Tag: Balkans
Stay the course
I spent last week visiting two allegedly dysfunctional states in the Balkans: Macedonia and Kosovo. Rumors of their incapacity or even demise are exaggerated. I visited with government officials, parliamentarians, NGOers, journalists, and old friends. I saw their presidents and prime ministers, but not their foreign ministers, as both were traveling. Despite their real problems, both states are functional and have made enormous progress over the past twenty years.
I started in Macedonia, which is saddled with two current issues: a law on language that the President refuses to sign and a dispute concerning its name with Greece.
The former raises constitutional questions, as the parliament has passed the law twice, after which the President is obliged to sign. He claims however that the law, which increases the required use of Albanian by state institutions, contradicts the constitution, which he is sworn to uphold. People get really worked up over this, but I just don’t see how it compares even remotely to the political crisis that enveloped the country in 2016 and 2017, when the opposition was publicizing wiretaps that demonstrated abuse of power. I’m betting Macedonia’s citizens and politicians will figure out how to get the constitutional court to decide who is right. That would be an institutional solution appropriate to the challenge. Not so bad.
The second problem is a congenital one. From the moment of independence, Athens challenged Skopje’s right to use “Macedonia” and has refused to accept Macedonia into NATO either as the Republic of Macedonia (its constitutional name) or as The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (The FYROM), the appellation Greece agreed in 1995 would apply to membership in international organizations.
This is the moral equivalent of the United States objecting to Mexico’s official name (Estados Unidos Mexicanos), or the Mexicans objecting to “New Mexico.” As in the rest of the Balkans, the real issues are territory and identity, not the name. Here too there are lots of solutions and an ongoing negotiation that appears to be making progress. Current betting is on “Republic of Upper Macedonia,” but precisely when and where that would be used is still uncertain. Any solution will have to pass muster in parliament and get approved in a referendum: again, institutional solutions.
Kosovo has also been through a rough patch, with two issues that created disorder in both the streets and parliament: demarcation of the border with Montenegro and creation of an Association of Serb Municipalities (ASM).
The former verged on silly, since only a few hundred hectares were involved and the agreement had already been concluded as well as ratified in Montenegro before it became controversial in Kosovo. It is now solved and the waters have calmed.
The ASM is still a problem, as it is part of the plan that got Kosovo its independence 10 years ago but risks making Kosovo like Bosnia, which is to say so ethnically divided as to be dysfunctional. The constitutional court has made clear within what parameters the issue should be solved, but some think it will be necessary to go further. That is going to be difficult, especially as the situation in Bosnia is worsening because the leader of its Serb 49% “entity” is using its power-sharing arrangements to block effective governance at the state level. Kosovo Albanians are right to want to avoid that kind of trouble.
Another recent incident has also roiled Kosovo’s waters: Turkish security officials were allowed to seize some of President Erdogan’s political opponents on Kosovo territory and deport them to Turkey, where they face a court system that is doing the President’s bidding. The proper court proceedings were not followed in Kosovo. A parliamentary committee has been commissioned to investigate.
The distinguishing characteristic of all these issues is that they touch on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states that are not yet consolidated, or self-confident (I’m grateful to Veton Surroi, a tough critic of Kosovo’s state-building process so far, for this realization). The result is a level of political (and occasionally physical) conflict that challenges weak institutions.
America’s own early republic had quite a few such challenges to sovereignty (look up Whiskey Rebellion and Marbury v Madison) that had to be decided in the courts, and we are still capable of creating new ones. It would be a mistake to conclude from their existence that the state-building process in the Balkans is a failure. The citizens’ preference for institutional solutions in both Macedonia and Kosovo is clear, even if the politicians don’t always abide by it.
Sovereignty is not yet complete, and territorial integrity not yet ensured. Reassurance on those scores is critical. In the 21st century Balkans, the US and EU need to continue to play their vital roles in ensuring that borders are not moved, minorities are treated in ways that make loyalty to the states in which they live appealing, and governance is not only fair but also functional and effective in producing services and prosperity.
I would guess Kosovo and Macedonia are a lot more than midway between independence and EU membership. Completing that trajectory is the shortest distance to regional peace and stability. We and they should stay the course.
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Peace picks, April 29 – May 6
- Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis: Searching for Relief | Monday, April 30 | 9:00am – 10:30am | Atlantic Council | Register here |
Please join the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center for a critical discussion on the multiple dimensions of the humanitarian crisis, how it has evolved through time, and what can be done to alleviate the suffering. Featuring speakers Diego Beltrand, Regional Director for South America at the International Organization for Migration; Chiara Cardoletti, Deputy Regional Representative to the United States of America and the Caribbean with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR); Julio Castro, Professor in the Infectious Diseases Unit at the Universidad Central de Venezuela; Michael Fitzpatrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary with the United States State Department; José Manuel Olivares, Representative from the National Assembly of Venezuela; and Susana Raffalli, Venezuelanh humanitarian expert. Moderated by , U.S. News Director for NTN24 Gustau Alegret, with remarks by Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Director Jason Marczak.
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- Oman’s Role in a Turbulent Region | Monday, April 30 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
In the midst of a series of diplomatic crises in the Gulf region, Oman stands out as a widely-respected regional mediator and has also led working groups in China and India on bilateral economic ties as well as maintained cordial relations with Iran. What is Oman’s role in promoting diplomacy, security and stability in the Gulf, and the prospects for Oman’s growing economic ties in the region and around the world? The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host Sayyid Badr bin Hamad al-Busaidi, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Oman, to address these pressing questions about Oman’s future. Amb. (ret.) Gerald Feierstein, MEI’s director for Gulf affairs and government relations, will moderate the discussion.
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- Behind the Scenes of Russian Opposition Campaigns | Monday, April 30 | 3:30pm – 5:00pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
How do you run an election campaign when you know that your candidate will not win? What lessons do the latest campaigns offer for the future? The managers of Alexei Navalny’s and Ksenia Sobchak’s 2018 Russian presidential campaigns will discuss their experience and the future of opposition campaigning in Russia. Featuring Leonid Volkov, Chief of Staff for Alexey Navalny, and Vitali Shkliarov, Senior Adviser to Ksenia Sobchak.
There will be a webcast of this event.
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- Denuclearizing North Korea: Practicalities and Politics | Tuesday, May 1 | 9:00am – 12:00pm | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register here |
In the aftermath of the inter-Korean summit on April 27, and ahead of planned U.S.-North Korea talks, please join Carnegie for a deep dive on the practicalities and politics of denuclearizing North Korea. With two sessions: Denuclearization Roadmaps at 9:10am – 10:30am, featuring Corey Hinderstein (vice president of international fuel cycle strategies at the Nuclear Threat Initiative), Eli Levite (nonresident senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment), Li Bin (senior fellow working jointly with the Nucelar Policy Program and the Carnegie Endowment), and Toby Dalton (co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment); and Regional, Political, and Diplomatic Dimensions from 10:45am – 12:00pm, featuring Choi Kang (vice president for research and director of the Center for Foreign Policy and National Security at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies), Douglas H. Paal (vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment), Jung H. Pak (senior fellow and the SK-Korea Foundation chair in Korea studies at Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies), and James L. Schoff (senior fellow in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment). Opening remarks by George Perkovich (vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment).
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- Iraq After ISIS: What to Do Now | Tuesday, May 1 | 12:15pm – 1:45pm | New America | Register here |
In 2017, the United States dealt ISIS a devastating blow eliminating its territorial holdings in Iraq and Syria. Iraq, which will hold national elections on May 12th, emerged out of the war against ISIS strong and in an increasingly positive mood. Yet as Iraq looks ahead to a post-ISIS future, numerous challenges lie ahead. In a new policy report, Iraq After ISIS: What to Do Now, Bartle Bull, author and founder of Northern Gulf Partners, an Iraq-focused merchant banking firm, and Douglas Ollivant, (ASU Senior Future of War Fellow with New America and former Director for Iraq on the National Security Council, propose the contours of a positive, forward-looking U.S.-Iraqi relationship. In discussion moderated by Peter Bergen, Vice President and Director of the International Security Program at New America.
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- Eurasia and Afghanistan – A New Era of Regional Cooperation | Wednesday, May 2 | 10:00am – 12:00pm | Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies (Johns Hopkins University) | Register here |
Despite present challenges to global security and the international liberal order, the South/Central Asian region remains a dynamic and fast-changing region and over the past couple of decades and has shown that increased regional cooperation is indispensable to achieving development goals and stability in the region. Four experts on the region – Afghanistan Ambassador to the United States Hamdullah Mohib, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Earl Anthony Wayne, former U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and Ambassador to Pakistan Richard Olson, and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphel – will analyze the recent progress in regional cooperation, peace process, and the economic integration in broader Eurasian context impacting Afghanistan and Central Asian countries. The discussion will be moderated by Dr. Kent Calder, with introductions by Rohullah Osmani, Visiting Scholar of the Reischauer Center.
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- Japan’s Security Strategy: A Political Update from Nagatacho | Thursday, May 3 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register here |
Please join CSIS for an exchange with Japanese thought leaders on the security policy debate in Nagatacho (a district in central Tokyo where the national parliament, or Diet, is located) and priorities for the U.S.-Japan alliance. Featuring Gen Nakatani (Liberal Democratic Party; Former Minister of Defense), Akihisa Nagashima (Party of Hope; Former Vice Minister of Defense), and Satoshi Morimoto (Takushoku University; Former Minister of Defense), with Sheila Smith (Senior Fellow for Japan Studies, Council on Foreign Relations) and Michael J. Green (Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, CSIS).
This event will be webcast live from this page. No registration necessary.
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- Cyber Risk Thursday: Building a Defensible Cyberspace | Thursday, May 3 | 4:00pm – 5:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
This Cyber Risk Thursday, join the Cyber Statecraft Initiative as we engage key experts and stakeholders for a progressive and solutions-oriented discussion on the defensive innovations and methodologies that can helps secure cyberspace and its underlying infrastructure. A conversation with panelists Gus Hunt (Managing Director and Cyber Lead, Accenture Federal Services) and Jason Healey (Senior Fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Atlantic Council). With welcoming remarks by Frederick Kempe (President and CEO, Atlantic Council), opening remarks by John Goodman (CEO, Accenture Federal Services), and introductory remarks by Dr. Joseph Nye (University Distinguished Service Professor, Harvard University Kennedy School of Government).
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- Time for Action in the Western Balkans: Policy Prescriptions for American Diplomacy | Friday, May 4 | 2:00pm – 3:30pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
The Western Balkans — Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Albania, and Serbia — are re-emerging as a region of stagnation and instability due to poor governance, the influence of outside forces and tense relations between ethnic groups and neighboring states. A forthcoming report by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy and the EastWest Institute highlights the need for immediate, decisive action by the U.S. and the European Union to head off instability and possible violent strife. Please join the U.S. Institute of Peace to hear from the authors of the report — Amb. Frank G. Wisner (International Affairs Advisor, Squire Patton Boggs and former U.S. ambassador to Zambia, Egypt, the Philippines and India), Jonathan Levitsky (Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton, and former Counselor to Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations), Amb. Cameron Munter (CEO and President, the EastWest Institute and former U.S. Ambassador to Serbia and Pakistan), and Tom Graham (Senior Fellow and Managing Director, Kissinger Associates, Inc.) — as they present a strategy for the United States and Europe, working in a revitalized partnership, to forestall a downward spiral in the Western Balkans, which could potentially lead to fractured states and widespread instability on Europe’s borders. In conversation with moderator Amb. Sarah Mendelson (Distinguished Service Professor of Public Policy and Head of Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University, and former U.S. Representative to the Economic and Social Council at the United Nations).
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The US, EU and Kosovo: can they sync up?
Here are the speaking notes for the talk I gave this morning under the auspices of KIPRED in Pristina, Ambassador Lulzim Peci presiding:
- It’s great to be back in Pristina, and an enormous privilege to talk with you here at the Swiss Diamond, though I hope next time to have a Marriott at our disposal as well. Don’t tell your foreign minister I said that!
- I’d like to discuss with you the triangle that has so often driven progress in the Balkans in general and in Kosovo in particular: the US, the EU and of course you.
- When those three are in sync, nothing stops us. When they are out of sync, little progress is made on big issues, including those that can threaten peace and stability.
- Let me start with the US. Its circumstances have changed dramatically since the 1990s and early 2000s, when relatively small American interventions—military and diplomatic—ended and prevented wars in the Balkans, including the 2001 conflict in Macedonia.
- That was the unipolar moment, when Yeltsin’s Russia was on the ropes and China had not yet started to show its financial muscle.
- In the 1990s, the US was not yet tired of playing the role of global policeman and it was confident of its own strong democratic tradition.
- The 17 years since 9/11 have changed that. The attack on the World Trade Center prompted a justified US invasion of Afghanistan and an unjustified US invasion of Iraq, both of which seemed to go well at first but bogged down into quagmires that sapped American finances, strength and confidence.
- Now we live in a multi-polar world, one in which President Putin is trying to reassert Moscow’s claim to great power status and President Xi doesn’t even have to try.
- The financial crisis of 2008 sent the world’s economy into a tailspin. Though the American recovery was relatively steady and even fast compared to Europe’s, a large portion of the relatively uneducated, white, male working population still hasn’t recovered.
- It was their discontent, especially in the Midwest, that led to President Trump’s election in 2016. He lacked a majority of the popular vote but gained a modest margin in the electoral college, which gives less populous states greater weight in determining who wins the presidency.
- The Trump Administration is not a conservative one: it has abandoned a central conservative tenet—concern about the budget deficit—in favor of a massive tax cut for the wealthy and an unprecedented boost in military spending as well as sharply increased military activities focused on Islamic extremism, especially in the Middle East and Africa.
- It has also been sometimes belligerent towards North Korea and always towards, while abandoning both the Trans-Pacific and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnerships and throwing down the gauntlet on trade and investment as a challenge, especially to China.
- The Administration’s initial hostility towards NATO has been corrected, but the President has little use for the EU, whose sharing of responsibilities is anathema to an America First attitude.
- I need only mention briefly that the Administration is also preoccupied with a series of dramatic scandals that involve Russian tampering in the US election, the President’s many sexual affairs, and his financial and other legal improprieties. This is a confused White House under siege.
- As a consequence, Trump focuses on keeping his big money donors and his white working-class base happy. He explicitly states that he has no interest in how others govern themselves and has warmed to autocrats like Presidents Duterte, Putin, Xi, and Sisi.
- The kind of liberal democracy “of the people, by the people and for the people” that many in Kosovo aspire to is under threat in America and out of fashion in much of the rest of the world, as ethnic nationalists and kleptocratic elites feel unconstrained by Trump.
- So you shouldn’t be surprised when I say that the Balkans and their governance failures are one of the last things on minds in Washington. Even if he is married to a Slovene, President Trump hasn’t spent more than a few minutes on the Balkans since taking office.
- Instead, career officials in the State and Defense Departments have thankfully kept US Balkans policy on their previous course, and Vice President Pence as well as former National Security Adviser McMaster have intervened constructively.
- But it is going to be difficult to match even the low Obama-level interest in Balkans democracy with President Trump in the White House.
- The situation in Europe is better. The Europeans were for years preoccupied with their own financial crisis, the Greek debt debacle, and their consequences for the euro and for growth.
- Europe was also deeply scarred by the refugee influx from the Middle East and Africa and its implications for terrorism. More than 100,000 illegal border crossings occurred here in the Balkan, putting economic, logistical and political strain on the region.
- Some Europeans even within the EU have turned to demagogic leaders who promise to protect nativist groups from foreigners, while the British made the enormous mistake of voting narrowly to withdraw from the EU, in large part due to xenophobia.
- But Europe’s economy is now slowly recovering, and the Europeans have become much more alert to Putin’s trouble-making since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the attempted coup in Montenegro in 2016, and this year’s attempted murder of defectors in Britain.
- To my delight, the European Commission, alarmed by Putin, seized an opportunity in February to reopen the political window for EU accession in 2025, saying that those who qualify by 2023 will be welcomed in two years later. They did not say when the window would close.
- For good reasons, many doubt the sincerity, and even the feasibility, of this promise to enlarge once again. It is explicitly conditional on internal reforms to strengthen the Union, and it will require ratifications by current members that may prove difficult to elicit, including referenda in France and maybe the Netherlands.
- This is nevertheless an extraordinary opportunity. It is my hope that as many Balkan countries as possible will take advantage of it. Most of the benefits of EU membership come in preparing for accession.
- Montenegro and Serbia lead the regatta, as they have achieved candidacy status and are making their way as quickly as they can through the chapters of the acquis.
- But others are not so far behind: the Commission has recommended candidacy status for Albania as well as Macedonia, and Kosovo has approved border demarcation with Montenegro and will now I hope get the visa waiver. That will be an important milestone in synching up with the US and the EU.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina, although it has applied for candidacy, is in many respects the laggard, as its governing system is based on the awkward constitution Americans wrote at Dayton.
- Nevertheless, a process that has been frozen pretty much since Croatia acceded to the EU in 2013 has restarted. Opportunities like this one don’t come often.
- That brings me to the Commission’s Progress Report on Kosovo and its implications for your government, parliament, and civil society.
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The US, the EU and Macedonia
Here are the notes I used speaking in the Macedonian Parliament yesterday with Prime Minister Zaev, EU Ambassador Zbogar, and representatives of the governing and opposition political parties, under the chairmanship Artan Grubi:
- It’s great to be back in Skopje, and an enormous privilege to talk with you here at the Parliament.
- My thanks especially to Artan Grubi for suggesting this occasion, to Samuel Zbogar for tolerating an American’s comments on Europe’s business, and to all of you for being here.
- I’d like to discuss with you the triangle that has so often driven progress in the Balkans in general and in Macedonia in particular: the US, the EU and of course you.
- When those three are in sync, nothing stops us. When they are out of sync, little progress is made on big issues, including those that can threaten peace and stability. The Ohrid agreement is Exhibit 1, but this was also true at Dayton, in the leadup to the fall of Milosevic, and in Montenegro’s successful bid for NATO membership.
- Both the US and the EU have been through a difficult decade. But despite many difficulties, they have maintained their policies on the Balkans
- Career officials in the US State and Defense Departments have kept their previous course, while Vice President Pence and National Security Adviser McMaster have intervened clearly and constructively.
- Washington wants the Balkans peaceful and secure. The best way to ensure that is membership in NATO for those who want it as well as in the EU.
- The situation in Europe is analogous. The Europeans were for years preoccupied with their own financial crisis, the Greek debt debacle, and their consequences for the euro and for growth.
- Europe was also deeply scarred by the refugee influx from the Middle East and Africa and its implications for terrorism.
- Some Europeans have turned to demagogic leaders who promise to protect nativist groups from foreigners, while the British made the enormous mistake of voting narrowly to withdraw from the EU, in large part due to xenophobia.
- But Europe’s economy is now slowly recovering, and the Europeans have become much more alert to Putin’s trouble-making since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the attempted coup in Montenegro in 2016, and this year’s attempted murder of defectors in Britain.
- To my delight, the Europeans, alarmed by Russia, seized an opportunity in February to reopen the political window for EU accession in 2025, saying essentially that those who qualify by 2023 will be welcomed in two years later. They did not say when the window would close.
- For good reasons, many doubt the sincerity and even the feasibility, of this promise to enlarge once again. It is explicitly conditional on internal reforms to strengthen the Union, and it will require ratifications by current members that may prove difficult to elicit, including referenda in France and the Netherlands.
- This is nevertheless an extraordinary opportunity. It is my hope that as many Balkan countries as possible will take advantage of it.
- A process that has been frozen pretty much since Croatia acceded to the EU in 2013 has been restarted. Opportunities like this one don’t come often.
- That brings me to the Commission’s Progress Report on Macedonia and its implications for your government and parliament.
- The Progress Report is positive for Macedonia, which has clearly overcome a difficult and prolonged political crisis and is now pointed in the right direction.
- But I won’t worry too much about the Commission’s compliments. I’ll focus instead on the missing pieces of the Macedonian part of the puzzle.
- First and foremost is rule of law. Many of you will know the details of what the Europeans want better than I do, so I won’t bore you with those.
- I prefer to underline how truly fundamental an independent judiciary is to good governance. The essence of liberal democracy is individual rights.
- If I am unable to rely on the justice system to protect my rights as an individual, I’ll look elsewhere for security: to my family, my clan, my neighborhood, my language group, my ethnicity, my race, my religion, or my political party. We all have those identities, but when threatened with insecurity one or the other of them becomes dominant, or even exclusive.
- The result is a political struggle for power among different groups that all consider themselves victims. That struggle has degenerated in post-Communist Yugoslavia into war at least five times. You were witnesses to how bad that is when it happens.
- But what may not be so apparent is the role of an independent judiciary in making sure that it doesn’t.
- If I can expect to be treated fairly and objectively by the courts and hence also by the police and the rest of the public administration, I’ve got precious little to fight about, or grievances with which to rally others.
- There is nothing more important to Macedonia’s future as a state than establishing a judicial system that treats, and is perceived to treat, Albanians and Macedonians, women and men, members of SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE as well as DUI and DPA, equally and fairly.
- This is especially important when it comes to high-level corruption and abuse of power. It isn’t easy. You are watching in real time as the American judiciary tries to establish whether there were abuses during our last election. We’ll get through it, but not without a lot of problems.
- You’ll get through it too, again not without lots of problems.
- One further point: the kind of liberal democracy I am talking about requires a viable, constitutional opposition with a real possibility of alternating in power. That possibility should never evaporate, because it keeps politicians honest and alert to the needs of their constituents.
- VMRO-DPMNE fell from power in a terrible scandal, but it or some other party that represents its constituency has to have the real possibility of returning to power, as does DPA or some other group now in opposition.
- Balkan politics need to adjust to the notion that opposition is a vital part of democracy. Being out of power is hard, but just as important as being in it.
- Someone will say, what about the external factor? Even if we get an independent judiciary, even if alternation in power is a real possibility, even if our opposition is a viable one, Greece is blocking our path not only to the EU but also to NATO. Even if we meet all the EU accession requirements, won’t Athens still be a problem?
- Yes, is the short answer. You have a choice.
- There are two directions: a downward spiral of resentment that rejects EU and NATO conditionality and makes Macedonia vulnerable to Russian inducements, leading eventually to violence and partition, as the Russians will of course back the Greeks and those Macedonians who aren’t committed to a real democracy with equal rights.
- That is the direction you were headed in just a year ago.
- The other direction is a virtuous spiral that accepts tough NATO and EU conditions and keeps the country intact, leading eventually to a much higher standard of living and elimination of hard borders with Greece and Kosovo.
- I know of course what I would choose. But what does it mean to accept NATO and EU conditionality?
- With respect to NATO, I think it was a mistake for the US to say that Greece and Macedonia would have to come to an agreement before membership could be considered. That essentially delegated the US veto to Greece, which has not hesitated to use it, albeit informally.
- But that deed is done. Now the only way to sync up effectively with the Americans is to reach an agreement with Greece.
- I know that is painful, but the moment has come. You need to meet Athens somewhere in the middle, with a solution that emphasizes civic and not ethnic identity. Only then can NATO and EU become realities.
- Let me underline one other point: no matter what formal solution to the “name” issue you decide on, now or in the future, guys like me will continue calling you citizens of Macedonia and your language Macedonian until you ask us to stop, even if the formal agreement is ergo omnes.
- A Balkan friend whom I asked for advice on this talk wrote back: “The question is how we maintain the EU path with all these problems [throughout the Balkans and in the geostrategic environment]. How do we keep it as a value system and not just as a quick carrot? Can we hold with our institutions and economy until things will get more stable in the EU?”
- Those are the right questions. It is up to you to answer.
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The R word in practice
Natasa Kandic yesterday sent around a policy brief on How the European Union Can Contribute to Reconciliation of Post-Yugoslav Countries. It starts with a review of judicial proceedings in the region and continues on to this account of RECOM, an indigenous effort at non-judicial reconciliation that merits more attention than it has gotten. So I have taken the liberty of publishing that part of the policy brief here:
An Extrajudicial Fact-Finding and Truth-Telling
Body (RECOM)
The regional intergovernmental commission for the establishment of the facts about victims and the circumstances of their death (RECOM), should by its seal prevent the political manipulations and interpretations that jeopardize connectivity and cooperation. This would reduce room for lies, denial, and the production of nationalist narratives about the wars, and contribute to the humanization of the other, the stability and security of the region and the sustainability of economic cooperation, and at the same time enable reforms of educational programs in those parts concerning recent history.
In 2008, non-governmental organizations from the former Yugoslavia established the Coalition for RECOM, which today includes more than 2,100 organizations and individuals and advocates the establishment of a Regional Commission for the Establishment of the Facts on War Crimes and Other Serious Violations of Human Rights Committed in the Territory the Former Yugoslavia (RECOM). The initiative for the establishment of the Commission has been supported by the signatures of over 580,000 citizens from the entire region, and, following a broadly inclusive, four-year consultation process (during which 128 debates were held with 6,700 representatives of civil society), the goals, tasks, competence, duration and procedures of the future intergovernmental commission have been formulated. Starting from this foundation, the final version of the Draft Statute of RECOM was agreed in 2014 by the Special Envoys of the Presidents of Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia, and the Bosniak and Croat members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In the meantime, two new members of the Presidency (2014) were elected in BiH, with which the Coalition for RECOM has not yet managed to hold a meeting, while the Bosniak Presidency member has continued to support the establishment of RECOM. A new President was elected in Croatia in 2015 who believes that support for the establishment of RECOM is outside the scope of the competence of the President. In this situation, in which some newly elected politicians have ceased to support civil initiatives that enjoyed the support of their predecessors, the Coalition for RECOM has created a new strategy, which starts from the affirmation of the Berlin Process as being an appropriate platform for the agreement of post-Yugoslav leaders to launch an intergovernmental project for reconciliation. The first step is to be the signing of the Agreement on the Establishment of RECOM at the Berlin Process Summit in London in July 2018, by which the post-Yugoslav countries’ Prime Ministers, whose support would remain unchangeable (independent of elections), would demonstrate the willingness of their states to initiate procedures for the establishment of RECOM, in accordance with Article 48 of the Draft Statute. An equally important step is to re-engage Croatia in the RECOM process, in which it played a leading role until the beginning of 2015.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The progress in the reconciliation of post-Yugoslav countries requires the following:
1. Strengthening of the domestic judiciaries and their cooperation in the prosecution of war crimes:
– Support for the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) becoming the engine of regional cooperation in the prosecution of war crimes – to assist in the creation of a regional prosecutorial strategy, to provide easier access to evidence and facts established before the ICTY, and to provide expert support in investigations and in the preparation of indictments against individuals who participated in the planning of mass crimes but today hold positions that protect them from criminal responsibility.
– Resolving bilateral disputes between Serbia and Croatia by signing a bilateral agreement on the prosecution of war crimes, according to which the trials would be held on the basis of the defendant’s domicile, thus in practice eliminating the possible harmful consequences of the application of the universal jurisdiction principle contained in the law of the Republic of Serbia and the Croatian Law on the invalidity of legal acts produced in Serbia.
– The relinquishment by the BiH Presidency of the principle of territorial jurisdiction and acceptance of the standard whereby each state holds trials of its citizens, since this approach contributes the most to critical re-examination within the society and facing its own responsibility towards others.
2. Signing a political agreement by which the post-Yugoslav countries will undertake to create the conditions for the establishment of RECOM within a reasonable time frame:
– Signing of the agreement under the auspices of the Berlin Process at the London Summit in July 2018. The agreement should include the possibility of later accession, as well as an invitation to the other countries in this regard.
– Increasing the visibility of the objectives and tasks of the future Commission, especially the importance of the list of war victims in the context of the humanization of the victims and the public recognition of all 130,000 victims.
3. The action plan of the European Commission’s Western Balkans Strategy for a credible enlargement perspective should provide for explicit measures:
– To support the establishment and operation of the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts on war crimes and other serious human rights violations in the territory of the former SFRY in the period from 1 January 1991 to 31 December 2001 (RECOM), and to define the establishment and commencement of the work of this commission by the end of 2019 as an indicator of progress in the process of reconciliation;
– To support the cooperation of the domestic prosecutors’ offices with the MICT in the creation and implementation of the regional prosecutorial strategy, and define the development of the strategy by mid-2019 as an indicator of progress in establishing the rule of law and contribution to the reconciliation process.
4. The European Parliament should provide strong support to reconciliation in the region
through a resolution that would support the establishment and operation of the
regional intergovernmental commission – RECOM.
5. The European Commission and the European Parliament should organize a donor conference and the establishment of the Post-Yugoslav Reconciliation Fund, which would finance regional projects focusing on peace-building and common issues and include all post-Yugoslav countries.
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Peace picks, March 19 – March 25
- Japan’s Balancing Between Nuclear Disarmament and Deterrence | Monday, March 19 | 1:00pm – 2:30pm | Stimson Center | Register here |
Join us for the launch of Balancing Between Nuclear Deterrence and Disarmament: Views from the Next Generation. This volume offers analyses by five scholars who examine the complex question of how Japan should balance between its short-term requirement for effective nuclear deterrence and its long-term desire for a nuclear-free world in the face of increasing uncertainty relating to nuclear weapons in its own neighborhood. Yuki Tatsumi leads a panel discussion of the report with its five authors: Masahiro Kurita, Fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies in the Ministry of Defense of Japan; Wakana Mukai, Assistant Professor at the Faculty of International Relations, Asia University; Masashi Murano, Research Fellow at the Okazaki Institute; Masahiro Okuda (joining via pre-recorded remarks), Ph.D. candidate at the Takushoku University Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies; and Heigo Sato, Vice President of the Institute for World Studies at Takushoku University.
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- Foreign Policy and Fragile States | Monday, March 19 | 2:00pm – 3:00pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
Seven years into a brutal civil war in Syria, we are reminded how fragile states can lead to regional instability, cause humanitarian crises, and fall prey to extremist organizations such as ISIS. In this discussion, we’ll ask how the United States and the international community can address these national security challenges. How should U.S. assistance be prioritized and allocated? What is the difference between stabilizing a country versus nation building? How can the international community help a country like Syria? What lessons can be learned from efforts in countries, such as Nigeria and Colombia, preventing violence? And ultimately, how can we get ahead of the underlying causes of fragility that lead to and perpetuate violent conflict? Join leading experts at the United States Institute of Peace to discuss these vital questions. With Nancy Lindborg, President of the U.S. Institute of Peace; Ilan Goldenberg, Director of the Middle East Security Program at Center for a New American Security; Kimberly Kagan, Founder and President of the Institute for the Study of War. Moderated by Joshua Johnson, host of NPR’s program 1A.
This event will be live-taped for future broadcast on Public Radio International’s America Abroad and WAMU’s 1A.
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- Looking Ahead at the Next Presidential Term in Russia | Monday, March 19 | 2:30pm – 4:00pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
Few doubt that Vladimir Putin will be re-elected to a fourth presidential term on March 18, but there are many questions regarding what that election outcome will mean for Russia’s future. Putin’s main competitor, Alexei Navalny, was barred from participating and has called for a boycott. While a widespread boycott is unlikely, the number of recent protests suggest that political dissatisfaction is growing among at least a well-organized minority. Many questions also remain about where the next Putin Administration will take the Russian political system, economy, and foreign policy. The Atlantic Council will host a discussion on what’s next for the Russian government and population during the new presidential term. With Dr. Anders Åslund (Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council), Vladimir Kara-Murza (Chairman, Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom), Dr. Lilia Shevtsova (Associate Fellow, Chatham House), and Ambassador Alexander Vershbow (Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council); moderated by Ambassador John Herbst (Director of the Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council).
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- Charting a Path Forward for the Democratic Republic of the Congo | Tuesday, March 20 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Brookings Institution (hosted by Service Employees International Union) | Register here |
Amid rising turmoil in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), President Joseph Kabila remains in power despite a constitutional mandate calling for the end of his rule in December 2016. Although the next round of presidential and parliamentary elections is now scheduled for December of this year, and opposition leaders are gearing up for a fight, there is considerable uncertainty regarding Kabila’s real intentions. Facing numerous calls from Western leaders to step down, regional nations such as Botswana have also called attention to the rise in violence as an effect of Kabila’s corrosive hold on the DRC. The Foreign Policy program at Brookings, in collaboration with Stand With Congo, will host a discussion on the current state of the DRC as violence rises and elections are purportedly on the horizon. Panelists will include Tom Perriello, former U.S. special envoy for the African Great Lakes and Congo-Kinshasa; Omékongo Dibinga, professor at American University; and EJ Hogendoorn from the International Crisis Group. Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon will moderate the conversation.
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- Challenges to Democracy in the Digital Age | Wednesday, March 21 | 9:30am – 11:00am | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register here |
While the United States and the European Union have different approaches to privacy and data protection, both are critical partners to protecting freedom online. Europe and the United States have faced an escalation of hate speech, terrorist content, fake news, and misinformation online. They both encounter challenges in accessing electronic evidence for investigative purposes and in protecting personal data against cyberattacks. Join CSIS on Wednesday, March 21 for a timely conversation with H.E. Věra Jourová, EU Commissioner for Justice, Consumers, and Gender Equality, on the EU approach to the challenges democracies face in the digital age. The subsequent panel will review transatlantic efforts to countering hate speech, misinformation, and protecting personal data. Featuring Renate Nikolay, Head of Commissioner Jourová’s Cabinet; with CSIS experts James Andrew Lewis, Heather A. Conley, and Samm Sacks.
This event will be webcast live from this page.
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- Hidden Wounds: Trauma and Civilians in the Syrian Conflict | Wednesday, March 21 | 2:30pm – 4:00pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
Seven years of conflict in Syria have exacted an enormous human toll and led to widespread physical destruction. The psychological impact of the war, although less visible, has been just as devastating. The levels of trauma and distress impacting Syrian civilians have been staggering, with nearly 500,000 killed, half the population displaced, and more than 13 million Syrians in need of humanitarian assistance. The traumatic impact of the Syrian conflict is less often acknowledged, but could significantly impair the ability of Syrian civilians to recover and build a more peaceful future. Please join USIP and specialists from the Syrian American Medical Society, the U.S State Department and Save the Children for a panel discussion, addressing an aspect of the Syrian conflict that often receives less attention than it deserves. Featuring Catherine Bou-Maroun of the U.S. Department of State, Dr. Mohamed Khaled Hamza of the Syrian-American Medical Society, and Amy Richmond of Save the Children. The panel will be moderated by Mona Yacoubian of USIP, with opening remarks from USIP President Nancy Lindborg.
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- Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean | Wednesday, March 21 | 3:00pm – 4:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
On March 21, Hudson Institute will host a panel to discuss transnational organized crime in Latin America. The panel will discuss a new book, Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean: From Evolving Threats and Responses to Integrated Adaptive Solutions, by Dr. Evan Ellis. The book details the interaction and evolution of various criminal entities, including powerful cartels, criminal bands, territorially-oriented gangs, groups performing intermediary functions in the international criminal economy, and groups with a focus on political or religious extremist objectives. The conversation will be moderated by Hudson Senior Fellow Ambassador Jaime Daremblum.
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- Can the Balkans Really Join the EU? | Wednesday, March 21 | 4:30pm – 6:00pm | SAIS Conflict Management Program and Center for Transatlantic Relations | Register here |
The European Union has opened the window for accession of new Balkan members starting in 2025. It is not clear when the window will close. Can the countries of the region take advantage of this opportunity? Who leads and who trails? What can be done to ensure success? This conversation features a panel of representatives from various Balkan states: Josip Brkic, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Vlora Citaku, Ambassador of Kosovo to the United States; Srdjan Darmanovic, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro; Djerdj Matkovic, Ambassador of Serbia to the United States; Vasko Naumovski, ambassador of Macedonia to the United States. Moderated by SAIS professor Daniel Serwer.
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