Tag: Balkans
Montenegro looks pretty good from DC
I am speaking at the University of Montenegro in an hour or so. Here are my notes:
It is a great pleasure to be back in Montenegro. I enormously enjoyed my visit over the weekend to the coast, which I had never seen, with Sinisa Vukovic, a star professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Montenegro has exports it can be very proud of.
My last visit to Montenegro was well before independence, so this is a new country for me. I think you should be pleased with what you have achieved, but anxious to improve on it in the future. Let me explain.
Ten years of independence have wrought significant economic and political progress. Montenegro’s economic freedom score according to the Heritage Foundation has improved, even if rapid growth took a big hit from the 2008 financial crisis. Adoption of the euro as your currency has avoided many difficult issues, but also tied the country to Europe’s current recession and to a difficult competition with other producers within the eurozone. Democracy, while still a bit better than the Balkans average, has not improved overall according to Freedom House, even if the media have become more independent and the World Bank reports slowly improving government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law.
Your country is a candidate for EU membership and seems to be progressing, even if slowly, in the accession process. NATO membership is imminent and most welcome. These are no small achievements. They bode well for the future. You need only look to nearby Macedonia to see what happens to a Balkan country that stalls in its progress towards Euroatlantic goals. The proverbial bicycle needs forward motion to prevent it from keeling over.
There are in my view two main obstacles blocking Montenegro’s bicycle path right now. There is no going around them. You have to clear them.
The first is rule of law. A weak judicial system has been unable to adequately counter organized crime, graft and other endemic forms of corruption, especially in public procurement and abuse of state institutions for political purposes. Major prosecutions are now ongoing, and I trust there will be more. I worry not when prosecutions happen but when they don’t. A year doesn’t go by in Washington DC without serious judicial accusations against two or three members of Congress, not to mention three or four governors in the rest of the country. I am pleased, not dismayed, when justice is done. I think you should be too. Not every prosecution will be successful, but every successful prosecution will be a warning to others.
The second major obstacle at the moment is the lack of a viable alternative to the main governing party. There has been no alternation in power since independence. While there are now small opposition forces that are Europe-focused, a big portion of the opposition has failed to detach itself from its Russian patron and end its campaign against independence. Montenegro needs a viable, constitutional, united Europe-focused alternative to your founding President and his dominant political party, who among other things have laudably earned allegiance from Montenegro’s substantial minorities.
The broad pro-independence coalition will not last forever, nor should it. At some point it will fragment—maybe that process has already started. This is a natural evolution that signals the beginning of the end of transition. It is necessary and unavoidable.
My saying this should not be interpreted as criticism of Prime Minister Djukanovic. To the contrary, he deserves a great deal of credit for the progress Montenegro has made, but it is time for Montenegro’s citizens to be thinking about how they can move beyond his long-dominant leadership to the normal democratic alternation in power of more conservative and more liberal political coalitions. Alternation in power cannot be done with an opposition that doesn’t accept the constitution of the state and seeks instead to create a greater Serbia, an idea defeated in four wars and during more than 16 years of peace. Nor can it be done with people who reject Montenegro’s European future and pine for a return to an alliance with Mother Russia. Read more
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Professors on the Montenegrin coast
Saturday was a recovery day for me after 15-hour trip to Podgorica, where I’ll be speaking Monday at a university event commemorating Montenegro’s tenth anniversary of independence. So naturally Sinisa Vukovic, my Montenegrin colleague at SAIS, and I took in the sights on the coast, in addition to a busman’s holiday morning at a conference on Global Security at Stake–Challenges and Responses that happened to be occurring in Budva.
The first of the three sessions we attended was on the Balkans, featuring the presidents of Croatia, Montenegro and Slovenia. The message was clear: they want us to speed up entry of the remaining Balkans countries into NATO and the EU. Their plea is that accession is not only a technical question but a political one as well. It should be conceived as consolidation of Europe rather than enlargement. Montenegro’s entry into NATO is a strong positive signal, but it needs not only approval at the July Warsaw Summit but also quick ratification in the 28 member states. A membership action plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina should follow, as should membership for Macedonia, which had met the criteria for membership before its most recent crisis.
President Borut Pahor of Slovenia was less certain about membership in the EU for Ukraine and Turkey. He thought some sort of special status needed. President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic claimed Croatia is not blocking Serbian negotiations with the EU but only insisting that Belgrade meet the standards the EU sets, just as Croatia had to do in becoming a member. She was also keen to point out that the problem of refugees entering the EU is not the main issue, but rather the conditions in the Middle East and North Africa that are generating the refugee flow. Europe has to do more about that, she suggested. All three presidents seemed keen on infrastructure connections (transport, telecommunications and energy) not only within the Balkans but also around the Black Sea and with eastern Europe, all the way to the Baltics.
The second session focused on the US election and likely shifts in foreign policy. The European panelists–Julian Lindley French and Stefano Stefanini–agreed that either candidate as president will want Europe to do more. Both also thought it should, but suggested that the benchmark should not necessarily be 2% of GNP spent on defense (the NATO goal) but rather a broader measure of national security expenditure that takes into account relevant civilian diplomatic, development and state-building efforts.
Former US Ambassador to Turkmenistan Laura Kennedy (retired) had the unenviable task of explaining America, in particular the candidate she does not favor, to the Balkan audience. Hillary Clinton, she said, would be well within the centrist, multilateralist tradition that Barack Obama also represents, even if she differs with him on Syria and other things. Donald Trump, however, would be a radical departure, one more friendly to Russia, far less concerned about human rights, doubtful of US alliances (including NATO), and much more unpredictable than Clinton.
The third session discussed the Islamic State (ISIL) challenge. There was much the usual discussion of radicalization and deradicalization, with some observers noting a sharp decline in the once high rate of Balkan Muslims leaving to fight in Syria and Iraq. This is apparently the result of a sharp crackdown in Kosovo and Bosnia. Reintegration of those returning to the Balkans and elsewhere is however still a big challenge, even if there has been no sign so far of violent extremist events in the Balkans attributable to returnees.
Much the most interesting moment was General (ret.) John Allen’s outline of the longer-term challenges that are likely to make the governance challenges we face in the Middle East (and elsewhere) harder: shifts of wealth to the east, growing inequality, urbanization, youth bulges and climate change are the factors I remember him mentioning. Terrorism, he suggested, is a symptom of much deeper problems that are not going to go away because ISIL is defeated militarily. We need to meet the governance challenges the longer-term factors pose if we want to live in peace.
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Where is Serbia headed?
My SAIS colleagues Aylin Unver Noi and Sasha Toperich launched the Center for Transatlantic Relations’ Challenges of Democracy in the European Union and its Neighbors yesterday. Here are the remarks I prepared on my chapter, which deals with Serbia, where I’ll visit next week (after a stop in Montenegro):
- Let me give you the bottom line up front: I think Serbia is headed in what I consider the right direction. Ten years from now, I expect Serbia to be a far more prosperous, established democracy ready for EU membership and clearly aligned with the West, even if not a NATO member. I also think it will have taken major steps in the direction of normalizing relations with Kosovo.
- That may shock some of you. Right now, Serbia is still struggling to complete its April 24 early parliamentary election, with repeat voting at 15 polling stations and still no clarity about the overall result.
- It is clear however that nationalist, Russophile forces have done relatively well, while Western-oriented liberal democrats did poorly, not least because they are fragmented. Some harbor suspicions that the government is manipulating the results. Many would say the election was free but not fair, with the incumbents using their privileged position to gain unfair advantage.
- Even apart from the election it is easy enough to find well-founded criticism of Serbia’s still largely unreformed security services, government influence on its media and lack of independence and effectiveness of its court system. These are all serious long-term problems.
- But I would be far more worried if there were no criticism.
- It seems to me Serbia is struggling with what I would regard as the difficult middle period of its democratic transition.
- The initial period from the defeat of Milosevic to the end of President Tadic’s second term was a slow, and slowing, march toward the West.
- Prime Minister Vucic in the past couple of years accomplished a great deal, settling at least some issues with Kosovo, accelerating the opening of accession negotiations with the EU and signing a partnership agreement with NATO.
- But at the same time he faces a serious challenge on his nationalist right, including from President Nikolic and other anti-Western politicians determined to find in Moscow a counterbalance to the EU and NATO.
- The question we need to answer is what to do to keep Serbia moving in the right direction and prevent a relapse. Let me offer some ideas.
- The EU accession process is vital to curing what ails Serbia’s security services, its media and its judicial system.
- Beyond that, infrastructure and interconnectedness is important. Serbia is highly dependent on Russian gas and energy technology. With the cancellation of South Stream, there are lots of long-term options out there. Serbia’s road network needs better connections to the Mediterranean, both through Montenegro and through Kosovo and Albania.
- Regional issues are also important. Serbia needs to demarcate its boundary/border with Kosovo and establish a flexible regime for residents who need to cross it frequently. It also needs to fully implement the many technical agreements with Kosovo as well as make a clear break with Milorad Dodik’s ambitions of holding a referendum in Republika Srpska.
- Also important are improved and enhanced relations with NATO and American forces. That should come now from deployment, in a natural disaster area if not in a war zone, likely with the Ohio National Guard.
- It’s not clear that the door to the EU will be open when Serbia is ready to enter. The euro and migration crises, as well as Europe’s own turn to nativism, are all to evident.
- Serbia’s last challenge in transition will be convincing the 28 member states to ratify the accession treaty. That will not be the easiest of the tasks ahead, but it will be the most satisfying if it can be accomplished successfully, sometime after 2020 but I hope before 2025.
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Now comes the hard part
While it is still unclear how many seats he will have in parliament, Serbian Prime Minister Vucic has won a big victory, garnering close to 50% of the vote and far outdistancing his nearest competitors, his Socialist coalition partners at over 12% and Vojislav Seselj’s Radicals at close to 8%. The uncertainty about seats, which are awarded proportionately, derives from the results at the lower end, where several parties appear to have come in close to the 5% threshold. If any of those results changes, Vucic’s Progressives could gain or lose seats.
The Prime Minister’s victory is a big vote of confidence in his pro-European stance. His more nationalist opponents are much more inclined to view Serbia’s future as closely tied to Russia. His more liberal opponents share his commitment to EU membership but suffer from splitting into personality-based groups. Vucic may want to bring one or more of these personalities into his coalition, to strengthen its pro-European stance.
These election results were widely foretold. Vucic has managed to draw both on his nationalist past and his promise of a European future for wide support. Now comes the hard part: governing.
From the domestic perspective, the key issue will be the economy, which has been sputtering, along with the rest of the Balkans and Europe. Despite some real progress on economic reform, Serbia is in recession and unemployment is high. There isn’t a lot the government can do to promote recovery in the near term. Serbia, like most of the Balkans, is highly dependent on what happens elsewhere. Prospects in the euro zone and in Russia are not good.
From an international perspective, the main issues are corruption, the legal system and media freedom. When in the West Vucic appears comfortable and open in dealing with the media, but at home he is less comfortable and all too often attacks the questioner as much as he answers the question. He is widely believed to control appointment of editors, even in privately owned media. The courts are slow, disorganized and lack real independence, which Vucic acknowledges.
Looming on the horizon are difficult choices for Serbia with respect to Kosovo. Vucic has been vital to the progress made in years of talks with his Kosovar counterpart. Serbia has accepted the validity of the Kosovo constitution on its entire territory (including the Serb-majority north) and has acknowledged that Kosovo will qualify for EU membership separately and at its own pace. It seems to me a short step to mutual recognition and exchange of ambassadors, but that short step is still regarded as a yawning chasm in Serbia, one its politicians all seek to avoid.
Fixing these things isn’t easy. Nor is it likely to garner a lot of votes unless the economy also recovers. But Vucic now has four years in which to deliver. If he does, Serbia will make serious progress in negotiating EU membership, though I doubt it can meet expectations that it complete the process before the next election. Failure could mean a turn backwards towards the nationalists who were Vucic’s closest competitors, albeit lagging far behind. Brussels and Washington will want to avoid that turn and encourage Vucic to proceed in the pro-European direction he campaigned on.
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This doesn’t make sense
US Ambassador to NATO Lute said Friday:
I think Russia plays an important part in the strategic environment…[which] will put a break on NATO expansion. If you accept the premises…about Russia’s internal weakness and perhaps steady decline, it may not make sense to push further now and maybe accelerate or destabilize the decline.
I am assured that this statement represents no departure from Article 10 of the NATO treaty, which provides for the membership to unanimously “invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty.” Montenegro has already received such an invitation and will be admitted to membership at the July 8/9 NATO Summit in Warsaw.
What doesn’t make sense to me is Washington accommodating Moscow’s aggressiveness internationally in order to avoid destabilizing it internally. Quite to the contrary: pushing back on Moscow’s increasingly aggressive stance against NATO expansion would provide incentive and opportunity for Russia to refocus its energies on its internal problems, which lower oil prices and Ukraine-induced sanctions are aggravating.
This is particularly true for NATO expansion into the Balkans, a region not contiguous with Russian territory. NATO expansion to tiny and distant Montenegro can in no way be reasonably perceived as a threat to Russia, no matter how often Russian diplomats repeat that refrain. The same is true of Slovenia, Albania and Croatia, all of which became NATO members with little or no comment from Moscow. Even if all of the remaining Balkans countries join–that’s Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia and Serbia–Russia is in no way militarily at risk.
That makes the Balkans different from Georgia and Ukraine. Location matters.
This hasn’t prevented Moscow from mounting aggressive campaigns in all but pro-American Kosovo against Alliance membership, as well as a rearguard action against Montenegrin accession. Moscow uses its diplomats to speak out crudely against NATO membership, its money to fund anti-NATO protests, and its commercial influence to turn local politicians against the Alliance. Russia has even planted a proto-base (allegedly for humanitarian rather than military purposes) in southern Serbia, hoping this will inoculate Belgrade from catching the NATO flu.
Russia’s anti-NATO efforts threaten to destabilize the Balkans, where the prospect of NATO membership is an important factor in promoting democratization and reducing inter-ethnic tensions. This is especially true in Macedonia, where much of the Albanian population regards the prospect of NATO membership as vital to its own security. It is of course also true in Kosovo, where NATO troops have been vital to maintaining a safe and secure environment since the NATO/Yugoslavia war in 2001. Bosnia and Serbia are more ambivalent towards NATO, though Serbia’s prime minister recently noted (in the runup to a parliamentary election) that NATO troops in Kosovo protect the Serb population there.
So Ambassador Lute’s comments–even if not meant to qualify Article 10–will be read in the Balkans as discouraging hopes for NATO membership and in Moscow as a green light for Russian efforts to undermine the generally positive trend the region has taken for the past 20 years. It would be good now for the American Administration to reiterate that Washington still wants a Europe “whole and free,” including in particular the Balkans and even Russia if it so chooses. Anything less than that gives Moscow further incentive to muck in what it increasingly considers its sphere of influence, which could set back decades of democratization and run the real risk of destabilization.
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Macedonia agonistes
My inbox continues to produce interesting material. Today it was this opposition perspective from Hristijan Gjorgievski, commenting on the situation in Macedonia (but read also President Ivanov’s government perspective, at the link below):
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