Tag: Balkans
The time has come
Kosovo has decided to begin the process of adopting legislation that will eventually convert its lightly-armed Kosovo Security Force into an army. Serbia is opposed and warns of consequences. I hope that is as empty a threat as the the threat Kosovo’s army will pose to Serbia.
Kosovo aims for a force of 5,000, thoroughly integrated into NATO from the first. It will be something like 10 years before that level is reached, and possibly another 10 more before the force is fully capable, provided Pristina can find the financial resources needed. The Kosovo army will never be a match for the Serbian army of more than 40,000 (plus 50,000 reserves). Even if constituted as a territorial defense force, a fully developed and equipped Kosovo army would be able to do little more than slow a Serbian advance for a week or 10 days. The real opposition to a Serbian Army invasion would come from citizen mobilization, not from a formally constituted army.
Nor would a properly constituted Kosovo army integrated with NATO pose a significant threat to Serbs inside Kosovo. The threat from disorder and riot is much larger, as we saw only too well in March 2004 when Albanians attacked Serb communities, churches, and other religious sites. The main instrument for keeping internal order should of course remain the Kosovo Police Force, which is the most trusted institution in the country and has prevented any repetition of the rioting for almost 15 years. May they continue to succeed.
The real reason for Serb opposition to a Kosovo army has to do not with threat to Serbia or Serbs but with Belgrade’s own threat to Kosovo. Serbia still claims all of Kosovo as its sovereign territory and resists any moves that undermine that claim, even the withdrawal of a now largely pointless UN Mission that Belgrade views as symbolizing Security Council resolution 1244, which makes vague and not dispositive reference to Yugoslav sovereignty.
Belgrade still has levers to pull. Its main effort in recent months has focused on harassing Serbs who join the Kosovo Security Force, in an effort to get them to quit. The intimidation is unfortunately working, since Serbian security forces can reach easily into Serb communities inside Kosovo and have opportunities at the boundary/border to hassle Serbs who live in Kosovo but visit Serbia.
If Belgrade really were concerned with the threat from a Kosovo army, its best move would be to recognize Kosovo and establish diplomatic relations with it. Kosovo would then design its army not for territorial defense but rather for international deployments, which is really the most important function remaining for the armies of Balkan countries that join NATO. A Kosovo Security Force capable of helping to operate, maintain, and fly the helicopters the Americans want to keep at Camp Bondsteel would be a serious contribution to the Alliance and no threat to Serbia.
The time has come for a Kosovo army. Serbia would do better to reduce the threat environment to which Pristina needs to respond than to continue a quixotic effort to prevent the inevitable.
PS: Here is Petrit Selimi’s summary of Belgrade’s alarmist headlines on the issue:
Petrit SelimiVerified account @Petrit9h9 hours agoMore
Good morning with a taste of fear, loathing and warmongering. Serbian tabloids start the day informing their public “Albanians want war” “Albanians and West will arrest thousands of Serbs” any day now, and that Serbia must “declare occupation of Kosovo if Kosovo gets an army”.
10 replies11 retweets23 likesReply 10 Retweet 11 Like 23 Direct message
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You decide
Below are some comments on the results of Sunday’s Bosnian elections. But as a prelude I should note that almost no one in Washington is paying attention to them. America’s focus is elsewhere: on the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, on military and economic competition from China, and on a fractured domestic polity headed for its own important elections November 6. The United States will want Bosnians to find their own solutions to their own political problems, within the context of a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina. Europeans and Americans may be able to help, but you have to decide how your country is to be governed.
Erdin Halimic of Sarajevo daily Dnevni Avaz asked questions. I answered:
Q: Can we ask you for a comment on the election results in BiH? Can you comment individually on each new Member of the BiH Presidency? Šefik Džaferović? Milorad Dodik? Željko Komšić?
A: All I’ve seen so far is the presidency results: Dodik, Dzaferovic, and Komsic. That is not enough to comment on more than the presidency. Dodik and Komsic come from very different places: one favors independence for Republika Srpska, which would make it an unrecognized Russian puppet state, and the other a Bosnia and Herzegovina with serious European ambitions. Dzaferovic is widely thought to represent continuity with Izetbegovic. We’ll have to wait and see what they are able to do together. It is not very promising.
Q: Do you expect a government crisis in the coming period and why?
Government formation in parliamentary systems is often difficult. We’ll have to see the results at all levels to make an informed guesstimate, but even then we could be wrong.
Amil Ducic of web portal Klix.ba also asked questions, to which I replied:
Q: Milorad Dodik is elected as member of Presidency of BIH. Is this kind of paradox for you because he stated enormous times that BiH is impossible, now he is head of this state?
A: It is potentially a serious problem if he uses his position to prevent functional governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But we’ll have to wait and see.
Q: Željko Komšić is elected as well, for the third time. This is slap in face of Dragan Covic. As we expected the reactions are harsh from HDZ. Is it for you a surprise that prime minister of Croatia Andrej Plenkovic showed a very harsh reaction that Komsic is not a good choice for BiH?
A: Of course the reaction from the HDZ is harsh. They lost. Maybe they should worry more about the program they run on than about whether it is a slap in the face of Covic. Plenkovic’s reaction is no surprise. He too is HDZ.
Q: This year’s elections could be result of big election fraud: There is plenty of information about it. What is your comment?
A: I’ll be guided mainly by the OSCE on this issue. They saw problems but so far as I understand have not said that the presidential results were strongly affected by fraud. The main problem with elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not at the polling places, but in the political system, which mainly rewards nationalist parties that control state patronage. But the elections are competitive and people have other options. They don’t use them as much as I might like, but that is a their choice, not mine.
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Let’s not forget
Greater Albania he suggested was a failed political project of Mussolini. Today Albanians throughout the region aren’t interested. What they want is to be part of the West, which means NATO and EU membership for each of the countries in which they live. Albanians are an important pro-Western factor throughout the Balkans. Already in NATO, Albania will now focus on its EU aspirations.
Albanian President Meta appeared at Johns Hopkins/DC yesterday. He made a good impression, in particular on the difficult issues of Greater Albania, border changes in general, and treatment of minorities.
Border changes, the President said, are not a good idea, in particular to accommodate ethnic differences. Discussing them opens a Pandora’s box of possibilities throughout the region and beyond. Far better to treat minorities, the Bulgarian and Macedonian minorities in Albania were mentioned in particular, properly. They want and deserve equal rights under the rule of law. They are not seeking more, a view contested by an audience member from the Macedonian diaspora.
The President was optimistic about the completion of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline segment in Albania this year and the link up to Italy soon. He suggested that tourism development on the country’s southern coast is progressing well, with major hotel chains making investments. A new north/south road near the coast is also planned, if I understood correctly.
As I don’t follow things in Albania closely, I took the occasion to review quickly some of its data. Growth the last few years has been erratic. While still poor by European standards, Albania is middle income for the World Bank, with a per capita GDP approaching $5,000 (but close to $12,000 taking purchasing power into account). Since 1990, when its isolated Communist regime started to fall , the World Bank says GDP has grown by a factor of more than 6, life expectancy is up six years to 78, births per woman have dropped to 1.7, poverty and extreme poverty have declined. Yes, things have improved.
There are still big problems. The EU, which has indicated it may open negotiations for accession with Albania next year, first wants to see a more effective, merit-based public administration and a more independent judicial system capable of dealing especially with organized crime and corruption. Asked how Albania would react to the populist wave in Europe and the US, President Meta responded Albania would have to work harder and better to meet more stringent accession requirements.
No doubt I’ll get nastygrams in response to this post, reminding me that Meta himself has been accused of corruption and claiming him to be untrustworthy or worse. Sorry folks, I’m not omniscient. I don’t know any Balkan politician who hasn’t been accused of one thing or another. I rarely know the truth or falsity of the charges. I more often than not have to await that more independent judiciary to decide which allegations are true.
In the meanwhile, I take pleasure in the notion that people are living better in Albania than they were when I observed elections there in 1996, a grim moment punctuated by a lot of protest gunfire. I also take pleasure in the notion that there are still people who wisely realize that joining trans-Atlantic institutions is a worthy goal even if the uncertainties and pain are significant. Albania is surely closer to European Union membership than it is to the broken country I saw following the collapse of its state-endorsed pyramid schemes. If it keeps going in the right direction, it will get where it wants to go.
Let’s not forget what the Albanian exodus to Brindisi (Italy) was like in 1991.
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Ugh
The referendum on Macedonia’s agreement with Greece, which would enable it to join NATO next year and the EU when it qualifies, passed with more than 90% voting yes but failed to reach the 50% threshold of registered voters voting. That was always going to be difficult, not least because the voter rolls still contain names that likely shouldn’t be there. But still: the boycott organized by those opposing the referendum worked among the Macedonian population (but not among the one-quarter or so of the population that is Albanian).
From the point of view of those of us who wanted to see the referendum pass, this is regrettable. The referendum was advisory, but in a democratic society–and Macedonia is on the route to becoming one–it is hard to ignore the will of the people. The parliamentary majority can still try to pass the necessary constitutional amendments and other required legislation, but it won’t be easy.
So what next?
Prime Minister Zaev is saying he will try to implement the agreement, seeking the dozen or so votes he needs to reach a two-thirds majority from the opposition. If that fails, he says he will call early elections. That’s a risky strategy under the circumstances, but Zaev has proven himself a risk-taker.
I can’t help but wonder if the Greek and Macedonian governments could put their heads together to come up with a mini-package. One possibility would be a simple agreement to allow “North Macedonia” to enter NATO, along with confidence-building measures to implement at least some of the provisions of the Prespa agreement, including its provisions for enhanced bilateral cooperation. Athens will fear giving away carrots in advance of a full agreement, but that is not really a problem in the long term: it will still have a veto over EU membership.
To those who are celebrating the defeat of the referendum, claiming that it would have wiped out their identity and language, I say nonsense: in a non-violent context, only insecurity about who you are and what your language is can do that. Macedonia is fortunate that its Albanians are secure about their identity and language. Otherwise I could anticipate trouble from that quarter.
But Macedonia’s Albanians want NATO membership, sooner rather than later. They regard it as a guarantee of the country’s democratic ambitions and their own safety and security. I wonder how long they will continue their patience, especially if Serbian President Vucic and Kosovo President Thaci reach an agreement on border changes. At least some Albanians in Macedonia might think that is an opportunity to create Greater Kosovo, if not Greater Albania.
I am completely unsympathetic to those irredentist ambitions. The Americans and Europeans have had a clear agreement with the Albanians in the Balkans: Kosovo got independence, Albania got NATO membership, and Macedonia can have it as well, but if and only if borders are not moved, in particular to accommodate ethnic differences. In the wake of the referendum, Washington needs to wake up and re-establish the strict prohibition on border changes, which is a vital foundation for peace in the Balkans.
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A great deal to gain, and little to lose
Macedonia’s referendum Sunday asks its electorate:
Do you support EU and NATO membership by accepting the agreement between Republic of Macedonia and Republic of Greece?
The “Prespa” agreement in question is one that will change the country’s official name to Republic of North Macedonia and enable it to enter NATO next year and start accession negotiations, with entry whenever it is fully qualified and the existing members ratify its accession. The referendum is nonbinding and needs to pass with 50% voting yes and 50% f registered voters going to the polls.
The majority requirement will likely be met, but a boycott may prevent voting from reaching the 50% of registered voters. Even then the parliament could proceed with the agreement, which will require constitutional changes voted by a 2/3 majority as well as legislation. But proceeding in that way is not pretty and will present enormous challenges.
The agreement changes the country’s official name but leaves its citizens and everyone else with the freedom to continue to call it Macedonia, themselves Macedonians, and their language Macedonian. This to me is analogous to the United States of America, my country’s official name: most of refer to America (the beautiful) from time to time, ourselves Americans (despite Canadian as well as Central and Latin American objections), and our language English (which many English people may doubt but tolerate). Ambiguities and contradictions abound in language and identity.
Some object to this agreement because it entails limitations on sovereignty: the right of the Republic of Macedonia to call itself what it wants, not only internationally but also internally. That is correct, but many international agreements entail limitations on sovereignty. That is the point: sovereigns can do what they find in their interest, including limiting their own sovereign powers. The agreement also entails limitations on Greek sovereignty. It will no longer be able to veto NATO or EU membership. That is the basic bargain here: a change in official name in exchange for an end to the Greek veto of Macedonia’s primary foreign policy goals.
The agreement does other things as well: it ends any irredentist claims to each others’ territory as well as cross-border incitement, it affirms the distinct historical and cultural contexts in which “Macedonian” and “Macedonian” are used (thus ending Greek claims to exclusivity in their use), it provides a mechanism for reviewing and revising historical and other presentations (including textbooks), and significantly increases bilateral diplomatic, political, economic, scientific, and other cooperation. This is an agreement that aims to end a more than 25-year dispute that has plagued the Balkans and caused serious delays in Macedonia’s political and economic progress.
The Balkans has suffered in the past decade from a sense of stagnation, disappointment, and even despair. The agreement, if implemented, will also give new momentum to the region. While Macedonia’s citizens should of course be concerned first and foremost with their own interests, they should also be aware that the Prespa agreement will re-energize the Euroatlantic ambitions of others, especially in Kosovo, Serbia, and even Bosnia and Herzegovina. Forward motion is what keeps bicycles, and Balkan countries, from instability.
So I would urge Macedonia’s citizens to turn out and vote yes. I will continue to call your country Macedonia until you ask me to stop. Your culture and history will suffer no harm from this agreement, as its main provisions on those issues are subject to future negotiation and Macedonian approval. Your entry into NATO will reduce ethnic tensions and give your army enormous opportunities to improve its effectiveness and contribute to peace and security worldwide. Your opening of negotiations for EU accession will encourage vital political and economic reform. You have a great deal to gain, and little to lose.
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Partition has failed, prepare something else
Serbian President Vucic has announced that his efforts to get something in negotiations with Kosovo have failed. What could he mean, and what does the announcement portend? It is hard to tell, but my guess is that Vucic has come to realize that there will be no unilateral partition of Kosovo.
That is what Vucic wanted: the northern majority-Serb municipalities in exchange for some sort of recognition of rump Kosovo. Kosovo President Thaci has made it clear he would only agree to some version of that proposal if Kosovo gets equivalent territory in southern Serbian municipalities that have Albanian majorities as well as UN membership.
The Serbian security services have no doubt told Vucic that is unacceptable. The land/people swap just isn’t going to work out, as it fails to protect vital interests of both Belgrade and Pristina: the former is concerned about its main route to the sea through southern Serbia and the latter with its main water supply in the north. Moreover, Serbia can no longer–if it ever could–commit to UN membership for Kosovo, which is blocked by a Russian veto in the Security Council.
The failure of this proposition is a relief, as it will avoid raising questions about borders in Macedonia, Bosnia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Vucic and Thaci may regret it, but the rest of the world should rejoice that Putin has not been handed a prize he would use to try to shift borders to accommodate Russians in what he regards as his “near abroad.” We should also be glad that Serbia itself, Spain, China, and other countries with ethnically diverse regions will not find ethnic secessionists re-empowered.
So far so good, but what about Kosovo? What are its prospects if the land/people swap is dead?
Again I’m guessing, but I think there are still deals to be had. They will not involve UN membership, because Russia now has its own interests in blocking that unless it gets satisfaction on South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Crimea, and Donbas. But Pristina still wants and needs bilateral recognition, or at least de facto acknowledgement of it authority on all the territory of Kosovo, not least so that it can join multilateral organizations as well as settle issues still outstanding with Belgrade: unpaid pensions, state property, border demarcation, Serbian efforts to prevent Serbs from joining its police and security forces, protection of Serbs and Serb religious sites throughout Kosovo, and creation of a Kosovo army.
Belgrade has wanted to use the creation of an Association of Serb Municipalities, something that has already been agreed, to create in Kosovo a de facto self-governing Serb “entity,” analogous to Republika Srpska (RS) in Bosnia, with veto powers in Pristina. Vucic is likely now to double down on that idea, but it is clearly something Thaci cannot deliver. The Kosovo constitutional court has already ruled out anything analogous to the RS, which has rendered governance in Bosnia dysfunctional. The votes for a constitutional amendment to enable creation of a Serb entity in Kosovo simply don’t exist in the Kosovo Assembly.
Nor do the votes exist in the Serbian parliament for changing its constitution, which claims Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia. Those votes are unlikely to emerge before EU accession is imminent. At that point, Serbia can expect to get nothing in return, since all the leverage will be with the EU, which will not accept Serbia until normalization with Kosovo is a done deal.
So whatever emerges now is likely to be messy. That is not unusual. Colleagues in KIPRED have done us all a favor by reviewing some available options that have proved feasible elsewhere. I’d suggest Vucic and Thaci read that fine paper. They’ve both got good thinkers available. Put them in the same room to come up with something viable for both parties. And in the meanwhile focus political efforts on preparing their electorates for the inevitable compromises.
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