt Dodik, already sanctioned by the US, should also be sanctioned by the EU. So too should any and all RS parliamentarians who support his defiance of the Dayton agreements, the High Representative’s powers, or the authorities of the state (central) government. Republika Srpska owes its continued existence, after a war in which it faced imminent defeat, to the Dayton agreements. Its full cooperation with implementation of those agreements as well as the HiRep’s decisions should be a sine quo non.
The West will also need to be prepared to deprive the RS government of sustenance. A secessionist entity should not benefit from any sovereign financing, including money flowing from the IMF, the World Bank, the EBRD, the EIB, and other lenders. The IMF’s Rapid Financing Instrument, the IBRD, and the EU are providing upwards of $600 million to Bosnia and Herzegovina to deal with the consequences of the COVID epidemic. They need to be prepared to make the RS portion of those (and any other funds not yet transferred) evaporate. It will be especially important to zero out institutional budgetary support to the RS. Corridor Vc, a major highway being built north to south through Bosnia, will have to be re-evaluated.
RS withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s institutions would leave the country in constitutional and legal limbo. The only real options at that point would be reversion to the constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, (which preceded the current constitution), implementation of the current constitution without reference to the RS, or reliance on the constitution of the 51% of the country governed as the Federation (which however has many features in common with the current dysfunctional constitution). I’m not enough of a legal beagle to know which would be best, but somehow the legal continuity of the sovereign Bosnian state would need to be ensured.
In the 1990s, Americans hoped for a Europe “whole and free.” The NATO intervention in Bosnia was intended to ensure that hope was realized in the Balkans. But Serbia with Russian support has decided that not even the Balkans will be whole and free. Moscow and Belgrade are working to split the region between autocracy and democracy, or at least to cause instability. Republika Srpska, northern Kosovo, and Montenegro’s Serb regions are all trying to peel off, with Russian and Serbian encouragement. If they succeed, they will eventually be absorbed into what Serbian President Vucic calls the “Serbian world,” better known as Greater Serbia. This would be a serious defeat for liberal democracy and a triumph for Vladimir Putin.
RS’s independence ambitions, Serbia’s territorial aspirations, and Russian destabilization efforts need to be countered. That will not be hard, if done sooner rather than later. It will require a few hundred troops in Brcko, tough sanctions, legal ingenuity, and a halt to RS financing. It is time to stop the nonsense.
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A serious nomination that doesn’t guarantee success
The Biden Administration has announced its intention to nominate Chris Hill as ambassador in Belgrade. This is a clear break with other recent appointments, which have put career officers still in service in Pristina and Sarajevo. Chris is a career officer who retired more than a decade ago, but he is also someone well-known to President Biden and Secretary of State Blinken from his service as ambassador in Iraq, South Korea, and Poland, if not also Macedonia. Chris is a heavy, that is more akin to a personal or political friend of the President and Secretary of State than all the other ambassadors serving in the Balkans currently or Gabriel Escobar, the recently named Deputy Assistant Secretary for the region. If anything, Belgrade is a step down for Chris from his previous positions.
This nomination signals a serious intention on the part of the Administration to try to resolve the remaining war and peace issues in the Balkans, which I would define as the still not universally recognized sovereignty of Kosovo and the dysfunctionality of governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both quandaries will require Belgrade’s positive contributions.
This won’t be easy. Today’s clash betweeen Serbia and Kosovo at the UN Security Council was awful. The two countries are pointed in different directions.
Serbian Foreign Minister Selakovic repeatedly accused Kosovo President Osmani of lying, claimed she represented no one but herself, and asserted she was somehow affiliated with World War II Albanian Fascists. Serbia has in recent years aligned itself far more with Russia and China than with the US and Europe, including through economic cooperation, arms purchases, increased powers for its president, and reduced space for free media, an independent judiciary, and anything but an ethnic nationalist opposition.
The 39-year-old Osmani displayed a map of Albanian mass graves in Serbia and demanded an apology for the Milosevic-era depradations against Kosovo, during which she was displaced and fled to Montenegro before getting degrees from the University of Pittsburgh. Kosovo has a new Prime Minister, Albin Kurti, committed to cleaning up corruption and maintaining the relatively free media and increasingly independent judiciary that he inherited. Kosovo aligns itself entirely with the US and Europe.
The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is even worse, as the division splits the country internally. The leader of its Serb entity and member of the tripartite Presdency Milorad Dodik is freezing his loyalists’ participation in the country’s institution, trying to nullify its national laws, and threatening to take command of the Serb soldiers in its army. With Russian and Serbian support, he is inching towards the independence he has declared as his goal, hoping not to provoke an effective American or European reaction before the process is irreversible. He remembers what most Americans have forgotten: even during the unipolar moment, it took NATO 3.5 years to intervene in Bosnia and Herzegoina. The international community High Representative in Bosnia, German Christian Schmidt, is doing nothing visible to fulfill his mandate to protect the Dayton accords.
Neither situation is propitious.
But an ambassador who arrives in Belgrade with ready access to the President and Secretary of State has advantages. He can more effectively claim to speak for his bosses. He can far more easily mobilize all the resources of the US government and even the private sector than less weighty appointees. Chris was a protege’ of Dick Holbrooke, who was particularly effective at pulling all the levers of American power in the same direction at the same time. Chris is also well-known in Europe, which can bring far greater civilian resources to bear than the US. And he will have enormous leverage with Kosovo, for which he served as Special Envoy in 1998 and 1999, when the Rambouillet negotiations failed and NATO attacked Serbia.
I’m not predicting success. Chris knows as well as anyone that failure is a real possibility, as he has experienced it not only in the Rambouillet negotiations but also in negotiations with North Korea while he was an Assistant Secretary of State. His tenure in Iraq during a difficult period was not crowned with glory. But if he is able to solve either the Kosovo/Serbia conundrum or the Bosnia and Herzegovina Rubik’s cube, there will be good reason to applaud. Solving both would mean a standing ovation.
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So far so good, but we’ll need to wait and see
I’ve gotten more praise than criticism for yesterday’s piece on Serbia under President Vuvic, but my friend Ylber Hysa, Kosovo’s former ambassador in Macedonia and Montenegro, is super talented at posing questions. Here go my answers:
1. Do you see the EU really ready and open for any enlargement soon towards the Balkans?
No, I don’t, but I don’t see any aspirant that will be ready any time soon, especially given the tightened criteria. Under its previous government, Montengro might have been ready before the end of this decade. Kosovo has the legislation mostly right, but not the implementation. Macedonia is better, but also suffers from a lag in implementation. Bosnia and Herzegovina can’t get it right because its constitutional system is faulty. Albania is making progress, even if it has not yet opened accession negotiations, but it isn’t quick or easy.
2. With Merkel gone, and Macron with a tough election ahead, is there any leadership there for “Europe One and Free”?
No, but entry of Western Balkan states into the EU and NATO should not depend on that. Enlargement should now be seen in the context of strengthening the European counterweight to Russia and China. There too leadership has been lacking and it is not clear Biden will be able to mobilize Europe to the kind of efforts required.
3. Do you believe that Trans-Atlantic unity is better with this administration, or much better than we all hoped for…?
It’s better, as illustrated in the agreement between Serbia and Kosovo on license plates. The Americans and Europeans acted in unison and got a reasonable result. Now they need to extend that practice to bigger issues. Gabriel Escobar and Miroslav Lajcak need to be joined at the hip.
4. Do you really see the Biden Administration seriously engaged in the Balkans after Afganistan?
The Biden Administration has the right approach to the Balkans: strengthening the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and democratic legitimacy of all the states. But it has not yet developed detailed plans for how to do that. That requires hard work and serious engagement that they are now pursuing. I wish them success.
I didn’t see the Biden Administration engaged at a high level in the Balkans before the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Certainly the messy withdrawal has made pulling US troops out of Kosovo less likely. What is needed now is a clearer program that will advance the European perspective.
5. Do you see any progressive, liberal and serious opposition in Serbia?
No, and that’s what I said in the piece. I know lots of individual progressive liberals who are in opposition, but they have failed to construct a viable alternative to Vucic with mass appeal. We should be helping them do that, but the time before next year’s Serbian election is short. I expect Vucic will win another 5-year mandate as a committed ethnic nationalist and friend of Russia and China.
6. Do you believe that in the last “licence plates war” in Northern Kosovo Kurti demonstrated any strategic thinking (or that he picked the right time for war games)?
I can’t say I saw strategic thinking, but Albin applied the principle of reciprocity and got a reasonable outcome that I hope will lead to a satisfactory final agreement on license plates. That’s not strategic, but it’s not a bad start in the right direction.
Now he needs to show some of the same grit inside the dialogue and produce results he can vaunt. Doing that will give him what he needs to get the Europeans to give Kosovo the visa waiver. That would be closer to strategic: opening Europe to young Kosovars without a visa would put his country on a far clearer European path. So too will asking for Kosovo membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace and ensuring that the Kosovo army is fully functional by 2027, which will open the question of NATO membership.
7. Do you really believe that Kurti is a real liberal, democratic and visionary leader?
Albin has at least for now what a good prime minister needs: strong support in the population, which is tired of the nepotism, ineffectiveness, and corruption of the more established governing parties. In my experience, he is a vigorous proponent of individual human rights and an opponent of the group rights dear to ethnic nationalists, including Kosovo’s Serbs. But he also enjoys strong support among Albanian ethnic nationalists, many of whom want union with Albania. That’s a vision, but it is not a liberal democratic one or even a Kosovo patriotic one.
We’ll just need to wait and see whether Vetevendosje sticks with liberal democratic ideals or falls victim to the temptations of power and the Balkan tendency towards default ethnic nationalism.
PS: Ylber asks in addition:
8. Do you believe regional initiatives can substitute for EU Enlargement: Open Balkans, Berlin Process, Partition and border changes i.e “Jansa nonapaper” etc.
I am dead set against border changes, which will lead to mass displacement and likely death and destruction. We know this from the experience of the 1990s when Milosevic tried to change the borders of Serbia. I see no reason to believe the consequences would not be bad also today, not only for Kosovo and Bosnia but also for Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, all of which have minorities who will want union with a neighbor. Not to mention the negative consequences for Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, where border changes in the Balkans would be regarded as a license for Russia to annex more territory.
The Berlin Process in my way of thinking is part of the process of preparing the Western Balkans for EU membership, in particular by encouraging neighborly relations. Open Balkans is not clearly defined for me yet, but if it can remove non-tariff and tariff barriers to trade that would be a good thing, provided it is done on a reciprocal and equal basis. Certainly a more prosperous Western Balkans would have a greater stake in peace and stability. But the devil is in the details, and I haven’t seen a lot of details.
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No one should be fooled: Serbia is lost for now
Colleagues I know and respect think that Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic aims a) to get neighboring countries to treat their Serb populations correctly, and b) thereby avoid any mass migration of Serbs, as occurred in the 1990s when they left Croatia and Kosovo.
I beg to differ. I see no evidence of these two claims and lots of contrary indications.
Let us count them:
- In Kosovo, Vucic controls the Serbian List, which occupies all the Serb seats in the Kosovo Assembly. The Serbian List does not cooperate with other political parties to improve the lot of the Serbs but instead has conducted itself as a spoiler, boycotting parliament often. Belgrade has threatened and harassed Serbs who join Kosovo’s nascent army, and recently deployed army units, as well as the Russian ambassador, to the boundary/border with Kosovo in response to a dispute over license plates (sic).
- Vucic has toyed with the idea of trading Albanian-majority municipalities in Kosovo’s south for Kosovo’s Serb-majority municipalities in the north. But the majority of Serbs in Kosovo live south of the Ibar river. This “border correction” scheme would end the viability of those communities and lead to their eventual, if not immediate, abandonment.
- In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the now Vucic-allied Serb member of the tripartite presidency (Milorad Dodik) has tried to undermine the state institutions in preparation for secession and independence of Republika Srpska (RS), which occupies 49% of the country’s territory. Dodik objects to any strengthening of the state’s judiciary, police, army, and parliament.
- Vucic has taken up the cudgels in favor of a “Serbian Home,” that is a state that would annex the Serb populations of Bosnia, Kosovo, and Montenegro. The idea is indistinguishable from “Greater Serbia” and “all Serbs in one country,” the slogans that led Milosevic to four wars in the 1990s, all of which were lost and led to the mass migration of Serbs to Serbia.
- In Montenegro, a new Vucic-aligned government dominated by people who identify as Serbs is welcoming Russian and Serbian dominance and undermining the independence and sovereignty of NATO’s newest member, while also mistreating the country’s minorities.
It is hallucinatory to think that the Serbian Home and the behavior of Vucic-allied Serbs in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montnegro is intended to improve the lot of Serbs in neighboring countries or to avoid mass migration. This is no doubt a line Vucic uses with Westerners, as he knows what they want (and don’t want) to hear. But that doesn’t make it true.
In addition to threatening his neighbors, Vucic is taking Serbia in a definitively autocratic as well as Russia- and China-focused direction. Belgrade’s foreign policies are only 60% or so aligned with the European Union, the lowest ratio in the Western Balkans. Serbia has joined the free trade area of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, which is incompatible with EU membership. Belgrade has declared itself “neutral” with no intention of joining NATO (unlike all its neighbors). Its media are not free, its judiciary is not independent, and its economy is largely state-directed, with big investments from Russia and even bigger ones from China. Belgrade’s recent arms purchases are likewise largely from Moscow and Beijing.
Vucic faces an election, albeit not a free or fair one, next year. There is no viable liberal democratic alternative. The only current threat to his dominance comes from ethnic nationalists. He sees no hope of joining the European Union within his next five-year mandate and is behaving accordingly: grab what you can from Russia and China, promise to protect Serbs in other countries, look for opportunities to bring them and the land they occupy into Serbia, and stave off the the Europeans and Americans by telling them that you are anxious to avoid mass migration and improve the lot of Serbs in neighboring countries.
No one should be fooled. It is time for Washington and Brussels to wake up and smell the coffee. The geopolitical challenges from Russia and China have dashed hopes for early realization of a Europe “whole and free.” Serbia is lost to the liberal democratic world so long as this Vucic is president. He is a chameleon. For now, he has surrounded himself with autocrats and ethnic nationalists. Courting his favor won’t get us anywhere. Supporting serious liberal democrats inside Serbia and in the region might get us something. But we’ll still need to wait six years or more for a serious alternative.
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