Tag: Balkans
Foreign policy is also made by omission
Secretary of State Blinken outlined Biden Administration foreign policy yesterday. Here is the short version:
- End the pandemic
- Rebuild the economy
- Protect democracy
- Treat immigrants humanely but reduce incentives for migration
- Revitalize relations with friends
- Slow climate change
- Lead in hi tech
- Manage the rise of China
All of this is to be done with two things in mind: benefiting Americans and mobilizing other countries to carry part of the burden.
Tony is also at pains to underline that all these foreign policy issues have important domestic dimensions and that diplomacy will come before military action. The former is not new and underlay Trump’s “America First” slogan, especially on trade issues. The latter isn’t new either, but it is diametrically the opposite of what Trump was inclined to do. He thought cruise missiles and drones could get the US out of Syria without any need for talking with anyone. He tried talks with the Taliban, but did not wait for them to succeed before withdrawing half the troops.
It’s hard for me to quarrel with much of what Tony said. But there are things missing, as Tony acknowledges. Often in international affairs, as in domestic politics, what is not said is as significant as what is said.
Apart from the mention of China and some other geopolitical threats (Russia, Iran North Korea), there is no mention at all of specific regions and little of specific countries. My friends in the Middle East and the Balkans should take note. You are not going to get all the attention you crave. This is a major change from the traditional diplomatic “tour d’horizon” and suggests a shift from the State Department’s traditional emphasis on bilateral relations, as represented in its “geographic” bureaus and accentuated in the transactional Trump Administration, to “transnational” issues represented in State’s “functional” bureaus.
Among the “transnational” issues, one important one is omitted: nuclear non-proliferation. This may reflect a realistic recognition that with respect at least to North Korea and perhaps even Iran the cat is out of the bag: we are not going to be able to convince them to give up their nuclear ambitions entirely. It may also reflect a desire to leave room for some of our friends and allies to respond in kind. We’ve long exercised a tacit double standard with respect to Israel’s nuclear weapons. We might be willing to do so for other countries like Japan or South Korea whose neighbors threaten them with nukes. Trump famously uttered this heresy out loud, but his departure doesn’t make the issue evaporate. Confidence in the American nuclear umbrella fades as Pyongyang acquires the capacity to nuke Los Angeles.
Of course the urgent in foreign policy often comes before the merely important. Tony knows he won’t be able to ignore Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the Palestinians, democratic backsliding in the Balkans, the coup in Burma, or the agreed withdrawal from Afghanistan, which the Administration needs to either confirm or postpone. This Administration’s minds and hearts are in the right place. But that does not guarantee success. They face a challenging global environment, not least from all the omissions.
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Peace Picks | March 1 – March 5, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream
- Breaking the Tie: Security and Stability in Belarus | March 1, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council| Register Here
For the past six months, Belarusians protesting for free and fair elections across the country have faced growing repression as strongman Alyaksandr Lukashenka attempts to cling to power. The opposition has demonstrated staying power and growing political capital, but the army and the security services remain loyal to Lukashenka. This domestic stalemate also presents a strategic problem for the Kremlin, which seems to have no new ideas beyond some monetary support for Lukashenka’s regime. Meanwhile the US and Europe have responded with modest financial sanctions against the discredited president and his cronies.
Do Lukashenka or Moscow have any new cards to play? Does the opposition? How will the situation in Belarus end and how will Washington, Brussels, and Moscow react?
Speakers:
Dr. Pavel Felgenhauer
Columnist with Novaya Gazeta,
David Kramer
Senior Fellow at Florida International University’s Vaclav Havel Program for Human Rights and Diplomacy
Valery Kavaleuski
Foreign Affairs Adviser to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya
Dr. Marie Mendras
Professor at Sciences Po’s Paris School of International Affairs
Ambassador John Herbst (Moderator)
Director of the Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
2. Red Flags Report Launch | March 2, 2021 | 1:00 PM ET | Center for Strategic International Studies | Register Here
China’s political and economic influence in the Western Balkans is on the rise, fueled in part by a regional demand for infrastructure which is satisfied by opaque deals in the ICT, energy, and transportation sectors. These projects present risks to good governance, economic growth, environmental sustainability, and digital security. Join CSIS for a virtual discussion of a new CSIS report which describes tools and actions critical for stakeholders to objectively evaluate and respond to these risks. The report concludes a three-part series which examined the nature and impact of Chinese economic influence in the Western Balkans and its implications for the region’s stability and Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
Speakers:
Matthew D. Steinhelfer (Keynote)
Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, U.S. Department of State
Heather A. Conley
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, CSIS
Jonathan E. Hillman, Senior Fellow and Director of the Reconnecting Asia Project, CSIS
Valerie Hopkins (Moderator)
South-East Europe Correspondent, The Financial Times
3. Lebanon: Challenges and Future Prospects| March 3, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Middle East Institute| Register Here
The Middle East Institute is pleased to invite you to a panel to launch its Lebanon Program, focusing on Lebanon’s current state of affairs and potential US foreign policy options going forward. The months-long political stalemate and the unaddressed financial crisis keep pushing Lebanon further into chaos and uncertainty. In parallel, the new Biden administration is redefining the US stance vis-à-vis Iran and reassessing some of its bilateral relations in the region. Many of these changes will have direct implications for Lebanon. This distinguished panel will address these local and regional developments, think through ways US foreign policy towards Lebanon can be more nuanced and constructive, and highlight themes and signals that are worth paying attention to in the coming months.
Speakers:
Amb. (ret.) Edward M. Gabriel
President and CEO, American Task Force on Lebanon
May Nasrallah
Chairwoman, Lebanese International Finance Executives
Paul Salem
President, MEI
Mona Yacoubian
Senior Advisor to the Vice President of Middle East and North Africa, United States Institute of Peace
Christophe Abi-Nassif (Moderator)
Lebanon Program Director, MEI
4. Agent Sonya: Moscow’s Most Daring Wartime Spy | March 3, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Middle East Institute| Register Here
Please join the Intelligence Project for a discussion with Ben MacIntyre on his latest book, Agent Sonya. This true-life spy story is a masterpiece about the Soviet intelligence officer code-named “Sonya.” Over the course of her career, she was hunted by the Chinese, the Japanese, the Nazis, MI5, MI6, and the FBI—and she evaded them all. Her story reflects the great ideological clash of the twentieth century—between Communism, Fascism, and Western democracy—and casts new light on the spy battles and shifting allegiances of our own times.
With unparalleled access to Sonya’s diaries and correspondence and never-before-seen information on her clandestine activities, Macintyre has conjured a page-turning history of a legendary secret agent, a woman who influenced the course of the Cold War and helped plunge the world into a decades-long standoff between nuclear superpowers.
Speakers:
Ben Macintyre
Author and Journalist, The Times
5. Insanity Defense: Why Our Failure to Confront Hard National Security Problems Makes Us Less Safe | March 3, 2021 | 1:00 PM ET | Wilson Center| Register Here
In the wake of unprecedented domestic terror and national security threats in the form of mass shootings and insurrection in the nation’s capital, former Congresswoman & Wilson Center Director, President, and CEO Jane Harman offers her new book Insanity Defense: Why Our Failure to Confront Hard National Security Problems Makes Us Less Safe (St. Martin’s Press; May 18, 2021), which chronicles how four consecutive administrations have failed to confront some of the toughest national security issues and suggests achievable fixes that can move us toward a safer future.
Please join Congresswoman Harman and New York Times national security correspondent and senior writer David Sanger for an in-depth conversation on the book and a discussion on better processes and more sound policy for the next generation of elected officials and the new administration.
Speakers:
Jane Harman
Director, President and CEO, Wilson Center
David Sanger
Former Distinguished Fellow, National Security Correspondent and Writer, the New York Times; Author, The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage and Fear in the Cyber Age
6. Religion, Ethnicity, and Charges Of Extremism: The Dynamics Of Inter-Communal Violence In Ethiopia| March 4, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | European Institute of Peace| Register Here
In recent months, the conflict in Tigray has dominated most analyses of Ethiopian politics. The scale of the Tigray crisis makes this understandable, but in its shadow, inter-communal tensions and conflicts have persisted across Ethiopia. In recent years there were numerous violent incidents, such as the Amhara regional ‘coup’ attempt of June 2019, the violence across Oromia in October 2019, and incidents around Timkat in Dire Dawa and Harar in January 2020.
A team of Ethiopian and international researchers – Terje Østebø, Jörg Haustein, Fasika Gedif, Kedir Jemal Kadir, Muhammed Jemal, and Yihenew Alemu Tesfaye – studied two incidents of inter-communal violence: the attacks on mosques and (mostly) Muslim properties in Mota, Amhara region in December 2019 and the violence and destruction of properties in Shashemene and other towns in Oromia in July 2020. They will present their findings in this event, followed by discussion and Q&A.
Their research shows that in Ethiopia religion and ethnic violence overlap and interact with one another in complex ways. Given the current emphasis on ethnicity in Ethiopian politics, the role of religious affiliation is often overlooked, yet it is here that the accusation of “extremism” is most frequently and most consequentially raised: the mere expectation or accusation of extremism has sufficed to generate inter-communal violence and deepened a climate of mistrust.
Speakers:
Terje Østebø
University of Florida
Jörg Haustein
University of Cambridge
Sandy Wade (Moderator)
Senior Advisor, European Institute of Peace
7. COVID-19 and Cooperation in Libya | March 4, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | United States Institute of Peace| Register Here
Libya is at a turning point after the U.N.-sponsored Libyan Political Dialogue Forum elected a temporary executive authority in February to unify the country and move toward elections by year’s end. However, sustainable peace cannot be achieved with only an agreement at the national level. And the COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated economic challenges, strained the country’s health infrastructure, and added a new layer of complexity to the country’s conflict. Local-level cooperation—and linking these efforts to the national-level peace process—is of utmost importance to achieve a cohesive and peaceful country.
And despite a difficult year, there have been bright spots for Libya on this front. The COVID-19 pandemic yielded many examples of local-level initiatives where Libyans came together in challenging conditions to cooperate for a common goal. The hope is that these successes can lead to longer and more enduring areas of cooperation.
Join USIP as we host Libya’s ambassador to the United States and Libyan civil society leaders for a look at stories of positive community cooperation during the current crisis—as well as a discussion on how Libyan and international organizations can build off these successes to navigate Libya’s complex conflict and ensure a peaceful future for the country.
Speakers:
Wafa Bughaighis (Keynote speaker)
Libyan Ambassador to the United States
Ahmed Albibas
Director, Moomken Organization for Awareness and Media
Abdulrahman A. S. Elgheriani
President and CEO, Tanmia 360
Craig Browne
Program Policy Officer, World Food Programme
Nate Wilson (Moderator)
Libya Country Manager, U.S. Institute of Peace
8. Unraveling the Conflict in Syria March 4, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
In 2012, as the conflict in Syria continued to smolder, then-president Barack Obama made clear that any use of chemical weapons by the Bashar al-Assad regime would constitute a “red line” for U.S. engagement. Yet in the aftermath of a sarin attack outside Damascus just a year later, the Obama administration seized the opportunity to work with Russia on an ambitious plan to hunt down and remove chemical weapons rather than go to war. A decade later, the tangle of “heroes and villains” involved in that particular scenario is clearer.
Speakers:
Joby Warrick
Author of Red Line
Maha Yahya
Director of the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
9. The Future of ISIS March 4, 2021 | 11:30 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
On October 27, 2019, then-US President Donald Trump announced that the leader of the so-called Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was killed in Syria in an American special operation, striking a blow against an already weakened organization.
What ISIS accomplished during the period of its rise and growth represents a “quantum leap” in the ideology, strategies, and operating theories of terrorist groups, and requires deep analysis of the organization’s expected future trajectory. The Politics and Society Institute in Amman, Jordan, and the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in Washington, DC, are pleased to co-host this expert discussion. This panel will shed light on what opportunities exist for policymakers to deal with the legacy of ISIS detainees and returnees, as well as on strategies against a potential resurgence in Iraq and Syria.
Speakers:
Mohammed Abu Rumman
Expert, Politics and Society Institute
Former Jordanian Minister of Youth and Culture
Borzou Daragahi
Journalist and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Andrew Peek
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Former US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iran and Iraq
Mara Revkin
National Security Law Fellow, Georgetown University Law Center
Banan Malkawi (Moderator)
Jordanian-American Researcher and Lecturer
10. Strategic nuclear modernization in the United States| March 4, 2021 | 2:00 PM ET | Brookings Institutions| Register Here
What: As with prior administrations before it, the Biden administration is preparing to undertake a major review of the U.S. strategic nuclear modernization program. Though the U.S. arsenal has decreased in accordance with the New START treaty, new delivery systems are still being developed.
Supporters of the current program argue that implementation is critical for the United States’ ability to deter adversaries and reassure allies. Opponents argue that the current program is well in excess of deterrence requirements and is not affordable over the long term. During the review period, Congress will examine the current program as well as requested funding for these systems.
On Thursday, March 4, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings will host a panel to discuss how the Biden administration will – and should – approach negotiations regarding the future of the strategic modernization program.
Speakers:
Tom Collina
Director of Policy, Ploughshares Fund
Madelyn R. Creedon
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Center for Security, Strategy and Technology
Franklin Miller
Principal, The Scowcroft Group
Amy Woolf
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, Congressional Research Service
Frank A Rose
Co-Director and Foreign Policy Fellow, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
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What Kosovo needs now is not only Serbian recognition
Kosovo’s early elections have produced, as expected, a clear victory for Vetevendosje (VV or “Self-Determination”). According to preliminary results, it has won close to 48% and a commanding lead of something over 50 seats in the 120-seata Kosovo Assembly.
This is Albin Kurti’s moment. The still young, articulate VV leader had a couple of months in the Prime Minister’s chair last year. The Trump Administration didn’t like his insistence on reciprocity with Serbia or his skepticism about Trump’s bizarre choice of an American envoy. Washington took advantage of a squabble within his coalition to bring him down. That isn’t likely this time around, not only because of VV’s strong showing at the polls but also because Trump is gone. The Biden Administration will at least try to be respectful of Kosovo’s democracy.
That however won’t save Albin from a bigger challenge: constructing the kind of majority in parliament that will enable election of a new president as well as a strong position in negotiations with Serbia. Both in practice require a two-thirds majority. Part of the difference will come from ethnic minority parties, but at least one more Albanian-based party will be needed. Two obvious candidates both have a bad history with VV: the LDK, running a poor third in yesterday’s election, brought down Albin’s short-lived coalition last year and VV has been a stern critic of the second-place Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), in particular its now-indicted former President Hashim Thaci. Ramush Haradinaj’s Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) will not have enough seats to get VV to two-thirds, but it would be step in that direction.
Kosovo’s parliamentary system has often produced long inter-regna. Albin could cut this one short by acting unilaterally, but that might make forming the necessary coalition later more difficult rather than less. Negotiations with Serbia and electing a new president will not be top priorities for VV. Albin would prefer to focus on his campaign priorities: jobs and justice. That will not be easy, as Covid-19 has hit the Kosovo economy hard and reform of the justice system is a long-term project. The Americans and Europeans will be trying to get Pristina to engage as soon as possible on the dialogue with Belgrade, which faces presidential and likely parliamentary elections by April 2022 (and possibly earlier). No serious negotiations with Serbia will be possible after the end of this year.
Though the EU aims at it, there is little prospect of a “final” agreement within that timeframe. Serbian President Vucic has made eminently clear he will not recognize Kosovo before his re-election, if then. Some interim confidence-building steps might be possible, focused on missing people from the 1999 war and implementation of the several dozen existing agreements between Belgrade and Pristina, few of which have been executed to the satisfaction of both capitals. In any event, Pristina will need to be ready to walk away from a bad agreement in order to get a good one. Albin would do well to match Vucic’s reluctance.
A more comprehensive agreement is however needed. Serbia’s refusal to recognize its erstwhile “autonomous province” leaves Kosovo in international limbo with unclear and unmarked borders, enabling Serbia to undermine its statehood, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. But it also leaves Serbia without the “good neighborly relations” required for EU membership. The two capitals would do well to contemplate seriously the much-mentioned German/German solution, which entailed UN membership for the German Democratic Republic as well as ambassadorial-level representation in both capitals but no formal recognition. No one who knows Kosovo would expect the longer-term outcome to be like Germany’s (i.e. re-incorporation of Kosovo into Serbia).
If Kurti, either as leader of VV or prime minister, is even modestly successful in using the next couple of years to deliver on “jobs and justice,” Kosovo will find itself in a far stronger position to negotiate successfully with Serbia. A stronger economy and a judicial system that can handle both inter-ethnic crime and high-level corruption would make both Washington and Brussels more unequivocal in their support. Success would also enable a stronger position on reciprocity with Belgrade. Albin Kurti has big shoes to fill: his own.
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Changing of the guard: Montenegro and the US
Biljana Jovićević of Antenna M asked me some questions yesterday, prompted by a previous interview where I was cited as having praised Dritan Abazovic, the current deputy prime minister of Montenegro. I replied:
Q: Having in mind your respective field of expertise I am quite sure that you are familiar with the current political situation in Montenegro. Could you please be so kind to give us your assessment of new unfolding events in Montenegro in the last few months?
A: My sense is that pro-Russian and pro-Serbia forces dominate the new Montenegro government. Decision-making roles have gone predominantly to ethnonationalists, including in the security sector. The Serbian Orthodox Church is pleased and has reason to be. There is no sign of a technocratic government.
Q: In your recent statement for a Kosovo media you have said that you would like to see in Kosovo a civic option something like Montenegrin URA lead by now VP Dritan Abazović, but that is not possible because of the mostly ethnic segregation. Do you believe that URA and Mr. Abazović currently plays a constructive role in Montenegro society–which is seen by many now–as an enabler of the extreme right wing, clerical Government?
Q: I said I would like to see Kosovo with a civic option. The interviewer mentioned URA. I did not. URA has not fulfilled promises to insist on a truly technocratic government, to restrain ethnonationalist forces, and to bring minorities into the coalition. I don’t see URA as successful in fulfilling the role of a civic option.
A: Without any doubt Montenegro for a long time needed changes and reform, most of all to fight against corruption, nepotism and cronyism. But new right wing government, and let’s not forget with pro-Russian orientation–supported by URA, certainly is not an expert government. For the critics–what they show up until now is the same pattern of behavior as their predecessors regarding nepotism and cronyism. And apart from that they are in especially fast mode of implementing Serbian nationalist agenda in Montenegro. Do you believe that this kind of changes can bring Montenegro closer to the EU ?
A: No. Montenegro’s current course will slow its progress toward the EU as well as raise doubts within NATO whether Podgorica can be trusted.
Q: President -elect Biden, VP Harris and his administration will take the oath tomorrow–hopefully if the US manage to escape any dramatic or scary scenery. In that regard I have few more questions for you: having in mind the scale of a crisis that we are witnessing in the US and difficult job in front on Biden administration, when is it realistic to expect for them to become more engaged on Balkans and in which direction?
A: It will be months before the people concerned with the Balkans are put in place and the Europeans are consulted on the way forward. I would advise patience.
Q: Hardly that in this unprecedented time in the US Balkans can be among priorities, but Mr. Biden’s nominees for the State Department are people with great knowledge about this part of the world, so what should be their first steps on Balkans in your opinion?
A: I hope they will first consult with the Europeans and develop a common, agreed platform for the Balkans. When Brussels and Washington act in unison, good things happen. Biden will prefer that to Trump’s unilateralist approach.
Q: I had followed your hearing last month in the House committee for foreign relations, you were there with the Secretary Albright and with Mr. Bugajski and you offered recommendations for Balkans. Although focus was on Kosovo and Bosnia, much of the talk was about Serbia as well. But you had barely mentioned Montenegro and if I remember correctly only you mentioned that like in Bosnia and Kosovo–Serbia now trying to destabilize and Montenegro–but that was all. I was quite surprised.
A: I said on that occasion what I thought was most important: Belgrade is doing things to destabilize Montenegro. I have no problem with an opposition coming to power, but I would hope to see a pro-NATO, pro-EU government with the support of minorities.
Q: And in the and – after everything that has happened in the US in last four years (with impact on the whole world) and as we are approaching possible culmination with right wing white nationalist who are threatening with riot in all 50 states–what is your take about rising right wing parties and fringes groups all around world, their infiltrations in mainstream and consequence that we are facing? If the US is barely dealing with it, what can we expect in places like Balkans? How to fight back ?
A: We are all going to be called upon to defend democracy from right wing extremists and ethnonationalists who think they should be privileged to govern. The real possibility of alternation in power is essential to democracy, but if the alternation brings to power people who are anti-democratic, that is a big problem.
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Bid farewell to the treasons of Trump
It’s been hard, but we’ve almost made it to the other side. Now comes a time for rebuilding, or in Biden terms building back better.
Domestic issues will take first priority: the epidemic, the economy, social cleavages. Biden will need to get a lot more needles into arms, a lot more jobs returned and created, a lot of injustices to black and brown people, immigrants, women, college students, and LGBTQ people rectified. Trump’s white supremacist and 2nd Amendment supporters need to know that LAW AND ORDER applies to them as well as to everyone else. Successful prosecution of the January 6 insurrectionists is critical, including an eventual conviction of Trump in the Senate.
Current Majority Leader McConnell is not only open to that possibility but has blamed Trump for provoking the January 6 insurrection:
The mob was fed lies.
This is important, as it opens the a possibility of purging Trumpism from the Republican Party and eventually also from the Senate and House. Remnants will persist, but American politics will return to a much better place if Republicans and Democrats once again come to share a common factual basis rather than being distracted constantly by Trump’s lies.
International issues will be in capable hands at the State Department, National Security Council, and the Defense Department. But they can’t do everything at once. The early moves have been telegraphed: re-entry into the Iran nuclear deal (hard) and the Paris climate agreement (easy) as well as an effort to negotiate with Russia extended limits on strategic nuclear weapons. But the enemy also gets a vote on priorities. Surprise challenges could come from North Korea, China, or Islamist extremists. Those should not distract the Bidenists from their chosen path: to restore American leadership on a multilateral basis and make the world order more rules-based than it has been for the last four years.
My own focus is on what this means for the Balkans and the Middle East.
In the Balkans it is clear: Washington needs to develop a common vision with the European Union and its member states, then implement it with vigor to stem the tide of Russian and Chinese influence and hasten the day when the countries of the region will all qualify for accession to the EU.
In the Middle East, the way forward is far less clear, because the region lacks a clear direction and American interest has declined. I might prefer that the US favor democracy and human rights, but the fact is there are few Middle East countries in which we’ll find much prospect of either. The trick will be cooperating with autocratic friends (read Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and others) without encouraging their human rights abuses. Biden is already committed, as I understand it, to ending US support for the war in Yemen, which will displease Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
The Israel/Palestine equation will be particularly difficult to solve, as Trump has intentionally lessened the prospects for the two-state solution America has favored. Biden won’t want to reverse the move of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and the so-called Abrahamic accords between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain he welcomed. But he could tilt in favor of the Palestinians by renewing US contributions to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and re-establishing a consulate in East Jerusalem, making it clear it will become an embassy once a Palestinian state is formed and recognized.
The world will be watching. Expectations of Biden are high. Disappointments and failures are inevitable, but I do hope America can return to its proper role as a leader in the democratic world!
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Here is what I really said
Veljko Nestorović of Kosovo Online asked:
Q: Is it possible to get your answer to the question before the elections
in Kosovo, why at the moment there is no party (like URA in Montenegro
with Dritan Abazovic) civic options where Albanians and Serbs and
everyone else are represented, but all parties ethnically exclusive?
Is it necessary for Kosovo to “get a civic party” in order for democracy
in Kosovo to take an upward path?
I answered:
A: I would certainly like to see a civic option of the sort you
suggest, but it is difficult in a society where people are largely
segregated and ethnic identity overemphasized. The establishments in
both Pristina and Belgrade would see such an alternative as a threat.
But that is no reason for it not to happen!
Note: I did not comment on Abazovic at all. I commented on a civic alternative in Kosovo, which I would welcome. In retrospect, I should have added “I will not comment on Abazovic,” but it seems clear to me that was the case. The press that suggests I expressed approval of Abazovic is certainly distorting what I said and meant. I said nothing about him.
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