Tag: Balkans
A Bronx cheer for a dumb idea
COVID-19 isn’t the only epidemic in the Balkans. There is an even more deadly one: proposals to move borders. There is no vaccine to prevent their spread. Below is a good pictorial summary, courtesy of Rada Trajkovic, who tweets:
Balkans corrupt, criminalised, illiberal leaders have been so emboldened by their unfettered domestic power grabs that they now believe they can play a (bloody) game with our borders. Perfect distraction from their poor domestic records & a way to destabilise the EU for decades.
Greater Albania, Greater Serbia, Greater Croatia: the wet dream of Franjo Tudjman, Slobodan Milosevic, Hasan Pristina. Everyone wins!
But of course there are losers, both on this map and beyond. The Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims to the American press, no matter how unreligious) get an indefensible, rump state surrounded by sworn enemies and ripe for radicalization. The Kosovo Albanians lose their state and become the northeastern province of Albania. The major Serb Orthodox sites south of the Ibar River in Kosovo would no longer be sustainable. Macedonia loses perhaps 40% of its territory. Several hundred thousand people (maybe half a million or more?) on the “wrong” side of ethnically defined new borders would have to relocate or run the risks associated with minorities in ethnically defined states.
Beyond this map the repurcussions would also be dramatic: once the principle of not changing borders to accommodate ethnic differences is breached, the Russian position on South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, Transnistria in Moldova, and Crimea and Donbas in Ukraine would be vastly strengthened. Russian challenges to the terriorial integrity of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would not be far behind.
All of this is well understood in the United States and Europe. Few in Washington, London, or Brussels are interested in opening Pandora’s Box. But the West is distracted. The US is confronting a long list of foreign policy challenges. The EU is preoccupied with COVID-19, economic recession, and the aftermath of Brexit. Ditto the UK. Chancellor Merkel, the EU’s trump card when it comes to pursuing liberal democracy in the Balkans and many other matters, is getting ready to retire without a worthy heir apparent.
The current preference in the West is not to move borders but to make them less cumbersome. This proposition goes under the heading of “mini-Schengen,” an effort on the regional level to mirror the EU’s borderless Schengen area. Removing visas, tariffs and non-tariff barriers while shortening the waiting time for trucks at the all too frequent border stations in the Balkans could improve efficiency and hasten the day that the Balkans can join the “maxi” Schengen area.
That is a much easier and more promising prospect than moving half a million people, many of them against their will. Violence is the only force that could achieve what the map above projects. American and European troops would either need to suppress murder and mayhem in Kosovo, Bosnia, and North Macedonia or evacuate, something that would no doubt be celebrated in Moscow. Nor would violence stop there: the Serbs of Montenegro would seek union with Serbia while the Bosniaks of Serbia’s Sandjak seek union with rump Bosnia, pushing aside people of other ethnicities in the effort. Perhaps the Russians could use renewed Balkan violence as a pretext for deploying their own troops, as they did recently to end the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
In short: the map above is a proposal for death and destruction, instability, NATO and European embarrassment, and still another Russian win, in addition to ensuring the ethnic nationalist political stranglehold in the Balkans for another generation. Those who propose such an outrage merit oppropbrium from real democracies. I hope the US and EU can spare a few moments from their many other priorities to give this distraction the diplomatic equivalent of the Bronx cheer it deserves:
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A good move, but more is needed
My reaction to this letter from the Secretary of State to the tripartite presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is mixed. It is good that it presses hard on the need for constitutional as well as other reforms. It has been apparent for the better part of two decades that BiH needs profound changes in how power is gained and distributed in order to make it a functional state that can deliver services to its citizens.
But it fails to make clear, except by implication, that reform will need to go in the direction of strengthening individual rights relative to the group rights that the Dayton constitution favored. It also pretends to be modest in its goals, while laying out a broad requirement for constitutional, legal, electoral, and economic reforms. It is not clear whether those goals have been sufficiently coordinated with the European Union and its member states, who hold most of the carrots and sticks that can incentivize the needed reforms. Broad goals without sufficient incentives are not a formula for success.
In the more than 25 years since the Dayton agreements were signed, most BiH reform processes have either ended in drivel or in strengthening the ethnically-based power sharing system that is at the root of the country’s dysfunctional governance. It will take vigorous and coordinated diplomatic and political effort by the EU and US to prevent that from happening again. Milorad Dodik, the first member of the presidency to which this note is addressed, is a past master at blocking any reforms that threaten his corrupt and autocratic control over BiH’s Serb-majority entity, Republika Srpska. He exploits fear of the country’s Muslim majority and Serb nationalism, including the threat of secession and union with Serbia, to ensure that he stays in one powerful position or another.
It is a particular irony that Dodik is necessarily an addressee of this letter. The US has sanctioned him for violation of the Dayton accords:
Specifically, Dodik was designated for his role in defying the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in violation of the rule of law, thereby actively obstructing the Dayton Accords; Dodik was also designated for conduct that poses a significant risk of actively obstructing the same.
At the same time, Dodik is collaborating with a nationalist Croat leader, Dragan Covic, in attempting to implement a Constitutional Court decision in a way that favors ethnic nationalist political parties. While objecting to the authority of the Constitutional Court in principle, Dodik exploits any decisions it makes that he likes.
The missing ingredient in BiH reform proposals in the past has been popular support. The country’s citizens have left governance and reform largely to ethnic nationalists who have convinced their three respective groups (Bosniak, Serb, and Croat) that they need to be protected from one or two of the others. If there is no pressure from the street, the ethnic nationalists will do with the American initiative what they have always done: strengthen their own positions and prevent the emergence of a trans-ethnic coalition that can challenge their hold on power.
The Americans know this. What is unclear from Blinken’s letter is what they will try to do about it. Without popular demand for reform that protects individual rights and reduces the saliency of group rights, BiH will continue to be a dysfunctional and semi-democratic state ruled mainly by kleptocratic ethnic leaders who enjoy near monopolies on power. Individuals with equal rights are the essential ingredient of democratic governance. They are what BiH lacks. Only Bosnians, with some international assistance, can produce them.
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Elucidating a tragic moment in the Balkans
I received this note from the Humanitarian Law Center in Belgrade this morning:
March 17, 2021 marks the 17th anniversary of the March violence in Kosovo. During two days, March 17 and 18, 2004, Albanian protesters attacked Serbs, Roma and Ashkali, their property and Orthodox religious buildings throughout Kosovo.
In the March violence, 23 people lost their lives, 954 people were injured, almost 900 houses were completely destroyed or severely damaged, 36 Orthodox religious buildings were demolished and burned, and about 4,000 people were displaced.
Attached was this report by Isidora Stakić, which I find enlightening:
The retreat of the Serbian army and police from Kosovo in June 1999 meant liberation for Kosovo Albanians from Serbian rule and repression, and for Kosovo Serbs it meant the beginning of a new reality marked by the unwillingness and inability of UNMIK and KFOR to protect the personal safety of Serbs, Montenegrins, Bosniaks and Roma people, but also by the prevailing conviction of Kosovo politicians and the public that the priority is independence, followed by solidarity with the Serbs who stayed in Kosovo.[1]
The post-war reality was not easy for Kosovo Albanians either; much of their expectations of liberation came under pressure from the difficult economic situation and faintly observable justice for the thousands of civilians killed and a large number of missing. The then-new government of the Republic of Serbia made a step forward by discovering mass graves in Serbia, but the right-wing political parties, that were part of the government, managed to marginalize the question of the responsibility of the Yugoslav Army and Ministry of Interior for war crimes and influence Kosovo Serbs not to take participation in building a new political system in Kosovo. The killings and disappearances of Serbs and Roma, frequent until the end of 2000, would take place in the presence of KFOR and UNMIK, leading both the remaining Serbs and most of the Albanians to a conclusion that post-war perpetrators had the tacit consent of the international community to create Kosovo without Serbs.[2]
What were the triggers?
The March violence (17 and 18 March 2004) was preceded by three events. The first occurred on the 15th of March in the village of Čaglavica/Çagllavicë, when 18-year-old Serb Jovica Ivić was shot at and wounded in the abdomen and arm. Ivić claimed that the attackers were Albanians.[3] In response to this attack, Serbs from Čaglavica/Çagllavicë blocked the Priština/Prishtinë-Skoplje/Shkup road, a vital route for Albanians, and threw stones at Albanians’ vehicles.[4] This provoked anger of the Albanian community and strong condemnation by its political leaders who accused Serbs of endangering freedom of movement, and UNMIK of being passive towards the blockade.
At about the same time, in several cities in Kosovo, the associations of KLA veterans organized protests over the arrest of former KLA commanders charged with war crimes. These protests were directed, above all, against UNMIK, whose representatives made the arrests. In speeches during the protest, UNMIK was described as a neo-colonial force that “supporting organized crime and continuing the same politics applied by Serbia“.[5]
The third event took place on the afternoon of March 16, when three Albanian boys drowned in the Ibar/Iber river in the Serb-majority municipality of Zubin Potok. Immediately after the accident, the Kosovo media reported on this tragic event as an ethnically-motivated crime, stating that the boys jumped into the river because they were being chased by Serbs with a dog. The media were appealing to the statements of the fourth, surviving boy and the only eyewitness of the accident, but it turned out that the boy talked about Serbs with a dog cursing at them from a nearby house – which scared him and his friends – and not about Serbs chasing them.[6] Later, after investigating the incident, the international prosecutor concluded that the offered evidence did not support the existence of a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed.[7]
Although there was a possibility, on the day of the accident, that it was an ethnically motivated crime, the media couldn’t know that beyond any doubt and they were obliged to report professionally, following the known facts. Instead, Kosovo media – and TV stations in particular – reported sensationally, recklessly, emotionally and biasedly.[8] As the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media noted in his report, the media did not intentionally incite the violence that would follow the strangulation of the boy, but “had it not been for the reckless and sensationalist reporting, events could have taken a different turn.“[9]
The March violence in numbers
The March riots began in the morning of 17 March with a gathering of Kosovo Albanians in the southern part of Mitrovica/Mitrovicë and soon spread to many other towns in Kosovo. On March 17 and 18, 2004, 50-60,000 Kosovo Albanians took part in the violence, targeting Serbs, Roma and Ashkali, their property and Orthodox religious buildings. The participants in riots would use rocks and Molotov cocktails, set fire to people’s property and shoot at buildings, expel, intimidate and beat people. During the riots, the protesters would clash with UNMIK police and KFOR soldiers, and in some places with Serbs. The violence involved mostly younger men who spontaneously took to the streets. Human Rights Watch (HRW) estimates that the riots were both spontaneous and organized: although most of the protesters joined the riots spontaneously, there is no doubt that Albanian extremists worked to organize and accelerate the spread of violence.[10]
In the March violence in Kosovo, 23 people lost their lives: Macedonian Jana Tučev, nine Serbs – Dragan Nedeljković, Slobodan Perić, Dušanka Petković, Borivoje Spasojević, Borko Stolić, Dobrivoje Stolić, Slobodan Tanjić, Zlatibor Trajković and Nenad Vesić, and thirteen Albanians – Fatmir Abdullahu, Ferid Çitaku, Bujar Elshani, Kastriot Elshani, Isak Ibrahimi, Alumuhamet Murseli, Agron Ramadani, Nexhat Rrahmani, Arben Shala, Gazmend Shala, Ajvaz Shatrolli, Esat Tahiraj and one Albanian from Priština/Prishtinë whose name the Humanitarian Law Center (HLC) failed to identify.[11]
Among the victims, there were two women: Jana Tučev, who was shot dead with a firearm in her apartment in northern Mitrovica, and Dušanka Petkovic from Uroševac, who was a heart patient and died in KFOR base the day after she was kicked out from her house. Four of the Serbs were killed by Albanians with firearms, two were burned in their homes, the cause of death of one of them is unknown, and one disappeared during the evacuation. Two of the Albanians were killed by KFOR members, three lost their lives in clashes with KFOR and Serbs, one was killed by a UNMIK policewoman when he attacked another person with a knife, one was killed by a sniper by Serbs, and the reason of the death of the other Albanians is unknown.[12]
The April 2004 report by the UN Secretary-General stated that 954 people had been injured in the March violence, including 65 international police officers, 61 KFOR members and 58 members of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS).[13]According to the data collected by the HLC in months after the March violence, about 170 Serbs were seriously injured, 150 of them by beatings at their homes, while 20 were attacked outdoor.[14] About 800 Serbian, 90 Ashkali and two Albanian houses were completely destroyed or severely damaged, and 36 Orthodox religious buildings were demolished and burned.[15]
After the March violence, about 4,000 people, having lost their homes, were displaced – some of them for the second time, since they had already been displaced in 1999.[16] Older people found themselves in a particularly difficult socio-economic situation, as well as the others who lost in these riots all the property they had been acquiring all their lives. Immediately after the violence, many people who lost their homes were accommodated in containers provided by the international community and where the living conditions were very poor.[17] The displaced Serbs were largely dissatisfied with the damage assessments made by Albanian institutions, pointing out that the material damage they suffered was much greater.[18] Also, they complained that the help they used to receive from the Government of Serbia was insufficient or that they were not getting it at all.[19]
In January 2006, 1,231 of approximately 4,000 displaced persons after the March violence still had the status of displaced persons.[20] By June 2007, 897 previously destroyed or damaged residential buildings had been rebuilt, out of the intended 993.[21]
Actions of security institutions: KFOR, UNMIK police and KPS
Kosovo’s security institutions – both international (KFOR and UNMIK police) and local (KPS) – have failed to protect people and their property. According to the HRW report, members of the international forces interviewed after the March riots showed a lack of self-criticism and unawareness of their mistakes, shifting the blame to each other, but also justifying themselves by lack of material and human resources, inexperience in suppressing protests, surprise factor, lack of coordination, etc.[22] Members of KFOR were unable to prevent the attacks, but mostly acted as rescue teams, helping Serbs evacuate. They would leave unsecured houses behind, and in the presence of KFOR, Serb and Ashkali houses in several municipalities throughout Kosovo were destroyed and looted.[23] UNMIK police have also shown that they cannot control the situation and have no authority.[24]
The Kosovo Police Service (KPS) acted without command and instruction, so the conduct of KPS members varied from place to place. Some police officers sided with the protesters and participated in the destruction of property or they would arrest Serbs and Ashkali who were trying to defend themselves, ignoring at the same time the Albanian violence. Most KPS members were passive observers and wouldn’t interfere even when Serbs were being beaten by the protesters. The third group includes police officers who acted professionally in an effort to facilitate a safe evacuation, which some Serbs see as indirect participation in the expulsion, while others point out that this saved their lives.[25]
Solidarity
Most Kosovo Albanians who did not take part in the riots passively watched what was happening. However, there were also bright examples where Albanians tried to help Serbs by providing shelter in their homes, calling the police, helping them reach KFOR bases and other safe places, but also standing in front of Serb houses preventing protesters from destroying them.[26] In some cases, however, not even the solidarity of the neighbors was able to stop the wave of violence.
“When a group of Albanians came in front of our house, they started setting it on fire, and I was hiding in a toilet hole. I heard two of my neighbors, Albanians, telling them that I was a good man, that I had done nothing wrong to anyone, but it didn’t help. An Albanian who works in the mosque came and chased the two away. After that, they started setting the fire,” said the Serb M.I. from Kosovo Polje/Fushë Kosovë.[27]
The behavior of Albanian political leaders did not help stop the violence. Even when they called for an end to the violence, those calls seemed insincere and forced.[28]
Violent reactions in Serbia
The events in Kosovo provoked protests in several cities in Serbia, which soon became violent. Protesters in Belgrade set fire to Belgrade’s Bajrakli mosque on the night between March 17 and 18, shouting “Kill Shiptar”, “Kill, slaughter, let Shiptar disappear” and “Let’s go to Kosovo”.[29] Until the protesters broke through the police cordon, the police had an order not to use force.[30] The Bajrakli mosque, thanks to its construction, was not completely burned, but its interior was largely destroyed, including the library and art objects. Protesters in Niš set fire to Islam-aga’s mosque and it was even more severely damaged than Belgrade’s mosque.
In Novi Sad, rioters broke shop windows, destroyed and set fire to bakeries owned by Albanians and other Muslims, and broke windows to the Islamic Center premises. The police were mostly passive, standing aside while the protesters stoned the houses in Roma and Ashkali communities,[31] although Roma and Ashkali were not in any way involved in violence against Kosovo Serbs, but they themselves were also victims of the violence.
Trials
According to the UNMIK statistics from 2008, 242 people have been charged for the March violence (206 before local and 36 before international prosecutors), and additionally, 157 people have been charged before courts for misdemeanors.[32] International judges and prosecutors dealt mainly with cases involving serious crimes such as murder, attempted murder, incitement to national hatred and causing general danger, while the most common offenses before domestic courts were: participation in a group that committed a criminal offense and aggravated theft.[33]
The trials of these indictments were accompanied by a number of problems and difficulties, including defaulting witnesses, changing the testimonies of witnesses, procrastination of the police in submitting reports, postponing the main hearing, disregarding ethnic motives, imposing minimum sentences or even sentences below the prescribed minimum, the too frequent imposition of suspended sentences, etc.[34]
Out of a total of 399 indictees, 301 were convicted by April 2008. According to the OSCE, 86 persons were sentenced to prison (including suspended sentences), and the maximum sentence was 16 years in prison.[35] The March violence never happened again in Kosovo, thanks in part to KFOR, UNMIK and the Kosovo police.
[1] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Communities in Kosovo 2003 and 2004, p. 6, available at http://hlc-rdc.org/wp-content/uploads/editor/file/Etnicke_zajednice2003-2004..pdf
[2] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo, p. 2, available at http://www.hlc-rdc.org/images/stories/pdf/izvestaji/FHP_izvestaj-Etnicko_nasilje_na_Kosovu-mart_2004-srpski.pdf
[3] Human Rights Watch (2004) Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, p. 16, available at https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/kosovo0704.pdf
[4] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo, p. 4.
[5] Human Rights Watch (2004), Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, p. 18.
[6] OSCE (2004) The Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo, p. 4-5, available at https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/8/30265.pdf
[7] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo, p. 5.
[8] OSCE (2004) The Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo, p. 3.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Human Rights Watch (2004), Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, p. 26-28.
[11] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Secretary-General of the United Nations (2004) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 30 April 2004, p. 1, available at https://unmik.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s-2004-348.pdf
[14] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo, p. 4.
[15] Ibid.
[16] OSCE (2007) Eight Years After: Minority Returns and Housing and Property Restitution in Kosovo, p. 33, available at https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/e/26324.pdf
[17] Many HLC interlocutors talk about poor living conditions in container settlements. For further details see: Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] OSCE (2007) Eight Years After: Minority Returns and Housing and Property Restitution in Kosovo, p. 34.
[21] Ibid., p. 33-34.
[22] Human Rights Watch (2004), Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, p. 22-26.
[23] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid., p. 2; See also: Human Rights Watch (2004), Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, p. 22.
[26] Many HLC interlocutors talk about Albanians who helped Serbs. For further details see Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo.
[27] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo, str. 21-22.
[28] Ibid., p. 3.
[29] BBC News in Serbian (2019) 15 Years After: Who is Responsible for the March Violence in Kosovo, 17 March 2019. Available at https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/balkan-47569978
[30] Human Rights Watch (2005) March 2004 Violence against Albanians and Muslims, available at https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/serbia1005/4.htm
[31] Ibid.
[32] OSCE (2008) Four Years Later: Follow up of March 2004 Riots Cases before the Kosovo Criminal Justice System, p. 3-4, available at https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/4/32701.pdf
[33] Ibid., p. 23.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
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Foreign policy is also made by omission
Secretary of State Blinken outlined Biden Administration foreign policy yesterday. Here is the short version:
- End the pandemic
- Rebuild the economy
- Protect democracy
- Treat immigrants humanely but reduce incentives for migration
- Revitalize relations with friends
- Slow climate change
- Lead in hi tech
- Manage the rise of China
All of this is to be done with two things in mind: benefiting Americans and mobilizing other countries to carry part of the burden.
Tony is also at pains to underline that all these foreign policy issues have important domestic dimensions and that diplomacy will come before military action. The former is not new and underlay Trump’s “America First” slogan, especially on trade issues. The latter isn’t new either, but it is diametrically the opposite of what Trump was inclined to do. He thought cruise missiles and drones could get the US out of Syria without any need for talking with anyone. He tried talks with the Taliban, but did not wait for them to succeed before withdrawing half the troops.
It’s hard for me to quarrel with much of what Tony said. But there are things missing, as Tony acknowledges. Often in international affairs, as in domestic politics, what is not said is as significant as what is said.
Apart from the mention of China and some other geopolitical threats (Russia, Iran North Korea), there is no mention at all of specific regions and little of specific countries. My friends in the Middle East and the Balkans should take note. You are not going to get all the attention you crave. This is a major change from the traditional diplomatic “tour d’horizon” and suggests a shift from the State Department’s traditional emphasis on bilateral relations, as represented in its “geographic” bureaus and accentuated in the transactional Trump Administration, to “transnational” issues represented in State’s “functional” bureaus.
Among the “transnational” issues, one important one is omitted: nuclear non-proliferation. This may reflect a realistic recognition that with respect at least to North Korea and perhaps even Iran the cat is out of the bag: we are not going to be able to convince them to give up their nuclear ambitions entirely. It may also reflect a desire to leave room for some of our friends and allies to respond in kind. We’ve long exercised a tacit double standard with respect to Israel’s nuclear weapons. We might be willing to do so for other countries like Japan or South Korea whose neighbors threaten them with nukes. Trump famously uttered this heresy out loud, but his departure doesn’t make the issue evaporate. Confidence in the American nuclear umbrella fades as Pyongyang acquires the capacity to nuke Los Angeles.
Of course the urgent in foreign policy often comes before the merely important. Tony knows he won’t be able to ignore Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the Palestinians, democratic backsliding in the Balkans, the coup in Burma, or the agreed withdrawal from Afghanistan, which the Administration needs to either confirm or postpone. This Administration’s minds and hearts are in the right place. But that does not guarantee success. They face a challenging global environment, not least from all the omissions.
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Peace Picks | March 1 – March 5, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream
- Breaking the Tie: Security and Stability in Belarus | March 1, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council| Register Here
For the past six months, Belarusians protesting for free and fair elections across the country have faced growing repression as strongman Alyaksandr Lukashenka attempts to cling to power. The opposition has demonstrated staying power and growing political capital, but the army and the security services remain loyal to Lukashenka. This domestic stalemate also presents a strategic problem for the Kremlin, which seems to have no new ideas beyond some monetary support for Lukashenka’s regime. Meanwhile the US and Europe have responded with modest financial sanctions against the discredited president and his cronies.
Do Lukashenka or Moscow have any new cards to play? Does the opposition? How will the situation in Belarus end and how will Washington, Brussels, and Moscow react?
Speakers:
Dr. Pavel Felgenhauer
Columnist with Novaya Gazeta,
David Kramer
Senior Fellow at Florida International University’s Vaclav Havel Program for Human Rights and Diplomacy
Valery Kavaleuski
Foreign Affairs Adviser to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya
Dr. Marie Mendras
Professor at Sciences Po’s Paris School of International Affairs
Ambassador John Herbst (Moderator)
Director of the Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
2. Red Flags Report Launch | March 2, 2021 | 1:00 PM ET | Center for Strategic International Studies | Register Here
China’s political and economic influence in the Western Balkans is on the rise, fueled in part by a regional demand for infrastructure which is satisfied by opaque deals in the ICT, energy, and transportation sectors. These projects present risks to good governance, economic growth, environmental sustainability, and digital security. Join CSIS for a virtual discussion of a new CSIS report which describes tools and actions critical for stakeholders to objectively evaluate and respond to these risks. The report concludes a three-part series which examined the nature and impact of Chinese economic influence in the Western Balkans and its implications for the region’s stability and Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
Speakers:
Matthew D. Steinhelfer (Keynote)
Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, U.S. Department of State
Heather A. Conley
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, CSIS
Jonathan E. Hillman, Senior Fellow and Director of the Reconnecting Asia Project, CSIS
Valerie Hopkins (Moderator)
South-East Europe Correspondent, The Financial Times
3. Lebanon: Challenges and Future Prospects| March 3, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Middle East Institute| Register Here
The Middle East Institute is pleased to invite you to a panel to launch its Lebanon Program, focusing on Lebanon’s current state of affairs and potential US foreign policy options going forward. The months-long political stalemate and the unaddressed financial crisis keep pushing Lebanon further into chaos and uncertainty. In parallel, the new Biden administration is redefining the US stance vis-à-vis Iran and reassessing some of its bilateral relations in the region. Many of these changes will have direct implications for Lebanon. This distinguished panel will address these local and regional developments, think through ways US foreign policy towards Lebanon can be more nuanced and constructive, and highlight themes and signals that are worth paying attention to in the coming months.
Speakers:
Amb. (ret.) Edward M. Gabriel
President and CEO, American Task Force on Lebanon
May Nasrallah
Chairwoman, Lebanese International Finance Executives
Paul Salem
President, MEI
Mona Yacoubian
Senior Advisor to the Vice President of Middle East and North Africa, United States Institute of Peace
Christophe Abi-Nassif (Moderator)
Lebanon Program Director, MEI
4. Agent Sonya: Moscow’s Most Daring Wartime Spy | March 3, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Middle East Institute| Register Here
Please join the Intelligence Project for a discussion with Ben MacIntyre on his latest book, Agent Sonya. This true-life spy story is a masterpiece about the Soviet intelligence officer code-named “Sonya.” Over the course of her career, she was hunted by the Chinese, the Japanese, the Nazis, MI5, MI6, and the FBI—and she evaded them all. Her story reflects the great ideological clash of the twentieth century—between Communism, Fascism, and Western democracy—and casts new light on the spy battles and shifting allegiances of our own times.
With unparalleled access to Sonya’s diaries and correspondence and never-before-seen information on her clandestine activities, Macintyre has conjured a page-turning history of a legendary secret agent, a woman who influenced the course of the Cold War and helped plunge the world into a decades-long standoff between nuclear superpowers.
Speakers:
Ben Macintyre
Author and Journalist, The Times
5. Insanity Defense: Why Our Failure to Confront Hard National Security Problems Makes Us Less Safe | March 3, 2021 | 1:00 PM ET | Wilson Center| Register Here
In the wake of unprecedented domestic terror and national security threats in the form of mass shootings and insurrection in the nation’s capital, former Congresswoman & Wilson Center Director, President, and CEO Jane Harman offers her new book Insanity Defense: Why Our Failure to Confront Hard National Security Problems Makes Us Less Safe (St. Martin’s Press; May 18, 2021), which chronicles how four consecutive administrations have failed to confront some of the toughest national security issues and suggests achievable fixes that can move us toward a safer future.
Please join Congresswoman Harman and New York Times national security correspondent and senior writer David Sanger for an in-depth conversation on the book and a discussion on better processes and more sound policy for the next generation of elected officials and the new administration.
Speakers:
Jane Harman
Director, President and CEO, Wilson Center
David Sanger
Former Distinguished Fellow, National Security Correspondent and Writer, the New York Times; Author, The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage and Fear in the Cyber Age
6. Religion, Ethnicity, and Charges Of Extremism: The Dynamics Of Inter-Communal Violence In Ethiopia| March 4, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | European Institute of Peace| Register Here
In recent months, the conflict in Tigray has dominated most analyses of Ethiopian politics. The scale of the Tigray crisis makes this understandable, but in its shadow, inter-communal tensions and conflicts have persisted across Ethiopia. In recent years there were numerous violent incidents, such as the Amhara regional ‘coup’ attempt of June 2019, the violence across Oromia in October 2019, and incidents around Timkat in Dire Dawa and Harar in January 2020.
A team of Ethiopian and international researchers – Terje Østebø, Jörg Haustein, Fasika Gedif, Kedir Jemal Kadir, Muhammed Jemal, and Yihenew Alemu Tesfaye – studied two incidents of inter-communal violence: the attacks on mosques and (mostly) Muslim properties in Mota, Amhara region in December 2019 and the violence and destruction of properties in Shashemene and other towns in Oromia in July 2020. They will present their findings in this event, followed by discussion and Q&A.
Their research shows that in Ethiopia religion and ethnic violence overlap and interact with one another in complex ways. Given the current emphasis on ethnicity in Ethiopian politics, the role of religious affiliation is often overlooked, yet it is here that the accusation of “extremism” is most frequently and most consequentially raised: the mere expectation or accusation of extremism has sufficed to generate inter-communal violence and deepened a climate of mistrust.
Speakers:
Terje Østebø
University of Florida
Jörg Haustein
University of Cambridge
Sandy Wade (Moderator)
Senior Advisor, European Institute of Peace
7. COVID-19 and Cooperation in Libya | March 4, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | United States Institute of Peace| Register Here
Libya is at a turning point after the U.N.-sponsored Libyan Political Dialogue Forum elected a temporary executive authority in February to unify the country and move toward elections by year’s end. However, sustainable peace cannot be achieved with only an agreement at the national level. And the COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated economic challenges, strained the country’s health infrastructure, and added a new layer of complexity to the country’s conflict. Local-level cooperation—and linking these efforts to the national-level peace process—is of utmost importance to achieve a cohesive and peaceful country.
And despite a difficult year, there have been bright spots for Libya on this front. The COVID-19 pandemic yielded many examples of local-level initiatives where Libyans came together in challenging conditions to cooperate for a common goal. The hope is that these successes can lead to longer and more enduring areas of cooperation.
Join USIP as we host Libya’s ambassador to the United States and Libyan civil society leaders for a look at stories of positive community cooperation during the current crisis—as well as a discussion on how Libyan and international organizations can build off these successes to navigate Libya’s complex conflict and ensure a peaceful future for the country.
Speakers:
Wafa Bughaighis (Keynote speaker)
Libyan Ambassador to the United States
Ahmed Albibas
Director, Moomken Organization for Awareness and Media
Abdulrahman A. S. Elgheriani
President and CEO, Tanmia 360
Craig Browne
Program Policy Officer, World Food Programme
Nate Wilson (Moderator)
Libya Country Manager, U.S. Institute of Peace
8. Unraveling the Conflict in Syria March 4, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
In 2012, as the conflict in Syria continued to smolder, then-president Barack Obama made clear that any use of chemical weapons by the Bashar al-Assad regime would constitute a “red line” for U.S. engagement. Yet in the aftermath of a sarin attack outside Damascus just a year later, the Obama administration seized the opportunity to work with Russia on an ambitious plan to hunt down and remove chemical weapons rather than go to war. A decade later, the tangle of “heroes and villains” involved in that particular scenario is clearer.
Speakers:
Joby Warrick
Author of Red Line
Maha Yahya
Director of the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
9. The Future of ISIS March 4, 2021 | 11:30 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
On October 27, 2019, then-US President Donald Trump announced that the leader of the so-called Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was killed in Syria in an American special operation, striking a blow against an already weakened organization.
What ISIS accomplished during the period of its rise and growth represents a “quantum leap” in the ideology, strategies, and operating theories of terrorist groups, and requires deep analysis of the organization’s expected future trajectory. The Politics and Society Institute in Amman, Jordan, and the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in Washington, DC, are pleased to co-host this expert discussion. This panel will shed light on what opportunities exist for policymakers to deal with the legacy of ISIS detainees and returnees, as well as on strategies against a potential resurgence in Iraq and Syria.
Speakers:
Mohammed Abu Rumman
Expert, Politics and Society Institute
Former Jordanian Minister of Youth and Culture
Borzou Daragahi
Journalist and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Andrew Peek
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Former US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iran and Iraq
Mara Revkin
National Security Law Fellow, Georgetown University Law Center
Banan Malkawi (Moderator)
Jordanian-American Researcher and Lecturer
10. Strategic nuclear modernization in the United States| March 4, 2021 | 2:00 PM ET | Brookings Institutions| Register Here
What: As with prior administrations before it, the Biden administration is preparing to undertake a major review of the U.S. strategic nuclear modernization program. Though the U.S. arsenal has decreased in accordance with the New START treaty, new delivery systems are still being developed.
Supporters of the current program argue that implementation is critical for the United States’ ability to deter adversaries and reassure allies. Opponents argue that the current program is well in excess of deterrence requirements and is not affordable over the long term. During the review period, Congress will examine the current program as well as requested funding for these systems.
On Thursday, March 4, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings will host a panel to discuss how the Biden administration will – and should – approach negotiations regarding the future of the strategic modernization program.
Speakers:
Tom Collina
Director of Policy, Ploughshares Fund
Madelyn R. Creedon
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Center for Security, Strategy and Technology
Franklin Miller
Principal, The Scowcroft Group
Amy Woolf
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, Congressional Research Service
Frank A Rose
Co-Director and Foreign Policy Fellow, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
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What Kosovo needs now is not only Serbian recognition
Kosovo’s early elections have produced, as expected, a clear victory for Vetevendosje (VV or “Self-Determination”). According to preliminary results, it has won close to 48% and a commanding lead of something over 50 seats in the 120-seata Kosovo Assembly.
This is Albin Kurti’s moment. The still young, articulate VV leader had a couple of months in the Prime Minister’s chair last year. The Trump Administration didn’t like his insistence on reciprocity with Serbia or his skepticism about Trump’s bizarre choice of an American envoy. Washington took advantage of a squabble within his coalition to bring him down. That isn’t likely this time around, not only because of VV’s strong showing at the polls but also because Trump is gone. The Biden Administration will at least try to be respectful of Kosovo’s democracy.
That however won’t save Albin from a bigger challenge: constructing the kind of majority in parliament that will enable election of a new president as well as a strong position in negotiations with Serbia. Both in practice require a two-thirds majority. Part of the difference will come from ethnic minority parties, but at least one more Albanian-based party will be needed. Two obvious candidates both have a bad history with VV: the LDK, running a poor third in yesterday’s election, brought down Albin’s short-lived coalition last year and VV has been a stern critic of the second-place Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), in particular its now-indicted former President Hashim Thaci. Ramush Haradinaj’s Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) will not have enough seats to get VV to two-thirds, but it would be step in that direction.
Kosovo’s parliamentary system has often produced long inter-regna. Albin could cut this one short by acting unilaterally, but that might make forming the necessary coalition later more difficult rather than less. Negotiations with Serbia and electing a new president will not be top priorities for VV. Albin would prefer to focus on his campaign priorities: jobs and justice. That will not be easy, as Covid-19 has hit the Kosovo economy hard and reform of the justice system is a long-term project. The Americans and Europeans will be trying to get Pristina to engage as soon as possible on the dialogue with Belgrade, which faces presidential and likely parliamentary elections by April 2022 (and possibly earlier). No serious negotiations with Serbia will be possible after the end of this year.
Though the EU aims at it, there is little prospect of a “final” agreement within that timeframe. Serbian President Vucic has made eminently clear he will not recognize Kosovo before his re-election, if then. Some interim confidence-building steps might be possible, focused on missing people from the 1999 war and implementation of the several dozen existing agreements between Belgrade and Pristina, few of which have been executed to the satisfaction of both capitals. In any event, Pristina will need to be ready to walk away from a bad agreement in order to get a good one. Albin would do well to match Vucic’s reluctance.
A more comprehensive agreement is however needed. Serbia’s refusal to recognize its erstwhile “autonomous province” leaves Kosovo in international limbo with unclear and unmarked borders, enabling Serbia to undermine its statehood, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. But it also leaves Serbia without the “good neighborly relations” required for EU membership. The two capitals would do well to contemplate seriously the much-mentioned German/German solution, which entailed UN membership for the German Democratic Republic as well as ambassadorial-level representation in both capitals but no formal recognition. No one who knows Kosovo would expect the longer-term outcome to be like Germany’s (i.e. re-incorporation of Kosovo into Serbia).
If Kurti, either as leader of VV or prime minister, is even modestly successful in using the next couple of years to deliver on “jobs and justice,” Kosovo will find itself in a far stronger position to negotiate successfully with Serbia. A stronger economy and a judicial system that can handle both inter-ethnic crime and high-level corruption would make both Washington and Brussels more unequivocal in their support. Success would also enable a stronger position on reciprocity with Belgrade. Albin Kurti has big shoes to fill: his own.
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