Tag: Balkans
Serbia needs to get on the right side of history
Saša Janković, runner-up at the latest Presidential elections in the Republic of Serbia (2017), writes in Danas:
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has made an unnecessary and inappropriate personal gamble with national interests, participating in a campaign of one candidate in the US presidential elections. To make the case even worse, his candidate lost. This is not the first time he has made this mistake. But unlike when he supported Hillary Clinton, this time the consequences will be severe. This was the drop that flooded the cup and his actions will affect the whole country negatively.
At the recent hearing of the American House Committee on Foreign Affairs, likely perspectives of the new American policy towards the Western Balkans were heard. Serbia – or more accurately put – the kind of influence it exercises in the region was defined as a problem. The new American administration will no longer tolerate Serbia making trouble in Bosnia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia… nor anywhere else in the Region.
If and when Vučić loses support from Washington, he will have no other shield to hide behind – he has wasted them all already.
The U-turn away from the EU (to which, in fact, he never aspired) will now, unlike previously, hit back. The EU and US are beginning to coordinate their foreign policies again and Washington will not continue compensating for heavy messages from Brussels, as in the previous years. The revival of US – EU cooperation effectively closes the space for Vučić to continue manipulating them against each other.
As for the Russian Federation, Maria Zakharova’s public (and close to vulgar) mockery of the Vučić’s overall position in the Washington agreement (the infamous “Sharon Stone tweet”), revealed Moscow’s attitude towards his troubles. If the Kremlin interferes in the Region, it is in pursuit of Russian interests, not Vučić’s, nor Serbia’s.
Finally, China: if anyone believed Vučić when he claimed (including on billboards throughout Belgrade) that Xi Jinping is his “brother” and will shower Serbia with investments, flying cars, weaponry and protection of all kinds, then we deserve whatever is thrown at us, don’t we?
It is no secret anymore that changes are being considered to the Dayton Agreements. Both entities, including Republika Srpska, could easily lose the position of “state within a state.” That status, which could have been used constructively and as an advantage, Serbian and Croatian political leaders (ab)used as a rope around the neck of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Bosniak leaders didn’t help either, constantly playing victims.
The outcome? A quarter of a century after the war, the citizens of BiH do not have a functional state. Instead, the region has a continuing challenge, despite the lies of politicians from Serbia and Croatia that, as guarantors of the Dayton Agreement, they will support the integrity and sovereignty of BiH. In the meantime, Serbs in Bosnia developed very strong feelings for Republika Srpska.
Republika Srpska is not its most powerful and visible politician, Milorad Dodik. But Dodik, in cooperation with the authorities from Belgrade, ruined the opportunity for the Serbian entity to be constructive and favored by the world. After Vučić has lost his latest gamble, if and when the structure of BiH is changed the question is how much of Republika Srpska’s jurisdiction will remain. He broke so many promises that many in the West have become determined not to let him continue fooling them.
Another challenge, its solution long overdue, is Kosovo. The US and the EU will now insist, without further delay, on a comprehensive agreement between Belgrade and Pristina. Serbia should actively influence its content with its proposals, but Vučić’s populist regime abstains so that it can decline any responsibility for the outcome and blame it on others. His oppressed political opposition acts the same way.
There was just one proposal from the side of the opposition that didn’t include formal recognition of independence and still had some chance to be considered internationally.* It was swiftly declared treasonous by both the Vučić’s regime and the rest of the opposition. Since then, three years ago, neither the regime nor the opposition has proposed what to do.
Instead, some opposition leaders consider that putting forward a proposal would provide Vučić with an opportunity to blame them for the loss of Kosovo, using his propaganda machine. And he would, the record shows. So they choose to wait for the West to force Vučić into making a move, so that they can accuse him of treason and topple him. In the meantime, they join him in inspiring cheap nationalist feelings, needed to help their plan – which in fact mirrors his own.
Other opposition leaders silently agree with Vučić’s tactics of blackmailing everybody, inside and out, with Kosovo and Republika Srpska, with a faint view of the “Greater Serbia” somewhere down the road. They would only do it “faster, stronger, better” (an electoral slogan of Vučić’s own party).
The ultimate result is that the agreement on Kosovo will be written by foreign diplomats, without a substantive role of Serbia. Vučić’s regime and the opposition (with lesser responsibility but in an equal manner) are depriving Serbia of influence on the decision that deeply concerns national interests.
The US and the EU, of course, know that changes in BiH and Kosovo are high-risk operations. They will not make the mistake of conducting them without first weakening those who, for fear of losing their power, can sabotage changes by lighting fires in the region. Therefore the first cracks in the grandiose Vučić’s media image outside and inside of Serbia begin to appear. Cracks begin to show in Vučić’s own party, too – Nebojša Stefanović (for years, Vučić’s most trusted aide) is doing what Vučić, advised and used to do in the extremist Serbian Radical Party before he split it with other dissidents to establish the Serbian Progressive Party. Surely, Vučić recognizes the scenario, working against him now.
No injustice inflicted there on Vučić – what brought him up will pull him down. But the citizens of Serbia will suffer – Vučić’s party captured their state and will leave it in scraps. Not only economically, institutionally and legally, but also emotionally – he deprived the nation of self-respect and hope. Furthermore, Vučić will probably not behave like Kosovo’s Thaci and resign from the presidential post to avoid dragging his country into the dirt. No matter how hard one tries to differentiate between Vučić’s regime and Serbia, when he gets under more serious international criticism and, possibly, restrictive measures, that will not be possible.
So, in the world’s eyes, Serbia will once again be seen as a source of problems and a nation that, for the second time in only two decades, allowed a destructive autocrat to gain a position of unlimited power. Not yet fully recovered from the scars left by Milosevic, Serbia will get new ones. From a symbol of freedom, anti-fascism, vitality and capacity to stand united with South Slavic peoples in a strong and prosperous alliance, to a powerless, excommunicated, humiliated and problematic country that has lost its sense of direction and lags behind – the picture will be daunting and generations of Serbians will carry its shadow as a burden. No one can harm Serbian national interests as Serbian nationalists can.
There is a better way. Serbia should identify itself within the trinity of 1) universal human and civil values, 2) positive elements of our national identity, and 3) Western political culture. We are first human beings and free individuals, citizens with dignity and responsibilities to ourselves and the world we live in. Then we are the Serbs – a freedom-loving, friendly, and brave Slavic nation. Finally, we firmly belong to the civilization of Western democracies!
Saint Sava pointed Serbian religion (and partly spirituality) to the East, towards our Orthodox Slavic brothers. But his brother Stefan, the first crowned ruler of Serbia, not accidentally and not without an agreement with his brother, firmly oriented the Serbian state towards the West. In 1217 he sought and received the first Serbian crown from the Pope, not from the Patriarch in the East (which was an option at the time). Such are the foundations of our identity, which is still the direction for our progress. Every detour costs us lost generations and underdevelopment. Shortcomings of Western democracy, which we speak of constantly as “sour grapes,” we can improve upon only after we master its basics. We must work honestly and never again look for shortcuts. Long live Serbia!
*The proposal included the following:
1. Serbia agrees with (and in fact actively supports) the membership of Kosovo in all international organizations, including the UN. Serbia will not ask for any restrictions or create any obstacles for Kosovo to fully avail itself of every right, obligation, or interest arising from such membership. This attitude of Serbia does not mean and can not be used as proof that it formally recognizes the independence of Kosovo, nor Serbia will be conditioned in any way to do so.
2. The sites of the Serbian Orthodox Church of major historical and religious importance (the key monasteries and churches) shall be given extraterritorial status and left to be self-governed by the Church authorities (similar to the examples of monasteries in Mount Athos in Greece, or the Vatican in Rome).
3. Local self-governance in North Mitrovica and the Association of Serbian Municipalities shall be established, not to be used to the detriment of the authority of Pristina over the whole territory of Kosovo.
4. Individual and collective human rights of Serbs shall be guaranteed at the highest level.
5. Property rights shall be guaranteed in line with international norms and standards.
6. The Agreement shall be valid for 30 years. If before the expiry of that term a new one is not reached, it shall be automatically prolonged for the next 30 years, and so on.
Some answers on the Balkans, and other things
I did this interview with Janusz Bugajski on November 5, but if I understand correctly it was broadcast in Kosovo on RTK recently. So it’s a bit dated (but not wrong) on US election issues, but still okay on Balkan issues:
Russia disrespects sovereignty and the Dayton accords
I did an interview yesterday with Aldin Tiro, who published it today at hayat.ba:
Q: You probably heard that [Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov] met with Milorad Dodik last night in Republika Srpska, where the BiH [Bosnian] flag was not hoisted at all.
Lavrov also praised the RS National Assembly’s decision to be militarily neutral. At the meeting, the state of BiH was degraded and disrespect was expressed, and Dodik said at one point that Lavrov first came to RS last night and that he would come to BiH only [the next day]?
How to comment on such behavior of Russia, that is, Lavrov, who is an experienced politician?
A: Lavrov knows what he is doing: providing support to a secessionist who seeks to do Moscow’s bidding and prevent NATO membership.
Q: How do you view the facts that today Sefik Dzaferovic and Zeljko Komsic (the other two members of the Presidency of BiH) refused to meet with Lavrov?
A: I think they did the right thing. The Sarajevo state institutions need to be respected. Lavrov will be furious.
Q: Has Russia expressed disrespect for BiH? One could constantly hear Lavrov’s statement that Russia respects the territorial integrity of BiH and sends it to Dayton, and it is persistently repeated that it wants the High Representative to leave?
A: Duplicity is Lavrov’s middle name. You can’t respect the territorial integrity of BiH and visit Dodik first in a room without the Bosnian state flag. You can’t respect Dayton and want the High Representative responsible for the interpretation and implementation of Dayton to leave.
Q: How do you view Milorad Dodik’s behavior during these visits?
A: Dodik is Moscow’s puppet. No more, no less.
Q: Who will “profit” the most, that is, who is the manager here?
A: Lavrov is the manager, but no doubt Dodik is profiting.
My Balkans recommendations for President Biden
Here is my testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs from this morning:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, not only for this opportunity to testify once again but also for your decades of commitment to Europe whole and free. But the job is not yet finished. Problems remain between Serbia and Kosovo as well as inside Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Serbia is also a factor.
The essential precondition for solving the remaining Balkan problems is American recommitment to the region, in tandem with European allies. Recent competition between the US and EU, which has demonstrated it cannot do the job on its own, hampered progress. As part of his global re-assertion of democratic values, President Biden should consult the Europeans and announce a joint vision for the Balkan region.
Completing Kosovo statehood
Independent Kosovo is still completing its statehood. Its security forces are progressing toward NATO. Other sovereign institutions are also gaining capability but lack universal recognition.
The Pristina/Belgrade dialogue the EU leads can help but needs more US engagement. The Americans should focus on implementation and reciprocity. The dialogue needs a monitoring mechanism, including for past agreements as well as commitments like Kosovo’s EU visa waiver. Reciprocity should include extension of the Special Chambers’ mandate to crimes committed in Serbia, including the post-war murder of three Americans.
The main US goal for the dialogue is mutual recognition and exchange of ambassadors. President Biden and Chancellor Merkel should make this goal explicit and press the non-recognizing EU members to declare they will recognize Kosovo no later than Serbia does. UN membership will require the Americans to convince Russia and China not to veto.
Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are as fraught as Kosovo’s. The Dayton accords reached 25 years ago entailed territorial division and ethnic power-sharing, ending a terrible war. That formula no longer makes sense for the international community, which pays many of Bosnia’s bills, or for its citizens, who suffer dysfunctional governance.
Dayton today serves the interests of ethnic robber barons. One arms his statelet for secession while another eggs him on and the third complains. The US should press the Europeans to sanction those who advocate Republika Srpska independence and to strengthen and reposition their troops, visibly backed by the US, to the northeastern town of Brcko, to block secession. The US should seek to block Russian arming of entity police as well as Croatian and Serbian political interference.
Europe and the US want a post-Dayton Bosnia that can qualify for EU membership. That Bosnia will be based not on ethnic power-sharing but rather on majorities of citizens electing their representatives. The cantons and entities, as well as ethnic vetoes and restrictions, will need to fade. The Americans and Europeans should welcome the prospect of a new civic constitution.
No one outside Bosnia and Herzegovina can reform its constitution. A popular movement is needed. The United States, along with the Europeans, needs to shield that popular movement from repression while starving the entities of funding and redirecting it to the central government and municipalities.
Redirecting Serbia
Everything I’ve suggested will be easier if Serbia helps. President Trump allowed President Vucic to tighten control of Serbian courts and news media, which often indulge in hate speech, and to promote pan-Serb ambitions destabilizing to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Montenegro. The Biden Administration will need to toughen up on Belgrade, together with Europe. If Vucic continues to prefer autocracy and alignment with Russia and China, the Europeans and Americans will need to await the day Serbia is committed to real democracy at home and better relations with its neighbors. Serbia’s citizens, more concerned about jobs than Kosovo or Bosnia, need to help. In the meanwhile, we may want to think about an interim arrangement, provided it gives Kosovo a seat at the UN. Getting a good deal requires readiness to reject a bad one.
Conclusion
President Biden will have bigger problems than the Balkans. But few regions promise better returns. Cooperating with Europeans, the US can save the sovereignty and territorial integrity of two potential allies—Kosovo and Bosnia—and help Serbia escape its legacy of autocracy and war. President Biden should support those prepared to make Europe whole and free and counter those who block progress.
PS: Here is a post-hearing interview I did for N1, the Balkans CNN. Patience, it’s in English.
Dayton Bosnia is 25, time to act like an adult
The Foreign Service Journal earlier this week published my thoughts on how to reform the Dayton peace agreement under which Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently governed, 25 years after the war. I would like to see an end to the governance structures derived directly from the warring parties–the so-called entities, namely the Federation and its cantons as well as Republika Srpska–and a redistribution of their authority to the “state” (“national” in American lingo) government in Sarajevo to negotiate and implement the obligations of European Union membership (the acquis communautaire) and to the municipalities to deliver services to citizens. I would also like to see increased judicial capacity to protect individual rights and, though I don’t discuss it in the Foreign Service Journal paper, reduction in the mechanisms for exerting group rights.
This is pretty radical stuff. It would essentially convert Bosnia and Herzegovina to a civic state based on respect for the rights of individuals as citizens rather than a “multiethnic” state based on the privileges of favored ethnic groups, aka “constituent peoples.” Can it happen?
Yes, it can, but it would require an unusual coincidence of commitments. You can’t expect the current leadership to institute this kind of reform, which would quickly remove the ethnic nationalist political parties they represent from power. The impulse would have to come from the citizens in a popular movement, encouraged and supported by the key internationals, namely the US, UK, and Germany (spurring the EU to action). There have been recurrent signs of the kind of popular discontent required in recent years, but it has never coalesced into a movement with clear country-wide goals to alter the constitution. The internationals would need to starve the beast by dramatically reducing international funding to the entities and cantons and objecting to repression of popular discontent.
It is arguable that precisely the opposite direction is more likely: an ethnic breakup of the state into Croat, Bosniak, and Serb statelets, with accompanying violence and ethnic cleansing. I wrote my piece last spring, when the prospect of ethnic partition of Kosovo seemed possible, even likely, and I therefore emphasized that as a possible trigger for breakup of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That possibility has receded, not least because of the realization that partition of Kosovo would indeed create problems in Bosnia and elsewhere.
But there are still big risks of violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The excessive arming of Republika Srpska’s police by the Russians, Serbia’s willingness to support pan-Serbian sentiment not only in Bosnia but also in Montenegro and Kosovo, Milorad Dodik’s open advocacy of secession and denial of the 1990s genocide, the growing cooperation between Croat and Serb nationalists, and feelings of isolation and even desperation among Bosniaks all point to possible instability or worse.
It is clear we won’t get through the next 25 years with Dayton Bosnia. Whatever good it did in ending the war, Dayton Bosnia cannot fulfill its citizens’ aspirations for integration into the European Union. It would be far better to fix it as soon as we can, rather than let current problems fester until violence erupts. President-elect Biden wants to restore American leadership and reassert democratic values. Bosnia and Herzegovina would be a good place to start.
Dayton Bosnia is 25. It’s time to act like an adult.
Restoring individual rights and hope in Bosnia
I joined happily with knowledgeable colleagues in signing Fixing Dayton: A New Deal for Bosnia and Herzegovina, published yesterday by Dan Hamilton of the Woodrow Wilson Center. But my own thoughts go beyond that paper in some respects. Here is what I would advise the Biden Administration about what Dan Hamilton calls the “why, what, and how” of fixing Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Why: The Dayton agreements that ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina were a striking US foreign policy success in 1995, but the country risks becoming a disaster in the 2020s due to growing inter-ethnic strife. State failure in Bosnia would spew refugees into the EU and bring an end to a successful NATO effort to protect a vulnerable Muslim population. Breakup of the Bosnian state would strengthen Russian-sponsored secessionists not only in the Balkans but also in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia and cause further fraying of the NATO Alliance. The US needs to re-assert it leadership, in partnership with the EU, which is unable for now to proceed expeditiously with enlargement. Europe whole, free, and democratic is still a worthy vision, but the Europeans need America to help make it happen.
What: The objective in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be a functional, effective, and united state within its current borders capable of meeting the requirements for entry into NATO and the European Union. This will require elimination of the elaborate governing architecture created at Dayton that froze in place the warring parties (Republika Srpska and the Federation) and rewarded their commitment to ethnically based control of territory. Bosnia and Herzegovina should be governed in the future by a government in Sarajevo capable of negotiating and implementing its obligations to the EU as well as municipalities delivering services to citizens, with equal rights for individuals and vigorous legal and judicial protection for minorities.
How:
- Diplomatic: US/EU agreement on initiating a process of constitutional and other reforms, Zagreb and Belgrade convinced to support the effort, re-empowerment of the High Representative, deployment of additional NATO (read British and American) troops to Brcko to prevent either Serb or Muslim seizure of this vital chokepoint, pressure on Russia and Serbia to halt financial assistance Repubika Srpska.
- Legal: preparation by Bosnians of a new constitution that eliminates or drastically curtails the entities, full implementation of European Human Rights Chamber and Constitutional Court decisions, professionalization of the judicial sector, restoration of international prosecutors and judges in the court system, and prohibition of heavily armed police and paramilitary forces.
- Economic: an end to IMF and World Bank assistance to the entities and instead resources shifted to the municipalities and the “state” government (Sarajevo), vigorous enforcement of anti-corruption laws with European Union assistance, personal sanctions on corrupt officials levied by the US and EU in tandem, recovery and return to worthy causes of ill-gotten gains stashed in Europe or the US, strict conditionality on international financing requiring in response support for political and legal reform.
- Political: reform of the electoral law to disempower the ethically based political parties, election in parliament of a single president and two vice presidents, strict limits on the vital interest veto and the power of the House of Peoples, adoption of a law rendering all financing of political parties transparent and requiring democratic procedures for election of party leaderships.
- Public affairs: VoA/RFE/DW programming to counter Russian disinformation, redoubled international support to civil society and political forces that support serious reforms, diplomatic protection for citizens demonstrating against corruption and police abuse, and a concerted effort to publicize corruption among politicians and officials.
The obstacles to an effort of this sort are substantial. Those who govern today in Bosnia, who come to power in unfree and unfair elections conducted within a constitutional system that favors ethnic nationalists, have no interest in seeing serious reform or in preparing the country to become a serious candidate for NATO or EU membership. They will seek to use any reopening of the Dayton agreements as a means of increasing their own power and possibly breaking apart the state. The US and EU will need to be prepared to act vigorously against strong resistance by those who seek secession, ethnic separation, or ethnic domination by one group over others.
The rewards of success would be substantial. Making Bosnia into a serious candidate for NATO and EU accession would have a demonstration effect worldwide. It would restore American and European soft power, weaken ethnic nationalists in the Balkans and elsewhere, and illustrate the unmatched capacity of liberal democracy to govern effectively.