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Some ideas are better than others

I have been puzzled by some Balkan economic initiatives. So I turned to Demush Shasha, Executive Director of the Pristina-based thinktank EPIK and former Secretary General of the Ministry for European Integration, for answers. While I think Demush has done an admirable job of analyzing the situation, I’d be glad to hear from others who may have different views of the merits and demerits of the initiatives discussed. Demush writes:

First let’s try and delineate the discussion surrounding these issues. So, these are two separate, though related, conversations.

1.       CEFTA vs SEFTA;

2.       Mini-Schengen vs Berlin process.

Former is more specific and economic discussion, later is more general and political discussion. To put it differently, the former is about “free movement of goods” – so almost exclusively a trade discussion.  Later is about more than trade, it is about ALL types of freedoms in Western Balkans – people, capital, goods, establishment of companies, recognition of academic and professional qualifications, etc.

With that out of the way, a few words on differences between competing proposals.

CEFTA vs SEFTA

Kosovo proposed that CEFTA is succeeded by SEFTA. There are two reasons for this: (1) When CEFTA was launched Czechoslovakia was part of it 😊. So, the first argument is that agreement was designed for a different time and place, and it needs simply an update to new realities. (2) Kosovo is not a party to CEFTA as a sovereign country, but through UNMIK. This is because of Serbian veto within CEFTA mechanisms and procedures. So, Kosovo believes that with the launch of SEFTA, as a new mechanism, this issue can be addressed. Serbia on the other hand, for obvious reasons is against the proposal.

Mini-Schengen vs Berlin process

The Berlin process was launched in 2014 by the EU as a political mechanism to spur political cooperation in the region, allocate funds for important infrastructure investment, and ensure that the region gradually increases its competitiveness and prepares itself for EU Single Market. Since the launch, all 6 WB [Western Balkan] countries + 10 EU countries have been part of the process. So no brainer, everything was running great and smooth, until…

Mini-Schengen was launched in 2019 by three WB countries, without serious international political support, it failed to ensure inclusiveness of all WB countries and without any financial resources. Immediately, after a few first meetings it was obvious that this is not a serious undertaking, but rather a platform from which frustrated WB countries can get together and communicate their displeasure with the EU. Albania and North Macedonia were not being allowed to start accession talks, and Serbia’s accession process practically stalled, without any new negotiating chapter being opened.

In this light, Kosovo decided that it will continue to support Berlin process initiative and stay out of the Mini-Schengen. This decision is based on several factors:

1. Berlin process goal is regional cooperation in view of EU accession. Mini-Schengen goal is to create a mechanism that “will take the fate of the Balkans in our own hands”. You can imagine why in the Balkans, and in particular countries like Kosovo and BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina], this kind of language makes people edgy.

2. The Berlin process is led by Germany, and supported by its key EU member states. Mini-Schengen is led by Serbia.

3. Mini-Schengen goal is to undermine the Berlin process and EU influence in the region, since it is a duplication of the Berlin process. Mini-Schengen would create a political forum where out of all participating countries, Serbia would be a natural leader of the group. This raises eyebrows with regard to creating an opening for Russian influence in the region through Serbia and Mini-Schengen.

4. The Berlin process has at its disposal 9 billion EURO funding, for 2021-2027, allocated by the EU in the forms of grants, which the EU has assessed will generate additional 20 billion investments in loans.  Mini-Schengen has zero.

On US position: No high level US official ever took part in Mini-Schengen meetings. Mini-Schengen is mentioned in Washington KS [Kosovo]-SRB [Serbia] letters of intent, but it was never followed-up in any serious and structural manner by US administration. My reading is that the US supports any initiative that contributes to regional cooperation, and additionally on Mini-Schengen I think they understand the politics of it and they are simply allowing those 3 countries (Srb, Alb, NM) for the moment to vent some (justified to an extent) displeasure with the EU.

On EU position: Despite that the initiative in its title had the word “Schengen”, and aimed to transpose four fundamental freedoms of the EU, the EU never supported the initiative. They have continuously communicated that the Berlin process is the way forward. However, noting the current lack of enlargement momentum they really had little moral capital to be more aggressive publicly.
In a nutshell, I think it is one of those things that is not on the priority list of the US/EU, so they refrained from going publicly against it. They recognize that the initiative has no teeth, nor future. However, I believe that behind the public eye, they have strongly advised Kosovo, Montenegro and BiH to stay outside of the initiative.

PS: At this event earlier this week, Jim O’Brien of Albright-Stonebridge gave a vigorous and detailed defense of “Open Balkans,” which is a rebranding of mini-Schengen:

Who comes to equity must come with clean hands

Serbian President Vucic, after meeting with Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti yesterday, said:

We have received EU proposals that have been harmonized with our chief negotiators and Serbia has fully agreed with what the EU has proposed, three points – to intensify efforts to identify the remains of missing persons, to refrain from actions that could potentially destabilize the situation…on the ground and third, that the main negotiators meet regularly once a month and prepare meetings when necessary. We could not agree on these three points.

Kurti was rather more graphic:

The lack of agreement is not a surprise. It was foretold. Belgrade and Pristina are into the blame game. Neither Kurti nor Vucic has much to gain politically at home from an agreement. Both are posturing, mainly for their respective domestic political audiences but also for Brussels and Washington.

What can we learn from the posturing? Vucic is taking a minimalist approach. Agreement on missing persons 20 years after the war is no big step. Nor is a proposal on destabilization, because it would apply presumably inside Kosovo, not in Serbia. Meeting once a month is easy too, since it is unlikely given the current atmosphere that more than one or two meetings more will be necessary before Brussels tires of the posturing and lets the schedule slide.

Kurti is taking a maximalist approach, in part to distinguish himself from his predecessors. He regards them as patsies. A non-aggression pact would apply principally to Serbia, as there is no likelihood of Kosovo, which lacks an army, attacking Serbia, which has a big and well-armed one. Facing the past applies to both, but in much larger measure to Serbia, as it was the prime aggressor and human rights abuser in the 1990s conflict. And the barriers to free trade cited are all Serbia’s of course.

I am personally more sympathetic to Kurti’s maximalist agenda than Vucic’s minimalist one, but that doesn’t mean we are likely to see progress. These two are talking past each other, not with each other. The EU mediator, Miroslav Lajcak, is under pressure to produce something, so he may well want to continue the process. But if he does, he needs to underpin it with a more constructive conversation at lower levels, out of the public eye.

My guess is–and it is only a guess–that Belgrade and Pristina could really make some progress on missing people, on protection of Serbs in Kosovo and Albanians in Serbia, and on freeing up trade. Kurti seems intent on threatening to reimpose tariffs on Serbian goods if he gets no satisfaction on access to Serbia’s markets. It’s a good idea only if it leads to lowered barriers. Protection of their respective minorities in the other country is important. There is no excuse for interethnic violence in Kosovo, and in southern Serbia there is a concerted effort to displace the Albanian population through administrative means. Both should stop.

I don’t know what to say that hasn’t already been said about missing people. Twenty years is far too long for governments that claim to be democratic to fail to give a full accounting and return the bodies. I fear that in both countries it is people responsible for the crimes that killed civilians who are now sufficiently powerful to prevent their respective governments from doing what they know is right.

If there is one thing I would prioritize to improve the prospects for the dialogue, it is not at the table in Brussels but before anyone gets there. The day Pristina comes to the table with visible support from Kosovo’s Serb population is the day things will begin to move in a more peaceful, stable direction. Vucic has worked hard to prevent that from happening: he controls the political party that holds all the Serb seats in the Kosovo Assembly. Kurti should be working hard to gain Kosovo Serb support by preventing violence against Serbs and Serb property in Kosovo, ensuring that both are respected fully, and facing Kosovo’s own past, which includes deadly violence by fighters of its Liberation Army against both Serbs and Albanians before, during, and after the 1999 war.

Who comes to equity must come with clean hands. Kosovo can wash its hands a lot easier, and with much greater effect, than Serbia can.