Tag: Balkans
Two does not a trend make, but there is hope
Two so-called populist, definitely corrupt, would-be autocrats have fallen: Trump and Netanyahu. What are the prospects for others of their ilk?
- Indian President Narendra Modi has declined markedly in popularity, mainly due to COVID-19. The epidemic is beginning to ebb in India and he doesn’t face an election until 2024, so it is impossible to predict his fate.
- Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is in a less comfortable spot. The epidemic has hit Hungary hard and tanked its economy, but he is offering lots of goodies in advance of next year’s parliamentary elections. His party is still strong, but the opposition is more united than in the past.
- Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro is in worse shape, due to the virus and the economy. If former President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva returns to the hustings, Bolsonaro could be in big trouble come next year’s presidential election.
- Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is not in much better condition. Turkey was already in economic trouble before the epidemic, which has hit hard. The opposition, not fully unified, is gaining on him but the presidential election is still far off: June 2023.
- And for the sake of my Balkan readers, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic looks to be in good shape for next year’s presidential election, as the opposition is fragmented and he moved quickly to secure Chinese and Russian vaccines. Nor is there much hope of seeing the back of Bosnia’s Serb President Milorad Dodik, who has lost some traction but likely still has enough grip to hold on in next year’s polls. Both are enjoying lots of Russian financing and protection while Europe and the US twiddle their thumbs, uncertain what to do.
The already autocrats are in better shape:
- Chinese President Xi Jinping has done likewise and has no limit on how long he can serve.
- Russian President Vladimr Putin is holding his own, despite COVID-19. In any event, he is already eliminating any serious opposition to his hold on power in the next presidential election, which isn’t due until 2024.
- Iranian Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini is firmly in charge. The presidential election Friday includes no “opposition” or even bona fide moderates. Repression and cooptation have won the day.
- Syrian President Bashar al Assad has survived a decade of both moderate and extremist rebellion. He is now nominally in charge of perhaps 40% of Syria, but his regime is tattered and in desperate need of rebuilding.
- Belarusan President Alexander Lukashenko is weathering massive demonstrations and depends for his survival on Putin, whose efforts to jail or otherwise eliminate any serious opposition Lukashenko imitates.
- Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar’s coup leader, is trying to do likewise, despite persistent demonstrations.
President Biden has devoted his week in Europe to rallying the G7 to the cause of demonstrating that they can deliver for citizens better than the autocracies. Next week he’ll do the same with the broader audience of NATO allies before confronting Putin. The American economy is reviving rapidly if somewhat sporadically. The G7 has committed itself to a billion vaccine doses for poorer countries, improved public health preparations, and worldwide infrastructure efforts to counter China’s Belt and Road.
I don’t really have much hope that the autocrats will fall, even if Biden demonstrates unequivocally the superiority of liberal democracy. That’s not how the world works. Autocrats are autocrats in order to prevent that outcome. But the fall of a few more populist and corrupt would-be autocrats is certainly not out of the question. The world would be a lot better off if their citizens opted for true democracy. Two does not a trend make, but there is hope.
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Stevenson’s army, June 12
CRS has new study of China’s PLA.
WSJ tells how FBI captured the ransom Bitcoin.
WSJ says Turkey is key to Afghan pullout.
In FP, SAIS prof Edward P. Joseph discusses Balkan policy.
DOD announces security assistance to Ukraine.
NYT has special anniversary report on Pentagon papers. Here’s online link. Haven’t seen a hard copy.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Border changes should be ruled out of bounds
In this interview with Radio Television Kosova (RTK) Wednesday, State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary Matt Palmer had this exchange with an interviewer (start at 14:28 in the video):
Q: Is still alive idea for changing borders?
A: I don’t think that’s on the agenda. It’s not up to me to identify the redlines in this process. It’s up to the parties. The Kosovo side has been pretty clear about that issue.
This answer is unwise, counterproductive, and inconsistent with stated Biden Administration policy.
Unwise
The question of border changes in the Balkans has been thoroughly aired, including in discussions between Serbian President Vucic and former Kosovo President Thaci, not to mention in a raft of papers and nonpapers. Vucic and Thaci failed to come to an agreement: each wanted territory in the other’s country but wasn’t willing to give up the territory required to cut a deal. Leaving the door open to further discussion is foolish, because it has already been tried and failed. Putting the burden of killing the idea on Kosovo is unfair, as it absolves Serbia of responsibility, though it is true that no parliament in Kosovo, including the current one with a wider majority governing coalition than usual, could approve a “land swap,” which would also suffer a resounding defeat in a referendum.
Leaving the door open is also foolish because of the regional and international implications. Any change of Kosovo’s borders would lead to demands for changing Bosnia’s borders by secession of Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb-controlled 49% of its territory. How do we know? The de facto autocratic leader of the RS, Milorad Dodik, has promised it. In addition, Russian President Putin would demand the same for Russian-controlled portions of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Every illiberal politician worldwide would feel free to unleash irredentist sentiments, which exist throughout Asia and Africa. There is no quicker way of killing the Biden Administration’s hopes for a revival of democracy than leaving the door open to border changes in the Balkans.
Counterproductive
The purpose of Matt’s trip to Kosovo and now Serbia is to display solidarity with the European Union in pursuing a Belgrade/Pristina dialogue that has been unproductive for the better part of a decade. The EU is now aiming to revive it. The lead EU negotiator, Miroslav Lajcak, has been firm in ruling out border changes, which several EU countries have indicated they will not accept, most notably Germany. Each EU member has a veto on this question, since accession of any new members requires all existing member states to agree. Solidarity with the EU requires clarity on this point, not a wishy-washy statement that leaves it up to Pristina. That approach is precisely what got the Trump Administration into several years of unproductive friction with the EU in the Western Balkans. If Washington really wants the dialogue to produce anything, it needs to be crystal clear in public and private that it will not accept border changes.
Inconsistent
Biden, both as candidate and president, has unequivocally supported the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the countries of the Western Balkans, including both Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is the right position for a liberal democrat who believes in liberal democracy, that is democracy based on individual rights of citizens protected by the rule of law.
The problem is that sincere liberal democrats are still few and far between at the leadership level in the Western Balkans. Ethnic nationalists dominate, especially in Serbia but also elsewhere. President Vucic and his minions have been touting what he calls a “Serbian home,” which is indistinguishable from the Greater Serbia whose pursuit led Slobodan Milosevic into four or five wars (depending on how you count). Prime Minister Kurti has sometimes aspired to a referendum in Kosovo on union with Albania. RS President Dodik has the same aspiration, for Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some Bosnian Croats share the aspiration for themselves.
None of these propositions is consistent with aspirations for EU membership and should be ruled out of bounds both by the EU and the US.
PS: In case anyone wonders whether the video above was a slip-up, here is Matt declining again the same day, during an appearance with Lajcak, to rule out landswaps and saying that it is not up to the EU or the US to identify the compromises but up to “the parties determine the contents of the talks” (start at 6:14, apologies for the sound quality):
PPS: Then in Belgrade, Matt led out change of borders for Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but not for Kosovo:
The borders of BiH and North Macedonia are fixed. Nobody talks about changing he borders of BiH, nobody talks about changing the borders of North Macedonia. That’s out of the question.
When it comes to Kosovo, Matt puts the burden entirely on Pristina:
When it comes to borders and territories, I do not see this as an issue that Kosovo is ready to engage on.
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Yes, it’s time, but only you can make it happen
I was up at 5 this morning to spend 6-8 on Zoom with Circle 99, the venerable intellectuals’ club in Sarajevo. The topic was “Is It Time for a post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina?” Here are the speaking notes I used:
- Let me first say that it is a great pleasure to be back at Circle 99. Yes, I’ve been there before, in late 1995 or maybe early in 1996.
- I was then Special Envoy for the Bosnian Federation, helping to construct its institutions and get them functioning, along with Michael Steiner, then a German diplomat.
- Bosnia and I have come a long way since then. When I sit with friends drinking a coffee in Sniper Alley, I find it impossible to agree with their frequent declarations that nothing has changed.
- Lots of things have obviously changed. I think what they mean is that they are disappointed in the changes.
- Also for me, Bosnian politics too closely resembles war by other means: ethnically defined forces fighting a zero-sum game, each trying to enlist the support of powers outside Bosnia.
- I’d like to start today by explaining why this is the case, then move on to my analysis of what is wrong and what needs to be done to set it right, despite the odds.
- Notoriously, the Americans imposed the Dayton agreement on the warring parties of the 1990s.
- That is true, but we imposed what the three warring parties wanted: a power-sharing arrangement among “constituent peoples,” one based on its own ethnically defined 49% of the territory and the two others sharing power in the remaining 51%.
- Here it behooves me to explain why there was no third entity at Dayton.
- After all, the Herzegovinian Croats were in a very strong position in 1995: they had the backing of Croatia, which had successfully retaken most of its Serb-occupied Krajina, commanded the HVO, and controlled the flow of arms to the Bosnian Army, which by August 1995 were advancing rapidly towards Banja Luka.
- But President Tudjman, no great enlightenment figure, did not want Herzegovina inside his state or separated from Sarajevo, which would necessarily have meant a radicalized rump Muslim republic in central Bosnia.
- He agreed with the Americans and Germans that was something to avoid. The Federation was the means of doing so.
- By late 1994, when I first met with Herzeg-Bosna officials, Tudjman and Croatian Defense Minister Susak had removed the previous more radical, secessionist leadership of the Bosnian Croats and were pressuring them hard to participate constructively in the Federation.
- I spent many days in Zagreb lining up the details of Tudjman’s and Susak’s support. They never asked for a third entity, which they realized was not in Croatia’s interest.
- Fast forward to today: is a non-viable, radicalized, rump Muslim state or entity in central Bosnia a better idea today than it was in 1995? I think not.
- It is no better an idea for Serbia than it is for Croatia, never mind for the many Bosniaks who identify as politically moderate Europeans, or the Americans, the UK, and the member states of the European Union.
- At Dayton, the representatives of the three constituent peoples made their peace within a single sovereign state and agreed not only to share power but also to distribute it in a way that makes it difficult for anyone to gain power without identifying unequivocally with one of the constituent peoples and foreswearing support from the other two.
- No wonder the ethnonationalist leaders were prepared to accept what the Americans imposed at Dayton: it was as close to a guarantee they could stay in power indefinitely as they could hope to get.
- And no wonder Dragan Covic and Milorad Dodik want to strengthen the ethnonationalist hold on power.
- So to those who are hoping for a post-Dayton Bosnia, my first word is one of warning: be careful of what you wish for.
- The various non-papers tell you precisely what Covic and Dodik want. And who is Izetbegovic to object to the Green Garden, which had some appeal to his father during the war?
- There are more ways of making things worse in Bosnia and Herzegovina than making them better, as the Mostar election agreement showed.
- Electoral reform is a dangerous trap, full of technical issues that really matter in determining the outcome.
- I’d much prefer to see constitutional reform first, in the direction of making Bosnia and Herzegovina a more liberal democratic state.
- During the war, the President of the Federation, Kresimir Zubak, called me into his office one day and read me the riot act: one man one vote, he said, will never work in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- He was correct in that moment. The war had convinced each of the constituent peoples that they would never get a fair shake from the other two.
- Which is why Bosnia today has three presidents, two entities, houses of peoples, vital national interest vetoes, and dozens of other guarantees of group rights over and above individual rights.
- But now it is more than 25 years later. Does Bosnia and Herzegovina need its elaborate and dysfunctional governing structures in order to protect Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs as groups, or could it begin to dismantle those structures in favor of individual rights?
- My answer would be yes. I think the group rights guaranteed at Dayton are now threatening the integrity and functionality of the state.
- What Bosnia needs now is a shift of power away from the entities and cantons towards Sarajevo for some things and towards the municipalities for other things.
- The “state” government in Sarajevo should have all the responsibility and authority required to negotiate and implement the EU’s acquis communautaire. It should set the rules of the game.
- The municipalities, many of which have Croat or Serb majorities, should be the main providers of citizen services, with the budgets and authority required to do so effectively and efficiently.
- The prerequisite for such a reform is to refocus the constitution away from protecting group rights and towards protecting individual rights.
- But I confess what I think really doesn’t matter. I’m an American who likes the fact that as a member of a minority group and descendant of immigrants I can claim exactly the same rights as any other citizen, without reference to my ethnic group.
- I interact much more often in my private life with my municipality, where my voice is more readily heard, than with the Federal government.
- But in Bosnia and Herzegovina 25 years after the war, the choice is yours, not mine.
- You can continue to fight your ethnic battles by political means for another 25 years, or you can choose to end what we call in English the consociationalism that has proven itself so dysfunctional in practice, even if it was necessary for peace.
- I would note here that you are not alone in facing that choice: Lebanon, Iraq, and Israel—each in its own way—is facing a similar choice, whether to continue with ethnically based governance or begin to reward competence.
- In all three of these Middle Eastern countries, people are taking to the streets to demand a change in the constitutional system in favor of individual rights and cross-ethnic and cross-sectarian political organization.
- Therein lies a lesson: it can only be done if the citizens demand it. It is not enough for you here at Circle 99 to analyze and criticize.
- Someone —one of you or someone else—needs to lead the way, backed by a mass movement of citizens demanding their voices be heard, organizing to ensure candidates emerge who represent them, and voting to end the monopoly power of the ethnic nationalists.
- I occasionally hear the rumbling of such mass movements and electoral coalitions across ethnic lines in Bosnia: after the floods, when the plenums convened, in the cries of Justice for David and Dzenan.
- So far though, they have failed so far to generate the required political weight, partly due to repression.
- But what happened to Milosevic in Serbia and to Gruevski in Macedonia can happen in Bosnia: a politician secure in his hold on power and his control of the state apparatus—so secure in Milosevic’s case that he called early elections—can fall to the popular will.
- It is high time for Bosnians who are tired of the ethnic state to try to create something better.
- So I conclude: yes, it is time for a post-Dayton, civic state in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But only you can make it happen.
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The path to ending the Kosovo conundrum
With apologies for the delay and thanks to Adam DuBard for getting it done, I am posting the report my students presented on Zoom Tuesday: Ending the Kosovo Conundrum (it is also now available on the SAIS website here). While our SAISers offered lots of interesting ideas about ways in which the EU-sponsored Belgrade/Pristina dialogue could be improved, they are not optimistic about the kind of comprehensive solution that the EU says is the objective of its Belgrade/Pristina dialogue. There is a stalemate, but it is hurting Kosovo more than Serbia, which is prepared to postpone–maybe forever–recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state.
This is understandable. Serbian President Vucic does not welcome the kind of rule of law and uncorrupt government the EU is demanding ever more insistently from potential new member states. Serbia got everything it asked for from Kosovo in the UN’s Ahtisaari Plan, which was intended as a prelude to Kosovo’s independence. Belgrade pocketed the concessions but refused recognition, even after the International Court of Justice advised that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international law. Without the EU “carrot,” which Vucic is now disdaining, there is little hope of his changing his mind. Good neighborly relations are not going to be written on Vucic’s epitaph.
This leaves Kosovo in limbo, but not without a course of action: NATO membership is the key next step. This will require convincing four of the five EU countries that do not recognize Kosovo at least to accept it into the Alliance. Greece, Slovakia, Romania, and Spain are the holdouts, more or less in ascending order of difficulty. Cyprus is not a NATO member but cannot be entirely ignored because of its influence on Greece. That is the tail wagging the dog and will require a courageous Greek Prime Minister to get it to stop, but Greece already maintains an ambassadorial-level representative in Pristina and an office that is an embassy in all but name.
Kosovo is slated to complete the transformation of its security forces, a few of which have already deployed to Kuwait with the Iowa National Guard, into an army by 2027, with assistance from the US and UK. So there is ample time for the US and UK to convince the non-recognizing allies to accept Kosovo, even if they do not formally recognize it. NATO membership will require in addition that Kosovo meet the Alliance’s criteria:
a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy; fair treatment of minority
populations; a commitment to resolve conflicts peacefully; an ability and willingness to make a military
contribution to NATO operations; and a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutions.
These criteria are entirely compatible with EU membership, which is further off because Kosovo will have to in addition adopt and implement the acquis communautaire, an elaborate and extensive set of legal requirements.
This then is the strategy I would propose for the Kosovo government:
- focus on preparation for NATO membership, including resolution of conflicts with Serbia on issues like missing people and financial settlements but without expecting recognition anytime soon;
- improve relations with the Kosovo Serb community, whose interests are not identical with Belgrade’s, throughout Kosovo, including by providing it with access to the dialogue with Serbia for those who are not tied to Belgrade, better economic opportunities, protection of property rights, and continued efforts to recruit Serbs for the Kosovo armed forces;
- disavow any prospect of union with Albania, because it is incompatible with NATO membership, as Ed Joseph suggests;
- build capable state institutions, including a Defense Ministry committed to civilian control;
- protect media freedom, continue cooperation with civil society, and ensure an independent judiciary;
- begin to examine objectively the pre-independence fight for liberation from Serbian rule.
Many Kosovo Albanians are disappointed in the fruits of their efforts since declaring independence in 2008. But the distance ahead to NATO membership is far shorter than the time since independence. The government now has what should be a stable majority. Sovereignty depends on governing capacity. It is time to intensify efforts to build a worthy state, leaving the question of Serbian recognition to the day there is leadership in Belgrade that really cares about EU membership and realizes its own European future depends on it. Because it does.
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It’s not only about Montenegro
Colleague Mike Haltzel has a lot to say about Montenegro:
Hard for me to disagree with any of this, but I might have put more emphasis on Russia’s and Serbia’s efforts to undermine Montenegro’s independence. It has been their troublemaking, including through the Serbian Orthodox Church, that has made it difficult for a pro-EU opposition to emerge in Montenegro. President Djukanovic has had a virtual monopoly on liberal democratic ideals because the main serious political alternative has been Serb ethnic nationalist.
Now Montenegro is in a kind of ethnic security dilemma: anything Montenegrins do to preserve their identity is perceived as attacking Serbian identity and the Serbian state; and anything Serbs in Montenegro do to preserve their identity is perceived as an attack on Montenegrin identity and the Montenegrin state. Perhaps the biggest losers in this have been minorities, whom the Serbs see as devotees of President Djukanovic because they have consistently participated in governing coalitions with his political party. With no apparent way of winning them over because Serb identity excludes them, self-identified Serbs in Montenegro are hoping to intimidate and chase out Bosniaks, other Muslims, and Albanians while enfranchising as many ex-patriot Serbs as possible.
Russia and Serbia are strong supporters of Serb ambitions in Montenegro, not least because the former aim to undermine NATO and the latter to pursue the latest Serb fantasy, the “Serbian Home.” That’s the updated moniker for Greater Serbia, a single state that incorporates parts of neighboring states that Serbs inhabit (i.e. part of not only Montenegro but also Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia). It isn’t going to happen, but Serbia is aiming at least to re-impose its hegemony on its neighbors, even if that means destabilizing them, slowing their progress towards the EU, or undermining their credentials as NATO allies.
I’ve never quite understood a country that wants unstable neighbors, but in a zero-sum world it would make sense. Whatever I gain will come at my neighbors’ expense. The world since the financial crisis of 2007/8 has been close to zero sum, especially in Europe. Unwelcome migration, Brexit, the Greek financial crisis (and the threat of other financial crises), slow economic growth, and nationalist populism have undermined the attraction of the EU and provided Moscow and Belgrade with opportunities to project their more autocratic alternatives. The availibility of Chinese money has compounded the incentives to turn East rather than West, though Montenegro’s own billion-dollar loan is already going south. It should be a warning to others.
The US has already begun its post-pandemic economic expansion. Europe has not. Let’s hope it comes sooner rather than later, not only for Montenegro’s sake.
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