Tag: Balkans
Macedonia needs to heal itself
Boris Georgievski of Deutsche Welle asked some questions about Macedonia. I replied:
Q: President Ivanov’s decision to pardon over 50 corrupt politicians and their aides caused a stir in Macedonia. What is your take on the current situation in the country?
A: Messy. This grossly inappropriate amnesty comes on top of a major wire tapping scandal that revealed widespread government malfeasance. It’s clearly time to clean up.
Q: How did Macedonia became a problem child again, after being fan-fared for years as a model of multiethnic democracy in the Balkans?
A: I wouldn’t minimize what Macedonia has achieved: economic reform has brought growth in the past decade that is relatively strong. The country has enjoyed a good deal of stability with a governing condominium of Macedonians and Albanians. But at least some of those in power have forgotten that they can be held accountable, judicially as well as electorally. That happens in democracies.
Q: The pardons have been condemned internationally, with the US and EU warning that they raised questions about rule of law in Macedonia and could undermine the country’s aim of joining the EU. Can we expect to see more direct actions by both Washington and Brussels?
A: You’ll have to ask official Washington and Brussels. But I doubt either one will roll out a red carpet these days for the president or prime minister of Macedonia, or any of those amnestied.
Q: An unnamed EU diplomat told the Wall Street Journal last week that the possibility of sanctions against individual politicians and the country might be on the horizon. What could be the next steps from the US especially since the country is in an election year?
A: Sanctions against individuals–travel bans, asset freezes–are possible, though I don’t expect them to have much immediate effect. And the governing parties still seem to be holding their own with public opinion.
Q: Many analysts, both in Macedonia and outside, suggest that the crisis in Macedonia was tolerated for too long by the international community. Is it an issue of the international community having no interest in the country and its democratic development?
A: I don’t think you should expect the international community to have more knowledge of, or interest in, corrupt practices than the citizens of Macedonia. Democracy is a system of self-government, not an imposition from abroad.
Q: Are the authoritarian regimes on the rise in Europe, especially in the Balkans? What is the reason for this phenomenon?
A: The pendulum swings. Incumbent politicians often use all the means at their disposal to remain in power. In democracies that are not fully consolidated, those means include influence over the press, illicit wire tapping, and pardons for corrupt officials. Macedonia, like other countries in the Balkans, needs an independent judiciary and vigorous electoral competition.
Q: Finally, is the EU choosing stability over democracy by tolerating hybrid authoritarian regimes like Gruevski’s in Macedonia. What’s the US role in the Balkans?
A: The US sees itself mainly in a supporting role today in the Balkans, following the EU lead. I’m pretty sure both Brussels and Washington will support a credible effort to clean up corrupt behavior and block authoritarianism in the Balkans. Both want Macedonia in NATO and the EU. But it is up to the citizens of Macedonia to ensure that their government does what is needed to qualify for membership.
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Anyone but Jeremic
I am getting a lot of questions about Vuk Jeremic’s candidacy for UN Secretary General, which the Serbian government is supporting. Here is what I have to say:
I think Vuk Jeremic is ill-regarded in Washington, both from his time as Foreign Minister and his time as President of the General Assembly. His support lies in Moscow, not the US. I am frankly surprised that a government aiming at EU membership would put him forward.
Jeremic’s most important contribution to peace in the Balkans was his mistake in asking the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence. The ICJ concluded unequivocally that the declaration breached no international law. That defeat of Belgrade’s claim led to the dialogue with Pristina and the ongoing process of reintegration of the north with the rest of Kosovo, whose constitutional legitimacy on its whole territory Belgrade has accepted.
I suppose Belgrade, where he is not in particularly good odor with the current government, puts him forward partly to assuage the Russians and partly to get him off their backs. Neither of those is a good reason for Washington to support him.
People will tell you Jeremic is hardworking and knows the UN well. Both are true. And for the US they are two additional reasons not to want him as Secretary General. He would work hard and possibly have significant success in making America’s goals unachievable, not only in the Balkans but elsewhere as well. He didn’t keep commitments to the US while he was foreign minister. He certainly wouldn’t do so as UN Secretary General.
From the American perspective, there are lots of good candidates this time around. Any one of them would be better than Jeremic.
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Peace Picks April 11-15
- Egypt’s Former Foreign Minister on Regional Statecraft and Domestic Reform | Tuesday, April 12th | 12:00-1:30 | Middle East Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host Nabil Fahmy, former foreign minister of Egypt, for a discussion about Egypt’s political and socioeconomic challenges and its role in regional politics and stability. Egypt’s government is under pressure to deliver economic development, good governance, and increased security in light of growing terrorist threats. These challenges come amid growing regional tensions- from the conflict in Syria to the war in Yemen. How can the state better meet its domestic objectives and how can Egypt play an effective role in brokering greater Middle East stability?
- The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry and the Obama Doctrine | Tuesday, April 12th | 1:00-3:30 | Middle East Policy Council | Email info@mepc.org to RSVP | Our panel will address Jeffrey Goldberg‘s essay, “The Obama Doctrine,” and how it impacts U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. Please RSVP promptly for limited space. Speakers include James F. Jeffrey, Philip Solondz Distinguished Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, Alireza Nader, Senior International Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation, and Fahad Nazer, Senior Political Analyst, JTG, Inc. and Non-Resident Fellow, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. The moderator will be Richard Schmierer, Former Ambassador to Oman and Chairman of the Board of Directors, Middle East Policy Council.
- The Fourth Annual Nancy Bernkopf Tucker Memorial Lecture: The Politics of Memory in East Asia | Tuesday, April 12th | 4:00-6:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II last year brought another round of contentious memory politics in East Asia. Despite the seeming sameness of the debates, in fact the practices and norms of public memory have substantially altered since the end of the war, creating what speaker Carol Gluck calls a “global memory culture.” Changes in the law, politics, society, criteria of knowledge, and concepts of responsibility have transformed our understanding of what it means to do justice to the past. How then do these changes relate to the politics of memory in East Asia today? Carol Gluck, George Sansom Professor of History at Columbia University, will speak.
- Outlook for Security and Integration of Albania and the Western Balkans | Wednesday, April 13th | 9:30-11:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Since the collapse of the communist regime more than two decades ago, Albania has undergone significant political, economic, and social reforms. Albania became a NATO member in 2009, a European Union (EU) candidate country in 2014, and signed a declaration of strategic partnership with the United States in 2015. Given the increasingly fragmented climate among EU member states over Europe’s capacity to overcome current challenges, the EU’s enlargement agenda has lost momentum. Meanwhile, instability in the Western Balkans has been fueled by unprecedented waves of refugees, and political and economic uncertainty to the South and East. As Prime Minister, H.E. Edi Rama plays a significant role in directing the path for Albania in EU accession negotiations and regional cooperation, particularly through the Berlin Process framework of annual summits in the Western Balkans. In his visit to Washington, DC, Prime Minister Rama will address Albania’s security priorities and goals for the NATO Warsaw Summit, and provide views on Albania’s reform progress.
- Supporting Tunisia’s Imperiled Transition | Thursday, April 14th | 8:30-12:15 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Tunisia remains the Arab Awakening’s last best hope. Its political transition is as remarkable as it is fragile—imperiled by both security challenges and significant socioeconomic obstacles. Join us for a discussion of how Tunisia and its international partners can forge a new and more constructive dynamic and reverse the country’s recent troubling trajectory. This event will launch a new Carnegie report entitled Between Peril and Promise: A New Framework for Partnership With Tunisia. Panels and panelists may be found here.
- Turkey, its neighborhood, and the international order | Thursday, April 14th | 10:00-11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Increasingly, there are concerns about the direction of Turkey’s politics, economy, security, and foreign policy. Debate is growing about the Turkish economy’s vibrancy, and its commitment to democratic norms is being questioned. Moreover, against the backdrop of the chaos in the region, its ability to maintain peace and order is hindered. These difficulties coincide with a larger trend in which the global economy remains fragile, European integration is fracturing, and international governance seems under duress. The spill-over from the conflicts in Syria and Iraq has precipitated a refugee crisis of historic scale, testing the resolve, unity, and values of the West. Will these challenges prove pivotal in reshaping the international system? Will these trials ultimately compel the West to formulate an effective collective response? Will Turkey prove to be an asset or a liability for regional security and order? On April 14, the Turkey Project of the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings will host a discussion to assess Turkey’s strategic orientation amid the ever-changing international order. Panelists will include Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Bruce Jones, Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan of the University of Maryland, and Francis Riccardone of the Atlantic Council. Cansen Başaran-Symes, president of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) will make introductory remarks. Turkey Project Director and TÜSİAD Senior Fellow Kemal Kirişci will moderate the discussion. After the program, panelists will take questions from the audience.
- From ISIS to Declining Oil Prices: Qubad Talabani on the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Challenges | Thursday, April 14th | 10:00-11:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Opening remarks will be made by Nancy Lindborg, President, U.S. Institute of Peace. H.E. Qubad Talabani, Deputy Prime Minister, Kurdistan Regional Government, will speak. Henri J. Barkey, Director, Middle East Program, Wilson Center, will moderate. Please join us on April 14 for a discussion with Qubad Talabani, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG). Long an island of stability in a Middle East marked by conflict, the Kurdish region of Iraq now faces a perfect storm. Its finances have been severely affected by the dramatic decline in the price of oil, its main source of revenue. The KRG also faces a constitutional crisis because President Masoud Barzani’s term has ended without the Kurdish political parties finding a definitive way forward or agreement on succession. And the KRG’s Peshmerga military force is engaged with the United States and its allies in an extended offensive to rout the self-declared Islamic State extremist group and liberate the nearby city of Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest. Amidst all of this, President Barzani also has indicated that the KRG will hold a referendum in 2016 on whether the region should seek independence from Iraq.
- A New Economic Growth Strategy for Pakistan: A Conversation with Pakistani Finance Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar | Thursday, April 14th | 2:30-4:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | When Pakistan’s current government took office in June 2013, the economy was under tremendous stress. Nearly three years later, estimates suggest that the economy could achieve 4.5 percent GDP growth in fiscal year 2015-16, which would be the highest rate in eight years. Inflation and interest rates have decreased, tax revenues have grown, and the fiscal deficit has shrunk. Additionally, foreign exchange reserves have crossed $20 billion for the first time in history. Meanwhile, the government recently had a successful 10th review from the International Monetary Fund. At the same time, however, the government confronts political, security, and energy challenges that have hindered a full economic recovery. At this event, His Excellency Mohammad Ishaq Dar, Pakistan’s finance minister, will unveil a new two-year strategy to place Pakistan’s economic growth on par with that of other emerging economies in South Asia. He will also speak about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Pakistan’s current security situation.
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The arguments are worse than the verdict
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) today acquitted Serbian politician Vojislav Selselj of all charges against him, by an overwhelming majority. Instead Judge Antonetti convicted the ICTY prosecution of confusion and incompetence.
Those disappointed in the outcome should read at least the trial judgement summary, which says the prosecution failed to prove that the political effort to create Greater Serbia constituted a “joint criminal enterprise” or that Seselj was in charge of those who committed crimes pursuing that goal. Even fighters called “followers of Seselj,” the Tribunal says, were arguably under the control of the Yugoslav National Army and the Serb armies in Croatia and Bosnia.
This should be little comfort to the Belgrade government, which has been anxious to avoid any hint of responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Croatia and Bosnia. Seselj’s acquittal can be read as a forceful indictment of the three Serb armies and governments, including the one led at the time by Slobodan Milosevic, and might raise again the question of compensation or reparations.
Essentially ICTY is saying a guy who inspired, recruited and deployed volunteers to go fight in the war was not responsible for any crimes those volunteers committed, because he was not in the chain of command. This certainly implies that the Yugsolav National Army, which at the time controlled the Serb forces in both Croatia and Bosnia, was responsible.
But the acquittal will be read by Serb nationalists as vindication, because it clears their Greater Serbia political program of responsibility. Rather than being inherently discriminatory, it is judged to be just one more political proposition, morally no worse than Croatian and Bosnian secession from Yugoslavia, whose fulfillment would not necessarily have violated anyone’s rights. Nor are many of the means chosen to fulfill that program found to be criminal, though the Tribunal finds that some crimes were committed, for which it held Seselj had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be responsible.
At times the Tribunal indicts itself in making its case against the prosecutors. It suggests there was no widespread Serb attack on civilians in Bosnia and Croatia and says:
…the majority cannot dismiss the Defence’s argument–amply supported by some of the testimonies–according to which these civilians had fled the combat zones to take refuge in villages inhabited by members of the same ethnic or religious group; that the buses that were provided for this purpose did not constitute operations to forcibly transfer the population, but were in fact provided on humanitarian grounds to assist the non-combatants fleeing combat zones in which they no longer felt safe….the SRS pursued the objective of a Greater Serbia which was to include all the Serbs, whether they were of the Orthodox, Catholic or Muslim faith….There is a reasonable possibility that the sending of volunteers was aimed at protecting the Serbs.
… were made in a context of conflict and were meant to boost the morale of the troops of his camp, rather than calling upon them to spare no one.
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Walk the talk
Kosovo President-elect Thaci spoke recently at the Hague Institute for International Justice. A friend urged me to have a careful look at his speech, I suppose in part because of my open letter to him upon his election to the Presidency.
I’m not inclined to respond in detail on the first four historical points Hashim makes. I’ll leave it to others to offer evidence on whether he is correct or not in claiming that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during its rebellion against Serbian rule in the late 1990s did not use terrorism against civilians, did not rely on revenue from criminal activities, truly embraced Western values and kept away from religion. I would prefer that all these things be true, but I understand that some will want to challenge them, especially the first, second and third of these points.
Hashim makes a fifth historical point of particular relevance today: that Kosovo independence was a compromise between Belgrade, which wanted the former autonomous province re-incorporated into Serbia, and those among the Albanians who wanted Kosovo to join Albania. I think he is basically correct: the Kosovars accepted a deal with the international community (Serbia never signed on) that permitted independence but prevented union with Albania.
Maintaining that deal is vital to a good relationship with the Americans and Europeans, not least because any departure from it in the direction of union with Albania (or surrender of the northern municipalities to Serbia, which would ensue) would provide Russia with the justification it seeks for its several border change propositions: annexation of Crimea and its de facto rule in Ukrainian Donbas, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria. The Kosovar political movement known as Vetvendosje! (Self-Determination) is challenging the deal that led to independence, along with some Serbs who want to incorporate the northern part of Kosovo into Serbia. In doing so, they risk opening Pandora’s box and making Kosovo into a pariah.
When the President-elect looks to the future, he makes four points: Serbia and Kosovo should
- help Europe, especially on immigration, extremism and organized crime, which he associates in part with Russia;
- cooperate economically, in particular to create jobs;
- engage regionally, especially on security (including via NATO) and infrastructure;
- establish the rule of law, including the Kosovo Special Court that will look into allegations of post-war KLA crimes some believe implicate Thaci himself.
He makes lots of other points along the way, but I wanted to strip the talk down to its policy-relevant essence, which seems to me eminently reasonable.
Many readers will want to raise questions about the President-elect’s sincerity, about post-war attacks on Serbs and destruction of Serb churches and monuments in Kosovo, about criminal allegations against and convictions of some KLA commanders and fighters, and widespread perceptions of corruption and illicit enrichment. I have no objections to those issues being raised and hope that the President-elect will respond in the same even-tempered tone as his speech in the Hague.
But I think it is appropriate to remind that diplomacy is getting other people to say, and do, what you want them to say and do.
Hashim is saying a lot of the right things, at least so far as the international community is concerned. Kosovo needs to govern effectively, clean up corruption, grow its economy, protect Serbs as well as other minorities, and end the trafficking, organized crime and extremism that are giving it a bad name. What it boils down to is instituting much improved governance.
That requires more than saying the right things to convince the skeptics. It requires doing the right things. Even with the best of intentions, it will not be easy: the president in Kosovo is elected in parliament and has limited powers. Many will be skeptical that Thaci is really committed to doing rule of law in a serious way. But Hashim has set his sights high. That’s good. Now let’s see if he can walk the talk. That would be far better.
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The truth goes to jail
This note, which appeared in my inbox this morning from Belgrade with 104 civil society signatures, goes a long way to explaining why the former spokesperson for the Hague Tribunal is spending a week in prison. Note that it supports her without suggesting that the punishment is contrary to the law. I imagine she will wear the imprisonment as a badge of honor.
The former spokeswoman of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Florence Hartmann, was arrested on Thursday, 24 March, outside the ICTY building and taken to serve a seven-day jail term. Hartmann was arrested by ICTY security officers on orders of the chamber that rendered a final judgment against her. Civil society representatives from the region of the former Yugoslavia hereby voice their support for Florence Hartmann and her uncompromising struggle for truth.
Florence Hartmann was not given the jail sentence because she did something that is usually considered to constitute contempt of court, such as tampering with witnesses or refusal to give evidence before the international court, but because of exposing and countering the practice of concealing documents in order to protect the interests of some states. Namely, in her book “Paix et Châtiment” [Peace and Punishment] and the article entitled “Vital Genocide Documents Concealed’, published in January 2008, Hartmann revealed information relating to the decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber ordering that the documents created by the Supreme Defence Council which Serbia supplied to the Tribunal during the trial of Slobodan Milošević be filed as confidential.
Let us quote the statement that Hartmann has recently given to the N1 TV Station during the Pressing talk show: “I discovered a decision in which judges say ‘we are concealing very important archives of the Milosevic regime because should Bosnia seek reparation, Serbia would have to pay millions of dollars, which would affect Serbia’s economy (…) This is the only part I used. The judges later removed the classification from these documents themselves, because I had said that was an unlawful thing to do. They disgraced themselves by accusing me, by issuing an arrest warrant for me. What matters is that we now have access to these documents“.
We are profoundly convinced that what Florence Hartmann did may be contrary to the ICTY Statute but is certainly not contrary to justice. Quite the opposite. Therefore we stand by her in her commitment to the pursuit of truth and efforts to make official state archives available to the public.
Lastly, we would like to draw attention to the fact that the Hague Tribunal made a decision to arrest Florence Hartmann at the moment when it showed weakness with respect to Vojislav Šešelj’s decision not to appear before the court for the pronouncement of the judgment against him and Serbia’s refusal to hand over Šešelj and another three members of the Serbian Radical Party accused of contempt of court for tampering with witnesses, to the ICTY. The Hague Tribunal used to apply the same standards to all accused persons in the past, so it should do so in this case too.
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