Tag: Balkans
Opening gambit
Kosovo Prime Minister Haradinaj has circulated a 30-page draft comprehensive agreement between his own Republic and Serbia. It contains a lot of things I might like, including extensive arrangements for cross-border cooperation, protection of Serbs and Serb monuments in Kosovo, and implementation of the many technical agreements already reached between Pristina and Belgrade.
But there are some obvious problems. This paper is essentially to an opening negotiation proposal. From that perspective, it incorporates serious negotiating errors that should be fixed before any encounter with Belgrade. On first reading, I see two glaring problems:
- The agreement foresees entry into force before Kosovo membership in the United Nations. Since that can be blocked by Russia or China even if Belgrade is prepared to allow it, Kosovo could find itself out on a limb, having committed to give Serbia the substantial benefits contained in the agreement without getting a big part of the quid pro quo. It is inadvisable to run that risk. UN membership should come first. Only after that is finalized should a comprehensive agreement of this sort be signed.
- The draft agreement includes a long list of unilateral concessions to Serbia on governance arrangements in Kosovo at both the central and local levels. All such concessions should be proposed as reciprocal, not unilateral. There is no reason why Kosovo should not ask for the Albanian-inhabited areas of southern Serbia whatever arrangements are provided to Serbs in Kosovo.
Admittedly reciprocity is not provided for in the Ahtisaari agreement (from which many of these governance and other provisions are derived) but that is now overtaken by events, because Serbia refused to sign on. A sovereign state should not make unilateral concessions in its own proposal, unless it is certain they will be appreciated. The way to determine whether Serbia is really interested is to see if they are prepared to pay the price of reciprocity. If so, fine. If not, why should Kosovo concede even before the negotiation starts?
I see other potential concerns as well. The draft agreement includes a dispute settlement mechanism that relies on the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. Why not the International Court of Justice? The draft agreement omits reference to cross-border cooperation between the countries’ security forces. This should be included: no two countries sharing a fortified border, which for the foreseeable future this one will be, can afford not to have regular consultations on national security issues as well as dialogue between their chiefs of staff. Kosovo does not yet have a full-fledged army, but cooperation of this sort should be starting sooner rather than later.
I am told that the Kosovo parliament, in creating a new negotiation team, has ruled out border changes. That is certainly a good thing.
I’m pretty sure I’ll find additional wrinkles in this opening gambit, but that will have to suffice for now. Anyone want to join me in offering suggestions and comments?
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Between past and future
I spoke yesterday in Belgrade at a conference organized by the Forum on Ethnic Relations and the Open Society Foundation on “Serbia and Kosovo Between Past and Future.” It was run under Chatham House rules, but I regard my own remarks as suitable for public consumption:
- First a word of thanks to the Forum on Ethnic Relations and the Open Society Foundation as well as the Helsinki Committee for providing this opportunity, at a particularly fraught time, for this discussion of relations between Serbia and Kosovo.
- First, on their relations right now: we are going through a difficult period, largely caused I think by exaggerated expectations.
- I don’t know who told President Thaci that he could get what he wants in southern Serbia without giving up vital interests in northern Kosovo. I also don’t know who told President Vucic that he could get what he wants in northern Kosovo without giving up vital interests in southern Serbia. Each was willing to take, but not to give.
- I’m fine with that, because however apparently rational to two ethnic nationalist presidents, the exchange of territories based on the ethnic affiliation of their populations is a bad idea.
- It would be an admission by both that neither can offer equal protection of the law to all his citizens. That is the essence of what they need to do to become EU, and if they want, NATO members.
- It would also destabilize Macedonia and Bosnia, and strengthen Vladimir Putin both there and in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
- It was foolhardy for both the EU and the US to entertain the proposition of land and people swaps, which are antithetical not only to EU and NATO membership but also to the Badinter principles laid down in the early 1990s that govern the dissolution of former Yugoslavia.
- Now we need to deal with the consequences of the failed swap proposition. These include Pristina’s imposition of tariffs and its decision to convert its security forces to an army, as well as Belgrade’s opposition to Kosovo’s entry into Interpol and other international organizations.
- In my view, the tariffs are a CEFTA question and need to be dealt with there. I hope its mechanisms will be sufficient both to eliminate them and fix any legitimate problems Pristina has with treatment of its exports to Serbia.
- As for the army, I find it hard to imagine how anyone thought the Kosovo Albanians would do without one after what they suffered. KFOR will not stay in Kosovo forever. Pristina needs the means to defend itself at least for a week or 10 days, so long as Serbia presents a threat.
- That it does: its prime minister has made it crystal clear that an intervention into Kosovo under the guise of protecting the Serbs there is an option. Serbia’s concerted efforts to prevent Kosovo membership in international organizations and bilateral recognitions are also hostile acts.
- NATO needs to make it clear to Belgrade that such a move would lead to a military response. At the same time, Pristina needs to make it clear that Serbs in Kosovo are not threatened. Prime Minister Haradinaj has been trying to do just that.
- But managing the immediate threat doesn’t solve the longer-term problem.
- What is needed is normalization, so that Serbia doesn’t represent a threat to Kosovo and Kosovo does not represent a threat to the Serbs who live there.
- That will require much more extensive cross-border relations than exist today, including but by no means limited to diplomatic recognition and exchange of ambassadorial-level representatives.
- But, some say, what does Serbia get? How can you expect Belgrade to accept Kosovo’s sovereignty and independence without a quid pro quo?
- If Serbia is seriously concerned with the Kosovo army, it might get some concessions on its size and capabilities.
- It will get nothing if it waits to just before accession to recognize Kosovo, since then all the leverage will be with the EU members.
- Let me remind you of a page from US history: our most threatening enemy for about 100 years after independence was Great Britain, whose Canadian territory had the longest border of any country with the US.
- Today, both Canada and Great Britain are two of America’s key allies.
- But 100 years is too long to wait in the 21st century. The time to end the enmity between Kosovo and Serbia, to the advantage of both, is now. It can be done, but only on the basis of mutual recognition and respect.
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From war to peace
I spoke at the Media Centre in Belgrade yesterday about my recently published Palgrave MacMillan book, From War to Peace in the Balkans, the Middle East and Ukraine. Here are my speaking notes for the occasion:
- It is a pleasure to be back in Belgrade, and a particular pleasure to give my first talk about this book here in a Media Center that witnessed so many of the pivotal events of the 1990s wars in the Balkans. Many thanks to Dusan Janjic for providing the opportunity!
- Many of you will remember that period: the US and Europe fumbling for years in search of peaceful solutions in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo only to find themselves conducting two air wars against Serb forces, first in Bosnia and later in Kosovo.
- But Americans have mostly forgotten this history. Europeans too often believe there were no positive results. Here in the Balkans, many are convinced things were better under Tito.
- I beg to differ: the successes and failures of international intervention in the Balkans should not be forgotten or go unappreciated.
- That’s why I wrote my short book, which treats the origins, consequences, and aftermath of the 1995, 1999 and 2001 interventions that led to the end of the most recent Balkan wars.
- In my view, conflict prevention and state-building efforts thereafter have been partly successful, though challenging problems remain in Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia.
- The book examines each of these on its own merits, as well as their prospects for entry into NATO and the EU, whose doors are in theory open to all the Balkan states.
- Bottom line: I believe all states that emerged from Yugoslavia as well as Albania are closer to fulfilling their Euroatlantic ambitions than they are to the wars and collapse of the 1990s.
- They were making decent progress when the financial crisis struck in 2007/8. The decade since then has been disappointing in many different respects:
- Growth slowed and even halted in some places.
- The Greek financial crisis cast a storm cloud over the EU.
- The flow of refugees, partly through the Balkans, from the Syrian and Afghanistan wars as well as from Africa soured the mood further.
- Brexit, a symptom of the rise of mostly right-wing, anti-European populism, has made enlargement extraordinarily difficult.
- The repercussions in the Balkans have been dire:
- Bosnia’s progress halted as it slid back into ethnic nationalist infighting.
- Macedonia’s reformist prime minister became a defiant would-be autocrat.
- Kosovo and Serbia are stalled in the normalization process.
- Russia has taken advantage of the situation to slow progress towards NATO and the EU.
- Now the question is whether the West, demoralized and divided by Donald Trump and right-wing populists, can still muster the courage to resolve the remaining problems in the Balkans and complete the process of EU and, for those who want it, NATO accession.
- I think Plan A is still viable. I also don’t see a Plan B that comes even close to the benefits of completing Plan A. Only three big obstacles remain.
- First is ending the Macedonia “name” issue. Skopje and Athens are on the verge of doing just that. New leadership was required to make it happen.
- For those who claim the West is prepared to tolerate corruption and state capture, I suggest a chat with Nikola Gruevski. If there is a viable liberal democratic option, the West will support it.
- Second is normalization between Belgrade and Pristina, the subject of the conference that will open within the hour.
- I’ll have more to say then, but let me say here that Serbia has already abandoned its claim to sovereignty over all of Kosovo, both in the April 2013 Brussels agreement and in opening the question of partition along ethnic lines.
- I think that is a terrible idea, for many reasons I will outline later, but it confirms that Belgrade has no intention of ever again governing the Kosovo Albanians.
- The third issue that needs to be resolved in the Balkans is the dysfunctional state structure that the Americans imposed on Bosnia and Herzegovina at Dayton.
- It has kept the peace for close to 25 years, but it needs reconfiguration to enable the Sarajevo government to negotiate and implement the acquis communautaire.
- These three are serious problems, but not insoluble ones. The road ahead is shorter than the road already traveled. Doubling back is a bad idea.
- My book proceeds after the Balkans to apply lessons learned to the Middle East and Ukraine, which also face identity-based conflicts challenging sovereignty and territorial integrity, lie close to the Balkans, and share more Ottoman history than is generally acknowledged.
- The lessons are these: leadership is key to starting, preventing, and ending wars; early prevention can work, with adequate resources; ethnic partition will not; international contributions can be vital; neighborhood counts; power sharing and decentralization can help.
- This accessible treatment of what makes war and how to make peace will appeal to both scholarly and lay readers interested in how violent international conflicts can be managed. It is available free, worldwide, courtesy of my generous employer, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. To get it, click on the book cover at www.peacefare.net
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Evenhanded would be wrongheaded
Yesterday, I said Kosovo’s 100% tariff imposed on Serbian imports was a violation of its international obligations under the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA).
Today, my email brought me this from the Kosovo Government. I still think these issues should be mainly resolved within the CEFTA framework, but certainly the government paper casts doubt on the bona fides of Serbia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina (where policy is essentially dictated by Republika Srpska). I’m sure there are trade complaints as well in the other direction. They all need to be resolved, as much as possible within CEFTA.
The Kosovo Customs Agency is ensuring that it is exempting humanitarian goods from the tariffs.
Some of my Serb friends are suggesting that the only reason for a Kosovo army is to chase Serbs imminently from the country. That’s silly. NATO is there and will remain for some years still, until Kosovo can defend itself at least for a few days from whatever threat Serbia presents. The less the threat, the smaller the army. No army is needed to chase people from their homes, as the tragic rioting of March 2004 demonstrated.
It is far more likely that the Serb Army would seize northern Kosovo, on grounds that its population is threatened, a notion Belgrade has been pumping up relentlessly for weeks if not months. NATO might even fall for such a ploy, given its weak-kneed and gullible reaction to the Serbian Prime Minister’s threat of the use of force if Kosovo votes to create an army.
There is right and wrong here. Serbia is wrong to harass Kosovo’s exports, to prevent it from joining international organizations, to seek to block it from creating an army, and to threaten the use of force. Evenhanded at the moment would be wrongheaded.
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The right medicine
Serbia is threatening to intervene in Kosovo if its parliament votes to create an army. NATO is backing Belgrade.
This is ridiculous. The Alliance should be telling Belgrade to stuff it. NATO-led forces in Kosovo should be put on alert to underline the point.
Kosovo has been without an army since the 1999 NATO intervention that saved it from Serbian President Milosevic’s efforts to reduce its Albanian population by force and its 2008 declaration of independence. NATO has provided the country’s territorial defense, though it governs itself and has been recognized as sovereign by about 110 countries.
Pristina now wants to convert its security forces, which are only lightly armed, into an army. The US, UK and NATO have been thoroughly consulted. The process will take 10 years or more. If NATO forces are ever to be removed from Kosovo and sent on to higher priority missions, the country will have to have the means to defend itself at least for a few days. NATO should be supporting those who want to lighten its burdens, not those who threaten aggression.
Belgrade’s agenda has nothing to do with any threat from a Kosovo army, which is non-existent, now and in the future. What Serbia is trying to do is deprive Pristina of one of the vital elements of sovereignty. It is also trying to find an excuse to intervene and occupy the Serb-majority portion of Kosovo’s north, where organized crime figures aligned with Belgrade’s ruling authorities reign supreme.
NATO backing for these objectives is a serious mistake. So too is Europe’s refusal to give Kosovo a visa waiver program, despite its assiduous and successful efforts to meet the criteria that the European Commission set. Citing domestic political pressures, France and others are saying Kosovo will need to wait until at least 2020. While the EU has consistently lowered the bar for Serbia’s progress on its EU agenda, Brussels seems determined to raise the bar for Kosovo.
Kosovo makes its mistakes too. The 100% tariffs it recently imposed on Serbian imports is a violation of its international obligations under the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), so far as I can tell. But that mistake will be corrected through the normal CEFTA process. The NATO and EU mistakes are far harder to correct and will leave serious scars on their relationship with an admittedly small country with no near-term prospects of accession.
But that is precisely the reason the EU and NATO should rethink what they are doing. Kosovo as much as Serbia needs Euro-Atlantic prospects if the two countries are to escape the negative spiral they are currently locked in. A visa waiver program for Kosovo, a strong NATO warning to Serbia, initiation under NATO guidance of the evolution of its security forces into an army designed mainly for international deployments, and an end to prohibitive tariffs on Serbian goods are the medicine that can cure the current fever.
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Peace Picks: October 22 – 28
1. Completing Europe: Will Macedonia seize its moment? | Monday, October 22, 2018 | 4:00 pm – 5:15 pm | Atlantic Council | 1030 15th St. NW, 12th Floor, Washington, DC 2005 | Register Here
On September 30, Macedonians voted in a referendum that would rename the country North Macedonia and remove the key obstacle to NATO and European Union (EU) membership. A boycott effort, outside influences, and ambivalent results – more than 90 percent voting yes, but below 40 percent turnout – raise questions about what comes next.
Will the government in Skopje muster the constitutional majority required to adopt the changes called for in the Prespa Agreement it negotiated with Greece? If not, will the country face snap parliamentary elections? How does this influence the calculus in Greece ahead of its own difficult parliamentary vote on the agreement? What impact does this have on the region and prospects for future NATO and EU enlargement. What roles are the United States, Europe and Russia playing in all this?
Speakers
The Rt. Hon. Lord Robertson of Port Ellen
Former Secretary General of NATO
Lilica Kitanovska
Chief, VOA Macedonian Service
Damon Wilson
Executive Vice President, Programs and Strategy, Atlantic Council
2. Turmoil in Nicaragua: Is there an end in sight? | Tuesday, October 23, 2018 | 9:00 am – 11:00 am | Wilson Center | 1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, 6th Floor, Washington, DC 20004 | Register Here
Since April 2018, Nicaragua has been rocked by street protests against the government of President Daniel Ortega. Amidst harsh measures that criminalize social protest, the government arrested over two dozen opposition activists and leaders on Sunday, October 14th, subsequently releasing them after an international outcry.
According to the OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission, over 300 people have been killed, the majority of them anti-government demonstrators. A broad civic alliance consisting of the private sector, student, labor, and human rights groups, and intellectuals has demanded an end to the repression, the resignation of Ortega, and the holding of early elections. Attempts by the Catholic Church to mediate a dialogue have thus far failed.
Speakers
Cynthia J. Arnson
Director, Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson Center
Douglas Castro
Professor & Researcher, Universidad Centroamericana
Member of Alianza Cívica’s Political Committee
Lesther Alemán
Student of Communications, Universidad Centroamericana
Member of Alianza Cívica’s Political Committee
Jeancarlo López
Student of Engineering, National Autonomous University of Nicaragua
Member of Alianza Cívica’s Political Committee
Dr. Shelley McConnell
Associate Professor of Government
St. Lawrence University
3. Israel in a Turbulent Region: A Conversation with Ephraim Sneh | Tuesday, October 23, 2018 | 1:00 pm – 2:30 pm | Wilson Center | 1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, 6th Floor, Washington, DC 20004 | Register Here
Israel sits at the center of a region in the throes of several major challenges, including the situations in Iran, Syria, and Lebanon as well as the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Join the Wilson Center for a conversation with Ephraim Sneh, a long-time Israeli official and analyst of Israel’s foreign policy and the region at large. He will address these challenges as well as the state of U.S.-Israeli relations.
Speakers
Jane Harman
Director, President and CEO, Wilson Center
Aaron David Miller
Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director, Wilson Center
General (Ret.) Ephraim Sneh
Chairman, S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue, Netanya Academic College Former Cabinet Member and Knesset Member
4. On the Brink of Brexit: The United Kingdom, Ireland and Europe | Tuesday, October 23, 2018 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm | Brookings Institution | Falk Auditorium: 1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
The United Kingdom will leave the European Union on March 29, 2019. But as the date approaches, important aspects of the withdrawal agreement as well as the future relationship between the U.K. and EU, particularly on trade, remain unresolved. Nowhere are the stakes higher than in Northern Ireland, where the re-imposition of a hard border with Ireland could threaten a hard-fought peace. Scotland, which voted resoundingly against Brexit, has raised questions about the future of devolved governance arrangements in the U.K., while the independence question remains alive. As Robert Bosch Senior Fellow Amanda Sloat writes in her recent report “Divided kingdom: How Brexit is remaking the UK’s constitutional order,” “Brexit will alter not one but two unions: the European Union and the United Kingdom.”
On October 23, 2018, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings will host a panel discussion on the Brexit endgame. It will examine what the decisions of the coming weeks could mean for the U.K., Ireland and Northern Ireland, Scotland, the European Union, and the United States. Sloat will be joined on the panel by Douglas Alexander, former U.K. Secretary of State for Scotland and Shadow Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; Lucinda Creighton, former Irish Minister for European Affairs; and Sir Kim Darroch, British Ambassador to the United States. Edward Luce of the Financial Times will moderate.
Speakers
Thomas Wright
Director, Center on the United States and Europe
Amanda Sloat
Robert Bosch Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe
Douglas Alexander
Senior Fellow, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Chair, UNICEF UK
Lucinda Creighton
CEO, Vulcan Consulting
Sir Kim Darroch
British Ambassador to the United States, British Embassy
Edward Luce
Washington Columnist and Commentator, Financial Times
5. The Future of AMISOM | Wednesday, October 24, 2018 | 1:30 pm – 3:30 pm | Center for Strategic & International Studies | 1616 Rhode Island Ave., NW Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
A panel discussion addressing the evolution, challenges, and future of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Deployed in 2007 to counter the threat of al-Shabaab in Somalia, AMISOM remains the African Union’s most extensive and dangerous military intervention. Eleven years later, however, Somalia’s security challenges persist. As al-Shabaab continues to stage deadly attacks, questions linger regarding AMISOM’s transition, the commitment of its Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and the ability of the Somali National Army to stand on its own.
The event will feature Paul D. Williams, and his recent book, Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007-2017, which offers a meticulous account of AMISOM since its deployment. Paul Williams will present insights from his book on the history and obstacles of AMISOM, and address how AMISOM’s funders and troop contributors envision its future. Amanda Dory, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, will then weigh in on potential avenues through which AMISOM could transition from Somalia.
Speakers
Paul D. Williams
Associate Director of the Security Policy Studies M.A. Program, George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs
Amanda Dory
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Judd Devermont
Director, Africa Program
6. US Policy & The War in Yemen | Thursday, October 25, 2018 | 10:00 am – 11:30 pm | Brookings Institute | Falk Auditorium: 1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
The war in Yemen is in its fourth year of unabating violence. What began as a power struggle within the government has now ensnared a population of nearly 30 million. With tens of thousands killed, millions displaced, and many more dependent on humanitarian assistance for survival, the state is on the brink of collapse
Yemen now constitutes one of the worst humanitarian disasters in the world, in a large and impoverished country. Nonetheless, little discussion is devoted to how U.S. policy affects this disaster and what might be done to ease the dire conditions on the ground. The United States supports the war effort of the Saudi- and Emirati-led coalition in the war, fighting against Iranian-backed Houthis. The war will also have major implications for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its stability. Riyadh is America’s oldest ally in the region and Washington has important geopolitical interests at stake. In September, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo certified that the U.S. allies were working to reduce civilian casualties, reportedly overriding staff recommendations on this.
Speakers
Natan Sachs
Director, Center for Middle East Policy
Bruce Riedel
Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Center for Middle East Policy
Dafna Rand
Vice President for Policy and Research, Mercy Corps
Fatima Abo Alasrar
Senior Analyst, Arabia Foundation
Daniel L. Byman
Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy
7. Next Steps for US Strategy in Syria | Friday, October 26, 2018 | 12:00pm – 1:30 pm | Hudson Institute | 1201 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20004 | Register Here
Hudson Institute will host a panel to assess U.S. policy in Syria. Panelists will consider how the Trump Administration’s new Syria strategy diverges from previous administrations’ and analyze how the new strategy intends to respond to outside influencers, particularly Russia, Iran, and the Islamic State, who continue to obstruct U.S. efforts within Syria.
Speakers
Mariam Jalabi
Representative, Syrian Opposition Coalition to the United Nations
Michael Doran
Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Jonas Parello-Plesner
Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Jomana Qaddour
Doctoral Candidate, Georgetown University Law Center
Former Senior Policy Analyst, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
8. Prevent to Protect: From Counter-Radicalization to Disengagement | Friday, October 26, 2018 | 2:00pm – 3:00 pm | Center for Strategic & International Studies | 1616 Rhode Island Ave., NW Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
Join Muriel Domenach, Secretary General of the French government’s Inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Delinquency and Radicalization (CIPDR), as she discusses France’s ongoing efforts to counter radicalization and violent extremism.
“Prevent to Protect,” the plan released by CIPDR in February 2018, offered 60 measures to refocus France’s policy of prevention around five key themes:
- Shielding individuals from radicalization
- Widening the detection and prevention network
- Understanding and preparing for developments in radicalization
- Training local stakeholders and assessing practices
- Tailoring disengagement schemes
After Ms. Domenach’s remarks, Seth G. Jones, Harold Brown Chair and Director of the CSIS Transnational Threats Project, will host a moderated armchair discussion comparing and contrasting the French and American perspectives on the issues of returning foreign fighters, counter-narrative efforts, and building community resilience.
Speakers
Muriel Domenach
Secretary General, Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Delinquency and Radicalization
Seth G. Jones
Harold Brown Chair
Director, Transnational Threats Project
Senior Adviser, International Security Program
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