Tag: Balkans
The Bytyqi brothers
“Don’t worry, we’ll resolve [the Bytyqi murders], and I think that it’s our job, it’s our duty to do it…. [Resolution will] happen very soon or much sooner than anybody might expect.”
— Serbian PM Aleksandar Vucic, June 4, 2015 at SAIS
Many of you were present at SAIS approximately one year ago when Prime Minister Vucic promised expeditious resolution on the Bytyqi case – the case of three American citizens and brothers that were kidnapped, executed and dumped into a mass grave by Serbian special forces at the end of the Kosovo war.
But in the year that has transpired, virtually nothing has happened. Witnesses have not been given clear signals that they will be protected. No charges have been filed. Suspected war criminals, however, are faring much better. Goran Radosavljevic, a prime suspect in the case, remains a key advisor to Prime Minister Vucic and President Tomislav Nikolic and their Progressive Party. Despite repeated requests, the Bytyqi family has not been given updates on any future plans to move the case along.This wasn’t the first promise that Prime Minister Vucic had broken to US officials (including Vice President Biden, Secretary Kerry, and National Security Advisor Rice), the American public, and the Bytyqi family. He had previously promised to resolve the case by the end of the Summer 2014. After missing that first self-imposed deadline, he promised in November 2014 to resolve it by end of March 2015.
I’d have preferred this note read “has failed to fulfill his promises to the family…,” but that’s just me. Here is the full recording of the Prime Minister’s appearance at SAIS on June 4, 2015 (please let me know if you discover at which point the above quotation about the Bytyqi brothers appears):
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One thing not to worry about
Yesterday’s front-page New York Times piece on radicalization in Kosovo is every diplomat’s nightmare: a well-written, prominent story with solid facts that contradict what his or her government wants the Americans to believe. But there is another two-thirds of the story that got short shrift:
- the Kosovo government has already reacted vigorously and effectively to the inroads Islamic extremists have made, and
- Kosovo Albanians as well as their government remain overwhelmingly and enthusiastically pro-American and pro-European.
The article would have been a clarion call to action three or four years ago. But today it is largely old news. The story of relatively high levels of extremist recruitment and Saudi funding Carlotta Gall tells has already been amply documented. In fact, radicalization according to Adrian Shtuni is not uniform across Kosovo but focused in four municipalities:
The Kosovars themselves have spilled a lot of electrons on the subject, in particular the Saudi connection that is one of Gall’s main, and well-told, points. They figure:
In terms of the number of foreign fighters per capita amongst their Muslim population, Kosovo is in the bottom half of the list of countries, ranked 14th among 22 countries with the highest number of foreign fighters per capita of their respective Muslim populations.
The Kosovo government is claiming there have been no known Kosovar recruits to the Islamic State (ISIS) in the past year or so. To my knowledge, no one is denying that claim.
ISIS recruitment worldwide is down overall, due to its loss of territory and fighters over the past year. But in addition Pristina has been conducting a legal crackdown, described by the Police Director earlier this month in Brussels. It includes 110 arrests, 67 indictments and 26 convictions so far. This is not an easy thing to do for a young country still not a member of Interpol with lots of other problems. But it is getting done. The government has also prepared a 2015/20 strategy for countering violent extremism covering early identification, prevention, intervention and de-radicalization and reintegration.
The overall political environment is favorable to blocking ISIS recruitment: Kosovars are remarkably pro-NATO and pro-Europe, with over 90% supporting membership in the Alliance and the European Union. Despite divisive domestic politics that have led to street demonstrations focused on the wisdom of continuing Pristina’s dialogue with Belgrade, dissenters from the Euroatlantic path Kosovo has chosen are few and far between.
Americans are quick these days to see threats, in particular from Muslim populations. Kosovo however is a constitutionally secular state whose mostly Muslim population is as friendly to the West as any on earth. The Alliance saved Kosovo Albanians from Serbia’s effort to expel them in 1999, has protected the country ever since and is now in the process of helping it to build up its security forces. The European Union has been generous and helpful, providing most of the NATO troops deployed there and much of the international aid. It is not surprising that most Kosovars view Washington and Brussels as friends and protectors, not enemies.
Of course there are some individuals who feel differently. Unprovoked, a Kosovar killed two US airmen five years ago in Frankfurt. Other incidents may happen. What we need to do to ensure they are few and far between is to continue to help ensure the success of Kosovo’s democracy and economy, as well as its application of the rule of law. Despite the Times’ front-page article, Kosovo is one of the last things Americans should have to worry about.
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Still works in progress
Home from the Balkans for a couple of days, I’ve had time to reflect a bit on my almost two weeks in Podgorica, Belgrade and Sarajevo. I was in Podgorica and Sarajevo for academically-sponsored conferences. I inserted the stop in Belgrade during the week between them. In all three places, I organized my own visit, with the cooperation of friends and colleagues. The US embassies were not involved, except that in Sarajevo it was one of the sponsors of the meeting.
All three capitals are wrestling with internal political issues with profound implications: Montenegrin Prime Minister Djukanovic has taken some opposition figures into his cabinet to try to ensure wide acceptance of the October elections as well as NATO accession, Serbian Prime Minister Vucic is rejiggering his coalition in an effort to accelerate progress towards the EU, and the many levels of governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina are trying to convince the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to release $800 million to support implementation of the EU-imposed Reform Agenda.
Montenegro, despite some recent Russian-promoted disorder in Podgorica’s streets and even in parliament, has the best chances of success. NATO issued its formal invitation yesterday. The Russians objected, demonstrating how false its avowals of feeling threatened by NATO expansion really are. Montenegro’s 2000-person army is not even a threat to its immediate neighbors, much less to Moscow. The 28 members of the Alliance still have to ratify the accession. Podgorica is nervous mainly about US ratification, because of the Trump factor, and would like to see it done during the lame duck Senate session following the November election, in particular if he becomes president.
The real significance of NATO accession for Montenegro is that it keeps up the momentum in the Balkans, where Macedonia and Kosovo are already committed to joining the Alliance. That leaves only Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has asked for a Membership Action Plan, and Serbia, which has not made a decision on joining and flirts with Russia incessantly. Montenegro’s entry into NATO doesn’t threaten Russia, but the continued attraction of the Alliance to Balkans countries could end Russia’s troublemaking in the region.
Belgrade’s infatuation with Moscow was one of the disappointments of my trip to the Balkans. Normally proud and self-reliant Serbs tell me they need Russia’s warm embrace and cultural affinity. The pan-Slavic sentiment I get. We all like to chum with those who speak our language, or something close to it, listen to similar music and worship in ways we recognize.
The warm embrace is harder to comprehend. Russia is a declining regional power that allowed its currency to appreciate unrealistically during the period of high oil and gas prices, making its other industries uncompetitive in world markets. With prices now less than half of what they once were, Moscow is unable to balance its budget and lacks the industrial infrastructure needed to diversify its economy and finance the solution of its many serious social problems. It is also stuck in wars in Syria and Ukraine, not to mention smaller and less arduous military interventions in Georgia and Moldova.
Prime Minister Vucic recognizes the sterility of Russophilia and ran a markedly pro-Europe re-election campaign in April. But getting to Europe is not done in one big leap. Even while I was in Belgrade, masked thugs destroyed allegedly illegal construction on the waterfront, in order apparently to avoid a drawn-out court procedure. Many think the government was involved, or at least turned a blind eye, at the behest of someone well-connected. Calls to the police for help went unanswered. That’s not how things are handled in European states with consolidated judicial systems.
Many more liberal democratic Serbs and others in the Balkans think Europe and the US are turning a blind eye too. Washington and Brussels appreciate the progress Vucic has made reaching agreements with the authorities in Kosovo. He has accepted the validity of the Kosovo constitution on its whole territory, including the Serb-majority north, and has acknowledged that Serbia and Kosovo will enter the EU as separate states, each at its own pace. This is not far from formal recognition of Kosovo’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. But are Washington and Brussels rewarding this progress on Kosovo by ignoring Serbian government control of the media and courts as well as failure to reform its security services?
This is a good question. I hope the answer is no, but I also hope that we will be patient as well as exigent. There are lots of things that can be done to assist Serbia’s progress towards Europe: improved road connections to the Mediterranean through Montenegro and Kosovo, for example, as well as gas supplies that do not come from Russia. There are also next steps with Kosovo: the Serbian and Kosovar chiefs of staff, who have apparently never met, should be talking with each other regularly, and the boundary/border between the two should be agreed and demarcated.
When it comes to Bosnia and Herzegovina, I confess to being flummoxed. I’m not at all sure that the rather slow and rudimentary steps so far in the European Reform Agenda are worth $800 million, especially if some portion of that amount ends up feeding the corruption beast. The IMF and World Bank will tell you they can account for their funds, but part of the money will be displacing Bosnian funding that will then be diverted to less transparent purposes. Money is fungible. Some authorities in Bosnia are past masters at enriching themselves whenever it passes through their hands. That helps them to consolidate power and maintain their stranglehold on a country that deserves better.
Or it may help them defy the international community and make promises about independence for Republika Srpska, the Serb-dominated half of the country. That isn’t going to happen, because the international community won’t accept it. But those who support that goal are succeeding at making Bosnia and Herzegovina exceedingly difficult to govern effectively. A coffee at an outdoor cafe in Sniper Alley and a walk with an old friend to buy a Sarajevo football club tee shirt for my grandson are great pleasures, but I’d trade them happily for a Bosnia in which ordinary people could enjoy European standards of living and freedom from bombastic nationalism.
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When and where America really was great
Wherever I go abroad–on this trip to Podgorica, Belgrade and Sarajevo–the topic people most want to discuss is–you guessed it–Donald Trump. Across political sympathies, religions, genders and ages, people are fascinated and mostly disgusted by his appeal to Americans. The exception is a few of the more nationalist leaders in the Balkans, who are Trumpites because they admire his autocratic style and remember that he was a vigorous opponent of the NATO war against Yugoslavia.
Here is what I tell my Balkans interlocutors: Trump reflects a real and important slice of the American electorate. His greatest strength is among white, working class males, many of whom have not seen a rise in income for decades. They incline towards blaming others, which makes some of them xenophobic, misogynist and racist. Europeans in particular should understand this, as many European countries are suffering analogous rises of comparable nationalist political forces. Trump has discovered how to tap into nationalist sentiment, much the way the UK Independence Party, Marine LePen in France, and Hungarian Prime Minister Orban have done.
Hillary Clinton is a much better known figure worldwide, but especially in Europe and the Balkans. If elected, I expect her to continue what has become traditional American policy in the region: support for democratization and European Union accession for the seven successor states to former Yugoslavia (two of which have already succeeded) plus Albania and openness to NATO accession for those who want it. As on many (but not all) other issues, Clinton is likely to serve the moral equivalent of Barack Obama’s third term. After all, Obama has delegated the Balkans mostly to Vice President Biden, who was a strong supporter of Bill Clinton’s 1990s interventions in the Balkans and a close associate of Clinton thereafter when both were in the Senate.
The odds are heavily in Clinton’s favor, but no one can reliably predict the outcome of American elections, especially six months out. A relatively strong economy, revulsion at Trump’s more extreme and erratic stands, and dissent from his candidacy within the Republican elite (and to some extent in its base) favor Clinton. The American electorate is increasingly Hispanic, female, gay and aging, all categories that will vote disproportionately for Clinton. Some establishment Republicans have made it clear they will support her, though many more are now flocking to Trump, despite his obvious lack of conservative credentials on social issues. Independents, who decide most American elections, are leaning towards Clinton.
That said, stuff happens. A mass casualty terrorist attack or a sudden economic downturn would tilt the table towards Trump. So too will Clinton’s “negatives”: many Americans regard her as untrustworthy and excessively tied to Wall Street. The North Atlantic and Pacific coasts seem pretty solid for Clinton right now, but there is a lot of political turf in between. Billionaire New Yorker Trump is not a natural fit with the heartland, but he has surprised all observers during the primaries and may continue to do so, as he adjusts his positions to garner more mainstream support. His shifting stances do not seem to weaken his core support.
Election of Trump would really do serious damage on the foreign policy front. Even if he is unable or unwilling to follow through on his promises to get Mexico to pay to build a wall on the border, block Muslims from entering the US, withdraw from NATO and allow South Korea and Japan to build nuclear weapons, it will take months or even years for the course corrections to become clear. In the meanwhile, a great deal of damage will be done.
In the Balkans, uncertainty about American policy will allow all sorts of crackpot proposals to emerge in the next six months. I’ve already heard from some who claim that Trump will unrecognize Kosovo. No doubt others will emerge suggesting ethnic partition of Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia. But Donald Trump, who is married to a Slovenian, is nevertheless unlikely to pay even passing attention to the Balkans, which are way down the list of American priorities. Apart from rallying a few Serb voters in Ohio with an offhand remark or two, he is likely to focus much more fury on the mess in the Middle East, on the Chinese challenge and on his much-vaunted promise to make America great again.
He will ignore the very real accomplishments Washington delivered in ending the war in Bosnia, saving Kosovo Albanians from expulsion, and rescuing Macedonia by diplomatic means. America really was great in the Balkans during the unipolar 1990s.
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A foreigner’s view of Belgrade today
I’ve been the darling of the pro-government press in Serbia the last few days, largely because I called on Prime Minister Vucic in front of a lot of photographers. As I’ve sometimes been highly critical of Serbia (especially its behavior in Bosnia and Kosovo), I’m alleged to have changed my opinion, as if that accords a democratic seal of approval.
First: let’s be clear about who I am: just a private citizen with long experience in the Balkans, starting with my first trip to Sarajevo in November 1995. That does not make me more than a devotee of the region whose views are strictly unofficial. If you want to know what the US government thinks, ask its ambassador.
I suppose it is true that I’ve changed my view of Serbia, most of all because Serbia has changed in important ways since the fall of Slobodan Milosevic going on 16 years ago. I’ve given a detailed account of those changes in a recent book chapter that I recommend highly, as any self-respecting professor would. Serbia today has made significant progress away from the electoral autocracy Milosevic ran. Progress towards the European Union was slow under President Tadic but has accelerated under Prime Minister Vucic. Serbia is headed in the right direction.
But that doesn’t mean the road ahead is clear. Here I’ll give a quick summary of just the more important challenges Serbia’s democracy faces today, all of which have more to do with values rather than the more technical requirements of Europe’s acquis communautaire:
- The government exercises excessive influence on the media. This is well-documented by the OSCE as well as others and is the most common complaint I hear from friends across the political spectrum in Serbia. Editors are too often court-appointed, journalists are intimidated, self-censorship is common, media are heavily dependent on government advertising, and the prime minister too often attacks the questioners rather than the questions.
- The courts are neither independent nor efficacious. This makes a difference in many spheres: cases like that of the murdered Albanian American Bytyqi brothers remain unsolved despite many promises to prosecute the perpetrators, impunity for corruption and abuse of state resources is still more the rule than the exception, citizens feel alienated and abused, and investors are wary of risking their resources.
- The security services still require reform. Higher-level war criminals have not been brought to justice, eavesdropping and other domestic spying is too common, police are still not trained to serve and protect, and civilian control is not strictly observed.
Let me add a fourth:
- Russia’s anti-democratic influence has grown by leaps and bounds. Moscow subsidizes candidates, high officials embrace Putin’s autocratic behavior, emotional pan-Slavism is all too common, Belgrade refuses to align itself with European Union sanctions levied in response to the invasion of Ukraine and some even suggest that the US is attempting to mount a Euromaidan type coup in Republika Srpska.
Now one Serb wag or another will respond that all those problems exist in one form or the other in the US as well, even the last. Donald Trump has made no secret of his admiration of Vladimir Putin.
My response would be: yes. That’s true. Putin’s Russophilia is just as ridiculous as some of what I’ve heard in Belgrade. Washington also has trouble bringing war criminals to justice, our police mistreat too many citizens, our courts are sometimes subject to too much political influence, and the White House is often accused of manipulating the media, most recently on the Iran nuclear deal. There are differences of degree, and validity, but all democracies continue to struggle with these important issues. Neither the US nor Serbia is an exception.
But I hasten to add that a lot of what I’ve seen here is positive. Last night in Belgrade I attended a packed documentary film about the wholesale murder of Albanians in Kosovo in 1999 and the hiding of their bodies at a police installation in Serbia because Milosevic thought “no bodies–no crime.” The Albanian diplomat who represents Kosovo here came up to introduce himself. I also enjoyed a beer with two friends from Kosovo I met on the street here: one is Serb and the other Albanian. They had driven from Kosovo together yesterday afternoon. Picture that happening 10 years ago.
But it is still is incumbent on a foreign visitor to hold up a mirror and point out the most glaring things needing correction. If he is lucky–and I think I am–he might be heard by those with some power and authority, or those in civil society with energy and influence, to do something to fix things. He can also offer a helping hand, if the local people want it.
If not, he can still write another book chapter, or a blog post.
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Serbia wants stability
I am finishing up a first day of meetings and interviews in Belgrade. I hadn’t been here for I don’t remember how many years. Commerce is notably more active and everything a bit spiffier, except for the rather tired Hyatt hotel, once the glitziest place in town. Prime Minister Vucic, whom I saw this morning, is readying a new government for parliamentary approval following on his good performance in the April 24 election.
Serbia today worries about stability in its neighborhood. That alone is good news, since under Slobodan Milosevic it spent a good deal of time and effort creating instability throughout the Balkans. There is unfortunately a lot to worry about. Macedonia is suffering a major political crisis, initiated over illegal wiretapping but now extending far beyond that. Bosnia and Herzegovina has its perpetual political problem: Republika Srpska President Dodik wants his 49% “entity” to be independent and is doing his best to render the Sarajevo government dysfunctional. Kosovo has weathered a normal succession of presidents but faces continuing violent opposition, in particular to talks with Belgrade, and advocacy of union with Albania, which Kosovo’s constitution prohibits. Scandal allegations and political ambiguity are buffeting Croatia.
Things in Serbia are relatively calm and clear. Vucic may not have won quite as many seats as he would have liked, but he has a clear majority and will bring in a few other parties to consolidate his hold on power. His more challenging opposition, part of which will be within the government and even the presidency, is from nationalists and Russophiles who really don’t stand a chance. Their Greater Serbia program has been rejected in both war and peace. Moscow, while thumping its chest quite a bit, really has little to offer anyone in the Balkans, as its treasury is running dry due to low oil and gas prices. Moscow is also exhausting its military and credibility in wars in Ukraine and Syria.
On the more democratic and civic left of the political spectrum fragmentation and confusion reign in Serbia. Former President Tadic has been unable to assemble a critical mass and has prevented others from doing so.
Vucic is therefore as free as any Serbian prime minister has been for a long time to set Serbia’s direction. My hope is that he will double down on the more politically difficult parts of qualifying for EU membership, in particular by allowing far more media freedom, instituting significant security sector reforms and developing a more independent and efficacious judicial system. I discuss these issues in a recently published book chapter on “Challenges of Democratization in Serbia, which I know the PM has read.
Beyond that, it seems to me the regional issues really are very important. The priorities include completing the Durres/Pristina road to Nis, the Belgrade/Bar road through Montenegro, railway improvements and added intra-regional flights, especially between Belgrade and Pristina. The Kosovo/Serbia boundary/border needs demarcation. These are the subjects of what former Croatian Foreign Minister Pusic calls “boring politics”(as opposed to the heroic politics of state formation) but they are vital in providing the kind of economic stimulus and interconnectedness required for stability in a place like the Balkans.
I’ll also hope that Belgrade will prepared to restart talks with Pristina, focusing initially on implementation of the existing agreements but eventually extending to a settlement of all outstanding issues, including entry of Kosovo into the United Nations and establishment of diplomatic relations between Belgrade and Pristina. With respect to Bosnia, Belgrade needs somehow to rein in Dodik and convince him to throw in his lot with a government in Sarajevo that can credibly begin to prepare the country for EU membership. Solutions in Bosnia and Kosovo would do a great deal to ensure the kind of stability democratic Belgrade needs.
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