Tag: Balkans
Stevenson’s army, January 16
The Federal Government is closed today, but I’m open. No broadsheet papers, however — new carrier who’s “never seen snow.”
-Semafor says Iran IRGC has people in Yemen
– Iran admits attack in Erbil.
– US approves Javelins to Kosovo.
– Here’s summary of new CR, with Senate voting maybe tonight.
– RollCall says Speaker Johnson wants to cut DHS via 302[b] allocations
– Sen. Sanders wants vote on Israeli practices in Gaza
Here’s Politico’s report on Dean Steinberg et al.’s visit to Taiwan:
US DELEGATION IN TAIWAN: A delegation of former senior administration officials tasked by the State Department “to travel in their private capacity to Taiwan” is meeting with the island’s post-election incoming senior officials. Landing in Taipei just a day after the election, former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and former Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg met with Lai, outgoing President Tsai Ing-wen, leaders of the Kuomintang opposition, and the Taiwan People’s Party’s Ko Wen-je, who’s set to be a kingmaker in the race for the parliament speakership.
According to Laura Rosenberger, chairperson of the American Institute in Taiwan, the delegation stressed that the U.S. intends to work with all parties in Taiwan, adding there would be more meetings with senior Taiwanese officials on stronger cooperation, including in beefing up Taiwan’s self-defense. There’ll also be continued cooperation in trade and technology, Rosenberger added.
The concern — a parliament run by Lai’s rivals: Rosenberger’s remarks come as diplomats in Taipei are waiting to see how an opposition-led parliament could delay the DPP government’s policies, especially on defense. The Kuomintang, which stresses engagement with China, had a track record of criticizing military procurement on the grounds of corruption allegations.
—
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, January 10
Prostate cancer: treatable, not disqualifying from service
WSJ notes Biden’s loyalty to advisers
Iraqi government doesn’t really want to kick US out
Staffers ain’t like they used to be
Administration revives export advisory council
Correction: here’s the right link for Ed Joseph on Serbia
—
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, January 9
– Fred Kaplan says SecDef Austin should go. [I’m more concerned to know his medical condition. Presidents and certainly officials in the military chain of command for combat operations should not be afforded the same privacy regarding health as ordinary citizens.]
– Politico says Netanyahu is losing control.
– WSJ tells how Macron bungled French relations in Africa.
– NBC tells what AMLO wants from the US
– Intercept says CNN vets Mideast stories with Jerusalem bureau.
– SAIS prof Ed Joseph discusses Serbia’s election.
– Politico’s China Watcher backgrounds Taiwan’s coming elections
War on the rocks has good think pieces — on Iraq lessons for Gaza and on Army special operations forces.
—
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Vucic got what he wanted and then some
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s Progressive Party won an absolute majority in national parliamentary elections, with double the vote of the main opposition coalition yesterday. His party also won a plurality in the Belgrade city council. The election was “free” in the sense that all registered citizens could vote, but far from “fair.” The government exploited media control, pressure on voters, abuse of institutions and public functions as well as forged signatures and phantom voters. Elections in Serbia are stolen before election day. Elected autocrats are all the rage these days.
Stronger and more recalcitrant
The new parliament replaces one in which Vučić’s party had only a plurality. He gained that in an election that much of the opposition boycotted. The election thus strengthens his hold on power, which is going eleven years. If it sticks together, the one-quarter of the parliament that the main opposition coalition, Serbia Against Violence, gained will give it a platform for its anti-violence, anti-corruption, anti-inflation messages. But it will not be able to block legislation or exert substantial influence on foreign and defense policy, which is the prerogative of the president.
We can expect ontinuation of Serbia’s current strong lean towards befriending fellow autocrats in Russia, China, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Hungary. While the Progressives ran on a nominally pro-Europe ticket, they have done little to move Serbia closer to the European Union. Instead they have successfully straddled the East/West divide. Vučić pursues a “non-aligned” hedging policy that flirts with both in order to extract valuable concessions from Moscow, Beijing, Brussels, and Washington.
Some might hope Vučić would use his victory to settle Serbia’s conflict with Kosovo and move definitively in the Western direction. That isn’t going to happen. He has locked himself into intransigient opposition. He refuses even to acknowledge Kosovo’s de facto independence. This would be easy to do. He could turn Milan Radoicic, who led a failed terrorist rebellion in northern Kosovo September 24, over to the Pristina authorities. Serbia recognized the validity of their judiciary in the 2013 Brussels agreement that Vučić has been trying to get Pristina to respect. But he won’t do that. Or anything else to make amends for sponsoring a well-equipped armed rebellion intended to lead on to a Serbian military invasion.
Europe and the US will do nothing
The US, UK, and EU could in the aftermath of this flawed election their pressure on Vučić. They say they want Serbia solve its problems with Kosovo, adhere to Ukraine sanctions against Russia, and speed reforms required for EU accession. But the five EU member states that don’t recognize Kosovo will prevent any push on Kosovo issues. Hungary will block any pressure on Russia questions. The EU as a whole is much more concerned with Ukraine and will let Serbia slide.
The Americans are still claiming that they’ve convinced Serbia to embrace the West. This is laughable but no one in Washington these days wants to tell the would-be emperors they have no clothes. They prefer to pretend that agreements Serbia has renounced in writing are legally binding. “They are being written into the requirements for accession” State Department officials like to explain. That is fine with Belgrade, which knows full well accession is a distant horizon, at best.
I might have some hope for the UK, which isn’t committed to the American pipedreams and isn’t constrained any longer by the EU. But London hasn’t been vocal in denouncing Serbia’s current behavior. It is likely shy of offending Brussels and Washington and anxious to protect its own equities in Belgrade.
What’s the then some?
Vučić’s party wasn’t the only one to do well in yesterday’s elections. Some ultra-nationalists and outright pro-Russian parties did too. That gives Vučić an “Après moi, le déluge” argument. If you are not nice to me, look what might come next!
Some in Kosovo might hope that now at least Pristina can be relieved of the “consequences” the EU mistakenly levied in response to its deployment of mayors to municipal buildings and police to northern Kosovo, where they blocked an armed rebellion. We’ll have to wait and see, but I doubt Pristina will get satisfaction. The EU has developed a habit of favoring Serbia that is going to be hard to break. The US is not far behind.
President Vučić has won his cake. Now he’ll eat it. That’s not good news.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
A cold shoulder might get more results
This is one of those moments in the Balkans when what is not said is more important than what is said. The Americans and Europeans have so far failed to publish the results of their announced investigations of the September 24 failed Serb uprising in northern Kosovo. On that occasion, Serbia sent a well-armed group to ambush the Kosovo police, killing one officer. The Serbs also tried to draw the police into a firefight at a monastery compound. The perpetrators intended this incident to provide an excuse for Serbian military intervention. Presumbly the goal was to seize the four Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo.
No doubt
There is really no doubt about what happened and why. The only real question is who authorized this terrorist plot. It was either Serbian President Vučić or not. I have no evidence on that issue. But we know that Vučić usually makes all the really important decisions in Belgrade. If he did not make this one, that is only a marginally better reflection on his rule than if he did.
Ever since the failed plot, Vučić has cozied up even more than usual to anti-democratic forces in the region and beyond. His besties lately have included Bosnian secessionist Dodik, Hungarian would-be autocrat Orban, illegitimate Belarusian chief of state Lukashenko, Azerbaijani dictator Aliyev, as well as Russian and Chinese autocrats Putin and Xi. Here is Vučić siding with Putin in Ukraine.
He intends to follow Aliyev’s lead in taking Nagorno-Karabakh back by force. When geopolitical circumstances permit, he will do likewise with Kosovo.
Vučić did belatedly fire his security and information agency chief Vulin. But he did it in response to US sanctions, not the September 24 events. Milan Radojičić, a close political ally of Vučić as well as Kosovo political and criminal kingpin, has taken responsibility for the plot. The authorities arrested but quickly freed him. The courts will take their time getting around to a trial.
Nor should Serbia try him, since his September 24 crimes were committed in Kosovo. He should be handed over to the Pristina authorities.
So why the silence?
Some diplomats will attribute the silence to preoccupation in Washington and Brussels with the Gaza war. That certainly merits priority and slows high-level decisions on other issues. But the State Department and the EU foreign policy apparatus are both geared to deal with problems worldwide, not just today’s top issues.
More likely they have hesitated because of the Serbian parliamentary elections this Sunday, which won’t bring big surprises. President Vučić would not have called an early poll if he thought he would lose it. There is ample evidence he is using the government’s media dominance, state institutions, patronage, and largesse to ensure a friendly outcome. But no one in Washington or Brussels at this point should want to help him.
The EU has another handicap. It requires consensus for any serious reaction. Most of its 27 members might be ready to do something. But Hungary and perhaps now Slovakia will be prepared to block consensus on sanctions on Serbia.
I might also hope that the State Department is re-evaluating its policy in the Balkans and needs a bit more time to get it right. It has officials devoted to the notion that he has succeeded in getting Serbia to embrace the West. It is sometimes easier at State to change personnel than minds, but it takes time.
Here are three nudges
Maybe Brussels and Washington need a nudge in the right direction. They no doubt have this Kosovo government preliminary report on the September 24 plot. But to my knowledge no one has published it outside Kosovo.
I offered a summary more than a month ago. It is high time that someone make it widely available. Along with the investigation the EU has promised. Read please, and tell me whether Serbia has embraced the West.
Or try this statement from Serbia’s Prime Minister reneging on commitments the US and EU say are legally binding:
Meanwhile, the EU has levied “consequences” on Kosovo that are long past their sell by date. Some Europeans are anxious to say so:
Note that it is the same police who foiled the September 24 plot that the US and EU have wanted withdrawn from northern Kosovo. That would have been a big mistake.
Hedging only works if we play the game
Serbia’s foreign policy relies on hedging between East and West, in the tradition of the non-aligned movement founded in Belgrade in 1961. This makes sense for Serbia, which thereby extracts value from both directions. The game is to lean hard one way and see how much the other side will ante up for you. Vučić has been leaning hard towards the East and collecting bounty from the West. Don’t take it only from me–read what people in Moscow are saying.
But if the West refuses to play the game, the hedging fails, and Serbia lands in the arms of Putin and Xi. That is no great loss to the West, which hasn’t gained much for all the goodies it has rained on Belgrade. Let’s assume though that Vučić is sincerely committed to hedging. A cold shoulder would then make him do a bit more to please the West. Wouldn’t that be nice?
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The good, the bad and the unwritten
The EU-proposed draft of the statute for the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities in Kosovo is now widely available. Is it good, or is it bad? The answer of course is complicated and depends not only on what is in the proposed text but also what is not in it. So here is my preliminary assessment:
The good
- The text calls Kosovo the “Republic of Kosovo,” which in my view is the right appellation (in English). I suspect this is a deal-breaker for Serbia, but we’ll have to wait and see.
- It provides for prior Kosovo Constitutional Court review, including of any amendments to the statute, which is vital.
- The procedures for establishment strike me as reasonable and include a role for the Kosovo government’s Ministry of Local Government Administration.
- Joining the Association is voluntary for the Serb-majority municipalities. Non-Serb communities are to be represented, albeit in some undefined way.
- The EU will provide oversight for 5 years, renewable for another 5.
The not so good
- The statute says the purpose is to enable Serbs in Kosovo to take advantage of already existing rights without adding executive competencies beyond those already existing in the municipalities. That isn’t good, as it admits the possibility of executive competences in areas of already existing municipal responsibility.
- It allows the Serbian government to provide financial support without requiring that it flow through the Kosovo government, which has only auditing powers. It also provides for duty and tax-free imports for the Association, which is a giant loophole.
- The Association can adopt regulations, decisions, declarations, rules of procedure and instructions. This provision clearly anticipates executive powers.
- The Serbian government can provide through the Association health and educational services. This essentially makes permanent the current arrangement, which infringes on Kosovo sovereignty. I don’t see a clear provision for Republic oversight of the curriculum offered in the Serbia-provided educational institutions.
- The Serb-majority municipalities get carte blanche in areas of municipal responsibility, including culture, economic development, urban and rural planning, and research and development. I wonder if the Association decided cars should drive on the left whether that might be covered.
What is not said
- There is no quid pro quo. The statute itself does not require Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo or even refer back to the 2013 agreement on which it is based, which had clear provisions implying Kosovo’s sovereignty and recognizing the validity of Kosovo’s constitution on its entire territory. These issues should be fixed before any formal adoption of the statute.
- There are a lot of provisions in the statute that Serbia would not countenance for the Albanian-majority municipalities in Serbia. Reciprocity is among the first rules of diplomacy. Anything Serbia wouldn’t agree to, Kosovo should not agree to unless it serves the Republic’s interest.
- There is no constraint on agenda items the Assembly could discuss. Would it be permissible for it to discuss rejecting the Kosovo judicial system, as the Assembly in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska has done, or declaring independence? Could it issue a regulation prohibiting display of Albanian cultural artefacts within the municipalities of the Association?
- There is no provision requiring that public meetings of the Association and its executive Board, or even public announcement of their decisions.
- The EU and US no doubt intend to cram this proposal down Albin Kurti’s throat. That would be a mistake.
I’m sure many of these points are debatable and that I haven’t got everything right. There may well be other points needing clarification. I’ll be glad to see wide discussion of this draft.
RSS - Posts
