Tag: Balkans
Blunter would be better
In a tweet this morning, I called these words about the Western Balkan non-EU members harsh but true:
…they do not fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, despite an accession process that has lasted around 20 years: They have neither stable democratic institutions nor functioning market economies….Another factor…against early accession to the EU: their unwillingness to establish good neighbourly relations…German European policy should change course here and make it clearer that these states have no place in the EU without making efforts towards peaceful coexistence.
https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/german-foreign-policy-in-transition#fn-d57704e4133
Of course there are nuances. Here I’ll try to explore some of them.
None of the Balkan states, even the current EU members, has achieved a truly independent, honest, judiciary. I’m hard put to distinguish among them, as is the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index. But there Kosovo and North Macedonia are headed in the right direction and Serbia in the wrong direction, which jibes with my own impression. Montenegro isn’t rated, but wouldn’t depart much from the regional average. Albania is worse than that average, despite decades of reform efforts.
When it comes to freedom and democracy, I depart from Freedom House’s rating of Kosovo as less free and democratic than the other non-EU members, which are all clustered together. Kosovo has perhaps the freest press in the region, has repeatedly seen alternation in power (unfortunately viewed as instability by many outside observers), and has a relatively free economy. Corruption is a big problem (one the current government is targeting) but it is also a big problem in the other countries.
As for the other countries, Serbia lacks a free press and power is concentrated in the hands of its current president, who has drifted towards autocracy rather than democracy. The most significant institutional governance issues are in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which at Dayton was given a constitution that makes democratic governance impossible. One person one vote is inconsistent with the group rights that the warring parties insisted on at Dayton and afterwards. Montenegro and Macedonia have both struggled with alternation in power, but both have managed it, with some violence. Albania has improved its electoral performance and has a vigorous political competition between government and opposition.
As for good neighborly relations, the main issue is between Serbia and Kosovo, since the former does not recognize the latter and has even recently menaced the use of military force. Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo (the first three NATO members and the last defended by NATO-led forces) are for now getting along pretty well, partly because they are all feeling the heat from Serbia’s Russian-sponsored re-armament. Kosovo has issues also with Bosnia and Herzegovina, but those are entirely derivative of Belgrade’s non-recognition. SWP would have done better to point the finger towards culpability rather than resort to generalities.
All that said, the SWP basically has it right. The Western Balkan countries are all looking for easy ways into the EU, but even those that have adopted and implemented much of the acquis communautaire do not completely meet the Copenhagen criteria. Besides, the EU member states have gotten more particular about accession, due in part to their own domestic politics (and economics) and in part to the poor performance of some of the more recent members, especially Bulgaria and Romania. The reforms the EU wants should be the reforms aspiring members want as well. The benefits of EU membership largely precede accession for aspirants who are serious. Germany and the EU should indeed get blunter about this.
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Friends in need can get you in big trouble
A young colleague asked some questions this week. I replied. I’ll have a longer piece on these issues and what should be done about them in the next day or two:
Q: What do you believe Dodik realistically hopes to gain from his increasingly alarming proposals to pull RS from the federal government and to establish parallel institutions in Banja Luka? As many have noted, complete secession is highly unlikely. Thus, is he trying to erode federal institutions to gain concessions for greater RS autonomy?
A: I wouldn’t rule out secession, if circumstances permit, but even if they don’t he is trying to achieve de facto independence.
Q: Is it possible that Dodik, as he’s done in the past, is making such claims in an effort to posture for the upcoming elections in 2022?
A: Sure, but more or less democratically validated politicians come under a lot of pressure to deliver what they promise.
Q: Over the past month, much has been written about the West’s loss of focus in the Balkans, and the resulting failure of its deterrence. Many observers have called for greater involvement from the West and its institutions. Few, however, have offered concrete suggestions on what the West’s response should look like. I am curious if you have any thoughts
A: You are seeing the emergence of one prong of Western engagement in the sanctions levied yesterday. I hope to see them extended to people in Belgrade and Pristina, along with clear US and EU denunciations of the authoritarian drift in Belgrade. More direct engagement with the issues, both in the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue and in the discussion of constitutional reform in BiH, could be another prong. So too could be a joint US/EU effort to monitor implementation of dialogue agreements similar to the International Civilian Office, which monitored implementation of the Ahtisaari plan after Kosovo independence.
Q: I assume that Dodik’s antics put Vucic in a difficult position. For one, he has to maintain the nationalists in his base by continuing to act as the figurehead for all Serbs, and thus, at least apathetically, support the plight of the Serbs in Bosnia. At the same time, however, Vucic knows Serbia’s economic future lies with the West. Serious derailment of Dayton in Bosnia, especially with his public support, could further hinder Serbia’s economic future with the West. So, that leads me to ask, can Vucic play a positive role in mitigating Dodik’s brinkmanship?
A: Yes, and that’s what Brussels and Washington count on. But Dodik, like Karadzic, regards himself as a potential rival to Vucic in Serbia, not only as a provincial chieftain in Banja Luka. With Russian encouragement, Dodik may go further than Vucic would like.
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Getting back to the nuclear deal is the best option, the sooner the better
Iran is arguably already a threshold nuclear state. American withdrawal from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, aka Iran nuclear deal) in 2018 has allowed Tehran to enrich uranium to 20%, develop more advanced centrifuges, and likely make other technological process. It is now well within one year of being able to fabricate a nuclear weapon. What difference does that make?
Not much, yet. Possession of nuclear weapons is not a major factor in today’s geopolitics, because they are unusable. As Richard Burt put it a decade ago:
The currency of power has changed from [nuclear] military power to economic, technological competitiveness.
http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1230/the-new-geopolitics-why-nuclear-weapons-no-longer-serve-us-interests
Israel’s growing power in the Middle East is not due to its nuclear weapons, which represent a guarantee of its existence rather than a means of projecting power. Arab states are now cozying up to Israel because of its economic and technological prowess, built on top of its military strength. Nuclear weapons have given Pakistan a means of deterring a conventional Indian invasion but have not made Pakistan India’s equal even within South Asia. India is by far the greater economic and technological power. Russia’s resurgence as a great power is not based on its nuclear weapons, which Moscow possessed in the 1990s when it was an economic basket case, but rather on its economic recovery and willingness to project conventional military force into Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria as well as hybrid warfare in the Balkans, Belarus, and elsewhere.
Nuclear weapons are still important for deterrence, but they do little more than guarantee mutual destruction.
So what’s wrong with Iran getting nuclear weapons, or the technology to make and deliver them within a few months time? The answer lies in Turkey and Saudi Arabia, not in Israel. Iran becoming a threshold nuclear state will inspire, if it has not already, its regional rivals to do likewise. Both President Erdogan and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have both said as much. I’d guess Turkey is technologically capable on its own. Saudi Arabia may need to buy experts and technology abroad, but it is capable of doing so. Once four countries in the Middle East go nuclear, the risks of intentional or accidental nuclear warfare rise exponentially.
Bilateral deterrence works reasonably well, judging by experience not only with the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States but also with India and Pakistan, India and China, as well as China and the US. Multilateral deterrence poses much more complex issues, especially with countries that lack second strike capabilities and are geographically proximate. Preparation for launch of Iranian missiles that might (or might not) carry nuclear weapons could trigger responses not only from Israel, which in its submarines has second strike capability, but also from Turkey or Saudi Arabia, depending on the crisis du jour. Miscalculation is a key factor in war. The odds of a mistake are much higher the more countries are involved.
The question remains: can the world manage with Iran as a nuclear-threshold or even a nuclear country? The answer is yes, at least for a while, but that circumstance will not be in Iran’s favor. If it fails to negotiate a return to the JCPOA, the US will tighten its economic sanctions and apply them with more vigor. Israel will continue its “dirty war” of cyber attacks and assassinations of Iranian scientists. Europe and the UK will go along with the Americans, as their financial institutions and companies have too much to lose by displeasing Washington. Moscow won’t want Iran to go nuclear, but its companies may well be prepared to surreptiously help Tehran evade sanctions. Beijing may do likewise, as it has much to gain from acquiring Iranian oil at sanctions-induced relatively cheap prices.
The negotiations on return to the JCPOA adjourned Friday without progress and bitter words from both Washington and Tehran. Failure of the negotiations, whose aim is to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear threshold state, will thus aggravate East/West tensions and vastly complicate US relations with both Russia and China, which won’t take kindly to the tightening of sanctions. Iran’s economy, already well on the way to ruin, will deteriorate further. Israel will find its dirty war progressively more difficult and less effective as the Iranians learn how to counter it. Washington will want try to restrain Ankara and Riyadh from acquiring all the technology needed for nuclear weapons but will find it increasingly difficult to do so.
Getting back to the nuclear deal is the best option. The sooner the better.
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Admire Russia’s provocative statecraft, even if its objectives are odious
Russian President Putin is feeling his oats. He is pushing against the West along a front that extends from the Baltics to Syria and possibly beyond. Here is an incomplete account of his maneuvers:
- The Baltics: Russia has concentrated troops along its border with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Moscow is also conducting menacing exercises and violating Allies’ airspace.
- Belarus: Again lots of military exercises, but more inventively Putin has encouraged President Lukashenko to import Kurds from Iraq and try to push them across the border into Poland and thus the EU. This constitutes intentional weaponization of third-country nationals.
- Ukraine: Moscow has (again) concentrated military forces on the border with the apparent intention of threatening an expansion of Russian-controlled territory inside Ukraine beyond Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea. Moscow is also raising gas prices and shipping more gas to the West avoiding Ukraine and thus reducing its revenues.
- The Balkans: Russia is giving and selling arms to a vastly re-armed Serbia, is financing the Serb entity inside Bosnia and Herzegovina and encouraging secession talk there, and has gained vastly increased influence through proxies inside Montenegro.
- Turkey: Moscow has sold its advanced air defense system to Turkey, which as a result has lost its role in manufacturing components of the American F-35 fighter and will likely look to Russia for modernization of its fighter fleet.
- Syria: Russian air forces intervened in Syria in 2015, when rebels were seriously threatening the regime in Damascus. Russian forces have occasionally tested their mettle against the Americans and US-supported forces in the northeast.
Russian military forces have also taken on a “peacekeeping” role inside Azerbaijan after its 2020 clash with Armenian-supported secessionists in Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow’s troops were already stationed inside Armenia. Prior Russian interventions in Georgia and Moldova were explicitly aimed at preventing NATO and EU membership, respectively, and have resulted in separate governance of Russian-controlled territories within those states.
For Putin, not only NATO but also the EU is an enemy. He is right: the EU and NATO are committed to open societies, democratic governance, and the rule of law, which are anathema to Putin. He wants none of their members on Russia’s borders or even nearby. The Eurasian Economic Union is intended as the economic dimension of his fight against the West. He is also seeking to weaken the EU and NATO from within. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is Russia’s handmaiden within the EU. Montenegro risks becoming one inside NATO.
It is difficult to know how the West should respond to all this. Neither the EU nor NATO is skilled at anticipating and preventing trouble. Nor can they coordinate and focus resources as quickly as an autocrat can. But it is important to recognize that for Russia all these pieces are part of the same puzzle. Obsessed with being surrounded, Russia responds by trying to expand and establish autocratic hegemony in what it regards as its near abroad, even if that designation is no longer so commonly used. You have to admire Russia’s provocative statecraft, even if the objectives are odious.
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Here is what Bosnia needs
I don’t think I know any of the signatories of this paper, but what they say makes sense to me (I’ve made a few minor editorial amendments to the English):
Changes to the highest legal act of a state – the Constitution, represent the most complex social political endeavor. In BiH, this process is even more complicated because it is an integral part of our constitutional legal order and the OHR, that is the “international community”, made up of representatives of the world’s most influential forces united in PIC, which do not have the same political views towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.
It is undeniable that the BiH Constitution must be changed. Amendments to the BiH Constitution are no longer a matter of will, desire or compromise of domestic political parties, but an international legal obligation of Bosnia and Herzegovina resulting from the final judgments of international courts adopted from 2007-2020., as well as judgmenta of the Constitutional Court and the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
For more than two decades, our NGOs have held the position that all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, all nations and minorities must have equal rights and obligations on the territory of all of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This principle is contained in the Dayton Constitution of BiH, which also contains as its integral part the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which is directly applicable and takes precedence over any other law in BiH.
The existing ethno-national concept in BiH, which is particularly exemplified through the role of the houses of peoples at the level of BiH and the entities, is unsustainable because the institutution of vital national interest is abused in most cases. This institution is mainly not used for the vital national interest of a people but for the “vital interests” of nationalist political parties. It also completely suppresses civil rights guaranteed by BiH’s existing Constitution, leading to complete ethnic segregation.
On the other hand, the practice showed that entity voting had a much more disastrous effect on BiH’s (non)development than protecting vital national interest. The main problem lies in the fact that Annex VII, that is, the return of expelled and displaced persons has not been complited and, therefore, we have a situation that the entity voting has simultaneously become the ethnic voting.
In February 2007, a verdict was delivered by the UN International Court of Justice in The Hague in the case of BiH vs. Serbia and Montenegro, which found Serbia responsible for not preventing genocide against Bosniaks in Srebrenica, and then a series of judgments by the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights is in five separate judgments (2009 in favour of Sejdic-Finci vs. BiH, 2014 judgment in favour of Azra Zornic vs. BiH, 2016 judgment in favour of Ilias Pilav vs. BiH, Samir Slaku vs. BiH, and 2020 judgment in favour of Svetozar Pudaric vs. BiH) found the BiH Constitution discriminatory, practically towards all BiH citizens, from all peoples and the Others , despite the guarantee of all the rights under the United Nations General Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It is important to point out that since 1st January 2009, the European Court of Human Rights has adopted 395 judgments against Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), with the lawsuits being brought by both individuals and groups. The ruling parties, even after more than a decade, have not implemented the verdicts.
The adopted judgments, which are obligatory for the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, represent the international legal basis for amending the BiH Constitution. The ethnic principle has been imposed by the flagrant violations of all human rights, aggression, ethnic cleansing and genocide.
We have no ambition or pretension to propose concrete solutions or texts of constitutional amendments, however, we want to offer principles that should be the starting basis for drafting a proposal for amendments to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The principles should be minimal common denominator for all progressive political forces of BiH, which can be presented as a common interest to friendly states and signatories of the Dayton Agreement who are jointly responsible for BiH’s state-of-affairs and the future. This primarily concerns the U.S. administration, which played a decisive role in establishing peace in our country 25 years ago. It is important to emphasise that in December 1995 we did not have judgments of the international courts.
In the context of what has been stated above, we propose the following principles for the changes to the BiH’s Constitution:
- The elimination of systemic discrimination that is widespread throughout the constitutional regulation. The enumerated judgments of the European Court of Justice oblige the state to remove existing constitutional provisions because of which all citizens who do not declare themselves members of constituent peoples are denied elementary civil and political rights. Those rights are also denied to members of the constituent peoples if they do not live in the “appropriate” entity. Discrimination is widespread also on other bases, such as gender, religious affiliation, social status, level of education received and so on.
- The entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as administrative forms, were established on the basis of the “facts on the ground” caused by the international armed conflicts and as such are overcome today, as stated by the Venice Commission in 2005, while the biggest problem in practice has been, it has been shown, the entity voting in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In its 2005 opinion, the Venice Commission states, at point 34: “.:. This veto, which in practice seems potentially relevant only for the RS, appears redundant having regard to the existence of the vital interest veto.”.
- Failure to implement final court judgments by international and domestic courts clearly shows that in BiH there is a suspension of the rule of law, and in this regard it is necessary to insert all needed amendments in the Constitution to establish the rule of law and ensure the full political independence of BiH’s judicial institutions. Four separate atunomous legal and judicial systems operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina – at the level of BiH, in both entities and in Brcko District of BiH. This leads to uneven and even conflicting legal solutions and uneven case-law, and thus to inequality of citizens. Therefore, constitutional solutions must be created so that this does not happen.
- Define the principle of sanctioning the denial of holocaust, genocide and crimes against humanity by the Constitution.
- It is necessary to precisely determine the rights protected by the institution of Vital National Interest/National Veto in the legislative bodies of the State and lower levels of government.
- The amendments to the Constitution must specify the disabling of the paralysis of its institutions and affirm the civic character of society and the strengthening of a democratic state modelled on all democratic states in Europe and the world.
The decisions on constitutional changes must be brought back into the institutions of the system, into the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH which will include the NGO sector in the debate, academia, the media and the widest circles of citizens.
Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a multiconfessional and multinational country for hundreds of years, where the riches of diversity have been an advantage. Unity of diversity is still in the most part the way of life in it today. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitution must contain it, promote it and enable it.
| Stipe Prlić president Croatian People’s Council of BiH | Zoran Jovanović president Serb Citizens’ Council – Movement for Equality in BiH | Miro Lazović president Forum of 1992-1996 Parliamentarians | Nedžad Mulabegović president Council of the Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals |
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The Balkans got its due, but there are bigger issues
Deputy Assistant Secretary Gabriel Escobar, in charge of relations with the Western Balkans, testified this morning at the House Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber. He toed the traditional US lines: EU accession within a foreseeable timeframe of all the Western Balkan states, maintenance of their sovereignty and territorial integrity, and countering the malign influence in the region of Russia and China. The specifics included
- a start to EU accession negotiations for Albania and Macedonia before the end of this year,
- support for the EU “normalization” dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade with the aim (ideally) of mutual recognition,
- insistence on sovereignty, inclusiveness, and democracy in Montenegro,
- hope for electoral, economic and rule of law reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
- sharp criticism of those who want Republika Srpska’s 49% to secede.
The House members were supportive but questioned Escobar on whether US the negotiator for electoral reforms was too close to the ethnic nationalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whether enough is being done to counter China and Russia, what more might be done on energy and trade, and how the Adminstration’s authority to impose corruption-related sanctions will be used. Escobar asserted that the US push for Bosnian electoral reforms will aim at ensuring all citizens are treated equally (as required by European court decisions), he emphasized the US lacks the autocratic tools that China uses to penetrate the region economically, he elaborated on energy issues (especially the prospects for liquified natural gas), and he pledged vigorous use of the new sanctions authority.
It was a fine performance, but I would fault it on a few details: even a lukewaram endorsement of the Open Balkans initiative that Serbia is pursuing should be conditioned on the requirement to treat all prospective members, including Kosovo, as equal partners. Failure to mention the EU’s long delay in granting Kosovo a visa waiver program is an important error of omission, as it has caused the most EU-positive country in the region to suffer increasing doubts about whether its government can deliver. I am also skeptical of the pursuit of electoral reforms within a flawed constitutional structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We’ll just have to wait and see whether that will work well or simply solidify the ethnic nationalist hold on power. Russian progress in penetrating and instrumentalizing its relationship with Serbia was not, I think, adequately appreciated, especially in the military sphere as Serbia massively re-arms to the consternation of its neighbors.
All that said, the big missing piece was how we get to the Administration’s goals–EU membership for all the countries of the Western Balkans–from where we are. The EU quite rightly has tightened requirements for membership, based on its not entirely happy experience with new members who slide backwards in their commitments to accountable and transparent government, individual rights, foreign policy alignment, and other important dimensions of joining the EU. The Western Balkan countries are complaining bitterly that enlargement lacks political support among many member states. The result has been a seemingly ever-more-distant horizon for accession, over which the US has precious little leverage.
One parting note: the House members may not be able to pronounce “Podgorica,” but their questioning was apt and even perspicacious. Two of the members have significant numbers of Bosnians resident in their districts, one has been involved with the region in various capacities for decades, and others just seemed well-staffed. But no one should be fooled: this hearing will get little or no ink in tomorrow’s papers, which are much more interested in the torturous trajectory of President Biden’s budget proposals. Today’s hearings on climate change will attract a lot more attention. The Western Balkans got its due, but there are a lot bigger issues out there.
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