Tag: Balkans
What to expect from renewal of the Kosovo/Serbia dialogue
Alma Baxhaku of Klan Kosova asked some questions today; I answered:
Q: The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is resuming. The new Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, has said that this process is not a continuation of what it was until now. Do you think that Kosovo should radically change its approach to dialogue with Serbia?
A: The Prime Minister has good reason to want to underline that he will take a different approach, as the past several years of the dialogue have not been productive. I do think some changes are in order.
Q: What should be Kosovo’s position at the negotiating table?
A: Kosovo needs to insist on equality and reciprocity. If something is agreed for Serbs in Kosovo, an equivalent should be available to Albanians inside Serbia. The Specialist Chambers violated this principle. I’d like to see their jurisdiction extended to Serbia, where the Albanian American Bytyqi brothers were murdered after the war.
Kosovo also needs to be ready to walk away from a bad agreement in order to get a good one. And it needs to strengthen its international support.
Q: In the first meeting with President Vucic, PM Kurti came up with four new proposals. How did you see them?
A: I’m mostly in agreement. I obviously agree with him on reciprocity in general, though I might have some quarrels with how it is applied in practice. I also agree that the missing persons of all ethnicities need to be identified and their remains returned.
On CEFTA/SEFTA I’m inclined to agree as well. Mini-Schengen seems to me an ill-defined enterprise, one in which Kosovo’s equality is not clearly recognized. I also like the idea of a non-aggression agreement, though I imagine Serbia will hesitate because it implies Kosovo sovereignty and Belgrade would want NATO to sign on as well.
Q: PM Kurti said in front of the MEPs that the authors of the documents that would bring ideas for a final solution between Kosovo and Serbia are missing. Do you think the EU should offer a concrete solution to the parties?
A: Only if it is one that recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kosovo. In the meanwhile, the EU should allow Kosovo into the visa waiver program.
Q: What should be the role of the US in this resumed process?
A: The US should be supporting the EU, but it will also be called on to “deliver” Kosovo. I think Brussels and Washington should form an entity like the International Civilian Office to monitor implementation of agreements reached in the dialogue as well as name and shame those who fail to implement them.
Q: According to the statements made public, both Kurti and Vucic have much opposite attitudes. Do you think that a final agreement between Kosovars and Serbs is near?
A: I don’t. President Vucic sees little prospect of EU membership in the near term and has consequently turned toward Moscow and Beijing rather than Brussels. He has made it eminently clear he is not prepared for a major move before next year’s Serbian presidential election.
Kosovo in these circumstances has to do what it can to use the time to strengthen its bargaining position. The recent movement of non-recognizers Greece and Spain toward upgrading their relationships with Kosovo is precisely the kind of thing needed. I’d like Pristina to improve relations with Beijing, which is more interested in commerce in the Balkans than politics. The Kosovo government should also be doing everything it can to improve relations with the Serb and other communities inside Kosovo, including identifying and returning the remains of missing people, implementing the Constitutional Court decision of the Decan/Decani monastery’s property, and protecting all of the communities from interethnic violence.
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Independence is relative and takes a long time
The Continental Congress voted a resolution of independence on July 2, 1776, the day John Adams thought should be celebrated, but the Declaration in its final form was not presented until July 4. Adams and his rival Thomas Jefferson both died on that day 50 years later, so I suppose Adams would have to be content with losing that round. July 4 is the date we celebrate, even if we do it by taking off from work July 5 when the 4th falls on a weekend.
But independence doesn’t come just because you declare it. The British Crown nominally accepted it 7 years later in the Treaty of Paris, but even then things weren’t settled. The war of 1812(-15) witnessed the British burning of Washington DC. During the Civil War (1861-65) the British, fearful of growing Union industrial might, remained formally neutral but sympathized with the Confederacy. After the war, the Brits and Americans quarreled over fishing and tariffs. It was only with the arbitration of a British Guyana/Venezuela (backed by America) boundary dispute in the 1890s that a more friendly relationship between Britain and America emerged, boosted by America’s growing naval power. The “special relationship” often referenced today was a product of World War II.
Post-World War II decolonization, which created dozens of newly independent states within a few decades, may appear an exception, but it isn’t. Many of Europe’s colonies had fought long and hard for independence, and few have entirely severed their ties to their former metropoles. At the very least, language and culture often remain strong links, as they did for the United States. German was the second most commonly spoken language in the thirteen colonies, but it was the pre-independence colonial power, not Berlin, that prevailed in the newly independent United States. Francophone and anglophone Africa show similar patterns: no matter the loathing towards the former imperial power, its culture and language often remain dominant.
So do other ties: education, trade, investment, politics, and diplomacy. Many former colonies export people and products to the former metropole, which provides investment and often diplomatic support. The export of people becomes a political factor: witness African francophones in France and South Asian anglophones in the United Kingdom. Latinx, Filipinos, and Vietnamese have likewise become political factors in the US, even if some of their countries of origin were not formally colonies. But there is no denying the close ties that come from prolonged US political involvement and military presence.
Here is where Kosovo differs substantially from other newly independent states. There is no risk of an influx of Kosovo Albanians into Serbia. Many young Kosovars are choosing to learn English rather than Serbian as a second language. While some aspects of Albanan and Serbian culture are similar (cuisine and music, in my view), Kosovo looks more to Tirana and the United States than it does to Belgrade for cultural and political guidance. This is not attributable a more general Albanian/Slavic divide. Albanians in Macedonia have made their peace with a Slavic majority and most speak Macedonian. In Albania, there are Orthodox Albanians.
The most important potentially independent state on earth today is Taiwan, which is a sovereign, democratic state that does not claim independence, fearing the consequences of China’s possible military response. Taiwan has intense economic relations with the People’s Republic and most Taiwanese speak Mandarin, but few Taiwanese would welcome the repressive treatment to which Beijing has subjected Hong Kong. China is ratcheting up the pressure on Taiwan and shows no sign whatsoever of willingness to accept its independence.
Another important potentially independent state is Tigray, which has successfully fought off the Ethiopian Army in recent weeks but still faces occupation of part of its territory by Eritrea and by fighters from the neighboring Ethiopian state of Amhara. It is unclear whether the Tigrayans are looking for independence. They say they want the violence to be ended with a political settlement consistent with the Ethiopian constitution, which however includes provisions for secession. The political leadership of Tigray is resentful of neighboring Eritrea, an autocracy with which Ethiopia fought a devastating boundary war 1998/2001. But the most widely spoken language in Eritrea and in Tigray is Tigrinya. If Tigray were to secede from Ethiopia, Eritrea could certainly be at risk. A state that includes both Tigray and Eritrea would have a far better chance of survival than either state on its own.
There are other potentially independent states out there: Western Sahara (claimed and partially occupied by Morocco), northern Mali (scene of rebellions by several different groups), Israeli-occupied Palestine of course, Balochistan, Kurdistan in one form or another, and others I’ve missed. All have seen longstanding struggles that, even if they succeed, will entail continuing interaction with their current rulers, if only because the geography dictates it. Independence is relative and takes a long time.
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The Western Balkans the day after Covid-19 won’t be better
Alexandros P. Mallias, former Ambassador of Greece to the US and member of the International Advisory Council of the Greek House Davos, said in remarks to the Greek House Davos/Thessaloniki Forum June 10:
The Balkan region will not look much different after Covid-19 unless there develops a genuine sense of political accountability. Politics is meant to serve, not the other way around. Political egotism, nepotism and corruption adversely affect citizen expectations throughout the region. The region’s politicians –some at least—appear failing their countries, their peoples, and themselves.
This can change. The remedies include:
- Enhanced involvement of the younger generations, which need opportunities to participate. Politics should not be the privilege of self-styled elites.
- Independent judiciaries, which are needed to hold politicians accountable. In much of the Balkans the courts are subject to political influence.
In addition, change will require the region to rid itself of other endemic infections, especially unreliable, aggressive, and authoritarian politics. The processes of NATO and EU accession offer appropriate and calibrated sticks and carrots. Aristotle put it well in The Nicomachean Ethics: “impose punishments and penalties upon malefactors and bestow honors on those doing fine actions.”
Proposed changes in borders, and associated forced exodus of populations, could renew conflict in the Balkans once Covid-19 is gone. Such proposals are now circulated without names attached, as no one wants to own their paternity. But behind closed doors key political figures in Western Balkan countries have contemplated the idea. International players even appeared to be backing it, though denying authorship.
Such proposals would open Pandora’s box, which cannot be easily close. They will be used as alibis for malfeasance in the Caucasus, Crimea, and elsewhere. Border changes start with a known beginning but risk a hazardous end. The EU, US, and states of the region should rule out land and population swaps in the Western Balkans, lest the end of Covid-19 initiate an even less controllable contagion.
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Two does not a trend make, but there is hope
Two so-called populist, definitely corrupt, would-be autocrats have fallen: Trump and Netanyahu. What are the prospects for others of their ilk?
- Indian President Narendra Modi has declined markedly in popularity, mainly due to COVID-19. The epidemic is beginning to ebb in India and he doesn’t face an election until 2024, so it is impossible to predict his fate.
- Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is in a less comfortable spot. The epidemic has hit Hungary hard and tanked its economy, but he is offering lots of goodies in advance of next year’s parliamentary elections. His party is still strong, but the opposition is more united than in the past.
- Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro is in worse shape, due to the virus and the economy. If former President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva returns to the hustings, Bolsonaro could be in big trouble come next year’s presidential election.
- Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is not in much better condition. Turkey was already in economic trouble before the epidemic, which has hit hard. The opposition, not fully unified, is gaining on him but the presidential election is still far off: June 2023.
- And for the sake of my Balkan readers, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic looks to be in good shape for next year’s presidential election, as the opposition is fragmented and he moved quickly to secure Chinese and Russian vaccines. Nor is there much hope of seeing the back of Bosnia’s Serb President Milorad Dodik, who has lost some traction but likely still has enough grip to hold on in next year’s polls. Both are enjoying lots of Russian financing and protection while Europe and the US twiddle their thumbs, uncertain what to do.
The already autocrats are in better shape:
- Chinese President Xi Jinping has done likewise and has no limit on how long he can serve.
- Russian President Vladimr Putin is holding his own, despite COVID-19. In any event, he is already eliminating any serious opposition to his hold on power in the next presidential election, which isn’t due until 2024.
- Iranian Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini is firmly in charge. The presidential election Friday includes no “opposition” or even bona fide moderates. Repression and cooptation have won the day.
- Syrian President Bashar al Assad has survived a decade of both moderate and extremist rebellion. He is now nominally in charge of perhaps 40% of Syria, but his regime is tattered and in desperate need of rebuilding.
- Belarusan President Alexander Lukashenko is weathering massive demonstrations and depends for his survival on Putin, whose efforts to jail or otherwise eliminate any serious opposition Lukashenko imitates.
- Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar’s coup leader, is trying to do likewise, despite persistent demonstrations.
President Biden has devoted his week in Europe to rallying the G7 to the cause of demonstrating that they can deliver for citizens better than the autocracies. Next week he’ll do the same with the broader audience of NATO allies before confronting Putin. The American economy is reviving rapidly if somewhat sporadically. The G7 has committed itself to a billion vaccine doses for poorer countries, improved public health preparations, and worldwide infrastructure efforts to counter China’s Belt and Road.
I don’t really have much hope that the autocrats will fall, even if Biden demonstrates unequivocally the superiority of liberal democracy. That’s not how the world works. Autocrats are autocrats in order to prevent that outcome. But the fall of a few more populist and corrupt would-be autocrats is certainly not out of the question. The world would be a lot better off if their citizens opted for true democracy. Two does not a trend make, but there is hope.
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Stevenson’s army, June 12
CRS has new study of China’s PLA.
WSJ tells how FBI captured the ransom Bitcoin.
WSJ says Turkey is key to Afghan pullout.
In FP, SAIS prof Edward P. Joseph discusses Balkan policy.
DOD announces security assistance to Ukraine.
NYT has special anniversary report on Pentagon papers. Here’s online link. Haven’t seen a hard copy.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Border changes should be ruled out of bounds
In this interview with Radio Television Kosova (RTK) Wednesday, State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary Matt Palmer had this exchange with an interviewer (start at 14:28 in the video):
Q: Is still alive idea for changing borders?
A: I don’t think that’s on the agenda. It’s not up to me to identify the redlines in this process. It’s up to the parties. The Kosovo side has been pretty clear about that issue.
This answer is unwise, counterproductive, and inconsistent with stated Biden Administration policy.
Unwise
The question of border changes in the Balkans has been thoroughly aired, including in discussions between Serbian President Vucic and former Kosovo President Thaci, not to mention in a raft of papers and nonpapers. Vucic and Thaci failed to come to an agreement: each wanted territory in the other’s country but wasn’t willing to give up the territory required to cut a deal. Leaving the door open to further discussion is foolish, because it has already been tried and failed. Putting the burden of killing the idea on Kosovo is unfair, as it absolves Serbia of responsibility, though it is true that no parliament in Kosovo, including the current one with a wider majority governing coalition than usual, could approve a “land swap,” which would also suffer a resounding defeat in a referendum.
Leaving the door open is also foolish because of the regional and international implications. Any change of Kosovo’s borders would lead to demands for changing Bosnia’s borders by secession of Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb-controlled 49% of its territory. How do we know? The de facto autocratic leader of the RS, Milorad Dodik, has promised it. In addition, Russian President Putin would demand the same for Russian-controlled portions of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Every illiberal politician worldwide would feel free to unleash irredentist sentiments, which exist throughout Asia and Africa. There is no quicker way of killing the Biden Administration’s hopes for a revival of democracy than leaving the door open to border changes in the Balkans.
Counterproductive
The purpose of Matt’s trip to Kosovo and now Serbia is to display solidarity with the European Union in pursuing a Belgrade/Pristina dialogue that has been unproductive for the better part of a decade. The EU is now aiming to revive it. The lead EU negotiator, Miroslav Lajcak, has been firm in ruling out border changes, which several EU countries have indicated they will not accept, most notably Germany. Each EU member has a veto on this question, since accession of any new members requires all existing member states to agree. Solidarity with the EU requires clarity on this point, not a wishy-washy statement that leaves it up to Pristina. That approach is precisely what got the Trump Administration into several years of unproductive friction with the EU in the Western Balkans. If Washington really wants the dialogue to produce anything, it needs to be crystal clear in public and private that it will not accept border changes.
Inconsistent
Biden, both as candidate and president, has unequivocally supported the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the countries of the Western Balkans, including both Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is the right position for a liberal democrat who believes in liberal democracy, that is democracy based on individual rights of citizens protected by the rule of law.
The problem is that sincere liberal democrats are still few and far between at the leadership level in the Western Balkans. Ethnic nationalists dominate, especially in Serbia but also elsewhere. President Vucic and his minions have been touting what he calls a “Serbian home,” which is indistinguishable from the Greater Serbia whose pursuit led Slobodan Milosevic into four or five wars (depending on how you count). Prime Minister Kurti has sometimes aspired to a referendum in Kosovo on union with Albania. RS President Dodik has the same aspiration, for Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some Bosnian Croats share the aspiration for themselves.
None of these propositions is consistent with aspirations for EU membership and should be ruled out of bounds both by the EU and the US.
PS: In case anyone wonders whether the video above was a slip-up, here is Matt declining again the same day, during an appearance with Lajcak, to rule out landswaps and saying that it is not up to the EU or the US to identify the compromises but up to “the parties determine the contents of the talks” (start at 6:14, apologies for the sound quality):
PPS: Then in Belgrade, Matt led out change of borders for Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but not for Kosovo:
The borders of BiH and North Macedonia are fixed. Nobody talks about changing he borders of BiH, nobody talks about changing the borders of North Macedonia. That’s out of the question.
When it comes to Kosovo, Matt puts the burden entirely on Pristina:
When it comes to borders and territories, I do not see this as an issue that Kosovo is ready to engage on.
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