Tag: Balkans

Talk should focus on the possible

Posted in Uncategorized - June 26, 2024 - 2 Comments

Here are the remarks I prepared for today’s panel in Pristina, Kosovo on “The Future of the Dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia: the possibilities for new dynamics in the process and the impact of new US and EU elections.” The Group for Legal and Political Studies sponsored the event.

  1. Here in Pristina I face a great challenge. I need to say something sensible about the Dialogue in front of people here in Pristina who have spent years observing it and engaging in it.
  2. Fellow panelist Sonja Biserko is also closer to the Dialogue than I am. She has been observing the political moods in Belgrade since before my first trip to Kosovo in 1998, as war was brewing.
  3. Anything I say will be from a more distant, professorial perspective.
  4. That perspective tells me there is no better alternative than a peaceful and friendly relationship between Belgrade and Pristina.
  5. When I said this to Kosovo Albanian friends during and soon after the war they laughed grimly. They said they would never want to talk with Belgrade again.
  6. But it soon became clear that Serbia was Kosovo’s biggest security threat, an important factor in its economy, and a major influence on its Serb population.
  7. Not to mention its influence on other countries, which has prevented universal recognition of Kosovo independence.
  8. Neighbors don’t have the privilege of ignoring their neighbors if they want security, prosperity, the loyalty of their minority populations, and international recognition.
  9. I participated in the first training for talks with Belgrade around 2004, for the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. Bajram Rexhepi, then Prime Minister of the provisional institutions, was a participant, along with several other ministers and directors general. Maybe some of you were there.
  10. I soon after helped to train Serbian foreign service officers for their engagement with Kosovo.
  11. But quite rightly the international community decided that independence needed to come first. And so it did, as Martti Ahtisaari recommended, along with his EU and American collaborators.
  12. Then of course there was the need to ensure implementation of the Ahtisaari plan, a process that the International Civilian Office supervised well.
  13. So it was 2011 before the dialogue with Belgrade officially began. This was the technical dialogue, which Edita Tahiri and Borko Stefanovic led.
  14. The goal of the technical dialogue was to improve the lives of people in both countries.
  15. It produced a lot of agreements by 2013, many of which were not fully implemented in the timeframes foreseen.
  16. These included agreements on civil registry books, cadastral records, freedom of movement, recognition of diplomas, custom stamps and duties, regional representation, telecommunications, and energy.
  17. In 2013, the participants raised the level of the dialogue and set a new goal: political normalization.
  18. This political dialogue resulted in the 2013 Brussels agreement, which famously included the Association of Serb Municipalities.
  19. But the Association was not a standalone, unilateral proposition.
  20. Kosovo agreed to create it in exchange for Serb participation in Kosovo’s institutions, especially municipal elections, the police and judiciary, as well as non-interference by either side in the other’s progress toward the EU.
  21. Since 2013 there has been some progress on implementing the technical agreements. But there has been virtually none in meeting the goal of political normalization. I would even say that Belgrade has reversed some progress.
  22. It has reneged on all the 2013 commitments. It has maintained de facto governance over the Serb population in the Serb-majority communities of northern Kosovo. Serbia organized the boycott of municipal elections there. Belgrade has withdrawn Serb officials from the police and courts. And Serbia has done everything it could to block and reverse recognition of Kosovo and its entry into the Council of Europe.
  23. Pristina has done nothing to implement its commitment to create the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities.
  24. For the past three years, Gabe Escobar and Miroslav Lajcak have tried to pressure Pristina into creating the Association, with no success. That should not be surprising, as the agreement to create it included obligations for Belgrade as well.
  25. Instead of fulfilling those, Serbia has chosen to make things worse, through purposeful violence. Last year it kidnapped two Kosovo police from Kosovo territory, rented a mob to attack NATO peacekeepers inside Kosovo, and organized a terrorist attack that was supposed to provide the excuse for a Serbian military intervention.
  26. Most recently, Belgrade has torpedoed the proposal to re-call the non-Serb mayors in the north and conduct new elections.
  27. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the technical dialogue was far more productive than the political one.
  28. I have to ask: why is this the case?
  29. Belgrade, it seems to me, is not ready for political normalization. By the end of last year, President Vucic was expressing his hope for changed geopolitical conditions that would enable Serbia to retake part or all of Kosovo. The newly inaugurated Serbian government includes vocal supporters of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It also includes the leading advocate of the “Serbian world,” a euphemism for Greater Serbia.
  30. President Vucic has de facto achieved the Serbian world in half of Bosnia and in all of Montenegro. Why wouldn’t he want to extend that success at least to northern Kosovo?
  31. I am not convinced that Pristina is ready for political normalization either.
  32. Albanian Kosovars first want to hear that Serbia regrets what Slobodan Milosevic did in 1998 and 1999. They want to see Belgrade encourage Kosovo Serbs to look to Pristina for governance, including law and order. Pristina wants Belgrade to be ready to give Albanians in southern Serbia comparable privileges and representation to those Serbia enjoys inside Kosovo for Serbs.
  33. I suppose if Belgrade were to fulfill its obligations under the 2013 agreement Pristina would too. But that isn’t going to happen.
  34. EU and US policy needs a reset. While I don’t expect diplomats to admit it, they need to return to a more practical, less political, dialogue. Political normalization is a bridge too far. Serbia won’t be interested in surrendering its sovereignty claims until the war in Ukraine ends the Russian annexations there. Kosovo won’t be interested in forming the Association until it is confident that Serbia accepts its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
  35. But both Belgrade and Pristina can welcome smoothing movement of people, goods, and finance through their mutual border and enabling more licit trade, investment, and commerce.
  36. Pristina has rightly begun to insist on the use of its official currency, the euro, in transactions in Kosovo. But that is creating problems for the Serb communities, which receive subsidies from Belgrade for health and education—and likely other things as well—in Serbian dinars.
  37. This is the kind of practical issue the EU and US should focus on. Belgrade and Pristina need to agree on transparency for Serbia’s subsidies and a scheme for how they can proceed smoothly.
  38. Both Belgrade and Pristina should be interested in a serious crackdown on organized crime that exploits the lack of law and order in northern Kosovo.
  39. Now would be a good time for Belgrade to ensure that Milan Radoicic pays for his crimes and is unable to recover politically. Serbia should turn him over to Kosovo for trial. No doubt Serbia could name some Albanian candidates for similar treatment.
  40. Another issue I’d like to see discussed in the Dialogue is Belgrade’s intimidation of Kosovo Serbs who join the Kosovo Security Force or police. It is high time to put an end to the threats and violence that they and their families suffer at the hands of Belgrade’s proxies.
  41. That is the practical direction in which prospects for success lie. Saying farewell to failure requires getting the priorities right.
  42. Political normalization will come when Pristina and Belgrade are ready for it. My guess is that Belgrade will be first, because its EU accession will depend on recognition of Kosovo.
  43. More than one of the 27 member states of the EU will insist on it, even if the member states do not adopt it as EU policy.
  44. In the meantime, the Dialogue should focus on practical problems that can be solved in practical ways. It is a mistake to require politicians to do more than they are ready to do.
  45. That’s my professorial take.

I added a few extemporaneous remarks about the US election:

  • The good thing about American elections is that we know the outcome only after we count the votes.
  • Our 18th-century constitution makes predictions difficult, because of close races in a few battleground states.
  • A Biden election will lead to continuity in defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Western Balkan states.
  • A Trump election will lead to surrender of Ukraine to Russia, unqualified support for Israel’s war on Gaza, and doubts about US commitment to NATO and Asian allies.
  • And it will lead to revival of partition ideas in the Western Balkans, with catastrophic consequences.
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Is the sun setting on the West?

Posted in Daniel Serwer - June 24, 2024 - 1 Comment

These are the thoughts I offered at today’s University of Tetovo conference on “The Future of the Western Balkans after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine”:

  1. It is a great pleasure to be with you here in Macedonia, and in particular at the University of Tetovo.
  2. Yes, I said I am in “Macedonia,” because article 7 paragraph 5 of the Prespa agreement protects my personal right to call the country what I want. The “North” part is for official usage. I hope your new President will respect that.
  3. But her reluctance is part of the issue I want to talk about today: is the sun setting on the West? By the West, I mean those countries that are liberal democracies that base their open political systems on individual rights safeguarded by independent judiciaries.
  4. Lest I be misunderstood, let me say at the outset that my answer is “no.”
  5. But there are certainly a lot of reasons why someone might come to the erroneous conclusion that liberal democracy as a governing system is in trouble.
  6. First, there is the US: Donald Trump is seeking re-election on the false premise that the 2020 election was “stolen,” his recent trial was “rigged,” and everyone but him is “corrupt.”
  7. His campaign is anti-immigrant, anti-minority, and anti-Muslim. But the pollsters are telling us he may do relatively well among immigrants, minorities, and Muslims, all of whom are important in the “swing” states that will decide the election.
  8. He will certainly lose the popular vote. He did last time by about 10 million.
  9. But because of an 18th-century compromise embedded in the U.S. constitution he could still win in the Electoral College, where less populous, former slave states of the south get greater weight than their populations.
  10. Yes, the U.S. constitution contains an illiberal system for electing the president that makes some individual votes count more than others.
  11. A Trump win will unquestionably put liberal democracy as a governing system on the ropes. He has promised to govern as a dictator on day one. If he gets away with that, you don’t have to ask how he will govern on day two.
  12. He is skeptical about NATO, friendly to Vladimir Putin, and an enemy of free trade and international agreements and institutions in general.
  13. A Trump victory would have inevitable repercussions in the Balkans. He and his minions are ethnic nationalists. They will favor ethnic nationalists in the Balkans, in particular of the Serbian variety.
  14. Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, will have good economic reasons to do so once he has his hands on prime property in downtown Belgrade.
  15. Richard Grenell, Trump’s handmaiden, has made no secret of his political allegiance not only to Trump but also to President Vucic.
  16. So yes, if Trump wins you can expect his second administration to back genocide-deniers, Serbian world supporters, and pro-Russian miscreants throughout the Balkans.
  17. But I don’t really think Trump will win. The campaign has begun but won’t peak until fall.
  18. One of the good things about American elections is that we don’t know the outcome until after the votes are cast. Polls this early mean little.
  19. The media loves the campaign horse race they create, but only Election Day counts.
  20. Whatever the outcome, the fate of Ukraine will be important to you here in the Balkans. Trump would no doubt surrender Ukraine, or part of it, to Putin. Biden will not.
  21. America is not the only uncertainty.
  22. The European Union election results forebode a shift toward ethnic nationalism in Europe this year and next.
  23. Germany and France are at risk of bringing to power people who would abandon Ukraine and, like Trump, befriend ethnic nationalists in the Balkans.
  24. That would make support for Ukraine and resistance to its partition more difficult.
  25. A partitioned Ukraine would promote similar ambitions elsewhere, including the Balkans.
  26. Bosnia and Herzegovina would be at risk. So too would Kosovo and Macedonia.
  27. The return of Trump, resurgent ethnic nationalism in the EU, and the outcome of the Ukraine war are the big far-away problems for the Balkans, but the nearer problems in the Balkans are worth noting too.
  28. First and foremost is Alexandar Vucic’s Serbia.
  29. I was among those who hoped when Vucic first came to power that he would turn Serbia in a definitively Western direction.
  30. I arranged his first public appearance in Washington at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, where I teach.
  31. I went to see him a year later in Belgrade, after writing a paper on the things Serbia needed to do to consolidate its democracy: free the media, establish the independence of the judiciary, and commit itself to the reforms required to accede to the European Union.
  32. He has done none of those things. Quite the opposite.
  33. The media in Serbia are not only under government tutelage but are also blatantly pro-Russian and racist, especially towards Albanians and Bosniaks. They are not much better towards me.
  34. The judiciary is little improved, if at all.
  35. And progress on implementing the acquis communautaire has been minimal.
  36. Vucic today rules a Serbia that is ethnic nationalist, irredentist, and increasingly autocratic. It can’t even pretend to administer a decent municipal election in Belgrade.
  37. The Serbia Against Violence movement is courageous, but Vucic has for now no viable Western-oriented opposition.
  38. And Serbia is aligned increasingly with Russia and China on the international stage.
  39. In addition, Vucic has managed, without firing a shot, to take over the governments in Podgorica and Banja Luka, thus realizing de facto the first stage of the Serbian world.
  40. He won’t be able to do that in Kosovo, but he has tried with violence: the kidnapping of two Kosovo police, the rent-a-riot against NATO peacekeepers, and the September 24 terrorist action.
  41. All those efforts failed, but he will continue trying.
  42. Unfortunately, the Americans and Europeans are still seeking to pacify Serbia and have not done anything to punish its resorts to violence in Kosovo.
  43. Vucic will likely also be active here in Macedonia. Increasing tension between Macedonians and Albanians will be his preferred mode of operating.
  44. Russia will back these efforts. But I think it a mistake not to recognize that in addition to serving Putin’s purposes Vucic has his own reasons for stoking ethnic strife in the Balkans.
  45. A successful, democratic Kosovo next door that respects the rights of Serbs is unwelcome to Vucic.
  46. So too is a successful, democratic North Macedonia that can aspire to EU membership before Serbia.
  47. Exacerbating ethnic tensions in Macedonia could help Vucic to gain de facto control of Skopje, which would need Serbian backing if it steps back from the West.
  48. I hope that day does not come. But if it does, I hope the citizens of Macedonia will do as they have in the past. At critical junctures, they have chosen to support the Macedonian state and ensure that it treats all minorities with respect.
  49. That in my view is the right reaction to Serbia’s ambitions. Macedonia has little to gain from Serbia or Russia.
  50. It has a great deal to gain from NATO and eventually EU membership.
  51. The problem in Macedonia is common throughout the Balkans, as well as in the United States and the European Union. Our Western systems leave the electoral door open to people who don’t support liberal democracy.
  52. They prefer ethnic rule without any serious possibility of alternation in power.
  53. The counterweights to autocratic ambitions in liberal democracies are strong institutions, especially the justice system, and vigorous civil society.
  54. Both should be focused mainly on individual rights, which make the political system far more fluid and more difficult to dominate.
  55. But even in a long-established democracy like the United States institutions can be hijacked and civil society repressed.
  56. Doing that is easier in relatively new democracies like Serbia, which can no longer claim to be one.
  57. Montenegro is headed in the same direction: a democracy in form but an autocracy in practice.
  58. Bosnia has never really achieved what I would term a democratic system, and 49% of the country is an ethnic autocracy.
  59. This is despite the fact that among Bosnia’s citizens there is remarkably little ethnic tension.
  60. I came to Macedonia Friday night from Sarajevo, where an enormous gap is opening up between the politics and the society.
  61. Ethnic nationalism dominates the politics. Mutual respect and even friendship is more common among the citizens, who however have failed to vote out people who do not really represent their own respect for individuals and their rights.
  62. Your challenge as citizens is to prevent something similar happening in Macedonia. The sun will begin to set on the West here earlier than in the United States.
  63. I wish you well in meeting your responsibilities to defend the institutions, invigorate civil society, and protect the rights of all.
  64. That is what will prevent the sun from setting on the West!
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Getting to post-Dayton Bosnia

Posted in Daniel Serwer, Uncategorized - June 20, 2024 - 2 Comments

Here are the talking points I prepared for myself for today’s conference in Sarajevo on The Biden Administration’s Bosnia Policy: 30 Years of Federation of BiH sponsored by the US-Europe Alliance and the International University of Sarajevo:

  1. It is a great pleasure to be back in Sarajevo, truly one of the most beautiful and welcoming cities on earth.
  2. A great deal has changed since I first came here in November 1994, during the war, and even since I was here five or six years ago.
  3. I was the US embassy’s most frequent visitor during the war.
  4. The streets then were empty of both cars and people, the city was divided and isolated from its so-called suburbs, shelling was frequent, most shops were closed, heat and electricity were at best sporadic, telephones had stopped working, civilians needed to learn where they could walk without being targeted by snipers. Thousands of civilians were killed.
  5. Small arms fire hit my UN plane while landing the first time I came to Sarajevo.
  6. Things have changed a great deal. My compliments to those who have made it happen.
  7. I find Sarajevo much enlivened, younger, and more cosmopolitan. It is good that so many tourists are making their way here, that you have a Sarajevo School of Science and Technology that grants British as well as Bosnian degrees, that the Vijecnica is restored and occupied by a young woman who has more experience as a university professor than as a politician.
  8. But it is also true that the Dayton agreements froze the warring parties in place by institutionalizing the political divisions among Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats.
  9. Each group has a veto on almost everything at the state level and in the Federation.
  10. Dayton also reduced the role of people who refused to identify themselves with one of the three major groups, preferring to think of themselves as individuals with inalienable rights.
  11. I believe it is high time to correct those mistakes.
  12. The two entities are the warring parties of 1995. One is now threatening secession. The other is threatened with division by those who want a third entity.
  13. These objectives are ethnic war by political means. That is better than war by military means, but it is still not the best option available.
  14. You will later in this conference discuss the legal strategy aimed at reforming Dayton Bosnia, which has been notably successful at the European Court of Human Rights but remains largely unimplemented, due to the ethnic nationalist vetoes.
  15. That however should not be the only strategy aimed at making Bosnia a more functional and effective state.
  16. Others may talk today about economic strategies. Any Bosnian enterprise with ambition should be unhappy with today’s Dayton Bosnia.
  17. A serious company should want a more unified economic space with improved relations with the rest of the world, especially Europe but also the United States.
  18. But I want to focus mainly on political reforms, which I think are needed in two dimensions.
  19. One is reform within Bosnia’s political parties, which are largely fiefdoms of the party leaders.
  20. More competitive contests for party leadership would open up the existing political parties, enable them to have more policy and programmatic focus, and reduce the dominance of the political parties within the Bosnian state.
  21. Political party reform would also reduce the risks of state capture by people exploiting public resources and patronage. And it would reduce the risks that state investigations of corruption would be blocked.
  22. The second dimension of needed political reform is cross-ethnic cooperation.
  23. This is not entirely lacking. Croat and Serb ethnic nationalists cooperate quite well these days, as they did in southern Bosnia during the war.
  24. What is needed is creation of a more civic-oriented multiethnic coalition, one that would reinforce the legal strategy that has produced good results at the ECHR.
  25. Such a civic coalition would focus on improving governance, not only at the national level but also in the municipalities.
  26. That is where citizens and government interact most frequently. A coalition that proves it can meet citizen demands at the municipal level will have a much greater chance of winning at other levels.
  27. Despite my wartime role as Mr. Federation, I am no longer a friend to the entities or the cantons. It seems to me Bosnia and Herzegovina could be more effectively governed at the municipal level and at the state level.
  28. The state government should have full authority to negotiate and implement the EU’s acquis communautaire.
  29. The municipalities, in accordance with the European principle of subsidiarity, should have responsibility for everything else.
  30. It is not clear to me how you get to that kind of post-Dayton Bosnia from where things stand now.
  31. It will take political courage and smart strategy, beginning with redefinition of Bosnians as citizens rather than ethnic groups.
  32. Yes, you are correct in thinking that the Americans imposed the Dayton system on Bosnia. Some of you will want to fix what we broke.
  33. But we imposed what the wartime leadership said they would accept.
  34. Twenty-nine years later neither the Americans nor the Europeans have the clout to change the system.
  35. Nor do they have the incentive to do so. Many fear instability and some have confidence in the transformational power of the EU.
  36. It is now up to Bosnians to change the political system. There are good legal, political, and economic reasons to do so.
  37. The simple fact is that Dayton Bosnia will not be able to join the European Union or NATO.
  38. Many in the current political leadership know that but don’t mind. They fear their own political and economic fortunes would end in a Bosnia with strong judicial, legislative, and executive institutions.
  39. It is Bosnia’s citizens who are going to have to do the heavy lifting.
  40. The Americans and European should be prepared to help.
  41. The Americans tried with European support in 2006 when they supported the negotiation of what became known as the April package.
  42. That failed to get a 2/3 majority in parliament by just two votes.
  43. The EU tried more recently with American support through the Citizens’ Assembly, municipal versions of which have also convened in Banja Luka and Mostar.
  44. Much more of this kind of effort is needed to build a cross-ethnic constituency for peace.
  45. Let me turn now to the hard part. I regret to say Bosnia also needs to be ready for war, in order to prevent it.
  46. Milorad Dodik and Aleksandar Vucic have made their intentions clear. They are creating a de facto Serbian world that would remove Republika Srpska from any oversight by Bosnian institutions.
  47. This is a clever scheme, with each step kept below the level at which it might stimulate a negative European or American reaction.
  48. Nor would I rule out a military dimension to the Serb strategy like the attempt at Banjska in Kosovo last September. That would be a provocation intended to provoke a reaction that enables Republika Srpska or Serbia to justify intervention.
  49. The Bosnian Army, EUFOR and NATO also need to be ready for what we call in Washington “little green men” used to infest Brcko in a kind of stealth takeover.
  50. Only if Dodik and Vucic understand that there will be a rapid and effective US and EU military reaction can we be sure they won’t try these Moscow-inspired gimmicks.
  51. Preserving the peace requires both military strength and political reform. Getting beyond the Dayton state in Bosnia will require commitment and inspiration.
  52. Bosnia has come a long way in the past 29 years. But it still has a way to go before it is a normal democratic country, one without a High Representative, one whose unity and territorial integrity citizens of all ethnicities defend, and one in which individual rights are protected for everyone.
  53. I am not suggesting something less than what I myself want. I would never trade my individual rights—protected by the judicial, legislative, and executive branches—for group rights.
  54. I wish you well undertaking the worthy effort of creating a post-Dayton, civic Bosnia. One that can join the European Union and NATO without looking back!
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Belgrade needs to do its part

Posted in Daniel Serwer - May 30, 2024 - 0 Comment

Besnik Velija of Pristina’s Gazeta Express asked questions. I responded yesterday:

Q: As an analyst with long experience and who has followed the politics of the Balkans for so long, what does the fact that Prime Minister Albin Kurti refused to move forward with the Association Draft even though it cost him the loss of membership in the Council of Europe. And what does it mean for the relationship of trustworthiness between the parties, given that the internationals were not even convinced by two letters with promises and demanded substantial and tangible steps for the Association?

A: The Prime Minister’s relationships with the Europeans and Americans is lacking confidence and effectiveness. That said, I think it is a colossal mistake for the Americans and Europeans to insist on creation of the Association of Serbian-Majority Municipalities, which is Belgrade’s top priority in the dialogue, without any benefits for Pristina. All concerned should reread the 2013 Brussels agreement, which required not only the Association but also Belgrade recognition of the validity of the Kosovo constitution on its entire territory, participation of Serbs in Kosovo’s institutions, and non-interference in Kosovo’s path toward the European Union. Belgrade has fulfilled none of those requirements.

Q: How do you see everything that happened around the Lajcak Draft for the Association? Do you think that Kosovo will ever implement that Draft, considering that Kurti was able to fail the membership in the Council of Europe and not send that Draft to the Constitutional Court?

A: I don’t see how the Association can move forward without at least de facto if not de jure recognition of Kosovo by Serbia.

Q: How did you see Foreign Minister Gervalla’s offer in the last few hours? She first said that Kosovo is writing a Draft inspired by the FES draft, then at the conference she said that there is nothing concrete and that it is only in the proposal phase. Does such an approach show frivolity on the Kosovo side and how do you comment on the fact that there was no coordination with the President of Kosovo for such a proposal?

A: I’ll leave the coordination issue up to those involved. I do think Kosovo should prepare a draft that it would find acceptable, provided Belgrade fulfills its obligations under the 2013 Brussels agreement.

Q: Now that the CoE application is gone, what do you think that the EU and US can do in order to convince Kosovo to move forward with ASM implementation?

A: They can convince Belgrade to do its part.

Q: If there will be no steps toward ASMM, Do you think that there could be space for a return of the land-swap idea if former US president Donald Trump will be back in office in WH?

A: I have no doubt the land swap idea will arise again if Trump is re-elected, whether or not there are steps toward ASMM.

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What to do about the Association

Posted in Daniel Serwer - May 17, 2024 - 6 Comments

The inevitable question today for those who think about the Balkans is what to do about the Association/Community of Serb-majority Municipalities. Belgrade wants it formed by statute inside Kosovo. The Americans and Europeans are insisting on it. The Kosovo authorities are resisting it. What should be done?

The original agreement

Pristina agreed to the Association in 2013, in what was termed the “First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations.” This unsigned agreement envisaged the Association having “full overview of the areas of economic development, education, health, urban and rural planning.” The central authorities could also delegate to it additional competences. There was a further agreement concluded in 1915, but the Kosovo Constitutional Court voided much of that agreement.

The 2013 agreement includes quid pro quo‘s for Kosovo. It provides for the integration of Serbs into the Kosovo Police and judicial institutions, as well as application of the Kosovo legal framework in all the Serb municipalities. It also provided “that neither side will block, or encourage others to block, the other side’s progress in their respective EU path.”

This was a two-way deal, not a one-way concession. Vuk Draskovic, Serbia’s former foreign minister, reminded me of this during a visit to Washington last year.

Its failure

Neither Belgrade nor Pristina has fulfilled its part of the bargain. Albin Kurti, now Kosovo prime minister, opposed formation of the Association while in opposition. In power, he has continued to resist its implementation. Serbian President Vucic, who served as Deputy Prime Minister at the time of the original agreement, has continued to insist on it.

Moreover, talk in Belgrade about creating a “Serbian world” that includes the Serb populations of neighboring countries has raised suspicions. People in Kosovo worry that Serbia is trying to create with the Association a separate, autonomous area outside Pristina’s authority. Those suspicions gained credence when a Belgrade-backed proposal for the Association did just that. A similar Serb association in Bosnia led to war in the 1990s.

In the meanwhile, Belgrade has failed to fulfill its part of the deal. It has never given up trying to block Kosovo progress towards the EU. This includes its recent efforts to bar Kosovo accession to the Council of Europe. Serbs have withdrawn from Kosovo institutions in the four northern municipalities. Serbia also sponsored a boycott of elections there, kidnapped three Kosovo police from Kosovo territory, organized a rent-a-riot that injured NATO peacekeepers, and plotted a terrorist attack last September intended to provide an excuse for a Serbian military incursion. Each of these efforts was a challenge to the legal framework that Belgrade had agreed would be applied throughout Kosovo.

Diplomatic malpractice

There is nothing new about failed agreements between Kosovo and Serbia. Many of the more technical agreements from before 2013 achieved only partial or belated implementation. But for reasons only the diplomats involved can explain, in this case the Americans and Europeans promised Belgrade implementation of the Association without any quid pro quo for Kosovo.

In an op/ed the Americans promised the Association won’t be allowed to become a new level of governance. But they have not been willing to commit to that in a formal government agreement. The Europeans have levied “consequences” (i.e. sanctions) on Kosovo for failing to establish the Association. They have also at the last minute delayed consideration of Kosovo’s application to join the Council of Europe. The Europeans imposed this new condition even though Kosovo had met a long-standing requirement to acknowledge a Serb monastery’s property rights.

This is diplomatic malpractice. I suppose the intense pressure will make Kosovo cough up a proposed statute for the Association. But it makes no sense to condition accession to the Council of Europe on its implementation. Membership in that otherwise obscure institution would give Serbs in Kosovo access to the European Court of Human Rights. That provides a serious forum for resolution of ethnic minority complaints. Serbia, the US, and the EU should welcome Kosovo interest in joining it.

Give to get

In addition to pressuring Kosovo, the US and EU should remind Serbia of its obligations under the 2013 agreement. Serbs should reenter the Kosovo institutions and participate in elections. Belgrade should end its campaign against Kosovo membership in European institutions. Serbia should deliver its rioters and terrorists to Kosovo for trial, as evidence that Belgrade accepts the Kosovo legal framework. I have no doubt but that Pristina would view the Association differently if Belgrade fulfilled all these conditions.

Serbia should give in order to get. That is what they 2013 agreement on the Association requires.

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Could the message be any clearer?

Posted in Daniel Serwer - May 13, 2024 - 0 Comment

I spoke this morning at Hudson Institute-US/Europe Alliance event on Foreshocks in the Black Sea and Western Balkans: Repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine War. I drew on this post:

Serbia already has a “strategic partnership” with Russia.

All too often those who follow the Balkans view Moscow and Beijing as manipulating President Vucic. That is not the whole story. He “has agency” in the awkward syntax of political science. Vucic has decided to align his increasingly autocratic regime with Russia and China, as well as with Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Hungary. He likes their “might makes right” style, which gives him some hope of recovering Kosovo or part of it. He would no doubt befriend Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, if Pristina hadn’t beaten him to it by establishing its embassy in Jerusalem.

The many reasons why

Ethnonationalist, autocratic preference comes naturally to Vucic, who learned his politics at Slobodan Milosevic’s knee. But he had a choice when he became Prime Minister in 2014. He could have adopted a truly pro-Western approach. He has long talked pro-EU. If deed had followed words, Serbia would today have a consolidated democracy well on its way to accession. Instead, it has drifted towards authoritarian rule. Freedom House ranks it generously as “partly free.” Its ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) “has steadily eroded political rights and civil liberties, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition, and civil society organizations.”

Vucic has not only presided over Serbia’s democratic decline. He has encouraged it. Many Balkan watchers complain about “stabilitocracy.” They mean by that the alleged Western preference for incumbent rulers because they provide stability, despite democratic shortcomings. But that ignores the fates of Macedonian Prime Minister Gruevski, Montenegrin President Djukanovic, and Kosovo President Thaci. Vucic fears lack of Western commitment to stability. He worries, I hope rightly, that the day he faces defeat in an election or indictment in an international court no one in Europe or the US will trouble themselves with him.

There are no doubt ample economic reasons for Vucic’s autocratic drift as well. China is not beneficent, but its mining, rail, and tire projects and investments leave ample room for hiring well-connected locals and skimming off a percentage to support Vucic-connected oligarchs and politicians. Moscow deals are even less transparent. Both the Chinese and the Russians are all too willing to help as well with internal security cooperation that might go a yard further than the Americans or Europeans would countenance, including extensive electronic surveillance.

Vucic is serious about the Serbian world

But in the end the biggest factor in Vucic’s Eastern leanings is his admiration for those who take what they want, without offering any excuses. Vucic wants to govern all the Serbs of the Balkans, de facto if not de jure. His minions call that ambition the “Serbian world.” In Milosevic’s era it was known as Greater Serbia. Vucic is achieving his objective de facto in Republika Srpska and in Montenegro with minimal violence. That won’t be possible in Kosovo. Any violent move there would throw the Balkans back into chaos and ethnonationalist slaughter.

Belgrade’s new government includes the strongest Serbian world advocate, Deputy Prime Minister Vulin. He claims to have organized the terrorist incident in northern Kosovo last year. It was intended to provide an excuse for Serbian military intervention.

The new Prime Minister was Defense Minister last year when a rent-a-crowd injured dozens of NATO peacekeepers and when Serbia kidnapped police from the territory of Kosovo. He denies genocide in Bosnia and vaunts his ambition to get Montenegro “closer” to Serbia. He shows no sign of accepting as valid the two agreements negotiated last year on normalization with Kosovo. His predecessor disowned them. The new Foreign Minister, the former Ambassador in Washington, can talk for an hour or so with an EU diplomat without mentioning them.

Vucic himself has made it clear he is biding his time until geopolitical circumstances allow him to grab at least northern Kosovo.

This is where the Chinese, who want to do likewise with Taiwan, and the Russians, who have already annexed something like 18% of Ukraine, are most useful. They help Vucic keep alive the hope that some day he can seize what he wants.

So where will the fate of the Balkans be decided?

We should take Vucic’s ambition seriously. Washington and Brussels need to extinguish it. It will be difficult to do that until Biden wins in November and Ukraine evicts Russia. It will be impossible if Trump or the Russians win. Washington, Donbas, and Crimea will decide the fate of the Balkans.

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