Tag: Balkans
Montenegro is not alone
I did this interview on Montenegro yesterday for Ian Masters of KPFK (Los Angeles):
The main point is not only about Montenegro but also about the Article 5 mutual defense guarantee: Trump has made it doubtful not only for Podgorica, but for all the other allies as well.
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Fake news, wishful thinking
That’s the best response to the report that US Ambassador to Kosovo Delawie has opened the door to partition of Kosovo. Here is the text of the original interview with Adriatik Kelmendi, whose relevant section reads this way:
AK: We discussed in the previous interview with you, there are many ideas going around about how the final solution of the agreement would look like between Kosovo and Serbia and many are saying that maybe some exchange of territories or partition of Kosovo can again come into the table. What is the U.S. stance on it?
AMB: I’m not going to get at what could be the elements of a deal, of an agreement, at this point. I don’t think that is really helpful. Especially when I’m trying to encourage people in Kosovo to take on that responsibility and participate in the discussion. So I’m not going to say who I think should be in the room, I’m not going to talk about the shape of the table, I’m not going to talk about what should be the elements of the final agreement. I can say that Kosovo politicians, Kosovo citizens, are fully capable of making these decisions on the negotiating positions themselves, and the United States will be standing by them as they talk about these things. Our support for Kosovo is consistent, it’s unalterable, it will continue into the future. I think those are the elements of what a deal might look like, are elements that are more appropriately discussed by people in Kosovo.
AK: It’s been almost three years since you arrived in Kosovo, did you notice any change of U.S. policy towards Kosovo and the Balkans in these last three years, from the beginning up till now while we are talking?
AMB: People react as things change, there was this terrific deal between Macedonia and Greece, so our position changes when things change. We celebrate good news like that. So regarding U.S. support for Kosovo, I sense no change. Our commitment to Kosovo has been bipartisan, it has continued since the 90’s. I have no hints from the new administration of any change in that position.
AK: I note, up till now the U.S. policy towards Kosovo was Kosovo was independent, Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is the one that should be respected by all sides, partition is never to be discussed, so now are you hesitant to say that, to repeat this again?
AMB: First of all, Americans support for Kosovo’s independence is unshakable and will continue. The other questions you ask relate to the elements of a final deal and I’m still not going to get at those right now for the reasons I’ve already mentioned.
AK: But you exclude partition, or you do not exclude that?
AMB: I am saying that I’m not going to talk about what an element of the final deal will be, I’m not going to talk about who I think should be leading this discussion in Brussels, and I’m not going to talk about ancillary details like what room it should be in or the shape of the table. Especially I think we are getting ahead of the discussion that really needs to take place here, and needs to have more participation from Kosovo’s political parties. Everybody needs to get in the game to talk about these things.
AK: Does this mean that for the U.S. administration every deal that can be reached between Kosovo and Serbia will be okay with America?
AMB: I’m still not going to answer that question, I’m sorry, you are very creative in asking several different ways. But it’s still the same question. I don’t want to bore the audience and I’m not going to get at the elements of the deal today.
AK: But you answered these kinds of questions before. Something has changed.
AMB: Today, this week, I’m focused on encouraging Kosovo political parties, Kosovo politicians, to try to get together and work on what are Kosovo’s goals. I think we are getting ahead of things if we talk about what’s going to happen at the end of the game. Kosovo needs to figure out what its goals are, it needs to try to achieve some kind of consensus on those goals, and that is what I am focusing on right now.
AK: There should not be redlines?
AMB: I don’t think it’s really helpful for me to talk too much about redlines, it’s up to Kosovo to figure out what its goals are. I think Kosovo is facing a unique moment in its history when it can help determine what the future is going to be for Kosovo, for Kosovo’s children, and to put aside the nervousness, the tension, the controversy that has characterized the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia these last several years. I think it’s important to focus on how to make the future better for all of Kosovo’s citizens, for Serbia’s citizens as well, and to find out a way to get to this normalization that we’ve been working on for a long time.
I might have wished, with the infinite wisdom of hindsight, that he had handled the partition issue differently by saying that the US continues to support the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Kosovo, but Greg was clearly in this interview trying to stay our of the substance. He didn’t discuss partition at all. His main purpose was to encourage broader participation of Kosovo’s political forces in the process. He said unequivocally there is no change of US policy. For people in Belgrade to say there is, based on this interview, is wrong.
Kosovo Prime Minister Haradinaj quickly rejected the idea of exchange of territory with Serbia:
Division means war for me, and I say that without hesitation. It’s risky to speak about the partition…there is no victory, exchange of territory, or changes the borders. That’s dangerous and something we should not try to do in these circumstances.
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Cause to celebrate
Why should you be pleased that NATO has invited Macedonia to join the Alliance? It’s a small country (2 million people) tucked away and landlocked on the Balkan peninsula without even much of a highway running through it. One quarter of its population is Albanian and 10% are all sorts of other things: Serbs, Croats, Vlachs and who knows what. It only declared independence in 1991 and has spent most of its existence squabbling with Greece, which claims Macedonia’s name exclusively for one of its provinces.
First and foremost, the NATO invitation will, one hopes, give both Macedonia and Greece the courage to end the squabbling. Skopje and Athens have negotiated an elaborate agreement that changes the official name (for all uses) to Republic of Northern Macedonia and resolves a host of contentious details concerning the country’s language, cultural history, textbooks, minorities, irredentist claims, economic cooperation….All that is needed is final approval in the two countries’ parliaments and in a referendum in Macedonia. That is a high water mark in a 25-year effort to resolve the issue.
Second, the invitation sends a strong signal in two directions:
- to the other countries in the Balkans who are not yet members of either NATO or the EU.
- to the Russians, who have been determined to slow if not block NATO expansion.
The signal to the rest of the Balkans is just this: if you have the political courage to take on and resolve tough issues, the trans-Atlantic institutions will hold their doors open to you. First NATO, then the EU. Solve your inter-ethnic issues and problems with your neighbors, reform your economies and political systems to reduce corruption and prevent state capture, and you will get a place at the table in the two most important alliances ever created.
To the Russians, the signal is just as clear: you may try to block NATO expansion and try to drive a wedge between Europe and the US, but you will not succeed. Even the relatively weak states in the Balkans will stand up to you. Macedonia has already expelled some of your intelligence agents trying to sow dissension from the “name” agreement. Montenegro last year, Macedonia this year. Maybe Kosovo the year after. Then only Serbia and Republika Srpska will stand between the Alliance and a Balkans whole and free. You can try to shore up your proxies, but they stand to gain more joining the West than continuing to bet on Vladimir Putin.
Third, NATO membership will add Macedonia’s small army and military capabilities to an Alliance that needs them. The Macedonians have already served years embedded in the Vermont National Guard in Afghanistan, where their commanding general thought they performed as well as US troops in combat. Who knows where they will be needed next, whether by NATO or the EU military structure? They are still short of the 2% of GDP goal NATO set for 2024, but their invitation gives Macedonia every incentive to reach it, sooner rather than later.
Of course in the scheme of things, “Northern Macedonia” in NATO is a small victory. It isn’t nearly as earthshaking as an American president who can’t find anything good to say about the Alliance while praising the Russian president who attacked the American electoral system. But it’s a good thing and something to celebrate.
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Who can fix Bosnia?
Delvin Kovač of Bosnian website Vijesti.ba asked questions; I replied:
- Should the international community increase its presence in Bosnia, since Bosnian politicians can’t come to an agreement on any important issues regarding Bosnia’s future?
A: No. It may need to adjust its presence, for example by moving all the EU military forces to Brcko to forestall any attempt to seize it by one entity of the other, but Bosnia’s politicians need to learn to deal with their own problems.
- Will Bosnia be sliding into a constitutional crisis after the autumn elections this year, as some politicians already announced such scenario due to unresolved electoral law issue?
A: No. As I’ve explained, there are adequate provisions in the existing Federation constitution to deal with any issues that may arise.
- Bosnian Croat lawmakers refused to attend a session of the lower house of the Federal Parliament because the body recently adopted an election-related law without them. Is boycotting a Parliament maybe a part of a Croat Democratic Party Leader Dragan Covic’s so called “Plan B”?
A: You’ll have to ask him. For me, boycotting is a way of eliminating yourself from the political equation, not getting what you want. If you want to protect your rights, show up.
- A coalition of parties representing Bosnian Serbs in the Government said that it would not allow Bosnia to enter NATO while neighbouring Serbia is not part of the international alliance. Should Bosnia really depend on neighbouring countries Serbia’s and Croatia’s decisions when it comes to foreign policy issues?
A: No. But it is up to Bosnia’s voters to punish at the polls politicians who want to follow foreign leaders rather than their own.
- Milorad Dodik is no longer the only ally of Russian Federation in Bosnia, since it is expanding an influence in Bosnia and Croatia through the Croat Democratic Party Leader Dragan Covic and the group of lawmakers in the Croatian Parliament. Russian Federation is obviously penetrating NATO countries territory increasingly. Is that to be considered dangerous?
A: Yes, but again it is up to voters to punish at the polls those leaders who kowtow to the Russians.
- Dragan Covic said that local parties cannot agree on the solution for the local election in Mostar and that the local election will almost definitely not be held in this city, which faces an indefinite wait for a new municipal council. What do you think is a adequate solution for this problem?
A: I think an adquate solution for this problem is one Bosnians can agree on. I don’t think you should expect foreigners to be very interested any longer in your municipal elections. I spent a lot of time on Mostar at the Dayton peace talks. It is time for you to invest the political energy needed to overcome the problems there.
- What can Bosnian citizens expect if Milorad Dodik and Dragan Covic become the Serb and the Croat member of the Bosnian tripartite Presidency. They both openly call for the destruction of Bosnia and the creation of a para-state – third entity? Who can confront such dangerous politics of the two?
A: Bosnia’s citizens, principally. But the West can be relied upon not to recognize any state that attempts to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nor will Croatia or Serbia want that.
PS: Here it is in Bosnian.
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Fixing democracy
Fitim Gashi of Pristina daily Koha Ditore asked some questions last week. I answered:
1. Having in mind the growing alarm about the wave of populism sweeping the Europe and USA, as well as the erosion of democratic safeguards in particular European states, such as Hungary, Poland, what can be said about the state of democracy today? Is it fair to say that democracy is in decline?
A: Democracy is facing serious challenges, but it still has capacity to respond to them. Leaders need to listen more carefully to citizens and try to represent them more fully.
2. Why is this happening? Which are the main factors contributing to the decline of the democracy?
A: It seems to me trade and immigration are the main issues, though in many countries corruption is a contributing factor. We should also recognize that racism and xenophobia are important contributing factors.
3. What can be done to prevent the situation from deteriorating?
A: Reducing the negative impacts of trade and immigration on relatively uneducated people in America and Europe would help. So too would more vigorous defense of a trading regime that has raised living standards and greater recognition that both America and Europe need young workers. I really don’t know what to do about racism and corruption. Exposing them may be the best antiseptic.
4. As it was recently seen in Hungary and Turkey, as well as in many cases in the past, leaders who have shown disregard about democratic norms have been reelected through popular vote. How can that be interpreted? Are people losing faith in democracy?
A: In Turkey, the election was certainly not free or fair. I hesitate to comment on Hungary, because I don’t follow it as much. Demagogues are using democratic forms to enhance their power. The only things that can stop that are the voters, parliaments, the media, and the courts.
5. In Balkans, we have leaders who are in power for decades, while the West, preoccupied with its problems, seems to have chosen “stabilitocracy” over democracy. Do you expect this situation to continue?
A: All countries deal with leaders who have come to power through the constitutional system in place, which is true of the current Balkan leaders. Only occasionally, when there is evidence of gross malfeasance, do the US and Europe weigh in against them, as they did recently in Macedonia against Gruevski. The only conscious choice I know for stability over democracy is in Bosnia, where Germany and the UK initiated a reform effort aimed at preventing the Americans from attempting one more time to change the Dayton constitution to make it more democratic.
6. Which is your opinion about the state of democracy in USA itself?
A: I think we have systemic problems. Our constitution favors states with smaller populations, enabling election of a president like Trump (and George W. Bush in his first term) who failed to win a majority of votes. We also have grossly gerrymandered Congressional districts that enable the Republicans to gain many more seats than the Democrats. And we have allowed Russian interference in our elections. These problems are unlikely to get fixed anytime soon. People who want change are going to have to come out to vote.
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Not with a bang
The prime ministers of Macedonia and Greece today announced a solution to the “name” issue: they propose that the former will in the future be known as the Republic of Northern Macedonia, its language as Macedonian, and its citizens Macedonians, if I understand correctly. The new name is to be used both within Macedonia, including in the constitution, and externally, as the Greeks had insisted. The agreement needs to be approved by parliaments in both capitals as well as by referendum in Macedonia.
This is excellent news. Disagreement about the name has slowed the country’s progress towards the EU, stalled its entry into NATO, and exacerbated frictions between its Albanian and Macedonian communities. A solution would mark important progress in a lingering Balkans dispute. Progress in one place gives encouragement to others, as last year’s entry of Montenegro into NATO did. Keeping the Balkans bicycle moving forward is vital to keeping it from falling over.
Of course it isn’t finished until it’s finished. Approvals in parliaments aren’t automatic. Nationalists in both countries will oppose the new name. Referenda are likewise dicey: no telling how things will go, though the Albanians in Macedonia, who are impatient for NATO accession, will presumably turn out in force to vote in favor. That’s close to half the votes needed for approval.
This is one of those issues that has aroused passions but will soon be forgotten once the solution is approved in both countries. There are much more important issues for both Greece and Macedonia: the welfare of their citizens (including EU and NATO membership for Macedonia), defending their electoral campaigns from Russian trouble-making, and exploiting the many synergies between their economies. The sooner both countries refocus on those issues, the better.
Once the name issue is settled, the remaining Balkan tough nuts will be normalizing relations between Kosovo and Serbia as well as making the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina capable of negotiating and implementing the acquis communautaire required for EU membership. Those are not easy problems, but there is more than enough time to solve them before the window for EU membership opens again in 2023.
Republic of Northern Macedonia: it’s a solution that could have been found at any time during the last 25 years. No big bang here, but a blessing to the politicians willing to take the associated risks. Prime Ministers Tsipras and Zaev deserve a lot of credit, as do Foreign Ministers Dimitrov and Kotzias and the ever-patient UN envoy Nimetz. Congratulations! Googletranslate tells me the right words are: συγχαρητήρια! and алал да му е! I trust someone will tell me if I’ve got that wrong.
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