Tag: Balkans
What to do about the Balkans
The European Union at the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003 affirmed its most powerful tool of democratization: enlargement. The Balkans had often been viewed until then as a ‘dark hole’ of Europe. The EU hoped that conditionality would pull the war-ravaged landscapes of the Western Balkans closer to the liberal democracies of its members states and ensure regional stability.
Fifteen years later and $20 billion from the European Union and $4 billion from the United States (excluding military aid), the post-Yugoslav countries of the Balkans have arguably created legal frameworks that resemble the liberal democracies, and there has been no war. Yet the region remains a space where endemic corruption and stagnation rule.
May 17 another EU-Western Balkans Summit took place in Sofia, Bulgaria, bringing together heads of state or government from EU member states and leaders from the 6 Western Balkans partners: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. President of the European Council Donald Tusk announced that
the European Union is and will remain the most reliable partner of the entire Western Balkans. And in very concrete terms we discussed how to improve connections with and within the Western Balkans region.
Tusk underlined the EU’s “connectivity agenda” for the region and clarified that this is “
neither an alternative, nor substitute for enlargement. It is a way to use the time between today and tomorrow more effectively than before, so that our citizens and businesses are not waiting for the benefits of EU integration. Because I don’t see any other future for the Western Balkans other than the EU. There is no other alternative, there is no Plan B.
This reiteration calmed fears among local population and politicians that the EU was backtracking on its enlargement commitment.
On the same day, the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies hosted a discussion titled “The Transatlantic Alliance and the Western Balkans: Regional Challenges and Options for a Common EU-US Response.” The panel included:
- Lord Paddy Ashdown, Member of the House of Lord and former High Representative and EU Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Marsaili Fraser, Former Head of the Political Department of the EU Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina
- James O’Brien, Vice Chair of Albright Stronebridge Group (ASG) and Former Special Presidential Envoy for the Balkans
- Majda Ruge, Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins SAIS
The panelists discussed the current state of play in the Western Balkans and offered recommendations for a common EU and US response.
Ruge reiterated the challenges currently haunting the region arising from the tension between the EU agenda and political realities on the ground. The socio-political landscape in the Balkans 15 years after the Thessaloniki summit includes unresolved conflicts and bilateral issues, complex and muddled jurisdictions (as seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern Kosovo), irredentism (recent flirtations with the idea of changing borders and secession in Bosnia), and backsliding on crucial democratic institutions and norms.
Ruge stressed as well the effects of Middle East instability on the Balkans and the EU. In 2015, the flow of refugees reached unprecedented levels since WWII, with 764,038 border crossings through the Balkans route into the EU.
There are also successes in the region. Ruge cited the new government in Macedonia as building bridges rather than relying on divisive rhetoric, as well as Albania’s commitment to enhance the rule of law in line with EU standards by setting up internationally-supervised vetting procedures for the appointment of judges and prosecutors.
Ashdown stated that despite the transatlantic engagement in the region manifested through billions of dollars in aid and expertise, the Western Balkan states cannot operate at a level of functionality that would make them welcome EU members. Nor can they deliver to their citizens the benefits that justify loyalty to the state. The EU and the US have failed. Corruption remains endemic in the region, “as deeply embedded as when I went there in 2002 and not much has changed.”
Among the few successes, Ashdown listed the absence of war, and in some cases states that have shuffled a bit closer to the standards that would allow them to be members of EU. But overall, the Balkans pretend to reform, and the international community pretends to believe them.
Ashdown reminded his audience that you cannot save the maiden if you are not prepared to kill the dragon. The dragon we keep on failing to identify and slay is the dysfunctionality of the states. Brussels and Washington should sync their efforts and always act in a united fashion and employ muscular conditionality. The EU and the US should have a regional policy (and not different enlargement packages for each country) as a way to exploit regional linkages.
O’Brien spoke on US engagement in the region, emphasizing that Washington has a short-term focus on bigger wins, for example over the last year the Macedonia name issue and the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. These are efforts to put out fires and achieve outcomes within the 1-2 year lifespan of a deputy assistant secretary. O’Brien would prefer the US focus on institutions that allow for political competition and rotation of power as well as reach out to parts of society that do not feel represented.
Fraser believes that the prospect of membership is still necessary (although it may not be sufficient) to stabilize the region. Enlargement remains the EU’s most effective foreign policy tool. However, the enlargement process that happened in the countries of Eastern Europe should not be copy-pasted to the Balkans. The EU should be mindful that political elites were crucial to the process and were conforming to EU standards before being asked to do so.
In the Balkans, the most glaring problem is lack of political will. Political elites are reluctant to undertake difficult reforms that undermine their own interests. Nonetheless, enlargement can still drive progress in the region. The EU should get better at selling the benefits of membership not only to political elites but also to the general population of the Balkans. Furthermore, the EU should get better at naming-and-shaming politicians who are not implementing EU reform policies.
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Stop griping
Marija Jovicevic at the Montenegrin daily Pobjeda asked some questions. I answered:
- New elected president of Montenegro Mr. Đukanović said that he will work on better relations with Moscow. Can we expect improvement of relations because Mr. Putin congratulated victory to Mr. Đukanović for presidential elections and said that relations between two countries should be better? How do You read this messages? Does anything at all depend on Montenegro?
A: There is no harm in principle for a NATO member to seek good relations with Moscow, but it depends on what terms. I think President Djukanovic has demonstrated his fortitude in resisting Moscow’s worst behavior, which included a murder/coup attempt. If he can now improve relations with Moscow while remaining faithful to EU and NATO concerns, all to the better. I might doubt it can be done, but it is worth a try.
2. Representatives of non-governmental organizations wrote letter to European commission that Brussels should stop negotiations with Montenegro because we not do enough in the fields of judicial reforms .Do You think that it is a work of non-governmental organizations or they should help government in the process of European integrations?
A: Insisting on judicial reform will help with the process of European integration, and civil society should be free to do as it sees fit, within legal limits. Writing a letter to Brussels is certainly within those limits. Civil society may also want to help, but it is not the government’s handmaiden.
- EU and western Balkans will host a big summit in Sofia on 17 May. Do you expect any big steps in this partnership? Do You think that big summits are not enough that EU needs to do more for Western Balkans?
A: I think the Western Balkan countries need to do more for themselves. They’ve been offered a date for new accessions to the EU, which is also prepared to help them meet the requirements of the acquis. It’s time to stop griping and start performing.
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Peace picks, May 14 – May 20
- The Fallout from Trump’s Decision on the Iran Deal | Monday, May 14 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
May 12 is the deadline for President Trump to renew sanctions waivers under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In January, he vowed to pull out of the JCPOA unless European nations met his demands for new pressure on Iran’s ballistic missile program, more stringent inspections of Iran’s military installations and a commitment to extend curbs on the Iranian nuclear program beyond the terms of the nuclear deal. The Future of Iran Initiative, the Global Business and Economics Program, and the Middle East Security Initiative invite you to a discussion of the ramifications of Trump’s decision on the likely responses of Iran and US European allies as well as the consequences for non-proliferation and conflict in the Middle East. A conversation with Axel Hellman (Policy Fellow; European Leadership Network), Elizabeth Rosenberg (Director, Energy, Economics and Security Program; Center for a New American Security), Ali Vaez (Iran Project Director; International Crisis Group), and David Mortlock (Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Energy Center; Atlantic Council). Moderated by Barbara Slavin (Director, Future of Iran Initiative; Atlantic Council), with keynote remarks by David O’Sullivan (Ambassador and Head, European Union Delegation to the United States).
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- How to Talk to North Korea | Monday, May 14 | 10:00 am – 11:00 am | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here |
As a possible Trump-Kim summit draws closer, join Carnegie for a conversation about what negotiating with North Korea is really like. Previous U.S. negotiators and experts will talk about what lessons have been learned in previous rounds of talks, and what the United States should know going forward. The New York Times’ Mark Landler will moderate. Panel includes Suzanne DiMaggio (Director and Senior Fellow, New America), Robert L. Gallucci (Professor, Georgetown University), Christopher Hill (Professor, University of Denver), and Daniel Russel (VP for International Security and Diplomacy, Asia Society Policy Institute)
- US Policy Towards Iran: Strategic Options | Monday, May 14 | 10:00 am – 11:30 am | Bipartisan Policy Center | Register Here |
The president’s decision on the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has dominated the discussion in Washington. But recent events also reinforce the need for an American strategy for the broader challenge posed by Iran. Returning some measure of stability to the increasingly fractured Middle East—a vital and enduring U.S. national security interest—requires confronting the spread of Iranian influence.
Join us on May 14 for a discussion on Iran’s influence in Syria and Iraq, and the release of a report from the Task Force on Managing Disorder in the Middle East on U.S. Policy Toward Iran: Strategic Options. Fireside chat includes Amb. Eric Edelman (Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey) and Jake Sullivan (Former Director of Policy Planning, U.S. State Department and Former National Security Advisor to the Vice President). Panel includes Amb. James Jeffrey (Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Iraq), Mary Beth Long (Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), Denise Natali (Director, Center for Strategic Research at the Institute for National Strategic Studies) and Blaise Misztal (Director of National Security, Bipartisan Policy Center). Moderated by Arshad Mohammed (Diplomatic Correspondent, Reuters).
A Tale of Two Elections: Recapping the Polls in Lebanon and Iraq | Tuesday, May 15 | 12:00pm – 2:00pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
As Lebanon holds its first parliamentary elections in nine years and Iraq paves a way forward in the aftermath of the war against ISIS, many questions remain as to what the political future holds for both countries. The parliamentary elections in Lebanon on May 6, and in Iraq on May 12, serve as a barometer for transparency, inclusion, and the political realities in both countries. The polls have raised pressing political and governance issues such as how to overcome sectarianism, corruption, and economic stagnation in order to encourage further openness and plurality. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a panel discussion to examine these issues. MEI’s Bilal Y. Saab and Paul Salem will be joined by Abbas Kadhim (SAIS), Omar al-Nidawi (Gryphon Partners), and Bilal Wahab (WINEP) for a two-hour panel event moderated by MEI’s director for conflict resolution and the Track II Dialogues initiative, Randa Slim.
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5. Cuba: Post-Castro Transition | Wednesday, May 16 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
In April, Miguel Díaz-Canel became the 19th President of Cuba and the first in over 40 years who was not a member of the Castro family. This appointment — not election — of a new Cuban president raises a number of important questions about the future and stability of the regime. In a post-Castro era, Cuban politics will likely change, though the direction and magnitude of those changes remains to be seen. On May 16, Hudson Institute will host a panel to explore these issues and discuss the possibility of a democratic transition on the island. Panelists will include Eduardo Ulibarri, a Costa Rican journalist, diplomat, university professor, and international consultant; Hector E. Schamis, a teacher at Georgetown University’s Center for Latin American Studies and Democracy & Governance Program; and Ambassador Jaime Daremblum, senior fellow and director of Hudson Institute’s Center for Latin American Studies.
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6. Decision Point: Iran, the Nuclear Deal, and Regional Stability | Wednesday, May 16 | 1:00pm – 2:30pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement will have far reaching implications for U.S. policy; the trans-Atlantic alliance; non-proliferation efforts; and even on regional stability – particularly in the Israeli-Lebanese-Iranian-Syrian arena. Indeed, those implications may go far in defining the U.S. posture in the region for years to come. Join us as four veteran analysts and policy advisers on the Middle East assess the implications of the president’s decision, including on U.S. foreign policy in the region at large. Featuring speakers Robert S. Litwak (Senior Vice President and Director of International Security Studies, Wilson Center), Michael Singh (Managing Director and Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Ray Takeyh (Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations), and Tamara Cofman Wittes (Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution). Moderated by Aaron David Miller (Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director, Wilson Center), with introductory remarks by Jane Harman (Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center).
There will be a live webcast of this event.
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7. Turkey’s Early Elections | Wednesday, May 16 | 2:00pm – 3:30pm | SETA Foundation | Register here |
On June 24, Turkey will hold its first presidential and parliamentary elections under the new presidential system that was adopted in the 2017 constitutional referendum. In the presidential race, several political parties have nominated their own candidates, while in the parliamentary elections, several parties have formed alliances to gain the majority in the legislature. The winner of the presidential election will form the first Turkish government under the new presidential system for the next five years. The parliamentary makeup will be of critical importance in the transition to the new system. Please join the SETA Foundation at Washington DC for a timely discussion on Turkey’s upcoming June elections, current coalitions, political party dynamics, and the future of Turkish politics. With speakers Ihsan Aktas, President, GENAR Research and Polling; Nebi Mis, Director, Domestic Policy, SETA Foundation; and Murat Yesiltas, Director, Security Policy, SETA Foundation; with moderator Kilic Bugra Kanat, Research Director, SETA Foundation.
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8. The Risk of Interstate War(s) in the Middle East | Thursday, May 17 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Middle East Institute | Register here |
While armed nonstate actors and proxy militias have been grabbing most headlines in recent years, the risk of interstate war in the Middle East is rising at an alarming rate. Tensions between Israel and Iran have boiled over several times in recent weeks in Syria, risking a serious escalation between the two countries. Iranian-supplied missiles have been launched from Houthi-held areas in Yemen targeting Riyadh and other Saudi towns and cities, risking an escalation between the two regional powers. Tension also persists between the United States and Iran as the Trump administration moves away from the JCPOA. In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces are flying missions in a crowded air and military space; the risk of escalation there between the two superpowers also cannot be discounted. How high is the risk of interstate war in the Middle East? What are the dynamics of these various tension axes? How could the United States and other regional and international powers help avert such potential outbreaks? The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a panel featuring Martin Indyk of the Brookings Institution, Kenneth Pollack of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), MEI’s Bilal Y. Saab, Julianne Smith of the Center for New American Security (CNAS) to discuss these mounting tensions and how best to address them. MEI’s senior vice president for policy research and programs, Paul Salem, will moderate the discussion.
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9. Decentralization in Tunisia — Empowering Towns, Engaging People | Thursday, May 17 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register here |
Tunisia’s first ever democratic local elections in May are a crucial step in the country’s efforts to devolve power from the national to the local level. In their latest paper, Decentralization in Tunisia: Empowering Towns, Engaging People, Carnegie Fellow Sarah Yerkes and Vice President for Studies Marwan Muasher argue that if done right, decentralization will both empower local actors and introduce a new political class outside of the country’s traditionally dominant political parties. Successful decentralization requires strong political will from central government officials, who must demonstrate their commitment to participatory local governance both on paper and in practice, and from local officials who must build trust with their constituents, provide opportunities for citizen engagement, and prevent the recreation of ineffective institutions at the local level. With the participation of Carnegie Senior Vice President for Studies Thomas Carothers and PBS NewsHour’s P.J. Tobia in the first session (10:05 – 10:45); Director of the Tunisian Institute of Elected Officials Elyès Ghanmi, independent consultant on local and international governance Laura J. Hogg, and programmes director at the Jasmine Foundation and researcher at Sciences Po Paris Intissar Kherigi with Sarah Yerkes and Marwan Muasher in the second session (10:50 – 12:15).
A light lunch will follow.
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10. The Transatlantic Alliance and the Western Balkans | Thursday, May 17 | 10:30am – 12:30pm | Johns Hopkins SAIS | Register here |
Amid a growing number of foreign policy rifts between the United States and the European Union, the Western Balkans remains one region where the new US administration has identified an opportunity for close cooperation with Brussels. As European political leaders convene in Sofia for the Western Balkan Summit, we will talk about the past and present challenges to transatlantic cooperation in the Western Balkans and how these might be overcome. As European political leaders convene in Sofia for the Western Balkan Summit, we will talk about the past and present challenges to transatlantic cooperation in the Western Balkans and how these might be overcome. The timing for such a discussion is critical, given the renewed secessionist threats in the region and the need for a joint US and EU response to grapple with this challenge. A conversation with Lord Paddy Ashdown, Member of the House of Lords and former High Representative and EU Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina; Ms. Marsaili Fraser; former Head of the Political Department of the EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and Mr. James O’Brien, Vice Chair of Albright Stonebridge Group and former Special Presidential Envoy for the Balkans; moderated by Dr. Majda Ruge, Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins SAIS.
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11. Politics and Economics in Putin’s Fourth Term | Friday, May 18 | 9:45am – 11:00am | Atlantic Council | Register here |
As Vladimir Putin begins an unprecedented fourth term as president of Russia, his country stands at a critical crossroads. With a volatile economy and an increasingly authoritarian government, the country is facing high levels of political and economic uncertainty. At this event, Vladimir Milov, Russian opposition politician and economist, will join a panel of US-based experts to discuss the political and economic future of Putin’s Russia. Featuring Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center Dr. Anders Åslund and David M. Rubenstein Fellow at the Brookings Institution Dr. Alina Polyakova, with moderation by Director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center Ambassador John Herbst.
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12. Can Inclusive Peace Processes Work? Strategies for Meeting Resistance to Inclusion | Friday, May 18 | 10:00am – 11:30am | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
Too often, peace processes only include dueling parties — leaving women; religious, indigenous, and ethnic groups; youth; and survivors of violence excluded from critical discussions that shape the future landscape of a country. Yet, sidelining their voices often results in a resurgence of conflict and fails to achieve comprehensive or sustainable peace. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace and Conciliation Resources for a discussion on overcoming challenges to inclusive peace processes and negotiated settlements. The research draws on case studies and local perspectives with local partners from Colombia, Bougainville and Nepal, exploring how inclusion is negotiated in war to peace transitions, common barriers to and trade-offs between inclusion and stability, and types of external and internal support that have been effective. In three segments: Presentation of Findings with Zahbia Yousuf (Senior Advisor, Peace and Transition Process, Conciliation Resources) and Sophia Close (Senior Advisor, Gender and Peacebuilding, Conciliation Resources); Application and Experiences on the Ground with Deepak Thapa (Director, Social Science Baha; Kathmandu, Nepal) and Rosa Emilia Salamanca (Director, Institute for Social and Economic Research and Action; Bogota, Colombia); and Policy Implications with Esra Cuhadar (JR Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace) and Jennifer Marron (Peace Process Advisor, Bureau of Conflict Stabilization and Operations, Department of State). With moderator Rosarie Tucci (Director, Inclusive Societies, U.S. Institute of Peace) and introduction by Nancy Lindborg (President, U.S. Institute of Peace).
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More on Bosnia’s election law
Slaven Kovačević writes:
Still another meeting about possible changes of the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina has ended without agreement, which some will consider bad. I think this is the best solution at the moment, because it is not true that without agreement implementation of the future electoral results will be impossible.
That claim is based on the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) incorrect interpretation of the Constitutional Court’s Ljubić decision. The intention is to create pressure for changes to the BiH Election Law that advantage the HDZ, diminishing the basic human rights of a significant number of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who live in environments beyond the HDZ’s direct political control.
In addition, the HDZ demands that the Election Law be amended to include election of members of the BiH Presidency, whereas the Constitutional Court of BiH rejected that part of the Ljubić appeal. The HDZ also abuses the Venice Commission, which at the end of its opinion made it clear that the current system for choosing members of the Federation House of Peoples is in line with the European electoral principles and standards.
The HDZ arguments are political in nature and not legal. The basic question is this: is the Federation formed from cantons or peoples, as HDZ claims? Under the Washington Agreement, the Federation of BiH is composed of federal units, later established in the Constitution as cantons. Here is an extract from the original Washington Agreement:
Bosniacs and Croats, as constituent peoples (along with others) and citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, transform the internal structure of the territories with a majority of Bosniac and Croat population in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a Federation, which is composed of federal units with equal rights and responsibilities.
The choice of delegates to the House of Peoples is based on the implementation of Annex VII of the Dayton Peace Agreement (return of all expelled citizens to their pre-war homes). As long as this process is not completed, the 1991 census is to be applied, in order to avoid legalizing the results of genocide and ethnic cleansing. This is a constitutional provision that cannot be put out of force unless someone, like the High Representative (HR) or a competent state body, declares the return of expelled citizens ended. As this has not happened, this current legal norm remains in force. The current system under the FBiH Constitution is in line with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The BiH Constitutional Court cannot contradict the European Court.
All citizens of the Federation of BiH must fully enjoy their civil and political rights, more precisely to elect and be elected to all legislative organs. The HDZ wants a consociational democracy, but one not based on the proportion of Croats throughout the country but rather one based only on four cantons that the HDZ controls. The HDZ’s efforts to change the BiH Election Law were motivated by their wish to legally mark part of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory as a “third entity.” Croatia and Russia support these efforts, in contradiction to the Dayton Peace Agreement, jeopardizing the entire political system.
The idea of blocking implementation of the election results is political, not legal. The earlier, 2011 HDZ effort to block implementation of electoral results led to the intervention of the High Representative. Annex 10 of the Framework Dayton Peace Agreement would still require the High Representative to intervene again to secure fair and democratic elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which means that he would then be obliged to intervene again.
The elections last until the moment of implementation of the electoral results, which are an integral part of the electoral process. It is important to relieve the public of unnecessary fears about changes to the Election Law of BiH and devote efforts instead to announcing, holding and implementing elections. This would enable other, more important issues to be discussed, such as the motives of tens of thousands of young citizens of Bosnia Herzegovina who leave Bosnia every year and seek for their better life abroad.
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Croatian Assembly of Bosnia says I’m wrong
Josip Merdžo, Secretary General of the Croatian National Assembly BiH, writes:
In your article ‘Bosnia’s teapot tempest’ released at peacefare.net, May, 2nd, 2018, several inaccurate facts were made regarding the decision of the Constitutional Court of BiH U-23/14 related to the request made by Mr. Ljubic for reviewing the constitutionality of the Election Law. Obviously, you did not read this request because in your article you said that „… Ljubić asked the Court to forbid the Croats from Sarajevo, Tuzla and Bihać from becoming members of the House of Peoples of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina“, which is not true, and you can check it by reviewing the Constitutional Court’s decision U-23/14.
You also claim „He argued that Croat candidates should be elected only out of the majority Croat cantons, thus ensuring that only Croats vote for Croat delegates“,obviously not knowing the provisions of the Constitution FBiH and Election Law which precisely foresee that each constituent people within their own club in cantonal assemblies elect delegates for The House of Peoples.
Mr. Serwer, this is not about politics, it is just about legal arguments. The elections are conducted in accordance with the Election Law. Currently, the Election Law lacks a part that the Constitutional Court has abolished and there is no possibility to form the House of Peoples of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the House of Peoples at the state level.
Yes, this provision remains in the Entity Constitution of FBiH, but if I am not mistaken, the Constitution of BiH and the decision of the BiH Constitutional Court are above the Entity Constitution. So there is no legal ability to carry out what you are writing about.
You mention the situation after the 2010 elections when the OHR suspended the CEC decision when the session of the House of Peoples was annulled because the President of the Federation was elected in an improper manner. If you had tried to be better informed, you would never use this shameful move by the OHR and international community as a positive example.
According to the Election Law, the mandate of the legislative bodies lasts four years. It is unclear how you make the conclusion that this mandate can be extended after the expiry of this deadline. An example is found in the OHR standpoint on the City Council of Mostar. After the end of the mandate, the City Council no longer exists although the elections were not held for reasons because no amendment to the Election Law was made.
How little do you know about the things you are writing about is demonstrated once again in the fact that you are looking for the OHR and the international institutions not to apply the 2013 census but 1991 census! The BiH Constitution does not mention any census regarding electoral issues at all. The Entity Constitution of the FBiH in Amendment 52 Article 11a, states that the public institutions apply a 1991 census, namely: “Ministries in the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cantonal Governments, Municipal Authorities, Cantonal and Municipal Courts in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina . “, So the 1991 census does not apply to the legislative bodies.
If you look at the valid provisions of the Election Law of BiH, you could also find that the “last census” is mentioned as a benchmark on a number of occasions, and the latest census is 2013. Also, Constitutional Court decisions U-23/14 and U-3/17 refer exclusively to the application of the 2013 census.
Dear Mr. Serwer, I do not intend to comment on your dealing with the HDZ, third entity, separatist tendencies, etc., which are commonly found in the performances of extreme Bosniak elements. That just proves that you are dominantly trying to enforce political interpretations instead of legal ones, and here we are talking about the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s decision.
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Bosnia’s teapot tempest
In December 2016, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) ruled partially in favor of a complaint lodged by former Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ) politician Božo Ljubić. At issue was the state election law provision dictating that cantons delegate at least one representative from each of the country’s three main ethnic groups to the Federation BiH House of Peoples. Ljubić argued that the Croat influence in cantons with majority Bosniak populations was unfairly diminished in the selection of delegates. He argued that Croat candidates therefore should be elected only out of majority Croat cantons, thereby ensuring that only Croats vote for Croat delegates. In effect, Ljubić asked the Court to forbid the Croats from Sarajevo, Tuzla and Bihać from becoming members of the House of Peoples of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Court partially agreed with Ljubić. The ruling struck down a portion of the country’s election law, stating that it must be amended within six months, without specifying changes. In previous, unrelated cases, the Court prescribed temporary solutions that enabled a ruling implementation; however, it declined to do so in this instance.
This has led some, especially HDZ leadership, to argue that a legal vacuum now exists, claiming that the failure to amend the law could render the October general elections invalid or, alternatively, prevent government formation at the Federation entity level, ultimately leading to a total political paralysis and the collapse of the social security system.
This argument is not legal, but political.
The Constitution of the Federation BiH clearly regulates the election of delegates to the entity and state-level House of Peoples, as based on Annex VII of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). Annex VII provides that all citizens can live and exercise their civil and political rights – including the right to vote and be elected – in their pre-war residence, as well as throughout the country. Furthermore, the Federation entity Constitution states that the 1991 Census has to be used in determining the number of delegates in the Federation House of Peoples. Disregarding this requirement amounts to rewarding the results of ethnic cleansing and genocide.
The said provisions of the Federation Constitution remain fully valid. Moreover, they are in line with the European Court of Human Rights rulings. Consequently, some of the members of the Central Election Commission (CEC) have publicly stated that the CEC can and will use the Federation BiH Constitution and the valid provisions of the state election law to elect delegates to the Federation entity House of Peoples.
The HDZ appears to be misreading the Court’s decision in order to justify its planned prevention of the election of delegates from four cantons controlled by the HDZ (West Herzegovina, Posavina, Livno, and Herzegovina-Neretva) to the Federation entity’s House of Peoples. The ruse of electoral illegitimacy and the resulting crisis is simply another effort toward the HDZ’s territorial ambitions of creating a so-called “third entity.” In this, the HDZ leaders are publicly backed by the Government of Croatia and the Russian Federation.
The HDZ staged a similar production following the 2010 election, when it tried to block government formation by refusing to elect delegates from the four aforementioned cantons. Their abstention from political participation failed – despite support afforded by Milorad Dodik’s SNSD – when the Office of the High Representative (OHR) intervened to enable the formation of the Federation BiH government.
The DPA envisages the OHR as the final arbiter precisely because no other final adjudicating authority exists within the legal order established by the DPA, of which Constitution of BiH is an integral part. Should the HDZ employ the same tactic following the October 2018 elections, the OHR can end the impasse by intervening in the same manner as in 2011 or, alternatively, by simply imposing the Federation BiH 2019 budget before the December 31, 2018 deadline. Marinko Čavara, the HDZ-appointed Federation BiH president, can dissolve the Federation BiH parliament only if the legislative body fails to adopt the entity budget before the end of calendar year.
Furthermore, the HDZ cannot prevent formation of the BiH Council of Ministers, which is elected solely by the state-level House of Representatives. In its 2011 decision, the Constitutional Court recognized the legal status of Sulejman Tihić as a standing member of the BiH House of Peoples despite the HDZ’s and SNSD’s claims that the delegates’ previous mandates expired after new elections had been held. The Court ruled in favor of the continuity of government in principle, meaning that officials must continue performing their tasks until new ones are sworn in. Thus, the state-level legislature continued to function despite HDZ and SNSD belligerence.
Under this precedent, similar attempts at disruption by HDZ (or other) delegates will not lead to the disruption of the BiH legal order, as the HDZ and others falsely claim, nor will it be the end of BiH as an internationally recognized state, as both the HDZ and SNSD hope. The Ljubić ruling will not render invalid the results of the 2018 general election or deny government formation as long as the international community stands by the letter and the spirit of the DPA. The OHR should continue to fulfill the legal obligation thrust upon it by the international guarantors of the DPA, of which the US – the architect of the Bosnian peace – is of supreme importance.
The OHR and the international community cannot allow the 2013 Census results to be used as the basis for determining the formula for allocation of House of People delegates because that would directly violate the Federation BiH Constitution, annul the Annex VII of DPA, and amount to accepting the results of ethnic cleansing.
The implementation of the Ljubić decision in the spirit of HDZ’s interpretation would be equivalent to a contemporary “Three-Fifths Compromise.” The United States has a moral obligation not to allow such “solutions” to be implemented under its watch.
Furthermore, the implementation of the Ljubić decision in the spirit of HDZ’s interpretation would only embolden HDZ’s and SNSD’s ever-growing separatist ambitions, spelling instability and a likely return to conflict in the not too distant future – a security nightmare in the heart of Europe that would be more than welcomed by the Kremlin.
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