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Escaping the shadow of the past

A Serbian friend writes:

The saying that “nothing grows in the shadow of a big tree” reflects the last 20 years of effort to normalize the relationship between Belgrade and Pristina. The “big tree of the past” provided a comfortable shadow for nationalism, negative stereotypes, corruption, and isolation. The wartime generation of political leaders did not look beyond their nationalistic mindsets and political agendas, which secured them leading positions in decision-making structures and the economy for decades. They controlled the money flow from dubious business people and kept the region outside global financial streams. Isolation was the way for them to hold on to power.

Kosovo was a convenient issue on which to demonstrate patriotism and solidify economic interests and political influence.  For decades it was considered politically incorrect to offer an alternative approach. Resolution of Kosovo’s status was considered a sine qua non for stability and wellbeing of the region. The international community was hesitant to step beyond a conventional approach that mixed morality, selective interpretation of history, and conviction that Serbia was primarily responsible and would need to pay the price for generations to come. This approach did not yield tangible results. 

How we should interpret Belgrade-Pristina economic agreement signed in the White House on September 4, 2020? Why did Ambassador Richard Grenell succeed where many failed before him? Has he ushered in a new peace?

Grenell’s approach: economy before status

Grenell came with an open mind, investing himself fully in the process while applying bulldozer style diplomacy once practiced by the architect of the Bosnia Dayton Peace Accords, former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke. Coming from the President’s inner circle, Grenell could make things happen. His recent visit to Belgrade and Pristina (September 21- 22, 2020, two weeks after the White House event) made it clear that economic progress between Belgrade and Pristina is high on his agenda. He was accompanied by Adam Boehler, CEO of the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), US EXIM Bank officials, as well as representatives of various other US agencies. The DFC opened a regional office in Belgrade and signed a separate agreement with Pristina. The Americans committed to secure equity and insurance for infrastructural projects and financial incentives for small and medium-sized enterprises.

Both Belgrade and Pristina needed a powerful interlocutor like Grenell, who serves as an alibi before their domestic constituencies to start with something new. Both gained at home. The White House meeting injected President Vucic with legitimacy. It is something no other Serbian leader has achieved, a tête-à-tête with a US President. The same applies to Pristina Prime Minister Abdullah Hoti, who is walking on thin ice at home. Opposition to parts of the deal by his coalition partner nearly destroyed chances to reach agreement. After some friendly arm-twisting, Hoti walked out of the Oval Office strengthened politically.

The American bulldozer provided both leaders with an excuse to step aside from well-rehearsed nationalist rhetoric, at least for a moment. The immature political culture and zero-sum thinking of the 90s could certainly return.

By putting “economy before status,” Grenell’s achieved a lot:

1. The US returned as an active and committed political, economic, and security factor in the region. Belgrade and Pristina are back on America’s radar.
2. There is new hope in the region with the shift of diplomatic focus to the economy and well-being of ordinary citizens.
3. The US military presence in the region, essential for stability, has been reaffirmed. It is now unlikely that the Trump Administration will pull US troops out of KFOR and close Camp Bondsteel, close to the Serb community of Urosevac.
4. Washington will close the strategic gap and prevent further expansion of Chinese and Russian influence in Belgrade, Pristina, Tirana, and Skopje by investing in infrastructure and economic projects that counter the Chinese sponsored Belt and Road Initiative.

A new game

Economic progress cannot resolve the status issue, but it could relax the negotiating atmosphere. Until now, profound distrust and zero-sum logic has prevailed. The war generation of leaders were unable to step out of their comfortable habits to become peacemakers.

Rarely do hawks transform into doves. The hawks controlled local economies, generating significant personal wealth from illegal and half-legal businesses. In most cases, state institutions turned a blind eye or even openly supported wartime barons in exchange for material compensation. Professional patriots exploited economic activities aimed to increase personal wealth. They had zero incentive to change things.

Only outside intervention could break the decades-long connection between shady local money and nationalist political options. Substantial US investments can marginalize their influence and empower ordinary citizens, build knowledge-based capacity, introduce strict business standards, strengthen the entrepreneurial spirit, and support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). US money comes with conditions.

The peace process is a marathon with numerous obstacles on the way. Agreements are just benchmarks on the way. Implementation is crucially important. Furthermore, although basic elements have been publicized (the promise of overall $3.2 billion allocated to rail, roads, air projects as well as support for SMEs), the specific elements are still not clear. Both Belgrade and Pristina would have to be careful taking multi-billion loans since that would be a significant economic burden for generations to come. Additionally, it is yet to be seen if the US presidential election will influence implementation.

Not everybody is delighted with this US pivot to the Western Balkans. Maria Zaharova, spokesperson of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tweeted that the Trump-Vucic meeting looked like a scene from the film “Basic Instinct,” implying that Vucic looked like he was being interrogated. Later she and Foreign Minister Lavrov apologized, unconvincingly. Marko Djuric, an official of Vucic’s Serbian Progressive Party, reminded the Russians that Vucic waited for an hour and a half for a meeting with President Putin.

Despite Serbian high hopes, Belgrade is not high on Russia’s agenda. Lacking confidence in Serbian loyalty, Moscow is suspicious and resentful of this American initiative for economic normalization.

Europeanization vs. Americanization

Connecting the US initiative with ongoing EU efforts is important. Positive things happen when the US and the EU join efforts in the region. The EU has invested significant amounts of financial aid and political capital in the region since the 2003 EU – Western Balkans Summit, when the Union pledged to open a European perspective for the countries of the region. That was 17 years ago. In the meanwhile only Slovenia (2004) and Croatia (2013) have become member states, while the other countries have made only modest progress in the accession process. The EU is the largest investor in the region, but so far has not managed to capitalize on its role and secure normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. 

The EU sponsored Belgrade – Pristina dialogue has gone on for 9 years without yielding impressive results. There are many reasons for that, but one of them certainly is not a lack of effort and goodwill by the EU. On the contrary, the EU has invested a lot of its political credibility. One of the fundamental reasons for the modest success so far is the complex EU decision-making process. Henry Kissinger asked, “who do I call if I want to call Europe?” It is easier for Grenell to wield both carrot and stick than for EU High Representative Joseph Borrell, who cannot move quickly because he need multiple approvals. Grenell is not the most popular diplomat in Germany or the EU, but he has made significant progress.

From an outside perspective, it is obvious that the US and the EU need each other to secure long-term stabilization of the Western Balkans and other parts of the world. With loads of energy and strong influence in Belgrade and Pristina, Grenell could move things forward quickly. The EU could provide a slower but more systematic and institutional-based process that solidifies American efforts.  The US needs to rediscover the advantages of multilateral diplomacy and put aside the do it alone approach. The EU should embrace Grenell’s initiative and try to build on it, since it furthers EU objectives in the region. Both partners should be ready to share glory and burdens to achieve sustainable results.

Where next?

Outside intervention can be an important element, but local players are the main agents of any profound change. Grenell’s involvement is positive and important, but he should not be seen as a messianic figure. He still has a lot to do. Neither Washington nor Brussels can resolve decades of problems with a magic wand.

Everything comes down to Belgrade’s and Pristina’s estimates of what is good for them. President Vucic decided to invest his political capital in President Trump’s process because it offered an alternative to well-known ready-made blueprints coming from Washington for decades. By contrast, the Kosovo side might want to wait for the results of the US Presidential elections before committing. Former Vice President Biden has strong feelings for Kosovo. If he wins, American policy may shift. Every option comes with risk. The important thing is to choose a strategic orientation wisely and keep moving forward in that direction. Every process takes time to solidify and produce tangible results. 

The Economic Normalization Agreement is a step in good direction. If we keep moving, we can escape the shadow of the big tree.

If you want historic, you’ll be disappointed

Here’s an interview I did last week for Shpat Blakcori of Radio Television Dukagjini:

Q: Prime minister of Kosovo, Avdullah Hoti, has said that within a year we except state recognition from Serbia, how do you comment on this issue?

A: The Prime Minister knows better than I do what will happen, but I see little sign that President Vucic is getting ready to recognize Kosovo. A year from now Vucic will be entering a pre-electoral period, which will make it more difficult. But I certainly hope what the Prime Minister says is true.

Q: Did Kosovo make the right decision, to recognize Jerusalem as part of Israel?

A: I think it is a mistake to pre-judge the outcome of the final status negotiations between Israel and Palestine, even if I am also convinced West Jerusalem and most of the Old City will remain in Israel as its capital.

Q: How you do see the relations between USA and EU, regarding the dialogue, it seems that they are not finding a common ground.

A: The State Department claims they are cooperating well. I’m not seeing it. I’m seeing an American Administration that is doing all it can to help President Trump get re-elected, regardless of the implications for Kosovo, Serbia, and the European Union. The “economic normalization” deal is far from normalizing economic relations, which in any event is a subject more suitable for Europe than the US. Washington has more clout when it comes to political issues, as the recognition of Kosovo by Israel suggests.

I also did this for Fitim Gashi of KOHA:

Q: How do you evaluate the Agreement in Washington, where Kosovo and Serbia pledged before the United States for Economic Normalization, between two countries.

A: The document doesn’t even really begin to normalize economic relations between Kosovo and Serbia. What it does is to call for implementation of some existing transportation agreements and aligns Pristina and Belgrade with US policy on airport screening, Hizbollah, Jerusalem and a few other things.

Q: Is there any point of this agreement that can bring benefits for parties and lead to full normalization?

A: I doubt it. I would look to the EU-sponsored talks for more serious results. The Washington meeting was a campaign gimmick that failed.

Q: In the initial drafts of the agreement there was a point that speaks of the commitment of the parties towards mutual recognition, but after the refusal of Serbia it wast lifted. Could this issue have been pushed forward, since the deal was mediated in the White House?
A: It could have been pressed. It wasn’t. That is one of many signs that this was not a serious effort.

Q: An agreement of this kind, how much can it guarantee peace and the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia?

A: It is a very small step forward, but the harm it did was in the Middle East, not the Balkans. The pledge to move two embassies to Jerusalem hurts the prospects for a peace settlement there.

Q: If we go back to the past, which agreements you consider can be called “Historic” in the context between Kosovo and Serbia?

A: I really haven’t seen any historic agreements between Serbia and Kosovo yet. But the habit of talking to each other is a good one. I am an admirer of the technical agreements and wish they were fully implemented. I also think the 2013 Brussels political agreement is a good one, so long as the Association of Serb Municipalities is established in accordance with the decision of Kosovo’s Constitutional Court.

Q: What elements should the next agreement with Serbia contain, to be so called “Historic?” Recognition and exchange of ambassadorial representatives, as well as membership in international organizations and the United Nations. That would be historic.