Tag: Balkans
Farewell to failure
State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary Escobar and EU Special Representative Lajcak, both with mandates for the Western Balkans during the past three years, are saying their farewells in Washington this week. These are two experienced diplomats who know the Balkans well. They have collaborated without much friction. The biggest visible issue has been American support for “Open Balkans,” a scheme for facilitating trade. The Europeans rightly viewed it as unnecessary and duplicative of their own efforts in what is known as “the Berlin process.”
But Lajcak and Escobar failed to produce the political normalization between Kosovo and Serbia that they made their top priority.
What went wrong?
Escobar and Lajcak started badly and ended worse. They promised Belgrade that they would prioritize the creation of the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities inside Kosovo. They ended without significant progress on that mistaken priority.
Pristina had committed to the Association in a 2013 Brussels agreement. But Escobar and Lajcak neglected to get Belgrade to deliver the quid pro quo. In addition to the Association, the Brussels agreement acknowledges the validity of the Kosovo constitution and justice system in its entire territory, commits the Serbs to participating in Pristina’s governing institutions, and pledges that Kosovo and Serbia will advance to the EU without interfering with each other.
Belgrade has reneged on all those commitments. It has maintained de facto governance over the Serb population in the Serb-majority communities of northern Kosovo. It organized the boycott of municipal elections there. Belgrade also withdrew Serb officials from the police and courts. And Serbia has done everything possible to hinder Kosovo entry into the Council of Europe.
Belgrade then went on the offensive
Frustrated with the failure of the EU and US to deliver the Association, Serbia last year decided to make things worse. It kidnapped two Kosovo police from Kosovo territory, rented a mob to attack NATO peacekeepers inside Kosovo, and organized a terrorist attack that was supposed to provide the excuse for a Serbian military intervention.
By the end of last year, Serbian President Vucic was expressing hope for changed geopolitical conditions, including Trump’s reelection, that would enable Serbia to retake part or all of Kosovo. The newly inaugurated Serbian government includes vocal supporters of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the leading advocate of the “Serbian world,” a euphemism for Greater Serbia.
Policy needs a reset
Clearly, Western policy towards Serbia is not working. Washington and Brussels aren’t doing much better with Kosovo. Pristina has refused to move on the Association, despite costly European “consequences” and vituperative US denunciations. Only if Belgrade implements the other provisions of the 2013 Brussels agreement will Pristina respond in kind. Vucic is in no mood to do that.
Success requires a reset. The more political dialogue the 2013 agreement initiated has demonstrably failed for more than a decade. The more technical dialogue that preceded it was far more successful. It focused on issues that could produce demonstrable benefits to the citizens of both countries. Despite spotty implementation, the results were substantial. Even today, Pristina and Belgrade have done better with practical issues like license plates and identity documents than political normalization.
That is the right direction for the future. Political normalization for now is a bridge too far. Serbia won’t be interested in surrendering its sovereignty claims in Kosovo until the war in Ukraine ends Russian annexations there. Kosovo won’t be interested in forming the Association until it is confident that Serbia accepts its sovereignty and territorial integrity. But both Belgrade and Pristina can welcome smoothing movement through their mutual borders and enabling more licit trade and commerce.
Pristina has rightly begun to insist on use of its official currency, the Euro, in transactions within Kosovo. But that is creating problems for the Serb communities, which receive subsidies from Belgrade in Serbian dinars. This is the kind of practical issue the EU and US should focus on. Belgrade and Pristina need to agree on transparency for Serbia’s subsidies to the Serb communities inside Kosovo, which would help resolve the currency issue. That is the practical direction in which prospects for success lie.
Farewell to failure requires getting the priorities right.
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See no evil is not good policy
Serbia’s parliament approved the country’s new government last week. The personnel and program represent a further turn to the ethnonationalist, anti-EU right. AP makes many of the details easily accessible. The government includes ministers the US has already sanctioned for corruption as well as blatant Russophilic sycophants. Not to mention a prime minister who led the Serbian Defense Ministry last year, when it was complicit in a terrorist attack in northern Kosovo, the kidnapping of Kosovo police, and rioting against NATO-led peacekeepers. He has already reiterated Serbia’s desire for good relations with Russia and refusal to align with EU sanctions against Moscow.
President Vucic is leaving little room for those who argue that Serbia is headed West. In recent months he has ostentatiously met with the would-be dictators of Hungary and Azerbaijan as well as the all too real authoritarians governing Belarus, Russia, and China. Vucic is making no secret of his ambition to extend his authority to the Serb-controlled 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all of Montenegro, and Serb-majority northern Kosovo. Vucic also presided in December over a grotesquely unfair national election, and a fraudulent municipal election in Belgrade, that have prompted Freedom House to continue lowering Serbia’s democracy scores.
Why Europe and the US delude themselves
Still, officials in the US and Europe are prepared to tolerate and even reward Vucic. Some fear that any alternative might be worse. Others don’t want to admit the failure of three years of going easy on Vucic. Still others imagine that crumbs he hands out in the Western direction–Serbs using Kosovo license plates and identity documents–may presage improvement on bigger issues. The shells and bullets Serbia allows to reach Ukraine may influence some, though surely similar amounts–if not more–make their way to Russia.
But self-delusion is a big part of this story. Vucic has made clear that he will not implement agreements the US and EU regard as legally binding. Belgrade has opposed Kosovo membership in the Council of Europe. This is despite its qualifications and the benefits that could derive therefrom to the Kosovo Serbs. Surely intelligent Americans and Europeans understand that Serbian participation in NATO exercises generates a substantial flow of intelligence to Russia. But doing something about Serbia’s malfeasance requires heavy political lifting. Why take that on if no one above your pay grade objects to a “see no evil” policy?
An opportunity to shift
There should soon be an opportunity to take a more effective tack. The officials who forged the see no evil policy are headed elsewhere. Rumint says EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajcak and US Deputy Assistant Secretary Gabriel Escobar are both getting ready to move on. They invested heavily in Vucic and have little to show for it. So has the US embassy in Belgrade. Ambassador Hill has repeatedly denigrated Kosovo’s leadership while lauding Serbia’s.
The new leader of the State Department European Bureau, Jim O’Brien, has not fallen entirely into their unproductive rut. He has been notably blunt on some issues with Vucic. But he, too, continues to promise Serbia progress on instituting an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities in Kosovo that Vucic intends to use as an irredentist mechanism for governing Kosovo’s Serbs.
The Association requires fulfillment of the quid pro quo
This is unfortunate. Kosovo promised this Association in a 2013 agreement that included recognition of the validity of the Kosovo constitution on its entire territory and a commitment to allowing Kosovo and Serbia to accede to the European Union separately and without mutual interference. This amounted to de facto Serbian recognition of Kosovo, since only sovereign states can accede to the Union.
But Serbia has withdrawn from those commitments. Vucic has made it clear that he has no greater tolerance for de facto recognition than for de jure recognition. He has pulled the Serb mayors, police, judges, and other officials out of Pristina’s institutions in northern Kosovo. Belgrade encouraged the Kosovo Serbs to boycott the last municipal elections. Serbia is also opposing Kosovo membership in the Council of Europe and other regional institutions.
The problem is democracy
To expect Kosovo to form the Association without the benefits that Serbia promised in return is foolish. Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti has held a commanding position for most of the past five years in Kosovo politics. There would be no quicker way for him to lose it than to give the Association to Serbia without getting anything in return. He likely faces an election next year. To expect him to commit political suicide to please Belgrade is diplomatic malpractice.
Of course the same is true for President Vucic. Serbia may be headed towards autocracy, but it is not there yet. Few Serbian politicians risk saying the obvious: that Kosovo is lost and Serbia would be better off admitting it. Vucic’s main opposition for years has been more hawkish on Kosovo than he is. It would require unusual courage for him to buck the political currents in Belgrade.
The only way of reviving the Association is to revive the 2013 quid pro quo as well. That should include genuine participation of Serb citizens in Kosovo’s governance, Belgrade acceptance of Pristina’s constitutional and judicial authority in the north, and an end to Belgrade’s opposition to Kosovo membership in international organizations. Kurti might then be able to boast that he had made a good deal. Vucic could claim to have have gotten what Belgrade wanted. And the US and EU would be able to claim real progress in bringing both Serbia and Kosovo closer to EuroAtlantic institutions and values.
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Good news, finally, but unlikely to last
Bits of good news all around. The US House of Representatives, after months of allowing a small number of dissenting Republicans to block vital expanded aid to Ukraine (as well as infusions for Israel and Taiwan), has now approved it. Israel has retaliated against Iran for last weekend’s massive barrage of missiles and drones. It managed to do so without provoking any further escalation. And on a much lesser scale of geopolitics, the Council of Europe appears to be readying itself to admit Kosovo as a member.
Better late than never
All of this is good news, even if much delayed.
The Congress should never have allowed its Russophile right-wingers to put Ukraine’s existence at risk. It is appalling that someone could become Speaker who required months of cajoling to recognize the importance of getting more assistance to Kyiv. Last year’s Russian dominance in the war of attrition has done real damage, not only to Ukrainian morale.
We can hope that the US will now send Ukraine everything it needs. The aim should be not only to resist Russian advances but also to roll back Moscow’s recent gains and the threat they now poses to Kharkiv. Ukrainian F-16s should arrive this summer. A big Ukrainian push with the right weapons could force Russian retreats in Donbas, the south, and even Crimea.
Israel needs to do more
Israel has been rampaging in Gaza as if it had nothing to fear. The Iranian attack, though a failure, is hopefully a reminder to Jerusalem that self-restraint and diplomacy can be virtues, not weaknesses. The Israelis need now to resuscitate the talks with Hamas and reach an agreement, however unsatisfactory, for the release of at least the civilian hostages.
They also need to get rid of Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has repeatedly endangered Israeli security. His encouragement of US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, his financial and political support for Hamas, his opposition to the creation of a Palestinian state, and the deplorable intelligence and military failures of October 7 qualify him as the worst Israeli prime minister, not just the longest-serving.
Serbia’s spite is shameful
The Council of Europe has dawdled far too long in approving Kosovo for membership. It is far more qualified than its principal opponent, Serbia. And allowing Kosovo in will give Serbs who live there a new and potentially fruitful avenue to pursue complaints, through the European Court of Human Rights.
The spitefulness of Belgrade’s opposition, which directly contradicts an agreement the European Union claims Serbia adhered to in February, may be expected, but it is still deplorable. Kosovo is demonstrably better qualified for CoE membership than Serbia.
Can we hope for more?
Good news is particularly welcome when it is a harbinger of more. Some may hope that the voting in Congress augurs a less polarized political atmosphere in which moderate Democrats and Republicans can cooperate to neutralize the nutty MAGAites. But I see little hope of that. Speaker Johnson will now face an effort to remove him. If he wins, the MAGAites will be embittered and he will be more cautious in the future. If he loses, we could face a truly dire situation, as then he would have to be replaced with an even more convinced MAGAite.
In the Middle East, Netanyahu still seems firmly in power. Though his margin in the Knesset is narrow, his allies stand no chance of remaining in power if he falls. He himself could end up in prison on corruption charges. Netanyahu is not going to be easy to displace. Let’s hope the civilians in Rafah won’t pay the price of keeping him in the prime ministry.
In the Balkans, Belgrade may lose the battle to keep Pristina out of the Council of Europe. But that is a minor skirmish in Kosovo’s effort to gain full international recognition. There is no sign of progress on UN membership. EU membership is far off. NATO will have to be the next major battle. Fortunately that excludes Serbia from having a veto or even a vote. But Hungary and now Slovakia will more than likely be prepared to do Belgrade’s dirty work.
A long road ahead
Those of us looking for a Ukrainian military victory, a Palestinian state that will live in peace with Israel, and UN membership for Kosovo still have a long wait ahead. But every step in the right direction today is one that doesn’t have to be taken tomorrow.
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Kosovo is more qualified than Serbia
Serbia is currently engaged in a ferocious campaign to block Kosovo membership in the Council of Europe (CoE). This is despite an explicit commitment in the February agreement the Americans and Europeans claim is legally binding not to do that for any international organizations:
Serbia will not object to Kosovo’s membership in any international organisation.
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovo-and-serbia_en
The merits of the case
I don’t know if the CoE will admit Kosovo later this spring. It certainly should. The main CoE qualification is rule of law:
Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
https://rm.coe.int/1680306052#:~:text=Every%20member%20of%20the%20Council,as%20specified%20in%20Chapter%20I.
Kosovo has been steadily improving and ranks above the median regional average on eight dimensions of rule of law. It is third in the region, slightly behind Montenegro and more behind Georgia, but well ahead of Serbia’s declining scores. Pristina recently resolved a major complaint. It recognized the Decan/i monastery’s property rights, an issue outstanding for more than 20 years. Corruption, regulatory enforcement, and criminal justice are its weakest dimensions. All of these are symptoms of a new and relatively weak state.
Benefits for Serbs
The main purpose of the CoE is
To promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law across Europe and beyond
In principle, you would think that people who really are discriminated against would welcome their country’s membership in such an organization. Instead, Belgrade is dead set against it.
The issue is not only one of ideals. There are practical consequences of CoE membership. It opens to citizens access to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). That is a serious privilege. If a national justice system fails in the eyes of a citizen of a member state of the CoE, that citizen can appeal to the ECHR, which has a strong tradition of ruling in favor of equality and non-discrimination, including the Balkans. That doesn’t mean its decisions are always implemented, as Bosnians will be anxious to tell you, but it does strengthen those who suffer discrimination. Member states can also file complaints against other member states, another privilege that Belgrade should welcome.
Why not?
Belgrade opposes Kosovo CoE membership for several reasons. First, Belgrade doesn’t want to acknowledge that Kosovo is a state. Second, it fears that Kosovo will file complaints against Serbia. There is ample reason for such complaints stemming from discrimination and other human rights violations against the Albanian majority inside Serbia, the treatment of Kosovo citizens in Serbia, and the failure of Serbia to account properly for its wartime malfeasance in Kosovo.
Third, Belgrade is also trying to pressure Kosovo into creating an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities, which it sees as important to formalizing its relationship with the Serb population inside Kosovo. The CoE Parliamentary Assembly regards this as an issue Kosovo should resolve after membership. Such minority associations are common among CoE member states and Kosovo has promised to create one. But it quite reasonably doesn’t want to do so until Serbia acknowledges its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Bottom line
The sad fact is that non-member Kosovo today is more qualified for CoE membership than current member Serbia. It is high time to fix that.
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C+ is not a good grade
C+ is what I would give as a grade for implementation of the year-old “Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia.” Koha asked for an interview on this subject but then did not call at the appointed time. So I wrote this piece instead. It’s a B or B+ for Pristina and a C for Belgrade.
Let’s break it down article by article:
Good neighborly relations:
Certainly not in general, but there has been some limited progress on mutual recognition of their respective documents and national symbols, including passports, diplomas, license plates, and customs stamps. Pristina was never the problem. Belgrade has moved on this. B or B+ I guess.
Respect for the UN Charter:
Serbia fails (that’s an F) miserably on respect for “the sovereign equality of all States, respect for their independence, autonomy and territorial integrity.” Kosovo gets a B+, marked down due to continued shortcomings in protection of human rights and non-discrimination. Things are improving in those departments, but problems remain.
Peaceful settlement of disputes:
Serbia fails (F) on settlement of disputes exclusively by peaceful means and refraining from the threat or use of force. Belgrade sponsored the September 24 attempted uprising intended to create a pretext for the use of force, which it threatened by mobilizing its forces on Kosovo’s borders. Belgrade had also already kidnapped two Kosovo police from Kosovo territory and organized a mob that attacked NATO-led peacekeepers. Kosovo has no real option for use of force, but nevertheless gets an A for the police handling of the September 24 incident.
International representation:
Serbia (D) continues to oppose Kosovo’s membership in international organizations. Kosovo (A) has not to my knowledge objected to Serbia’s membership in them.
EU path:
Serbia (D) is no longer in transition to democracy and does not align with EU foreign policy, especially but not only on Ukraine and Russia. Kosovo (B+) is moving in the right direction on democracy and does respect EU foreign policy.
Dialogue process:
Neither Belgrade nor Pristina is much engaged, the former because it objects to the basic premises and the latter because it has gotten little benefit. C+ for both.
Treatment of the Serbian community in Kosovo:
Kosovo has conceded little on “self-management” but is resolving one important issue concerning Serbian Orthodox Church property at Decan/i. Pristina has muddied the waters on financial support from Belgrade by insisting on use of the euro but there is really no bar to direct communication for the Serbian community with the Kosovo government. B for Pristina, but no better than a C+ for Belgrade, which insists on violating Kosovo law in transferring finances opaquely and in dinars.
EU and others’ support package:
I really don’t know. Has it been created? Is anything happening on this front?
Joint Committee on implementation:
Is this just the Dialogue writ small, or has such a thing been created?
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Serbia is the problem, Serbs the solution
Where did they get this nice photo in my living room?
I did this interview for Arlinda Rrmoku of Pristina outlet Sinjali yesterday:
Dialogue
1. What progress has been made towards the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia in recent years?
A: Very little. Acceptance of documents and license plates. Payment of electricity bills. Good things that should have happened long ago.
2. What are the main obstacles hindering the normalization process between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: The main obstacle is Serbia’s resistance. But Kosovo has also failed to do all it could to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb citizens, which is a vital part of normalization.
3. How do you assess the role of the European Union in facilitating dialogue and reconciliation between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: The EU has failed to use its leverage with Serbia. It has used leverage with Kosovo, but inappropriately and without results.
Politics are an obstacle
4. What impact could the recent political changes in Kosovo and Serbia have on the normalization process?
A: Not much. In Serbia, Vucic remains very much in charge. In Kosovo Kurti and Osmani remain in charge.
Washington has been too
5. How do you see the role of the United States in promoting stability and peace in the Western Balkans, particularly regarding Kosovo-Serbia relations?
A: Washington has done poorly in recent years. It was a serious mistake to prioritize the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities, which in my view can only come with recognition.
6. What steps should be taken to address the remaining issues in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, such as the status of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo?
A: Pristina should be taking unilateral action to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb citizens, as indicated above. This will require much greater effort to meet their needs, allow Serbia’s legitimate subsidies to flow, and protect their property, in particular at the monastery in Decan/Decani.
As is Russia
7. How do you view the involvement of other regional actors, such as Russia and Turkey, in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue process?
A: They don’t really play directly, but Russia is supporting Vucic’s illiberalism at home and irredentism with his neighbors. Turkey I see as a relatively minor player, though it occasionally will weigh in.
8. What are the potential implications of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue on the broader stability of the Western Balkans?
Security is at risk
A: The dialogue as conducted in recent years has not been a factor for stability. Its difficulties have echoed in the region.
9. How can economic cooperation and integration initiatives contribute to the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: I believe it can: having populations and companies that prosper could lessen hostilities and open new possibilities. But Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo makes this difficult.
10. How do you assess the security situation in the Western Balkans, particularly in light of recent developments?
A: It’s shaky, due mainly to Serbian malfeasance.
11. What are the main security challenges facing the region and how can they be addressed?
A: Serbia and Russia are the main security challenges in the region.
12. How do you see the role of NATO and other international organizations in ensuring security and stability in the Western Balkans?
A: NATO is the guarantor in Kosovo, Croatia, Montenegro, and Macedonia as well as the backup guarantor to the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That makes it pretty important to the region. The EU has the primary role in Bosnia.
13. What impact could unresolved disputes and ethnic tensions have on the security situation in the region?
A: I don’t worry about a big war or a long one, but localized instability and ethnic cleansing is a serious threat in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro.
Borders need improvement
14. How do you assess the effectiveness of border management and security cooperation among Western Balkan countries?
A: More would be better. Trade delays at the borders are too long, migration and trafficking too easy, and the border between Serbia and Kosovo too porous.
15. What role can the European Union play in promoting security sector reform and institution-building in the Western Balkans?
A: You’ll have to ask the EU, but my understanding is that the EU does a great deal on border management.
16. How do you see the potential for increased cooperation between Western Balkan countries and neighboring EU member states in addressing common security challenges?
A: I’d like to see more, especially between Croatia and Bosnia as well as Bulgaria and Macedonia, but political issues make that sometimes problematic.
Reciprocal reassurance is key
17. What are your recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders to promote peace, stability, and reconciliation in the Western Balkans, particularly between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: Kosovo needs to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb population, Serbia needs to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Albanian population, and the two countries need to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. When they do those things, peace, stability and reconciliation will be far easier than today.
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