Tag: Balkans
Peace Picks | August 2-6, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- Restoring a federal governance system in Sudan | Aug 2, 2021 | 9:00 AM EST | Chatham House | Register Here
The signing of the Juba Peace Agreement in October 2020, and a constitutional decree issued in March 2021 by the Chairman of the Sovereign Council, are both significant markers towards the restoration of a federal governance system in Sudan. Establishing a decentralized system of governance that bridges the development gap between the centre and the regions is a significant challenge. But it is hoped that the genuine devolution of power will support peace-building, result in more equitable distribution of wealth and resources, and amplify local priorities in Sudan’s regions.
At this event, panellists will discuss the implementation of a new federal governance architecture in Sudan, the establishment of structures that will ensure more equitable development across the country and priorities for local governance.
Speakers:
Hon. Adeeb Yousif
Governor of Central Darfur, Republic of Sudan
Anwar Elhaj
Researcher and Political Analyst
Dr. Mona Mohamed Taha Ayoub
Lecturer, Institute of Public Administration and Federalism, University of Khartoum
Dr. Louise Walker
Chargé d’Affaires, British Embassy in Sudan
Ahmed Soliman (Chair)
Research Fellow at the Africa Programme, Chatham House
- Turkey-Israel relations in a changing geopolitical landscape | Aug 4, 2021 | 8:30 AM EST | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Relations between Turkey and Israel have been historically low since a diplomatic rift in 2010, characterized by an atmosphere of mutual distrust and punctuated by recurring crises. Historically, as the United States’ two closest allies in the region, Turkey and Israel had enjoyed a close strategic relationship. Now, with changing regional dynamics in the form of the Abraham Accords, mutual concerns about the Syrian War and Iran’s role in the region, and the recent change in Israel’s government present new opportunities and environments for the two countries to engage in dialogue.
This panel will discuss the outlook for the relation between these two regional powers.
Speakers:
Jonathan H. Ferziger
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East Programs, Atlantic Council
Former Bloomberg Middle East Correspondent
Amb. Mithat Rende
Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Turkey to the OECD
Prof. Brenda Shaffer
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council
Amb. Matthew J. Bryza (moderator)
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, Global Energy Center & Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Defne Arslan (welcoming remarks)
Director, Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, Atlantic Council
- Enhancing security in the Black Sea: The future of security cooperation | Aug 4, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Since Moscow launched its war on Ukraine in 2014, NATO has taken substantial steps to bolster security for its eastern members, particularly with a stronger presence in the Baltic states, Poland, and Romania. The NATO approach to security in the Baltic Sea has been comprehensive, as all NATO members in the region and other states recognize the dangers posed by a revisionist Kremlin. But NATO efforts along the southern flank, in the Black Sea region, are not as far along.
This panel will discuss NATO’s role in the Black Sea region and what security cooperation among these states will look like in the future.
Speakers:
Leah Scheunemann (welcoming remarks)
Deputy Director, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Alton Buland
Director, South and Central Europe, US Department of Defense
Dr. Can Kasapoğlu
Director of Security and Defense Research, The Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM)
Ambassador Elena Poptodorova
Vice President, Atlantic Club of Bulgaria
Dr. Harlan Ullman
Senior Advisor, Atlantic Council; Chairman, The Killowen Group
Irina Zidaru
Director General for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania
Amb. John Herbst (moderator)
Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
- Why Tunisia’s democratic transition still matters? | Aug 4, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | Chatham House | Register Here
Late on Sunday 25 July 2021, the 64th anniversary of the proclamation of the Tunisian Republic, the Tunisian president, Kais Saied declared he will assume the executive power in country, dismissing the government of the Prime Minster Hichem Mechichi and suspending the parliament. He also declared the suspension of the legal immunity of parliament members and taking control of the general prosecutor’s office.
Struggle over powers and mandates has been characteristic of the Tunisian political system over the past decade. Since the eruption of the Tunisian revolution in 2011, significant political progress towards democracy has been achieved. However, over the past year, Tunisia has witnessed disagreements over cabinet reshuffles and control of the security forces, complicating the efforts to handle a recent fierce COVID-19 wave, structural economic hardship and a looming fiscal crisis. Are the shaky political progress and the sluggish economic progress a threat to the nascent democratic transition in Tunisia? Or are the ongoing developments part of Tunisia’s democratization process?
The webinar will explore the factors that paved the way to the dramatic moment of the evening of 25 July 2021, assess the options for Tunisia’s democratic transition, and why this transition is still relevant in the first place.
Speakers:
Dr Laryssa Chomiak
Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House
Fadil Aliriza
Editor In Chief, Meshkal
Prof Daniel Brumberg
Director of Democracy and Governance Studies, Georgetown University; Non-resident Senior Fellow, Arab Center Washington DC
Aymen Bessalah
Advocacy and Policy Analyst, Al Bawsala
Dr Lina Khatib (moderator)
Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House
- A New Transatlantic Policy Approach Towards the Western Balkans | Aug 4, 2021 | 11:30 AM EST | CSIS | Register Here
As the Biden administration pledges to work closely with its European allies, new policy approaches, development tools, and dialogue mechanisms to revitalize transatlantic policy across the region are essential as these countries grapple with weak institutions, endemic corruption, democratic backsliding, and are increasingly influenced by strategic competition.
The panel will engage in an in-depth regional conversation that explores German policy toward the region and how the U.S. and Germany and the EU can achieve better policy outcomes in the Western Balkans.
Speakers:
MdB Peter Beyer
Coordinator of Transatlantic Cooperation, German Federal Foreign Office; Western Balkans Rapporteur, German Parliament
James O’Brien
Vice Chair, Albright Stonebridge Group
Heather A. Conley
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic & Director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, CSIS
Paul Linnarz (opening remarks)
Director, Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung Office USA
- Tunisia’s Constitutional Crisis and Yearning for Democracy in Northwest Africa | Aug 5, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | Arab Center Washington DC | Register Here
On July 25, 2021, Tunisian President Kais Saied fired the prime minister and suspended Parliament in what some have called a coup. The move followed nationwide protests demanding the premier’s resignation and the dissolution of the parliament as the coronavirus outbreak pushed the healthcare system to collapse and worsened economic conditions.
In light of these developments in Tunisia, site of the Arab Spring’s only democratic success story, Arab Center Washington DC is organizing a webinar to discuss the status of democratization in Northwest Africa, specifically focusing on Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Morocco. Panelists will discuss the implications of President Saied’s move and its constitutionality, the state of democratization in the region and the impact of events in Tunisia, the role and interventions by regional powers like Egypt and Gulf countries, and policy recommendation to support democratic processes and governance reform across Northwest Africa.
Speakers:
Yasmina Abouzzohour
Visiting Fellow, Brookings Doha Center
Khaoula Ben Gayesse
Tunisian Journalist
Dalia Ghanem Yazbeck
Resident Scholar, Carnegie Middle East Center
- Pakistan’s National Security Outlook: A Conversation with Pakistani National Security Advisor Moeed Yusuf | Aug 5, 2021 | 11:00 AM EST | The United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
Since the country’s founding, Pakistan’s national security priorities have been largely defined by the realities of its geopolitical neighborhood. Now, with escalating violence in Afghanistan, intensifying competition between the United States and China, limited hopes for rapprochement with India, and the COVID-19 pandemic, Pakistan’s neighborhood is evolving — and Pakistan’s national security approach will have to evolve with it.
This discussion with Pakistan’s National Security Advisor Moeed Yusuf will look at what these developments mean for Pakistan’s national security outlook towards its neighbors and its relationship with the United States, as well as how the pandemic impacts Pakistan’s security and economic policy.
Speakers:
Dr. Moeed Yusuf
National Security Advisor, Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Hon. Stephen J. Hadley (moderator)
Chair of the Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Republika Srpska unifies in defense of genocide, “again and again”
The Serb political parties of the 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) called Republika Srpska (RS) have unified in rejecting the international community’s High Representative’s decision to prohibit denial of genocide and defense of war criminals under the country’s criminal code. This tells you all you need to know about about the RS, which is the product of the 1990s genocidal enterprise conducted principally against the country’s Bosniak population. It is entirely appropriate that the RS would stand up to be counted in defense of genocide and war criminals.
The question is what will the Americans and Europeans do about it? The RS is an essential component of the Dayton peace accords, which divided BiH into two regional entities, the RS and a Bosniak/Croat Federation. The latter controls 51% of the territory. Their active collaboration is required to make the central government (Bosnians call it the “state” government) to function. The Serb political parties are vowing not to participate in the central government.
Boycott is a frequent political tactic throughout the Balkans. Those who use it believe that nothing legitimate can be decided without their participation. This is of course untrue in a liberal democracy, where the majority rules, with respect for minority rights. But still the tactic is used: witness the Republican withdrawal of their pro-Trump members of the Congressional Select Committee investigating the January 6 insurrectionary riot. The Republican leader in the House is hoping this will delegitimize the investigation. The Democrats will simply proceed with the committee, including Republicans who did not supported the riot and are willing to serve.
That is what the “state” government should do: proceed without the participation of those who decline to participate. This can be difficult in the BiH context, so it would require some ingenuity on the part of those who wish to do it and the internationals who support them, including the High Representative who issued the initial decision. Nonparticipation should have consequences. Nonparticipation by those who wish to defend genocide and war criminals should have serious consequences.
Why should it be illegal to deny genocide and defend war criminals? In short, because in the Bosnian context it constitutes incitement. Incitement to genocide is illegal under international law (the 1948 Genocide Convention) and also in the US, including by foreigners present here. An arrest or two would go a long way to making the point. The situation is presumably comparable in the countries of the European Union. For those who may wonder: Bosnia and Herzegovina is a state party of the Genocide Convention, as a consequence of its succession from Yugoslavia.
Odds are, nothing like what I am suggesting will happen. Instead, there will be some sort of fudged “solution” that concedes ever more ground to genocide deniers and inciters. I have been around too long not to know what that means. “Never again” can turn easily into “again and again.”
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Who comes to equity must come with clean hands
Serbian President Vucic, after meeting with Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti yesterday, said:
We have received EU proposals that have been harmonized with our chief negotiators and Serbia has fully agreed with what the EU has proposed, three points – to intensify efforts to identify the remains of missing persons, to refrain from actions that could potentially destabilize the situation…on the ground and third, that the main negotiators meet regularly once a month and prepare meetings when necessary. We could not agree on these three points.
Kurti was rather more graphic:
The lack of agreement is not a surprise. It was foretold. Belgrade and Pristina are into the blame game. Neither Kurti nor Vucic has much to gain politically at home from an agreement. Both are posturing, mainly for their respective domestic political audiences but also for Brussels and Washington.
What can we learn from the posturing? Vucic is taking a minimalist approach. Agreement on missing persons 20 years after the war is no big step. Nor is a proposal on destabilization, because it would apply presumably inside Kosovo, not in Serbia. Meeting once a month is easy too, since it is unlikely given the current atmosphere that more than one or two meetings more will be necessary before Brussels tires of the posturing and lets the schedule slide.
Kurti is taking a maximalist approach, in part to distinguish himself from his predecessors. He regards them as patsies. A non-aggression pact would apply principally to Serbia, as there is no likelihood of Kosovo, which lacks an army, attacking Serbia, which has a big and well-armed one. Facing the past applies to both, but in much larger measure to Serbia, as it was the prime aggressor and human rights abuser in the 1990s conflict. And the barriers to free trade cited are all Serbia’s of course.
I am personally more sympathetic to Kurti’s maximalist agenda than Vucic’s minimalist one, but that doesn’t mean we are likely to see progress. These two are talking past each other, not with each other. The EU mediator, Miroslav Lajcak, is under pressure to produce something, so he may well want to continue the process. But if he does, he needs to underpin it with a more constructive conversation at lower levels, out of the public eye.
My guess is–and it is only a guess–that Belgrade and Pristina could really make some progress on missing people, on protection of Serbs in Kosovo and Albanians in Serbia, and on freeing up trade. Kurti seems intent on threatening to reimpose tariffs on Serbian goods if he gets no satisfaction on access to Serbia’s markets. It’s a good idea only if it leads to lowered barriers. Protection of their respective minorities in the other country is important. There is no excuse for interethnic violence in Kosovo, and in southern Serbia there is a concerted effort to displace the Albanian population through administrative means. Both should stop.
I don’t know what to say that hasn’t already been said about missing people. Twenty years is far too long for governments that claim to be democratic to fail to give a full accounting and return the bodies. I fear that in both countries it is people responsible for the crimes that killed civilians who are now sufficiently powerful to prevent their respective governments from doing what they know is right.
If there is one thing I would prioritize to improve the prospects for the dialogue, it is not at the table in Brussels but before anyone gets there. The day Pristina comes to the table with visible support from Kosovo’s Serb population is the day things will begin to move in a more peaceful, stable direction. Vucic has worked hard to prevent that from happening: he controls the political party that holds all the Serb seats in the Kosovo Assembly. Kurti should be working hard to gain Kosovo Serb support by preventing violence against Serbs and Serb property in Kosovo, ensuring that both are respected fully, and facing Kosovo’s own past, which includes deadly violence by fighters of its Liberation Army against both Serbs and Albanians before, during, and after the 1999 war.
Who comes to equity must come with clean hands. Kosovo can wash its hands a lot easier, and with much greater effect, than Serbia can.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
What to expect from renewal of the Kosovo/Serbia dialogue
Alma Baxhaku of Klan Kosova asked some questions today; I answered:
Q: The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is resuming. The new Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, has said that this process is not a continuation of what it was until now. Do you think that Kosovo should radically change its approach to dialogue with Serbia?
A: The Prime Minister has good reason to want to underline that he will take a different approach, as the past several years of the dialogue have not been productive. I do think some changes are in order.
Q: What should be Kosovo’s position at the negotiating table?
A: Kosovo needs to insist on equality and reciprocity. If something is agreed for Serbs in Kosovo, an equivalent should be available to Albanians inside Serbia. The Specialist Chambers violated this principle. I’d like to see their jurisdiction extended to Serbia, where the Albanian American Bytyqi brothers were murdered after the war.
Kosovo also needs to be ready to walk away from a bad agreement in order to get a good one. And it needs to strengthen its international support.
Q: In the first meeting with President Vucic, PM Kurti came up with four new proposals. How did you see them?
A: I’m mostly in agreement. I obviously agree with him on reciprocity in general, though I might have some quarrels with how it is applied in practice. I also agree that the missing persons of all ethnicities need to be identified and their remains returned.
On CEFTA/SEFTA I’m inclined to agree as well. Mini-Schengen seems to me an ill-defined enterprise, one in which Kosovo’s equality is not clearly recognized. I also like the idea of a non-aggression agreement, though I imagine Serbia will hesitate because it implies Kosovo sovereignty and Belgrade would want NATO to sign on as well.
Q: PM Kurti said in front of the MEPs that the authors of the documents that would bring ideas for a final solution between Kosovo and Serbia are missing. Do you think the EU should offer a concrete solution to the parties?
A: Only if it is one that recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kosovo. In the meanwhile, the EU should allow Kosovo into the visa waiver program.
Q: What should be the role of the US in this resumed process?
A: The US should be supporting the EU, but it will also be called on to “deliver” Kosovo. I think Brussels and Washington should form an entity like the International Civilian Office to monitor implementation of agreements reached in the dialogue as well as name and shame those who fail to implement them.
Q: According to the statements made public, both Kurti and Vucic have much opposite attitudes. Do you think that a final agreement between Kosovars and Serbs is near?
A: I don’t. President Vucic sees little prospect of EU membership in the near term and has consequently turned toward Moscow and Beijing rather than Brussels. He has made it eminently clear he is not prepared for a major move before next year’s Serbian presidential election.
Kosovo in these circumstances has to do what it can to use the time to strengthen its bargaining position. The recent movement of non-recognizers Greece and Spain toward upgrading their relationships with Kosovo is precisely the kind of thing needed. I’d like Pristina to improve relations with Beijing, which is more interested in commerce in the Balkans than politics. The Kosovo government should also be doing everything it can to improve relations with the Serb and other communities inside Kosovo, including identifying and returning the remains of missing people, implementing the Constitutional Court decision of the Decan/Decani monastery’s property, and protecting all of the communities from interethnic violence.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Independence is relative and takes a long time
The Continental Congress voted a resolution of independence on July 2, 1776, the day John Adams thought should be celebrated, but the Declaration in its final form was not presented until July 4. Adams and his rival Thomas Jefferson both died on that day 50 years later, so I suppose Adams would have to be content with losing that round. July 4 is the date we celebrate, even if we do it by taking off from work July 5 when the 4th falls on a weekend.
But independence doesn’t come just because you declare it. The British Crown nominally accepted it 7 years later in the Treaty of Paris, but even then things weren’t settled. The war of 1812(-15) witnessed the British burning of Washington DC. During the Civil War (1861-65) the British, fearful of growing Union industrial might, remained formally neutral but sympathized with the Confederacy. After the war, the Brits and Americans quarreled over fishing and tariffs. It was only with the arbitration of a British Guyana/Venezuela (backed by America) boundary dispute in the 1890s that a more friendly relationship between Britain and America emerged, boosted by America’s growing naval power. The “special relationship” often referenced today was a product of World War II.
Post-World War II decolonization, which created dozens of newly independent states within a few decades, may appear an exception, but it isn’t. Many of Europe’s colonies had fought long and hard for independence, and few have entirely severed their ties to their former metropoles. At the very least, language and culture often remain strong links, as they did for the United States. German was the second most commonly spoken language in the thirteen colonies, but it was the pre-independence colonial power, not Berlin, that prevailed in the newly independent United States. Francophone and anglophone Africa show similar patterns: no matter the loathing towards the former imperial power, its culture and language often remain dominant.
So do other ties: education, trade, investment, politics, and diplomacy. Many former colonies export people and products to the former metropole, which provides investment and often diplomatic support. The export of people becomes a political factor: witness African francophones in France and South Asian anglophones in the United Kingdom. Latinx, Filipinos, and Vietnamese have likewise become political factors in the US, even if some of their countries of origin were not formally colonies. But there is no denying the close ties that come from prolonged US political involvement and military presence.
Here is where Kosovo differs substantially from other newly independent states. There is no risk of an influx of Kosovo Albanians into Serbia. Many young Kosovars are choosing to learn English rather than Serbian as a second language. While some aspects of Albanan and Serbian culture are similar (cuisine and music, in my view), Kosovo looks more to Tirana and the United States than it does to Belgrade for cultural and political guidance. This is not attributable a more general Albanian/Slavic divide. Albanians in Macedonia have made their peace with a Slavic majority and most speak Macedonian. In Albania, there are Orthodox Albanians.
The most important potentially independent state on earth today is Taiwan, which is a sovereign, democratic state that does not claim independence, fearing the consequences of China’s possible military response. Taiwan has intense economic relations with the People’s Republic and most Taiwanese speak Mandarin, but few Taiwanese would welcome the repressive treatment to which Beijing has subjected Hong Kong. China is ratcheting up the pressure on Taiwan and shows no sign whatsoever of willingness to accept its independence.
Another important potentially independent state is Tigray, which has successfully fought off the Ethiopian Army in recent weeks but still faces occupation of part of its territory by Eritrea and by fighters from the neighboring Ethiopian state of Amhara. It is unclear whether the Tigrayans are looking for independence. They say they want the violence to be ended with a political settlement consistent with the Ethiopian constitution, which however includes provisions for secession. The political leadership of Tigray is resentful of neighboring Eritrea, an autocracy with which Ethiopia fought a devastating boundary war 1998/2001. But the most widely spoken language in Eritrea and in Tigray is Tigrinya. If Tigray were to secede from Ethiopia, Eritrea could certainly be at risk. A state that includes both Tigray and Eritrea would have a far better chance of survival than either state on its own.
There are other potentially independent states out there: Western Sahara (claimed and partially occupied by Morocco), northern Mali (scene of rebellions by several different groups), Israeli-occupied Palestine of course, Balochistan, Kurdistan in one form or another, and others I’ve missed. All have seen longstanding struggles that, even if they succeed, will entail continuing interaction with their current rulers, if only because the geography dictates it. Independence is relative and takes a long time.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The Western Balkans the day after Covid-19 won’t be better
Alexandros P. Mallias, former Ambassador of Greece to the US and member of the International Advisory Council of the Greek House Davos, said in remarks to the Greek House Davos/Thessaloniki Forum June 10:
The Balkan region will not look much different after Covid-19 unless there develops a genuine sense of political accountability. Politics is meant to serve, not the other way around. Political egotism, nepotism and corruption adversely affect citizen expectations throughout the region. The region’s politicians –some at least—appear failing their countries, their peoples, and themselves.
This can change. The remedies include:
- Enhanced involvement of the younger generations, which need opportunities to participate. Politics should not be the privilege of self-styled elites.
- Independent judiciaries, which are needed to hold politicians accountable. In much of the Balkans the courts are subject to political influence.
In addition, change will require the region to rid itself of other endemic infections, especially unreliable, aggressive, and authoritarian politics. The processes of NATO and EU accession offer appropriate and calibrated sticks and carrots. Aristotle put it well in The Nicomachean Ethics: “impose punishments and penalties upon malefactors and bestow honors on those doing fine actions.”
Proposed changes in borders, and associated forced exodus of populations, could renew conflict in the Balkans once Covid-19 is gone. Such proposals are now circulated without names attached, as no one wants to own their paternity. But behind closed doors key political figures in Western Balkan countries have contemplated the idea. International players even appeared to be backing it, though denying authorship.
Such proposals would open Pandora’s box, which cannot be easily close. They will be used as alibis for malfeasance in the Caucasus, Crimea, and elsewhere. Border changes start with a known beginning but risk a hazardous end. The EU, US, and states of the region should rule out land and population swaps in the Western Balkans, lest the end of Covid-19 initiate an even less controllable contagion.
RSS - Posts
