Tag: Balkans
A vote for change
Kosovo voted for a new parliament today. The results are striking: the two parties that formed most of the majority in the last parliament came in third and fourth. Two opposition parties came in first and second. The PDK (Democratic Party of Kosovo), which has been in government since independence, has declared it will go into opposition. The electoral mechanism seems to have functioned well, but official assessments won’t be available for a couple of days.
The leaders were the LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo), which led the non-violent protest movement before the 1999 war and has participated in government coalitions in the past, and VV (Self-Determination), which is a post-war movement that has never been in the government. At this writing, VV is claiming to have won. The cautious and moderate Isa Mustafa, a former prime minister, leads the LDK. The sometimes unruly and charismatic Albin Kurti leads VV. Many have thought they might govern together in the next coalition, but that was before they won virtually equal shares of yesterday’s vote. There are now presumably other arithmetic possibilities, so an intense negotiation is likely, taking weeks if not months unless the LDK and VV agree quickly on a prime minister and a government program.
Yesterday’s result was foreshadowed in National Democratic Institute polling from March, which concluded:
The research shows that citizens desire reforms that will foster social cohesion, economic opportunity, and the rule of law. Tackling corruption cuts across all of these areas and remains at the forefront of citizen priorities. On dialogue with Serbia to normalize post-war relations, citizens seek greater transparency and are not in favor of border changes to bring about a resolution. Generally, citizens seek greater efforts of political leaders to foster consensus to bring policy changes that will improve their lives.
The citizens wanted change and voted for it. Those who think the US and Europe are determined to maintain “stabilocracy” take note: Washington and Brussels will not be unhappy to see alternation in power.
The governing challenge will be a big one. Complaints about corruption in Kosovo in my experience focus on two levels:
- Grand corruption by political leaders and their families, who are known to control assets far larger than their salaries can have provided;
- More or less petty corruption via nepotism, especially in hiring for government positions.
I hope the new government, whoever enters it, will launch a major effort to document and prosecute grand corruption. Nepotism is going to be harder: Kosovo is a society in which extended family ties are still strong. Hiring your cousin is a familial obligation that many see as corrup only when others do it.
The dialogue with Serbia will be another priority, as both Brussels and Washington are pressing for complete normalization of relations between Pristina and Belgrade. But they are pressing for different solutions: Washington is looking for a land swap that its newly appointed Special Envoy will no doubt press; Brussels is looking for a solution that maintains Kosovo’s territorial integrity even if it compromises its sovereignty over Serb communities. This kind of split between the EU and the US is not a good omen.
Nor is the impending Serbian election, due by April next year. President Vucic is a skilled manipulator of Western thinking, even if he has presided over a years-long slide of Serbia in Russia’s direction. He will argue that Serbia has to “get something” in the negotiations with Kosovo because he needs a parliament that will have to ratify the outcome. In order to get a good deal, Pristina will need to be ready to walk away from a bad one, but that will be difficult if Brussels and Washington decide to back it.
One unfortunate wrinkle in the election results: over 90% of Serbs voted for a list controlled by Belgrade. Vucic regards this as a triumph. I regard it as betraying the unfortunate autocratic control Belgrade exercises among the Serbs of Kosovo. Maybe it is also evidence that Serbia can agree to just about anything on Kosovo without Vucic getting something.
Any government that wants to please the citizens of Kosovo will want to deliver economic results. Kosovo has not done all that badly in recent years:
That’s 2000 on the lower left and 2018 on the upper right. The World Bank appropriately puts this performance in perspective:
Kosovo is a lower-middle-income country which has experienced solid economic growth over the last decade. Kosovo is one of only four countries in Europe to experience growth in every year since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008.
Like it or not, Kosovo’s economy is heavily dependent on the Balkans region, which in turn is heavily dependent on Europe. Growth at higher rates than in the recent past (about 4%) will require that the EU grow faster, but the next Kosovo government would do well to prepare for that day by increasing transparency and reducing grand corruption. That’s what change should mean on the economic front.
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One more failure
I’d like to revise my judgment yesterday that the appointment of Richard Grenell as Special Presidential Envoy for Serbia and Kosovo Peace Negotiations is bizarre. It is likely worse than that, possibly even tragic. I hasten to add that I have not talked with the White House about it. There is no point: they lie too much for me to rely on anything they say.
A few things are nevertheless clear. Grenell is a John Bolton protege and far right advocate who has gone out of his way to offend his German hosts. If you wanted to make common cause with Europe in the Balkans, Grenell is the last American you would choose for the task. The Germans have made it clear they will not accept land swaps in the Balkans. Bolton was an advocate of land swaps between Kosovo and Serbia. The logic was compelling for an ethnic nationalist: Serbs want to be governed by Serbs and Albanians by Albanians. Anything else is too hard. Equal rights is liberal democratic clap trap, at home and abroad.
In addition, land swaps would kill two Clinton accomplishments with one blow: Kosovo will become the eastern province of Albania, sooner or later, and Bosnia and Herzegovina will be partitioned. Don’t worry about how many people will be displaced or die in the process, or even the radicalization of the Bosnian Muslims if they are forced into a rump Islamic Republic. Serbia will be so delighted to gain northern Kosovo as well as Republika Srpska that it will love the Americans again. It might even be possible to cut a deal with the Russians to recognize the annexation of Crimea in exchange for UN membership for rump Kosovo, which won’t matter for long as it will join Albania in due course. That is the kind of crude ethnonationalist logic the Administration is applying elsewhere, in particular to Israel and Palestine. Why not in the Balkans?
What does this mean for the good people of Serbia, Kosovo, and Bosnia? Pandora’s box will be opened with the border changes:
- Serbs will leave from south of the Ibar in Kosovo,
- Albanians will be pushed out of Serbia,
- Muslims will try to seize Brcko in Bosnia to prevent partition there,
- Bosnian Croats will declare the re-creation of their Herzeg-Bosna parastate.
In short, this is a formula for destabilization of the Balkans, precisely what the Russians have sought. Is it any wonder that the Trump Administration might try to deliver it?
Ironically, Secretary of State Pompeo* has been visiting Macedonia and Montenegro, the two newest members of NATO. He’ll get an earful there about the dangers that lurk in any land swap arrangement. Montenegro, because it has been governed for many years with the support of minorities, is not so much in danger, though quite a few of its Albanians might like to join Kosovo and most of its Serbs remain opposed to its independence. Macedonia is certainly at risk if some sort of land swap becomes a reality, even if many Albanians there will be reluctant to lose their sweet power-sharing arrangement in Skopje.
You might think the Trump Administration has enough trouble of its own making in the Middle East, Ukraine, North Korea, China, Venezuela and half a dozen other places, without reviving the zombie idea of land swaps in the Balkans. But they seem determined, with Grenell’s appointment, to add the Balkans to the list of their foreign policy failures.
*The original post said it was Vice President Pence. Apologies for my mistake.
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Bizarre
I got into the office this morning to find this in my email:
President Donald J. Trump Announces Intent to Appoint Individual to a Key Administration Post
President Donald J. Trump today announced his intent to appoint the following individual to a key position in his Administration:
Richard Grenell of California to serve concurrently as Special Presidential Envoy for Serbia and Kosovo Peace Negotiations and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Federal Republic of Germany.
That, plus multiple requests to comment from outlets that broadcast in the Balkans.
So I’ll try to do that here: it’s bizarre. I had assumed that the recent appointment of Matt Palmer as Special Representative for the Balkans, if it did anything, ensured that no one else would get the job of resolving the remaining issues between Kosovo and Serbia as well as within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Now the Administration has chosen to name in addition a controversial political figure who has managed to deeply offend Berlin, one of America’s most important allies, to handle the sensitive issues in the Belgrade/Pristina talks.
What does that signify?
To me, it communicates confusion and disorder in US policy, not the clarity of purpose and desire to cooperate with the European Union that is required. What might the relationship between Palmer and Grenell be? I don’t know. Political appointee Grenell clearly outranks professional diplomat Palmer because he has an ambassadorial title (never mind he is presumably closer to the White House), but if one has the Balkans and the other has the Pristina/Belgrade dialogue, the logical chain of command would be the opposite.
In short: this is an appointment likely to cause even more uncertainty about US policy than already prevails. I suggest the press try to get Palmer and Grenell to clarify. Not me.
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No rush
Pristina’s Gazeta Express (Besnik Velija) asked me questions today. I replied:
Q: How do you see the decision of State Secretary to appoint Matt Palmer as a Special Envoy for Western Balkan and for the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: I suppose it signals one more push to settle things, especially between Pristina and Belgrad.
Q: What are your expectations from Matt Palmer, as a Special Envoy ?
A: Matt is a good soul, but I’m not sure he brings the full weight of the United States to the table: military, economic, and political as well as diplomatic. We’ll have to wait and see.
Q: There is reporting saying that US wants a solution until next summer. Do you see latest moves from the US, as a hurry for reaching a final solution between Prishtina and Belgrade? If yes, can that be good for the whole process?
A: Yes, the Americans are in a hurry, but that doesn’t mean Pristina should be. First it needs to hold a good election and form a government that can take a widely supported position to the dialogue. Serbian parliamentary elections are due by April 2020, which means any negotiation this winter will include enormous pressure from Europe and the US for an agreement that President Vucic can sell as a victory to his electorate. I think Pristina should not be expected to negotiate during the pre-electoral period in Serbia.
Q: There was also a declaration from Bundestag member, Peter Beyer, that even EU should appoint a Special Envoy for Western Balkan and for Kosovo and Serbia dialogue. Do you see these moves as an effort to show who leads the European policy?
A: Once the Americans appointed a Special Envoy I suppose it was inevitable that Europe would want one too. I’d prefer that both the US and EU get a common policy before appointing special envoys, but that is not the way it is proceeding.
Q: Who should be the main mediator on dialogue, Brussels or Washington, or both? What about ideas to involve Russia? (ex US ambassador at Belgrade, Cameron Munter said that Russian Ambassador at Belgrade, Alexander Bocan-Harchenko, is an expert and he could help on the dialogue process).
A: Brussels has most of the leverage, but Washington support is vital, especially in pressuring Pristina. I don’t think the Russians will be helpful to the mediation in any way. Moscow favors Belgrade and does not want to see a solution that would allow Kosovo to proceed to NATO membership. It will also want a high price for UN membership: likely US acceptance of the annexation of Crimea and perhaps recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. That will not help the negotiations.
Q: Senator Chris Murphy on a personal statement about the last visit in Kosovo, when he describe meeting with Kosovo politicians, said that they told on meeting at US embassy that they don’t know who to listen to, EU or USA , about the dialogue issue: “The leaders tell us that these days, the United States and Europe come to Pristina and give them different advice on how to break the impasse — they don’t know who to listen to. More fallout from the disastrous Trump foreign policy.”
A: Nothing good happens in the Balkans until Brussels and Washington speak in unison.
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The Balkans stalled
I gave this interview to Vijesti.ba this morning:
Q: Another attempt to break Bosnia’s long-running political deadlock and form a new state-level government has failed. Milorad Dodik said that September 5 is the deadline to resolve the dispute, according to an agreement that was signed by Dodik himself, Bakir Izetbegović, Dragan Čović. If they fail to meet the deadline, Dodik has threatened Republic of Srpska will pull out of agreements that allowed the formation of ethnically-mixed armed forces, the state court and the national police agency. What consequences could cause such Dodik’s intention?
A: Dodik is determined to undermine the Bosnian state. I’m not sure what “pulling out” would really mean in practice at this stage, when the institutions mentioned already exist, but he could certainly make it difficult for them to function effectively.
Q: Western Balkans countries do not seem to be making any progress as the time passes by – a Beograd-Priština dialogue is still deadlocked, Bosnia’s state-level government hasn’t still been formed… Do you think United States should increase their engagement in the Western Balkans countries? And if yes – in what context?
A: I think the US needs a policy before I can answer the question about increased engagement. If that policy includes ethnically-based land swaps in Kosovo, I would oppose increased engagement because it would destabilize Bosnia and Macedonia and give Putin a big present in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. If it includes determination to make Bosnia and Herzegovina a functional state that can qualify for EU membership, I would be in favor.
Q: Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić recently met with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in New York. What do you see as a main goal of such Vučić’s visit?
A: Vucic is sitting on two stools, or three if you count Beijing. He wants to keep the US convinced that he is part of the solution in the Balkans and not part of the problem.
Q: Vučić says Serbia can’t recognize Kosovo in the current circumstances – “They will never get my signature to give the Albanians everything and Serbia nothing.” What is your comment?
A: I’ve outlined in detail what I think Serbia can “get.” First and foremost is removal of a significant barrier to EU accession. The rest is gravy.
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It’s not all about Washington and Brussels
Florian Bieber of the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG) has written an eminently sensible report on “Leadership Adrift: American Policy in the Western Balkans” based on a BiEPAG visit to Washington last spring. The subtitle really should have been “American and European Policy in the Western Balkans,” but I won’t insist too much.
The point is that neither Washington nor Brussels is approaching the Balkans with a clear concept and both are distracted by other issues, out of tune with each other, and divided at home. The results are dangerous. In both Kosovo and Bosnia there are signs of stagnation and retrogression. Even Macedonia, whose “name” problem seemed solved with the addition of “North” in front of it, is suffering a shaky moment with the arrest of its Special Prosecutor by less special prosecutors.
The “Quint” countries (that’s the US, France, UK, Germany and Italy) this month tried to unify their voices in a statement intended to restart the Kosovo/Serbia dialogue. They explicitly suggested a reasonable quid pro quo: Kosovo to suspend the tariffs it has imposed on Serbian imports and Serbia to suspend its campaign for “de-recognition” of Kosovo. This corresponds precisely to what Kosovo Prime Minister Haradinaj wants. It is unclear whether Serbian President Vucic, who met recently with Secretary of State Pompeo, is prepared to move in that direction.
The Quint called for urgent action. That really isn’t possible in the Serbia/Kosovo space, since the Kosovo Prime Minister has resigned in response to a summons from the Special Tribunal in The Hague. Elections are now scheduled for October 6. It would be nonsensical for anyone to expect real progress until there is a new parliament and government in Pristina. There too unity is a big issue: the next Kosovo government needs to go to Brussels with a platform for the dialogue agreed among its coalition at a minimum, and preferably by a much wider political group.
The Bosnia situation is more urgent. There no government has been formed for almost 11 months. The main issue appears to be (sorry about the pay wall) whether or not to proceed with the NATO membership process. The Serb member of the collective presidency is opposed. The Croat and Bosniak members are in favor. Fudging this is difficult, not least because the Serb member views NATO as an enemy, is in the pocket of the Russians, and is threatening to paralyze the country’s existing state institutions if he doesn’t get his way. The Croat and Bosniak have been unwilling to yield, as the people they represent regard NATO as a savior.
None of this registers on the Washington politograph. As Florian notes in his report, Washington is obsessed now with geopolitical challenges (that means jihadists as well as Moscow and Beijing, not democratization or rule of law, much less EU accession). Even in Brussels, Balkan problems are minor tremors. But the EU is worsening the situation, by making it appear that enlargement is over and maybe none of the Balkan countries will get in. That is a big mistake, one that my BiEPAG colleagues unfortunately ignore. French President Macron’s insistence on internal EU reform and nastiness about enlargement is a major factor in unsettling the Balkans.
That said, I share BiEPAG’s concern for increasing support to civil society and independent media. It is hard to see how the Balkans will climb out of the hole the region is in without new and more democratic leadership that is serious about taking advantage of whatever EU enlargement opportunities are offered. It’s not all about Brussels and Washington. Sarajevo, Pristina, and Belgrade are where the problems and most of the solutions lie.
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