Tag: Balkans
Slower can be better
Drilon S. Gashi* writes:
It does not look like my call for a pause and reset will be heeded in Kosovo. President Thaci, US Special Envoy Richard Grenell, and the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) look intent on moving ahead to replace Albin Kurti as prime minister. That would mean the formation of a new coalition agreement, removal of reciprocity on Serbian goods, and a sprint towards a hazily understood, Kosovo-Serbia “normalization” agreement.
The deal likely encompasses a land swap, extraterritoriality for Serb Orthodox Churches, and possibly a supra-institutional status for an Association of Serb Municipalities. It is unlikely to include UN membership or even Serbian recognition. Any combination of these components would mean a bad deal for Kosovo but a good one for Serbia. A new, even-handed deal based on economic cooperation and joint EU accession could be mutually beneficial.
False paradigm
For years, Kosovo has pursued a false paradigm: additional concessions to Serbia may further Kosovo’s international subjectivity and possibly even achieve UN membership. The truth is Kosovo’s international fate relies more on it reforming its own institutions and democracy, prospering economically, strengthening its military, garnering new recognitions of its independence, and convincing Russia and China to accept its existence. Some of these it can achieve on its own. For others, it will surely continue to need EU and US support.
It will also require greater competence and activism in Kosovo’s institutions and among its political parties, whose negotiating positions on normalization with Belgrade are consistently weakening. Yet this is the same Kosovo that achieved the 2010 ICJ verdict concluding “the declaration of independence of the 17th of February 2008 did not violate general international law.” So, Kosovo can do better.
Serbia continues to pursue a long game in which it strips away Kosovo’s gains since independence in 2008. A land swap deal would be a coup for Serbia, and a means to continue undermining Kosovo’s independence. Belgrade’s goal is to further isolate Kosovo and assure it remains far from universal recognition. Serbia has plastered posters all across Belgrade thanking President Xi Jinping for his COVID-19 support. It should be no surprise to learn Serbia seeks China’s support to make Kosovo further resemble Taiwan.
The “normalization” process should lead to mutual recognition between Kosovo and Serbia, border demarcation along their internationally recognized borders, and an exchange of Ambassadors. It is not moving in that direction. In fact, this normalization process “abnormalizes” Kosovo.
New government? The Constitution’s call
The Kosovo Constitutional Court has in the past struck down a Kosovo-Serbia agreement that contravened Kosovo’s Constitution. The Constitutional Court should step in again, but this time to settle the matter of how Kosovo should determine its new government.
Kosovo is currently in a constitutional crisis. President Thaci believes the LDK, the second place party in the October 2019 elections, should try its turn at forming a government. Vetevendosje (VV), the election winner, believes the recent vote of no confidence should lead to the President disbanding the parliament and calling post-COVID elections. VV believes it should not have to respond to requests to form a government based on the October 2019 election.
LDK now plans to circumvent VV, as well as its own Parliament Speaker—and previous candidate for Prime Minister—Vjosa Osmani, in forming a government. There’s a struggle inside the LDK between its old guard, and a new guard led by Osmani. The new guard brought in a significant portion of the LDK vote last election. But the old guard has remained in charge. It’s actions may also be circumventing the Constitution.
Acting Prime Minister Kurti and Speaker Osmani are popular. Their success in the recent election brought hope to Kosovo. They are well-educated, relatively young politicians, and committed to good governance and economic development. Kosovo’s voters have too often been let down by their establishment parties. And now the country faces a potential government of the losers of the last election.
Moves to replace a popular government managing the pandemic may lead to alarm and protest. While extraordinary in times of a pandemic, thousands gathered in Israel recently to protest government corruption. Nobody wants that for Kosovo. There’s still time for a constitutional solution, or a compromise unity government, instead of a contentious government.
Hope for a new deal
A rushed Kosovo-Serbia deal led by an unpopular—and potentially unconstitutional—Kosovo government, during a pandemic, spells trouble. What both sides need, and EU and US mediators should support, is a new deal for a sustainable peace. One that does not detract from Kosovo’s independence and territorial integrity, but rather is based on a formula for Kosovo and Serbia to accept one another as independent countries.
This deal could focus on economic and trade cooperation, significant EU support, and joint EU accession. A new trade deal could help settle disagreements over tariff and non-tariff barriers. The Serbian and Kosovo Chambers of Commerce have a working relationship. As recently as two years ago Serbian business associations took part in a Prishtina trade fair, emphasizing they’re creating jobs, products, and making a profit with their Kosovar counterparts. Together, they can work to solve their mutual long lists of trade grievances. The US administration, Richard Grenell and Matt Palmer, have been right to focus here and can work to show real progress.
For its part, the EU, and Special Envoy Lajcak, can prove to the sides, and others, that EU accession is still a powerful tool for progress. Whether it be through achieving multi-country infrastructure projects, joint legislative and rule of law reform, joint economic sector reform, or greater linkages for both sides to EU markets. The EU can also do a great deal by conditioning EU accession for both countries as part of the same process, with them simultaneously acceding. That way, it does not import problematic relations, but improves those relations, and encourages the accession of the countries as new EU partners.
The EU and US have all the carrots and sticks needed to put this process back on track. Fast-forwarding now to an unpopular deal will do much more harm than good, lead to failure for Kosovo, and ultimately for all. A new deal where both sides are winners, is not only better, it can last.
*Drilon S. Gashi is an international development specialist based in Washington, D.C. He has spent three years working in Kosovo’s public and non-for-profit sectors, and holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University.
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A really bad deal
Kosovo caretaker Prime Minister Kurti in a Zoom press conference this morning confirmed a lot of suspicions:
- The United States, in particular Special Envoy and Director of National Intelligence Richard Grenell, has played an important role in unseating Kurti, who has been defeated in a confidence vote the US welcomed.
- Grenell has opposed Kurti’s efforts to get reciprocity for Kosovo and instead insists on unilateral and complete abolition of the tariffs Kurti’s predecessor imposed on Serbian goods, without any quid pro quo from Serbia.
- The dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade should be held under the auspices of both the EU and the US, not one or the other but both acting together.
- Kurti said he was not invited to such a dialogue but only to an opportunity to sign up for the land (and people) swap Presidents Vucic and Thaci have been discussing.
- It would send three majority-Serb municipalities (but not North Mitrovica) to Serbia and provide for both extraterritoriality for Serbian sites south of the Ibar river as well as a Serb Association of Municipalities, with only part of the majority-Albanian Serbian municipality of Presevo in return.
- Kosovo would not even get Serbian recognition, but rather a kind of acceptance of the status quo, like West and East Germany.
- NATO would still protect Kosovo’s main water supply, Gazivoda.
- Kurti believes Thaci is doing this to protect himself from indictment by the Special Tribunal in The Hague but does not see how such a deal could be approved in Kosovo’s parliament, much less by the electorate.
Albin is proving strikingly popular in recent polling, not least due to his insistence on reciprocity with Serbia and his opposition to his President’s land/people swap plans. He made it clear in his remarks that he anticipates instability if he is removed from office (and implied he wouldn’t do anything to discourage it). What he wants is early elections, which he anticipates winning, perhaps even with an absolute majority in parliament.
This is all happening in the midst of the corona virus epidemic, which remains a big challenge for a poor country that has a weak health care system and has lost many medical personnel to emigration. For now, a new election is out of the question. More likely is that President Thaci will find an alternative majority in parliament that will name a new prime minister and grant him the emergency powers he has sought. They will be used not only to fight Covid-19 but also to try to proceed with the land swap deal, under pressure from the Americans to give President Trump something he can boast about during the US election campaign.
This is an ugly situation, with much wider implications in the Balkans and beyond. The land swap would validate an ethno-territorial concept Moscow has pursued not only in the Balkans, in particular Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Russian President Putin would enjoy the consequences no end, a result the ethno-nationalist Trump Administration would welcome.
Ironically, President Vucic may right now be the biggest obstacle to a quick deal. He has made it clear he will not proceed until after the Serbian elections, which have been postponed from April due to Covid-19. That said, the kind of deal Kurti outlined today should be more than satisfactory to Belgrade, which is required to do little but give up part of a municipality whose population it finds troublesome. By the same token, it is hard to fathom how anyone in Pristina would even consider it.
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Pause and reset
Drilon Gashi writes:
Stops and starts have riddled the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. Right now, the US Administration is showing great interest and the European Union has renewed its commitment, but Washington and Brussels disagree on the content, leadership, and approach of the talks. There is also disagreement among Kosovo’s leaders. Ironically, the otherwise devastating coronavirus pandemic may offer just the pause and reset opportunity all the parties need.
A Brief History
Having started out as an EU initiative in 2011, the dialogue has had mixed results. There were early positive signals that EU mediation helped overcome a previous zero-sum logic, and that conditionality tied to EU accession would bring the sides closer. However, many of the 23 agreements achieved as of 2018 have only been partially implemented. Presidential talks in the past few years between Kosovo’s Hashim Thaci and Serbia’s Alexander Vucic have added the wrinkle of “border correction,” a euphemism for a land swap. While statements from the presidents are contradictory, they have discussed some sort of territorial swap, with Kosovo ceding part of its north to Serbia, which would cede a lesser par of its southwest to Kosovo.
The Debate on the Deal’s Content
The land swap has become contentious.
First the con: such ethno-national solutions often produce more problems than they solve and may embolden others in the region, namely Republika Srpska, to separate from Bosnia or join Serbia. A departure from the Ahtisaari Plan—the internationally sponsored agreement endorsing Kosovo’s independence and territorial integrity—could bring Kosovo’s independence into question, rather than help make it a universally accepted fact.
Second the pro: former US diplomat James Hooper argues that Kosovo will not be able to “fulfill its maximalist stance.” He claims that all solutions to conflict include “territorial components,” so Kosovo should be prepared to accept one that provides full normalization, including Serbian recognition and security guarantees, an end to the conflict, admission to the UN, and advancement in EU and NATO integration.
Kosovo gets little
Little of what Hooper suggests is proximate or achievable.
Serbia continues to refuse to recognize Kosovo’s independence and actively campaigns against it. It interprets the dialogue as a negotiation over Kosovo’s status, rather than normalizing relations. It has never said it would recognize Kosovo, but rather that it may accept its existence. That’s not normalization but a continuation of the status quo.
Kosovo cannot alone balance the military threat Serbia poses and thus it relies on the presence of US and European troops as part of the NATO-led forces in the country. The troop presence and the promise of NATO membership are firmer security guarantees than anything Belgrade will be willing to offer.
Serbia does not control Kosovo’s admission to the UN. The five veto-wielding members of the Security Council do. Two of them, Russia and China, have not warmed to Kosovo’s independence, and thus it is not clear how Serbian recognition—without Russia’s or China’s endorsement—will lead to Kosovo’s UN membership.
Serbia says it aims for a “face-saving compromise,” in which both it and Kosovo give something up. However, a primary Serb concern—the rights of Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo’s Serbian Orthodox Church—is already enshrined in Kosovo’s constitution and laws. Serbia seeks more: extraterritoriality for both Kosovo’s Serbs and Serb Orthodox Churches. That is not compromise.
It is not clear what Kosovo gains in a land swap of this sort.
A Reset and New Momentum
Besides the content of the deal, there are other challenges. The EU has appointed a Special Envoy on Kosovo-Serbia normalization, Slovakian diplomat Miroslav Lajcak. The US also has its own Special Envoy on the talks, Richard Grenell, who is also Acting Director of US National Intelligence and Ambassador to Germany. It is not clear who is in charge. Past EU-US cooperation has been key to lasting progress in the region, but for now it is lacking.
Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti currently leads a caretaker government. He is a rival of President Hashim Thaci. The two rarely see eye-to-eye, especially on the talks with Serbia. Kosovo needs a new, fully empowered, government before it can re-engage in normalization with Serbia. The Constitutional Court and Assembly have both determined the government, not the President, should lead talks with Serbia.
The Constitutional Court may also need to decide whether a new government should be chosen through new elections or a new coalition agreement based on the October 2019 election. Kurti wants new elections, since his party’s popularity has grown. That would enable him to avoid a deal neither he nor the general public is privy to. Thaci prefers a new government based on the current parliament, which he hopes will back the kind of deal he wants.
Kosovo needs time to reconcile its government and president and to achieve the unity needed for normalization with Serbia. The EU and US need time to strengthen their collaboration. Serbia needs time not only to conduct its elections delayed due to the Covid-19, but also to come to terms with the need to acknowledge Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The corona virus provides the pause and reset everyone needs.
Drilon S. Gashi is an international development specialist based in Washington, D.C. He has spent three years working in Kosovo’s public and non-for-profit sectors, and holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University.
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Bullying
Congressman Eliot Engel’s statement on Friday deserves the attention of Balkan-watchers:
“To say that the United States and Kosovo have a warm and close relationship would be understating the depth of our ties. The United States led the campaign to end Milosevic’s genocidal ethnic cleansing and has been the most powerful and consistent friend of the independent and sovereign Republic of Kosovo. I’ve visited Kosovo many times and can confidently say Americans do not receive a warmer welcome anywhere else around the world.
“I’ve been proud to be a partner of Kosovo governments led by a variety of political parties. I do not take sides on who should run Kosovo. That is a decision for the people of Kosovo. I will always work with whomever they choose.
“This is why I have been increasingly concerned with the heavy-handed tactics the Trump Administration is using with Prishtina. The State Department has long called for Kosovo to lift its tariffs on Serbia. But this Administration turned to economic penalties just a few short weeks after the Kurti government took office. Rather than letting a new government facing a pandemic staff its agencies and set up internal procedures, the U.S. contributed to a political crisis in Prishtina over the tariffs on Serbia.
“There are good reasons for Kosovo to lift tariffs, mostly that they are hurting Kosovo more than they are providing leverage to reach a peace deal with Serbia. Regardless, tariffs are a legitimate tool of a sovereign nation. As such, they’ve been imposed around the world by President Trump against friends and foes, alike, for economic and political reasons.
“Rather than using overbearing tactics with a friend which relies on our support, the United States should have patiently worked with the now-outgoing Kosovo government—as it sought to work with the previous Kosovo government—to improve policies which promote prosperity and a lasting peace. Strong-arming a small democracy is the act of a bully, not a mature partner. Regardless, I will continue to work with whatever government the people of Kosovo select now and in the future.
“Moreover, the pressure imposed on Prishtina for its tariffs is decidedly unbalanced. Serbian diplomats are transiting the globe pressing countries to derecognize Kosovo, and Serbia is deepening relations with Moscow and purchasing significant amounts of Russian weaponry. In fact, under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) passed by Congress in the aftermath of Russia’s interference in the 2016 elections, these arms purchases require the Administration to impose sanctions on Serbia. Neither have we imposed those sanctions, nor have we energetically pressed Serbia to end its derecognition efforts.
“Something’s wrong with U.S. policy and we need to correct it. We should start with rebalancing our approaches toward Serbia and Kosovo. We should work with our European allies to treat both countries as independent and sovereign partners, applying consistent standards to both sides as we try to restart peace talks. When U.S. law says we should sanction Serbia due to its security ties with Russia, we should.
“Additionally, the U.S. should immediately restart its assistance through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). The MCC model is based on objective, data-driven indicators and a mutually agreed upon compact between the U.S. and the recipient country. Using this assistance as a bludgeon for actions not related to MCC or its mission twists the agency into just another transactional pressure tool—precisely what it was not intended to be.”
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van der Stoel deadline extended
The Max van der Stoel Award is presented by the Government of the Netherlands every two years. It honours the memory of distinguished Dutch statesman and the first OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel (seen here in Vukovar, Croatia). (OSCE) Photo details
THE HAGUE, 30 March 2020 – The deadline for receiving nominations for the Max van der Stoel Award 2020 has been extended to 30 April 2020. The award of 50,000 euros recognizes extraordinary and outstanding achievements in improving the position of national minorities in the OSCE participating States.
To propose a candidate, contact an OSCE field operation, a delegation to the OSCE or one of the OSCE institutions (the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the Representative on Freedom of the Media or the High Commissioner on National Minorities, as well as the OSCE Secretariat and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly) with the name of an individual, group or organization you wish to be considered for the award. Only the above-mentioned OSCE entities can nominate candidates. The OSCE entity you approach will therefore consider your submission and decide which of the proposed candidates to nominate.
“In order to ensure transparency, fair competition and inclusiveness, my office will nominate all qualified candidates whose application it receives. I encourage all other OSCE entities to do the same,” said OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) Lamberto Zannier.
The OSCE field operations, delegations and institutions should send their nominations directly to the office of the HCNM either via email (mvds@hcnm.org), through the online nomination form (maxvanderstoelaward.com) or by mail/diplomatic post to:
Max van der Stoel Award
Prinsessegracht 22
2514 AP The Hague
The Netherlands
After receiving all nominations, a special jury of distinguished experts of international repute, chaired by the High Commissioner, will choose the winner. The award will be presented at a ceremony in The Hague in November 2020.
For more information about the award read this factsheet.
Contacts
OSCE High Commissioner on National MinoritiesMedia contactOffice: +31 70 312 5503media@hcnm.org
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What they don’t say counts
The State Department issued this Joint Statement of Special Presidential Envoy Richard Grenell, Ambassador Philip Kosnett, and Special Representative for the Western Balkans Matthew Palmer on Kosovo yesterday:
The United States stands with the people of Kosovo. We commend the continued efforts of the health professionals and others who are working hard, at great risk, to reduce the progress of COVID-19 in Kosovo. In this time of uncertainty, we urge Kosovo’s leaders to follow Kosovo’s Constitution and the rule of law. We are committed to working with any government formed through the constitutional process.
In addition, we continue to urge Kosovo’s leaders to lift the tariffs completely. We believe the tariffs are harming the people of Kosovo by hindering regional cooperation against COVID-19 – including by delaying the entry into Kosovo of needed supplies – and hindering economic growth.
We want to make clear there is no secret plan for land swaps between Kosovo and Serbia, as some have speculated. Special Presidential Envoy Richard Grenell has never seen nor discussed such a plan. The U.S. Government’s focus on supporting the recent agreements to re-establish air, rail, and highway connections between Kosovo and Serbia aims to improve the economy and create economic momentum. We believe this momentum will give new energy to a dialogue process that would lead to mutual recognition.
This is at least in part a response to Shaun Byrnes’ A Bad Deal posted here two weeks ago, but it is also an attempt to justify the Trump Administration’s unfriendly policy toward Kosovo’s Albin Kurti-led government.
Let’s take it para by para:
- That phrase “stands with the people of” is a tip-off, as it is used to distinguish between the people and the government of a foreign country. It’s what the Americans say about adversaries like Iran: we stand with the Iranian people. The US embassy put out an unusual statement supporting the holding of the no-confidence vote that brought down Prime Minister Kurti’s government earlier this week. This happened in the face of European opposition to the no-confidence vote. The bottom line is clear: at a moment when the Kosovo government was confronting the Covid-19 challenge, the Trump Administration decided nevertheless to push for the government to fall.
- Urging the complete unilateral lifting of the tariffs ignores a basic principle of diplomacy: reciprocity. The Trump Administration is asking Kosovo to meet a Serbian demand without anything in return. What Pristina has sought is suspension of the de-recognition campaign that Serbia has conducted worldwide. Is it really too much to ask that a country that wants Kosovo to buy its goods to stop trying to get other countries to reverse their recognition of Kosovo? In any event, Kurti did lift some of the tariffs unilaterally and indicated a willingness to go further, without the slightest sign of reciprocity on Serbia’s part. Where is the pressure on Serbia to reciprocate?
- The notion that Grenell has never seen a plan is not credible. Several, of uncertain origins, have been published. Presidents Thaci and Vucic have both referred to land swap discussions. Even if the US was not involved in those (which is unlikely), US intelligence will have reported on them, including any maps that were exchanged. Grenell is the acting Director of National Intelligence. It is notable that Kosnett and Palmer are not associated with this denial of having seen a plan. It suggests they have.
Like many government statements, this one tells us more by what it omits than by what it includes, but there is one important inclusion: the line at the end referring to mutual recognition. Note there too is an omission. If land/people swaps are off the table, it should have read “mutual recognition within their current borders” or “mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity.” What they don’t say counts.
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