Tag: Balkans
A failed terrorist provocation
A month ago, the Kosovo police foiled an attempted insurrection near a Serb Orthodox monastery Banjska, in the northern part of the country. A 51-page preliminary investigative report by the Republic of Kosovo is now circulating in the US government. Here is my plagiaristic summary. The original is better.
Conclusions first
- A paramilitary group of about 80 cadres recruited, trained and specifically designated for the purpose carried out the attack, with heavy arms Serbia provided.
- Belgrade’s goal was to instigate a Kosovo police response to firing from the Banjska monastery that could be used to justify a Serbian military intervention, allegedly to save endangered Serb citizens of Kosovo and pilgrims from Serbia.
- The plan entailed challenging, threatening, and potentially killing members of KFOR as well as Kosovo police, who lost one officer to a land mine.
- The chain of command included the Serbian state, whose President and security structures are culpable legally and morally.
- Dozens of perpetrators who escaped to Serbia are now protected from justice by Belgrade.
- There is a risk of repetition , as evidenced by the continued offensive posture of Serbian security forces surrounding Kosovo as well as the intense pro-invasion propaganda campaign still ongoing inside Serbia.
A few details of the investigation
The Serbian Armed Forces trained the paramilitary perpetrators over a period of two years at army and Interior Ministry bases. US-donated Humvees were used in the training. The Kosovo authorities have captured detailed plans based on military-supplied maps for the paramilitaries to open routes into Kosovo for weapons and supplies from Serbia. Serbian special forces and drones entered into Kosovo in the leadup to the insurrection, and medical ambulances transported weapons into the country.
The operation was led by Milan Radoicic, then deputy leader of the Belgrade-sponsored political party in Kosovo, a close associate of Serbian security officials, and a political ally of President Vucic. The paramilitaries used vehicles disguised with KFOR labels and false license plates. The plan included attracting the Kosovo Police by blocking roads, firing on them from the Banjska monastery, and provoking an attack that would serve as a pretext for Serbian military intervention.
The paramilitaries were well-equipped with military-grade weapons almost entirely made in Serbia. This included 66 AK-47s, 9 machine guns, 6 sniper rifles, 41 anti-tank rocket launchers, 2 automatic grenade launchers, 8 anti-tank mines, and 122 hand grenades, along with the appropriate ammunition and over 350 units of explosives. Documentation that some of these weapons were definitely supplied by Serbia is available.
Serbia continues to promote violence against Kosovo
Since September 24, Serbia has continued to threaten violence against Kosovo. It has celebrated the paramilitaries involved in the foiled plot and declared a day of mourning for the three terrorists who were killed. High production value graffiti in Serbia, including in soccer stadiums, and in the four northern municipalities in Kosovo with Serb majorities, has promoted the idea that Serbian forces will soon return to Kosovo. Serbian armed forces are still on high alert.
President Vucic and media he controls uses hate speech in referring to Kosovo, its political leaders, and Albanians in general. Ambitions to create the “Serbian world,” a pale copy of Putin’s “Russian world” that includes Ukraine, are rife. Serbia has dramatically increased its military exercises with Russia. Belgrade intimidation of Serbs in northern Kosovo to prevent cooperation with Pristina continues, as do covert operations against Kosovo institutions.
It didn’t start on September 24 and it didn’t end then
There were four prior attacks in northern Kosovo since December 2022. The same units and some of the same personnel were involved, including in the attack on KFOR troops in May. None of the perpetrators have been returned to Kosovo to face charges. They are sheltered by the Serbian state and remain available to conduct future violent operations. So far, there has been no diplomatic action taken against Belgrade by either the US or EU, which will encourage Vucic to pursue future destabilization efforts in order to justify Serbian military intervention in Kosovo.
The precise Russian role in the September 24 plot is still unclear, but Russian backing for escalating Serbian efforts to challenge Western resolve in the Balkans is apparent. The Russians will not have failed to notice the lack of Western response. Moscow and Belgrade will amplify their efforts.
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What Serbia and Croatia are trying to do
I spoke via Zoom at Krug 99 in Sarajevo this morning. Here is pretty much what I said:
- It is a pleasure to join you, if only virtually, for this Circle 99 session. It has been more than 25 years since I attended one in person, though I enjoyed the privilege virtually two years ago.
- I was focused then mainly on the political and constitutional situation inside Bosnia and Herzegovina. That has not improved.
- I’ll again focus today on Bosnia, but in the regional context. And I’ll get, as I know many would like, to the question of American policy towards the end.
The Serbian world in Montenegro…
- The primary regional factor is Belgrade, which is trying to create what some there now term the “Serbian world.” President Vucic wants to control the political fate of Serbs in neighboring countries. That includes not only Bosnia and Herzegovina but also Montenegro and Kosovo.
- He is using his security and intelligence forces, financing, disinformation, and the Serbian Orthodox Church to overcome resistance and ensure that serious, Western-aligned democracies cannot emerge on Serbia’s periphery.
- He has been most successful in Montenegro, where he exploited genuine unhappiness with President Djukanovic and the long-ruling DPS. That discontent empowered an avowedly pro-European opposition that is reaching out to Belgrade and its proxies for support.
- The irony is that Djukanovic presided, with dignity, over a mostly peaceful and entirely constitutional transition that is bringing his hypocritical opponents to power.
…and Kosovo
- In Kosovo, Vucic’s overt political effort to control the Serb population is conducted through the Lista Srpska. But he also uses the Serbian secret services and their allies in organized crime to ensure that the Serb population, especially in the north, stays loyal to Belgrade, not Pristina.
- We saw that combination at work September 24, when Lista Srpska and the secret services attempted an armed uprising. The Kosovo police and KFOR foiled that.
- Vucic since then has leaned heavily in the direction of Russia and China. He no doubt fears that the US and Europe will demand that he apologize for the September 24 insurrection and promise it won’t happen again.
- The media campaign against Albanians inside Serbia is intense, as is Vucic’s use of the media to support his increasingly autocratic role.
As well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina
- In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vucic has in Milorad Dodik someone who is part proxy and part rival. Belgrade backs Dodik’s efforts to separate the Serbs from Sarajevo authority. But Vucic won’t want Dodik to fulfill his ambition of declaring independence.
- That would put Serbia in a difficult position. It could not recognize Republika Srpska for fear of the European and American reaction. Vucic will be careful not to allow Dodik to outflank his ethnonationalism by declaring independence and demanding annexation of Republika Srpska by Serbia.
- That said, Vucic has edged closer to Dodik as he moves increasingly into the orbit of Russia and China. Preventing successful democratic governance in Bosnia and obstructing its path towards Europe are Vucic’s aim. Dodik serves that purpose well, so long as he doesn’t go the final mile.
Croatia’s role
- What about Croatia? How does it fit into this picture?
- Zagreb, like Belgrade, wants control over its co-ethnic population inside Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is willing to cooperate with Belgrade to that end, cozying up as well as Moscow.
- Zagreb’s objective, however, is not secession but the third entity, de facto if not de jure. It wants political representation of Croats inside Bosnia and Herzegovina loyal to Zagreb, not Sarajevo.
- The irony here is that the Bosnian Croats did not ask for the third entity at Dayton, because they got a better deal: half the Federation and one-third of the state.
- But they failed to take political advantage of that situation and now are looking to exploit the High Representative to achieve their maximalist political goals.
The HiRep at risk
- His electoral decisions have favored Zagreb’s ambitions. He has ignored the European Court of Human Rights decisions that would counter group rights, like Sejdic-Finci and Kovacevic.
- At the same time, the HiRep has made himself persona non grata with Milorad Dodik, by countering Dodik’s efforts to remove Republika Srpska from Sarajevo’s authority.
- The failure of the international community to respond effectively to Dodik’s challenge risks vitiating the HiRep’s role and ending any hope that he can play a constructive role in dismantling the group rights that plague Bosnia’s politics.
- This is nub of the issue for both Serbia and Croatia. Zagreb and Belgrade want group rights and the constitutional provisions to protect them to prevail over individual rights, thus ensuring a permanent hold on power for ethnic nationalists friendly to Croatia’s and Serbia’s interests.
Washington and Brussels are not the answer
- That brings me to Washington and Brussels. The Americans and Europeans, who for a long time regretted the group rights granted at Dayton and backed the European Court decisions against them, are no longer fighting that fight.
- They seem content to allow Bosnia to wallow in its current dysfunctional state, so long as no major violence erupts.
- Lenin asked a good question: “what is to be done?”
- My colleagues and I in the diminished Balkan-watching world in Washington will continue to speak up for individual rights, for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and against Serbia and Croatia’s efforts to monopolize politics among their co-nationals inside Bosnia.
- But the center of gravity of Bosnian politics is properly inside Bosnia, not outside it.
Bosnia is the center of gravity
- The media and civil society can play a vital role. I’d like to see them mobilize as many voices as possible to press for implementation of the European Court decisions.
- Anything that reduces the salience of group rights and increases the commitment to individual rights would constitute progress.
- Ideally, the Bosnian state should have all the authority required to negotiate and implement the acquis communautaire while everything else is delegated to the municipalities (opstine).
- I’d like to see the entities and cantons, which are the power-sharing embodiment of ethnic identity and division, gradually disempowered and eventually eliminated.
- But that is an American’s version of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is your vision that counts.
- Democracy is not an easy system to manage. It requires courage and commitment. The majority of Bosnians showed lots of courage and commitment during the war.
- I hope they can summon that same spirit in 2023 and beyond.
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Breaking up Bosnia is not the thing to do
Ismet Fatih Čančar is an independent researcher, a former Partnership for Peace Fellow at NATO Defence College, and a former advisor to the Minister of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He writes:
On August 30, The Spectator published an article by Swansea law professor Andrew Tettenborn in which the author exults in the break up of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He believes this is a natural course of events, the inevitable ending of “the pantomime horse democracy.”
He is wrong. The break up of Bosnia is not a safe roadmap to sustainable peace in the Balkans. His argument is consistent with nationalist Serb and Croat actors who claim Bosnia is an aberration with no future, due to its ethnic differences and diversity.
Ignoring the law…
The complexities of the constitutional and political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the power-sharing structure under the Dayton Agreement, and the division of the society along ethno-national groups are well-known. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled against this system August 29 in Kovačević vs Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Court identified a series of systemic, institutional discriminations that need to be amended if Bosnia wants to progress on the Euro-Atlantic path.
Critics oppose implementation of this verdict, stating that any implementation, or even the mere thought of reforming or upgrading the Dayton Agreement, will lead to conflict and Bosnia’s break up. Discarding such a landmark decision is a brazen attempt to undermine the significance of the verdicts of an international court, in this case the highest legal and judicial institution in Europe in charge of implementation and protection of basic human rights.
The opinion of the ECHR in the case of Kovačević vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a lethal blow to the foundations of the discriminatory, ethno-national, backward oriented, immoral social contract embodied in the Dayton Agreement, which deprives a large number of Bosnian citizens of their basic civic rights. This is the greatest strength of the verdict: it directs Bosnia and Herzegovina to reject a system that subordinates individual citizens’ rights to the priorities of the country’s three major ethnic groups.
The argument that Bosnia cannot exist if it is not strictly an ethnic electoral system is a lazy, watered down excuse of anti-Bosnian actors who receive support from Moscow and wish to keep the country trapped in the chains of ethno-national politics. The alternative, a citizen-based civic model for Bosnia and Herzegovina, requires more political will and resources, but it is the best path towards a functional constitutional democracy like those other European citizens enjoy across the continent.
…and the facts
In an attempt to make the idea of Bosnian break up more digestible, domestic actors and international observers often display ignorance towards basic historical facts. Contrary to the statement that Bosnia and Herzegovina is “an entity set up following Bill Clinton’s brokering of the Dayton Accords in 1995,” Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina derives its continuity from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina accepted into the United Nations three years earlier, in 1992. Before that it was for centuries a stable European state with borders defined by natural geographical features and state structures. It was the Bosnian Kingdom in the Middle Ages, Bosnia during Ottoman rule, a Corpus separatum during the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and one of six republics within Socialist Yugoslavia. The claim that Bosnia’s diversity has produced animosity of “historical memories” lacks substance. Its civilizational space and international subjectivity are historic constants. Diverse religions and beliefs have coexisted in Bosnia and Herzegovina for centuries in peace and harmony.
The problems come from Serbia and Croatia, not Bosnia
The constant effort to break Bosnia up comes mainly from Serbia and Croatia, which have throughout history sought to annex parts of its territory. The source of the problem in the Balkans is not the allegedly irreconcilable religious, ethnic and national differences among people, but rather the “Greater-state” ambitions of Serbia and Croatia.
A series of judgments of international courts have unequivocally established the fact that the war pillage and destruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina resulted from the political projects of Belgrade and Zagreb to ethnically clean territories. They used both ethnic and religious factors to inflame interethnic hatred, mistrust, and instability, culminating in mass war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide.
These ambitions continue to serve as the political focus of Serb and Croat nationalist and secessionist actors, thus slowing nationbuilding in Bosnia. To save peace in the Balkans, the US and EU should raise their voices against the ethnonationalists, who deny genocide and glorify war crimes and their perpetrators.
Bosnia and Ukraine
The main reasons to reject the idea of breaking up Bosnia are not historical, but moral and political. Accepting Bosnia’s breakup would legitimize genocide and ethnic cleansing, posing a dangerous precedent for similar campaigns of killing and persecution. Such a precedent could also serve as a potent initiator of militant ethnocracy on European soil, which can easily consume other hotspots across the continent in pursuit of ethno-national exclusivity. The logic of blood and soil would return Europe to the 1930s.
It would be hypocritical for the democratic world to insist on defending democratic ideals under attack in Ukraine, while permitting the break up of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Ukrainian struggle is also the Bosnian struggle. The secessionist leader of the Bosnian Serbs has openly praised and publicly awarded Putin for the atrocities he has committed against Ukrainians. The recent visit of members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Kiev conveyed the right message. The campaign of Russian “denazification” of Ukraine is a campaign that Bosnia and Herzegovina also went through in its struggle towards freedom and international affirmation.
Principles of justice and legality, inviolability of sovereignty and territorial integrity, respect for human rights, and the promotion of peace and security are of crucial importance for the European continent. They need to be defended in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Appeasement is as appeasement does
It is difficult to write about the Balkans when something far more serious is happening in the Middle East, not to mention Ukraine. But Kosovo as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina still merit some attention. The European Union and the US have de facto reversed their positions and now are favoring de facto ethnic partition of both entities.
Clearer in Kosovo
This is clearer in Kosovo. The EU is insisting that Kosovo reduce its overwhelmingly Albanian police presence in the north, which on September 24 responded professionally and effectively to a terrorist attack. The threat of a repeat performance is clear and present. The EU is explicitly ignoring the attempted insurrection on September 24:
This insistence on ignoring the September 24 terrorist insurrection is difficult to fathom. But it jibes with EU insistence on the immediate formation of the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities, which Belgrade explicitly proposes be a vehicle for separate governance of Serbs in Kosovo. Hungary and the five member states that have not recognized Kosovo have become the bottom line of Europe’s position on Kosovo: no recognition and ethnic partition.
Same story in Bosnia and Herzegovina
In Bosnia, the situation is almost as bad. The West is supporting governments at both the state and entity levels that are under the control of ethnic separatists. Serb nationlist Milorad Dodik and Croat nationalist Dragan Covic are busy plotting the takeover of the Central Electoral Commission as well as the Constitutional Court. While they generally oppose the authority of the High Represenative, they naturally supported his post-electoral decisions that favored ethnic nationalists.
Dodik and Covic of course oppose implementation of several European Court of Human Rights decisions that would reverse the ethnic nationalist stranglehold on governance in Bosnia. The EU is ignoring those decisions and proceeding as if they don’t exist. The US has done nothing for years to encourage their implementation.
No priority has consequences
Why are the US and EU supporting, or at least not opposing, efforts to ethnically segregate populations in Bosnia and Kosovo? In part, the explanation is lack of horsepower. The Balkans have fallen off the priority list in Washington. It is hard to get any attention for the region. Secretary Blinken is not interested in doing any heavy lifting on Balkan issues while war rages in Ukraine as well as Israel and Gaza.
In Brussels, the main responsible officials come from Spain, Slovakia, and Hungary. Madrid and Bratislava have not recognized Kosovo. Budapest has, but its current leadership is explicitly ethnic nationalist. Prime Minister Orban is besties with Dodik and Serbian President Vucic, who can rely on his support. The EU higher ups are leaving the Balkans to people who have their own interests.
Appeasement is the policy
But there is more to it than that. Key officials in both Washington and Brussels have deluded themselves that they can attract Serbia into the West. President Vucic, they allege, is only concerned with getting a good deal for Serbs in neighboring countries. He is not serious about partitioning Kosovo or Bosnia. Buttering him up is easier and will work better than the alternative, tough love.
Labeling their current approach “appeasement” offends my colleagues at the State Department. But the US has done nothing more than a few talking points in response to Vucic’s sponsorship of the September 24 terrorist insurrection. The EU has done likewise. They are hoping the incident will give them leverage on Vucic in private but all blow over in public.
Of course that is not possible for Kosovo Albanians or for supporters to liberal democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But the former lack an international backer willing to press the case for serious sanctions against Vucic. The latter lack not only international backing but also political traction in their own country.
The West has abandoned its friends. It is supporting opponents of liberal democracy in both Kosovo and Bosnia. Appeasement is as appeasement does.
#Serbia’s 33 acquis chapters, level of preparedness for membership, as assessed by the European Commission since 2015. https://esiweb.org/publications/scoreboard-true-state-accession-what-commission-assessments-reveal…
That was tweeted in response to this, from the EU Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement:
Open discussion w/ Serbian Minister of European Integration Tanja Miscevic I encourage #Serbia to continue show its dedication to deliver on outstanding rule of law issues & to ensure implementation of recent laws Our meeting confirms that Reform agenda is a top priority for Serbia.
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Make partition unacceptable to the Serbs in northern Kosovo
Yesterday I wrote about what Serbia should be doing to atone for its unsuccessful insurrection in Kosovo. Today is I am writing about what Pristina should do to ensure that such a plot will never succeed. The Kosovo police should not be the only institution committed to preventing more terrorist attacks.
The secret sauce is budget and budget execution
The key for Pristina is gaining the acceptance, if not the affection, of Kosovo Serbs. To be fair, Pristina has already done a great deal to achieve this in communities south of the Ibar river. According to the Prime Minister himself:
Ten Serb-majority municipalities in have received on average 62% more budget (as a whole) per capita, as well as 89% more in capital expenditures per capita than the other 28 municipalities, 27 of which are Albanian-majority.
This is shown by Ministry of Finance Budget Dept. data from the last 14 yrs (’08-’22). When it comes to budget utilization, the 6 relatively well-integrated Serb-majority municip. in the south of have consistently performed better than the 4 in the north.
Tweeted February 7
Serbs, mainly from south of the Ibar, participate in Kosovo’s government and benefit visibly from doing so, even if they remain unsatisfied.
Last time I was in the four northern municipalities, admittedly a few years ago, the difference was apparent. The north was decrepit. Belgrade had mercilessly exploited it while Pristina largely ignored it. That needs to change: more budget execution and less interference from Belgrade are key. The EU and US need to do much more to convince Belgrade to withdraw its security forces and end their cooperation with local crime bosses.
Money won’t be enough
But more than cash and restraints on Belgrade are needed. Pristina should “reach out” to the four Serb-majority municipalities in the north. But what does this mean?
First and foremost it means establishing the rule of law there. The 2013 Brussels agreement between Belgrade and Pristina ensured it would be under the authority of Pristina’s police and courts, suitably integrated with Serbs. Belgrade has withdrawn the Serb personnel. Those who meet objective criteria for professionalism should be reintegrated and new hires recruited. Intimidation of Serbs who work for the Pristina institutions needs to be prosecuted, with help from EULEX.
Second, it means enabling free and pluralistic political discourse in the north. Pristina should aim to end the Srpska Lista political monopoly. The US and EU should provide assistance to other organizations of Serbs and others in the north to organize and campaign effectively. No new elections should be held before pluralism is ensured. It will do no good if the people who organized the insurrection win. In the meanwhile, Pristina should provide the non-Serb mayors with strong financial and political support to improve living conditions in their municipalities.
Third, Pristina should welcome dissent in the Serb communities, not only in the north. Opposition Albanian parties in Pristina should reach out to Serbs in the north to form coalitions. That would introduce a refreshing change in Kosovo politics.
Serbs are essential to Kosovo’s identity and independence
Most Kosovo Serbs do not like Kosovo’s independence. But so long as they remain in Kosovo–I hope forever–they are a vital piece of it. Without the Kosovo Serbs south of the Ibar river, where most live and most Serb religious sites are located, Kosovo as a separate state would lose an important reason for its separate existence. The Serbs are, in addition to a distinct history of the Albanian populations, one of the important factors that distinguish Kosovo from Albania. A Kosovo patriot today will want all Serbs and other minorities protected and even cherished.
I have the sense that Kosovars increasingly appreciate that point. Belgrade does not. President Vucic shows little concern for the welfare of the Serbs in Kosovo, especially those who live south of the Ibar. He uses their falsely portrayed plight to pump up war fever in Serbia. Belgrade is committed to partition. It wants the north, de facto if not de jure. Pristina should aim to make that something the northern Serbs reject.
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Presidential clarity in video
I try hard to keep an open mind and to understand opposing perspectives. But there are moments when doing so denies reality. This is one of those moments in the ongoing conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. If Pristina had done anything like what Belgrade has done, you can be sure I would be just as tough with Kosovo.
The attempted Serbian uprising in northern Kosovo weekend before last was just that. Belgrade trained and equipped 30 or so paramilitary cadres, who murdered a Kosovo policeman before losing three of their own men. Likely they intended to spark much more violence and a crackdown, with a view to justifying a Serbian military intervention. Serbia mobilized its forces and sent them to the border/boundary, which suggests an invasion was planned.
Two dozen or so perpetrators escaped to Serbia, where they still harbor. They include he ringleader, Milan Radoicic. He is a close political partner of Serbia’s President Vucic, supposedly now under house arrest. I haven’t seen anything on the whereabouts of the others.
Verbal reactions aren’t enough
So far, the US and EU public reactions have been exclusively verbal. Both Washington and Brussels know that the Serbian state was responsible for an attempted violent insurrection with political purposes, aka terrorism. Kosovo President Osmani in the above video is right to be calling for sanctions. If Serbia gets off scot free in public, it will only incentivize similar behavior, perhaps not only by Belgrade. There are lots of capitals that might like to foment rebellion in neighboring democracies.
This attempted insurrection is only the latest in a long series of Serbian efforts to destabilize the situation in Kosovo. It is high time to impose serious sanctions. What might that mean? Here are a few thoughts about items that should be on the options menu:
- Suspend Air Serbia flights to the US and EU.
- Freeze World Bank and EBRD projects in Serbia.
- Suspend EU and US official financing for economic (not democracy) projects in Serbia.
- Freeze Serbia’s negotiations for EU accession.
- Suspend military cooperation between the Serbian Army and the Ohio National Guard.
- Impose travel and financial sanctions on individuals who ordered and supervised the training of the paramilitaries.
Expectations should be clear
Just as important as sanctions are the expectations they are intended to support and what Serbia would need to do to end them. Here are a few suggestions for those:
- An official, public apology by the President of Serbia to the President of Kosovo.
- Delivery to the Kosovo authorities for trial of all of the alleged perpetrators harbored in Serbia.
- Disbanding of the Srpska List political party.
- A documented end to all arming and equipping of insurrectionary forces inside Kosovo.
- Documented withdrawal of all covert Serbian security forces from Kosovo territory.
These aren’t much more than random thoughts. There are many other things that could be done, either by way of sanctions or demands. The point is that verbal denunciations alone will not suffice. The EU and US should be aiming to permanently weaken Serbia’s hold on northern Kosovo.
Right the balance
Kosovo is currently suffering substantial EU “consequences”, for its failure to comply with Brussels demands for removal of elected mayors from municipal buildings and reduction of Kosovo police presence in the Serb communities of Kosovo’s north. I don’t know how the mayors are doing, but it was presumably the police presence that enabled a quick, effective, and professional reaction to the attempted insurrection. The EU should lift its sanctions on Kosovo. The circumstances that led to their imposition have evaporated.
The time has come to recognize that “consequences” for Serbia are far more important and entirely justified. The moment has come to right the balance in EU and US policy, which parliamentarians in both have declared unfairly weighted in favor of Serbia and against Kosovo.
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