peacefare.net

Albin’s fall could be Hashim’s

Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti lost a vote of confidence yesterday, abandoned by his main LDK coalition partner. He remains in office as caretaker, though it is unclear to me whether he’ll get another crack at forming a government. More likely he’ll be forced to cede to someone else or take the country to an early election. The latter would be difficult with Covid-19 around.

The Trump Administration welcomes Albin’s fall, as he was refusing to bend to its demand that he unilaterally abolish all the tariffs his predecessor had levied on Serbian goods, in retaliation for Belgrade’s campaign against recognition of Kosovo. Washington has abandoned the traditional American policy of support for Kosovo’s democracy and territorial integrity and is now twisting Pristina’s political arms in favor of a deal with Serbia that would damage both. There have been many ugly moments in Kosovo, so this one doesn’t really rate in the hall of infamy. But it isn’t pretty.

Albin was trying to deny emergency powers (to deal with Covid-19) to President Thaci because he feared Hashim would use them to cut a deal with Serbia unacceptable to the government. This despite the fact that both the parliament and the constitutional court have said the government should have the responsibility of negotiating with Belgrade. The Prime Minister made the mistake of firing an important figure from his LDK coalition partner when the Interior Minister suggested the President should get the emergency powers he wants. That, along with intense American pressure, seems to have turned the LDK against Albin.

I suppose Hashim will now try to cobble together a government more to his liking that will grant him the emergency powers he has sought. Albin is in a weakened position, as his party can’t govern without coalition partners that are unlikely to be available. But there are signs Albin would do well in new elections. The country is solidly against the kind of exchange of territory with Serbia that Hashim is open to, but if he can he’ll try to proceed with the deal with Belgrade as quickly as feasible after the April 26 Serbian election.*

The big question is why. All of Pristina thinks the Americans have promised Hashim protection from prosecution, in particular by the Special Chamber that operates in The Hague to deal with particular crimes committed before, during, and after the 1999 Kosovo war. I don’t know whether that is true, and I’ve long doubted that the Special Chamber prosecutor has the needed evidence to indict. But the prosecutor is an American the Trump Administration appointed. It is not hard to imagine he could be told to indict or not indict.

The President is no doubt concerned about his legacy and doesn’t want an indictment to mar it. But he should think twice before going ahead with a land/people swap that could lead to the end of the Serb presence in Kosovo, because those not on territory traded to Serbia will either flee or gradually relocate over the next few years. Kosovo would then be ripe plucking for Albania’s eastern province. The father of his country could find his legacy turned to the political equivalent of dust.

*Correction, 3/26: the Serbian election has been postponed due to Covid-19. I should have known.

A bad deal 2

I’ve already said I think the rumored deal between Belgrade and Pristina is a bad one. Some discussion of why is in order. I hasten to warn however that I have not seen the text and will have to rely on yesterday’s post from Shaun Byrnes for what it contains. I’m tired of waiting for something more definitive. If you want me to rely on the actual text of the proposed agreement, please send it to me. Absent that, here are a few points:

1. Land/people swap: Admittedly I don’t know the geography, but any movement of boundaries or borders on an ethnic basis will open Pandora’s box. Milorad Dodik has made this perfectly clear in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he intends to pursue partition if there is a swap between Kosovo and Serbia. He is being quiet about that for the moment to please Belgrade, but that is a purely tactical move. He is serious about pursuing independence for Republika Srpska if a swap happens anywhere in the Balkans. Principles matter.
2. Non-recognition by Belgrade: The agreement reportedly does not include Serbia’s recognition of a sovereign and independent Kosovo, but merely a promise by Serbia no longer to stand in the way of UN membership. Accepting this would be incredibly stupid for Pristina. It is Russia, not Serbia, that ultimately blocks UN membership and will continue to do so until there is an agreement with the US to permit it. Kosovo must have not only Serbian recognition but also exchange of diplomatic representatives at the ambassadorial level and agreement to demarcate the border. Until all that happens, no Kosovo citizen should be prepared to accept a deal, much less a president responsible for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of his country.
3. An Association of Serb Municipalities with undefined responsibilities. The association idea was a bad one when it was introduced in the 2013 Brussels-negotiated “political” agreement. Now that it is clear Serbia would use such an association to try to govern the Serb-majority municipalities from Belgrade and to block effective sovereignty from being exercised in Pristina, it is much worse. The Kosovo Constitutional Court has issued a decision that prescribes in detail what kind of association would be consistent with the constitution. Pristina should concede nothing more, and nothing indefinite.

As a prelude to this repulsive agreement, Washington is openly pressuring Prime Minister Kurti to unilaterally abolish the tariffs his predecessor imposed on Serbian (and Bosnian) goods. Influenced by Serbian-hired lobbyists, the Trump Administration has even threatened to withdraw both its peacekeepers and its assistance package from Kosovo. President Thaci is trying to cause Kurti’s government, which depends on support from people who oppose the tariffs, to fall. Kurti is trying to compromise by suspending some of the tariffs this weekend, but this hasn’t satisfied either Washington or his President. Vucic really doesn’t care: the tariffs make it easy for him to blame Pristina for stalling the agreement.

There is no good reason to rush to an agreement before the Serbian elections in April, or even soon thereafter. All of Pristina thinks Thaci is rushing to try to forestall an indictment by the Special Tribunal in The Hague, whose prosecutor is a Trump-appointed American. Vucic has made it clear he will not do a deal under pressure before he gets a renewed mandate. Richard Grenell–US Ambassador to Germany, acting but temporary Director of National Intelligence, and Special Envoy for peace negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo–is trying to deliver a diplomatic triumph to help President Trump’s re-election campaign and get himself a better job, even though he is unqualified for all the jobs he already has.

For America’s successful 1990s interventions in the Balkans in favor of liberal democracy to end in this mess would be shameful, but that is precisely what the ethno-nationalist Trump Administration wants. It views Kosovo and Bosnia as Clinton triumphs, which makes them second only to Obama successes in arousing the President’s jealousy and loathing. Shameful is not something he avoids.

There is an American election in less than eight months. Anyone who wants things to come out right in the Balkans should be prepared to await its outcome.

A bad deal

Shaun Byrnes, a retired US diplomat who served as chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Observer Mission in Kosovo in 1998-99, writes:

Kosovo President Thaçi and Serbian President Vučić have prepared a draft comprehensive agreement to end the conflict that has defined Serbia’s relationship with its Albanian citizens for a century.  It is now almost ready for signature but movement on it is being blocked by Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti’s refusal to lift tariffs on Serbian imports and a constitutional dispute over who is in charge of the dialogue with Serbia.   The draft reportedly includes the exchange of territory.  

Washington is threatening to withdraw US troops in retaliation and Thaçi is using escalating US pressure on Kurti to engineer his government’s collapse. Thaçi claims Kurti’s refusal dangerously threatens relations with the US.  

Kurti has taken the more responsible approach, unilaterally removing some tariffs on March 15th and offering to remove the rest on April 1st if Serbia responds constructively.  And he wrote to Secretary of State Pompeo that he will lift the tariffs and will himself resume the dialogue if Serbia responds constructively to his phased removal of tariffs.

At the close of an extraordinary session of Kosovo’s Assembly near midnight on March 11th, the Assembly’s Speaker proposed ending the tariffs at the same time Thaçi gives up leading the dialogue.  It is not clear what will now happen.  

Kosovo leaders need to be reminded that US friendship is and will remain firm regardless of the disagreement over the tariffs. 

In 2016, the Thaçi and Vučić decided to reject the EU’s step-by-step approach begun in 2013 in favor of a big, comprehensive deal. The EU had mediated a series of technical agreements  — university diplomas, license plates, auto insurance, and the like — that would culminate in a comprehensive agreement finally “normalizing” their relationship by Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence.  But few of the technical agreements were implemented and the dialogue stagnated.

The two presidents met secretly, according to many accounts, often under the aegis of former EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Mogherini.  By November 2019 these meetings produced a draft reportedly ready for signature but for a few details.  

The draft included, according to leaks, an exchange of territory (some parts of Kosovo north of the Ibar river, and some portions of the Preshevo valley in southern Serbia), an association of Serbian municipalities with authorities that reportedly remain to be agreed, extraterritoriality for Serbian monasteries, and no de jure recognition by Serbia, rather a Serbian commitment not to block Kosovo’s UN admission.  

What Russia will do in the UNSC remains problematic, despite Putin’s assurances to Vučić and Thaçi in 2018 that Russia will support whatever Serbia and Kosovo agree on. 

An exchange of territory (partition) and the association raised red flags with many diplomats and observers.  Partition risks forced population exchange and even violence.  Worse, it could revive dreams of radical nationalists elsewhere in the Balkans.  A virtually autonomous Serbian association of municipalities smacks of Bosnia’s Republika Srpska.  osovo has enough dysfunction without adding another ingredient.

In office barely a month, Kurti is under intense and escalating pressure from the US, and growing pressure from his coalition partner, to lift the tariffs immediately so  dialogue can resume and the comprehensive agreement completed.   

Vučić will not re-engage without Kosovo first completely lifting the tariffs.  Kurti has offered to compromise: to phase out the tariffs by first ending them on raw materials on March 15th.  Apparently 80% of the imports are raw materials so Kurti’s move goes a long way toward what Serbia, the US and the EU have been requesting.  Furthermore, Kurti offered to remove remaining tariffs beginning April 1st provided Serbia responds constructively by removing all non-tariff barriers to trade with Kosovo and halting its campaign to persuade states recognizing Kosovo to withdraw recognition.  

Washington has rejected the compromise and insists on all tariffs being removed now and threatened  to halt millions of dollars of financial assistance and subsequently to withdraw US troops from Kosovo.  

However, Vučić will not resume the dialogue until after Serbian parliamentary elections on April 26th.  His public goal is to have his Progressive Party better its previous decisive parliamentary victory and he does not want to give radical nationalist opponents any excuse to accuse him of selling out Kosovo.  

Vučić refused to move forward last week when pushed by National Security Adviser O’Brien, Special Envoy Grenell and Trump’s son-in-law Kushner, reiterating he will not reopen the dialogue until Pristina lifts the tariffs.  Even Kushner’s promises of vast amounts of foreign assistance and investment did not move Vučić.

In an interview after he returned home, Vučić declared he would not return to Washington to resume the dialogue until after the elections and criticized the rush to reach a quick deal. Vučić has been happy to let Kurti take intense pressure from the US to resume the dialogue because of his refusal to lift the tariffs immediately.

So what’s the rush?  Kurti will lift most of the tariffs this weekend and Vučić is in no hurry to resume negotiations.  Furthermore, unlike Washington, Brussels has welcomed Kurti’s decision to begin phasing out the tariffs and is not putting heavy public pressure on him to do more.  Finally, whence will come the “hundreds of millions of dollars” of foreign direct investment and assistance promised by Washington, especially when the US has not coordinated its initiative with the EU? 

It would be wiser to move gradually and build consensus among political leaders and society for the changes that the final agreement will produce.  Kosovo’s politicians and public need transparency: there has been none. Thaçi needs to be open about the contents of the deal so politicians and society can decide on it, rather than be surprised later by it and its consequences.   Kosovo needs time to develop a consensus on how to proceed with the dialogue in a democratic manner, and not be pushed into quick decisions. 

 In closing the Assembly’s extraordinary March 11th session on the tariff, Kosovo’s Assembly Speaker, Vjosa Osmani (an LDK deputy chairman), in a rebuke to Thaçi, called for lifting the tariffs at the same time he withdraws from the dialogue.  Osmani’s rebuke highlighted Thaçi’s refusal to bow to the constitutional requirement that it is the government’s prerogative to lead such a negotiation.

It is Washington and Thaçi that are pressing for a deal now, and hence escalating pressure on Kurti to lift the tariffs. President Trump, O’Brien and Grenell are behind the push for a quick agreement.

Trump is looking for a quick deal to boost his reelection prospects that are looking dimmer because of the economic and health crisis spawned by the pandemic coupled with the collapse of the price of oil and the likelihood that former Vice President Biden will be the Democratic nominee. 

For his part Thaçi sees the deal as an addition to his legacy but has other more important political considerations.  He would like to bring down the Kurti government to protect himself and his corrupt cronies from Kurti’s effort to root out pervasive corruption.  Thaçi’s aim is to then forge a new coalition government composed of the LDK, Kurti’s current coalition partner, and the PDK, the party Thaçi founded.

Trump’s intervention to take over the dialogue has given Thaçi the opportunity to do so.  He is exploiting threats of US punitive action as a bludgeon against Kurti and is trying to rally the LDK and parliamentary opposition to demand the tariffs be lifted immediately.  In public statements this week, Thaçi charged that Kurti’s actions threatened relations with the US and the “very future of our state,” an irresponsible charge.  

While the LDK’s leader supports Thaçi, for now the Assembly is not supporting Thaçi and the situation is at stalemate.  

It is worth reminding Kosovo leaders that no comprehensive deal will end Serbia’s hostility to its former province. Until Serbia acknowledges what it has done in Kosovo under Milosevic’s rule their relations will neither be normal nor friendly.  

Of more importance, we should remind Kosovo’s leaders that the US is and will remain a firm friend and that will not change regardless of what Trump, O’Brien, Grenell, Pompeo and Kushner may threaten.  Kosovo should not be compelled to accept a consequential agreement with a hostile Serbia its politicians and public have not seen because of the self-serving motives of one politician.