Tag: China
Let’s enjoy this election evening!
I’m doing a press briefing on the implications of the American election for foreign policy in a few hours. Here are the speaking notes I’ve prepared for myself:
- It is a pleasure to be with you tonight, as America concludes an ugly election campaign and decides on its 45th president.
- I won’t pretend to be neutral: I have supported Hillary Clinton with words, money, and even knocking on doors in West Philadelphia.
- But in these opening remarks, I would like to focus first not on the candidates but rather on the process, which is a complicated one.
- One consequence is that there is little uniformity: as you’ll see tonight, the states will close their polls at different times, starting in just a few minutes at 7 pm with Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia.
- The initial results will likely favor Trump, but swing states North Carolina and Ohio close their polls at 7:30 pm and by 8 pm lots of Clinton states close their polls.
- Key then will be Florida and Pennsylvania, and at 9 pm Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin. Clinton could be in trouble if she doesn’t win there.
- In the meanwhile, you’ll be getting exit polling from many of the “swing” states, those that might go one way or the other. Exit polls in my view are not terribly reliable: sampling errors can be significant, and in many states a significant percentage of people have already voted.
- Not only are rules and procedures decided by the states, but the vote in each state determines that state’s votes in the electoral college that meets in state capitals on December 19.
- Each state has a number of electoral votes equal to its number of Representatives and Senators. Because each state has two senators, this favors less populous (more Republican) states, but the reliably Democratic District of Columbia, which has no senators, gets three votes as well.
- As a result, an election can be close in the popular vote (polling suggests Trump and Clinton are within 3 or 4 percentage points of each other), but the electoral college difference can be big.
- If Trump were to get fewer than 200 electoral votes (and Clinton the remaining 338 plus), that might be considered a landslide, even if the popular vote is close.
- It is also possible for a candidate to lose the popular vote and win in the electoral college. That happened with George W. Bush and Al Gore in 2000. I went to bed convinced Gore had won.
- By morning, the Florida controversy had erupted and the election was eventually decided in the Supreme Court, which allowed Florida’s determination of the winner to stand and Bush to become President without a popular vote majority.
- The lesson here is don’t go to bed too early tonight. It may be late before the outcome is clear and unequivocal. In the last three elections it was past 11 pm.
- What does it all mean for foreign policy?
- First, I think an uncontested and clear outcome is highly desirable. The world does not need another month of uncertainty about who will be the 45th president.
- Second, there are dramatic differences between Trump, who prides himself on unpredictability, and Clinton, who has a long track record well within the post-911 foreign policy consensus.
- Trump is erratic, inconsistent, and hyperbolic. He wants to put America first, which he has defined not only as ignoring others, blocking immigrants, and doubting America’s alliances but also destroying the existing international trading system and illogically pursuing a bromance with Vladimir Putin.
- Clinton is committed, studious, internationalist, all perhaps to a fault. She once pursued a reset with Putin that failed. She wants to maintain the stability of the international system and restore American authority some think President Obama surrendered in his retrenchment.
- A word or two about what this all means in some important parts of the world.
- In the Middle East and Europe, including the Baltics and Ukraine, Clinton is far more likely to push back on Russian aggressiveness than Trump.
- In Asia, Trump has occasionally talked tough about China’s trade policy and suggested that South Korea and Japan might want to get their own nuclear weapons.
- Clinton would certainly not want that but might also be tough with China on trade. She would likely want to continue to build up American alliances in Asia, including with India and Vietnam.
- Both Clinton and Trump oppose the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), but Clinton would likely want to renegotiate parts of it and proceed while Trump would scrap it entirely.
- Presidents do not always get to decide which issues they focus on. I would expect Moscow and Beijing, and perhaps others, to take an early opportunity to test the new president.
- An incident involving China in the South China Sea? North Korean launch of a missile that could reach the US? A new push by Russian-supported insurgents in Donbas? An incident with Iranian ships or missiles in the Gulf? A massive cyberattack?
- Clinton understands the capabilities and limits of American power, as well as the need for allied support. Trump does not. He mistakes bravado for strength and unpredictability for leverage.
- Most of the world understands this and favors Clinton. Moscow may not be alone in favoring Trump, but it is certainly lonely.
- Those of us who enjoy foreign policy for a living—Republicans as well as Democrats like me—will likewise be almost universally relieved if she, not he, becomes president.
- But the evening is young. Let’s enjoy it with some questions!
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Managing South China Sea conflicts
I enjoyed some time with some smart colleagues yesterday discussing the South China Sea conflicts, unfortunately under Chatham House rules. Below are my own notes for the occasion.
Two points stand out in my memory of what others said:
- Oil and gas resources in the South China Sea are not promising and fish stocks are declining;
- The Chinese might well challenge the next president, or undisciplined pilots or naval captains might do so.
There were lots of other excellent points made, but I’ll have to hope that one of the students present might offer up their notes. I find it difficult to take notes while participating on a panel.
1. I’m truly honored to sit on a panel with distinguished colleagues. My advice to the students in the room is to listen carefully to them, as they know a lot about the South China Sea disputes and the legal background.
2. I don’t, but I was asked to talk about the conflict management implications of the recent arbitration and the outlook for resolving future maritime disputes in the region, including alternative methods of dispute settlement that China Studies and Conflict Management students will be exploring this fall and during a study trip to Beijing in January.
3. Let me begin with the bad news: if in order to ensure peace we need to settle the various claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea, I think there is very little chance of success.
4. Sovereignty claims are all too often resolved by force.
5. China has the advantage there. For the foreseeable future Beijing will be able to deploy force superior to any of the other individual claimants. Without US assistance, none of the South China Sea claimants would win a naval clash with China.
6. With US assistance, they might win, but only after causing incalculable damage to world order, the world’s economy, and international relations throughout the Pacific.
7. War would be a really bad way to resolve any of the South China Sea disputes.
8. Fortunately, other means are available. Arbitration is one.
9. But arbitration is a method that decides who is right and who is wrong. If it goes in favor of the less powerful state, the more powerful state is unlikely to accept the outcome. That is pretty much what we’ve seen in response to last summer’s arbitration decision.
10. But we’ve also seen another classic conflict management response: China is trying to buy off the Philippines, with at least initial indications of some success.
11. Billions are unlikely to make Manila cede completely, but it may render the arbitration decision ineffective, postponing rather than resolving the issue.
12. There are ample precedents for simply letting sovereignty claims slide. There are still more than five outstanding maritime boundary disputes between the US and Canada. They are mostly ignored in practice, even if neither country is willing to concede legally.
13. There are also ample precedents for cooperative regimes that do not necessarily decide the sovereignty question, or decide it without prejudicing economic interests, thus enabling disputants to gain at least some of the benefits that they think are rightfully theirs.
14. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia share production from a once-disputed oil field; Iran and Qatar share production from a disputed gas field.
15. Such cooperative arrangements are relatively easy where resources are concerned but particularly difficult where security issues are involved, since security is often regarded as a zero sum game.
16. China’s militarization of various non-islands in the South China Sea is perceived in Washington as a threat to US freedom of navigation there. So we send ships and aircraft to traverse locations that we believe are permitted, even if the Chinese think not.
17. In particular, the Chinese think military vessels and planes conducting espionage are not entitled to passage even in its Exclusive Economic Zone, so they may respond by declaring an Air Defense Identification Zone, or by challenging US naval ships or military aircraft. Read more
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What the next president will face in the Middle East
On Monday the Middle East Institute hosted the launch of the November volume of The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The event featured a panel of the Special Editors of the edition, Rand Beers, Richard A. Clarke, Emilian Papadopoulos, and Paul Salem, discussing the issue titled The Middle East and Regional Transition, Terrorism, and Countering Violent Extremism: What the Next President Will Face.
Clarke remarked that the next president will face a markedly different Middle East from eight years ago. The volume seeks to make specific recommendations for action as opposed to just a discussion of the issues. Two major and overlapping problems are determining how we see the issues:
- The number and role of failed states in the Middle East, of which there are now six or seven. These will continue to be a source of terrorism for some time.
- The role of ideologies, in particular how to address the violent jihadist ideology that is highly attractive to disaffected youth, not only in the Middle East but across all regions of the world.
Regarding the US role in Syria, Clarke recommends that we must not abandon the principle of ‘Assad must go’, as the US role in the Middle East will be permanently undermined if we do. The US must also take leadership in supporting the stabilization, economic stimulation and return of refugees in post-Islamic State Mosul and Raqqa, as simply removing IS from cities will not resolve any problems. Salem also suggested that the economic rebuilding of conflict zones in the Middle East is an opportunity to coordinate with China, which has demonstrated interest in building infrastructure and ensuring trade relationships in the region.
As former Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to the President, Beers focused on counter extremism measures. Since 2001 the focus has been on preventing the arrival of foreign nationals intending to commit terrorist acts in the US. But the trend has now shifted to radicalized Americans. Ninety-four people have been killed in the US by domestic terrorists since 2001, with 63 of those in the last year alone. The next administration must therefore focus on identifying individuals prior to their radicalization and on redirecting them. As the government itself is not particularly successful in communicating these messages the approach needs broadening beyond law enforcement agencies. Local nongovernmental organizations and religious organizations will be helpful partners in identifying those exhibiting patterns of behavior that suggest a move towards violent extremism.
Clarke remarked that to law enforcement’s credit there has not been a major foreign attack on American soil since 2001, however the next president should identify these successful components of the counter extremism program and cut down the excesses and inefficiencies that also plague the program.
Salem considers the Middle East to be in a perfect storm of dysfunction due to the disrupted regional order, the number of failed and fragile states, and underlying stress factors including demographic issues, climate change, and competing ideologies. He suggests some of the concerns in the Middle East that have dominated administrations in the past, such as Weapons of Mass Destruction and the flow of oil through the Gulf, are largely stable at this point, and Russia and China do not pose a direct threat to US security. Therefore the threat of terrorism should continue to be the primary concern of the US in the region.
The next administration, Salem thought, should continue to address IS and then focus on al Qaeda, try to rebuild the regional order, make more concerted efforts to end civil wars, and help to rebuild failed states. Salem agreed wholeheartedly with Clarke that Syria will not be resolved while Assad is still in power, but while waiting for a political solution the US must address the suffering of civilians. He considers President Obama to have failed in addressing humanitarian concerns. In response to a question on the future of the Sykes-Picot borders, Salem explained that the Middle East’s problems are primarily attributable to poor governance and institutions rather than the borders. The current borders are likely to endure but changes such as decentralization and federalism within states will be important.
The problems the next administration will face in the Middle East are complex, but the volume focuses on realistic recommendations for what can be achieved. The US must balance its military strength with non-military assets and smart power. While the Obama administration has cautiously withdrawn the next administration must reassert American leadership in the region and focus on re-establishing a regional order.
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Clinton won on the merits
How can anyone who watched last night’s presidential debate conclude that Trump did well? Clinton beat him on knowledge, amiability, respect, and record. Trump nervously sniffed, grunted, interrupted, and grimaced through the 90 minutes, scattering lies throughout. By the end, he was reduced to incoherence in responding to a question about America’s doctrine on first use of nuclear weapons and platitudes about how important they are.
But on NPR this morning, a self-described “alpha male” said Trump showed the kind of command authority required to be president. For him, that was the key: Trump attracts those who believe in male supremacy. His discourteous and dismissive behavior towards Clinton, not to mention his long record of derogatory remarks about women, is an asset, not a liability, with some voters.
He also attracts those who believe in white supremacy and maintenance of white privilege. His description of black neighborhoods as ridden with crime and violence is not calculated to attract black votes. It is the “dog whistle,” inaudible to many, intended to attract white racist votes by signaling that he understands their distaste for black people. Ditto his not denying that he discriminated against black people in renting apartments. Why deny something that your supporters like?
Trump, in short, represents the revenge of misogyny and racism. Can that win?
Unlikely, but not impossible. FiveThirtyEight has him at 45%, more or less, this morning. My guess is that his odds will go down over the next few days as his poor performance in the debate sinks in with the electorate. Hillary Clinton looked and behaved like a president last night: self-controlled, clear, and articulate. But even at 40/60, Trump would still have a shot a month our from the November 8 election.
On foreign policy issues, the debate was minimalist. Clinton ably defended the nuclear deal with Iran, which Trump attacked without promising to renege on it. Trump went after Clinton on trade agreements–not only the Trans-Pacific Partnership but also the North American Free Trade Agreement. Most commentators seemed to think that was his best moment. Syria did not come up, nor I think did Ukraine, Israel, or Afghanistan (except for Clinton’s mention of the NATO allies joining us there after 9/11). Clinton criticized the Russians for cyber attacks. Trump tried to parry by suggesting someone like the Chinese might have been responsible. He also criticized China for competitively weakening its currency, which hasn’t happened in years.
ISIS came up, but neither offered anything really new on how to counter it. Clinton got a point or two for mocking Trump’s “secret” plan. She also scored in emphasizing that the agreement for withdrawal from Iraq, which Trump criticized, was done during George W. Bush’s presidency, including the date by which the withdrawal had to be completed. Trump again denied supporting the Iraq invasion, which by now everyone should know is untrue. He also denied denying global warming and deleted an old tweet in which denied it.
In short, this was a clear win for Hillary Clinton on the merits even if she did not score any knockout blows. Those are more likely to come in the next debates, scheduled for October 9 and 19 (the vice presidential debate will be October 4).
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Happy birthday Blic!
1. As the talk about Chinese growth intensifies, its military is getting stronger, and while Beijing is defying even USA in the South Chinese sea dispute…what is your prediction for the decades that are coming: Could China become a world’s number one superpower?
A: No. China is a rising power, but it also still very poor and undeveloped. It faces enormous internal challenges: environmental conditions are deplorable, economic growth is slowing, social tensions have few political outlets, global warming will have a big impact on its infrastructure. China will be an important regional power, and it is already economically active in Africa and Latin America. But it will be a long time before it can play the kind of varied and multi-valent security, political and economic leadership role that the US plays globally.
2. It seems that Russia is getting support from some political factors in the EU countries. Is it possible that some of them will abolish the sanctions and open a wider cooperation with Moscow, especially now when the EU has a lot of its problems?
A: Russia is also getting support from “some political factors” in the US, but our sanctions will remain in place.
The EU will need to review again its sanctions against Russia, but there aren’t any positive developments in Ukraine to justify loosening them.
None of the EU’s problems would be ameliorated by dropping sanctions. The Russian economy is in a deep recession from which it is unlikely to recover without a big increase in oil prices. That isn’t happening.
3. Right-wing movement is getting stronger in Europe, and it seems it could reshape the EU as we know it today. Is that comeback of national states good or bad for Europe?
A: I’ll let Europeans decide. I can see positive developments emerging from the current euroskepticism, but I also see big risks to the single market.
4. Angela Merkel’s popularity has never been lower. If she decides not to run for fourth term, or if she loses, who do you see as her successor? Do you think that Germany will stop with the open door policy, with or without Merkel, because it is obvious that there is no solidarity between the member states?
A: I wouldn’t count Merkel out yet. She is at a low point in her personal popularity, but her political party is still polling very well. Europe is already controlling the inflow of migrants better than it had done. I expect that tighter control to continue.
5. Migrant crisis is shaking the EU for a while, but despite that, it seems that Brussels is avoiding to fulfill the promises given to Turkey, the main dam which is stopping the refugees to come in even bigger number to Europe. For how long could that take, especially now when Erdogan has grown warmer relations with Russia and Putin?
A: Brussels is in a bind. Turkey is taking an autocratic turn. It will be very hard to continue on the path to closer relations with Brussels if Ankara moves in a non-democratic direction. Erdogan has got some solace from Putin, who of course has no problems with autocrats, but Russia really has little to offer Turkey compared to the EU.
6. ISIS has become the world’s number one boogie-man. It seems that the strong actions in Syria has hurt this terrorist organization, but they didn’t destroy it, like something is missing. In your opinion, what is necessary to finally end “ISIS era”?
A: ISIS won’t “end.” It will be defeated in Raqqa and Mosul, then peter out. There never was an ISIS era. There was only an ISIS moment. ISIS has now lost lots of important territory in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. It will survive at least for a while as a terrorist group causing real harm to real people, but it is not, and never was, an existential threat to the West.
7. Hillary or Trump? What would the USA look like if Trump wins?
A: I am a supporter of Hillary Clinton for President. A Trump win would be bad for the US, bad for Europe, bad for the Balkans and good for Russia.
8. What is the best path for Serbia? Our ruling political elite is eager to bring Serbia in the EU, majority of people thinks the same, but that same majority wants good relations with Russia. Is it possible to sit on two chairs like that, or not? Also, do you think that some members of the EU will demand from Serbia to recognize Kosovo independence as a condition of joining the EU?
A: Lots of countries in Europe want good relations with Russia. Washington would also like good relations with Russia. It has become difficult to “sit on two chairs” only because of Russia’s renewed aggressiveness, especially in neighboring areas it regards as part of its “near abroad.” Russia’s behavior in Ukraine in particular is unacceptable and has aroused a strong–but peaceful–NATO response. It has also pushed several non-member countries to tighten relations with NATO. This is precisely the opposite of what Putin should want.
There is not now, nor has there ever been, any possibility of Serbian membership in the EU without Belgrade’s acceptance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kosovo, which is already de facto acknowledged in the Brussels political agreement. Belgrade has a choice of methods by which it can act to accept Kosovo’s de jure sovereignty and territorial integrity. It can recognize Kosovo and establish diplomatic relations. Or it can allow Kosovo to enter the UN General Assembly. There may be other clever solutions that I haven’t thought of. But the EU states that have already recognized Kosovo will not allow Serbia’s accession if this issue is still outstanding. Remember: this is not only a question for European presidents and prime ministers but also for their parliaments, which have to ratify accession.
Everyone in Belgrade knows that. But the current authorities don’t want to pay the price, and some like to think they can get a better deal on this issue at the end of the EU accession process than now. I think they are wrong about that. At the end of the process, Belgrade will be under enormous pressure from internal public opinion to remove any obstacles to EU accession, including Kosovo recognition. Serbia today could hope that Kosovo would accommodate some of its needs in return for recognition. I’ll leave it to Serbs and Albanians to cut that deal.
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Peace picks August 1-5
- Vitality, diversity, and diplomacy in Chinese contemporary art | Tuesday, August 2nd | 10:00 am -12:00 pm | Brookings | Click HERE to RSVP | China’s “reform and opening up” period has witnessed a booming Chinese contemporary art scene, which has steadily adopted artistic genres and techniques from the West. But heavy foreign influence has not led artists to abandon the distinctive features of Chinese art; rather, it has inspired a revival of its unique characteristics. Xu Bing, Fan Di’an, and other leading Chinese artists of the day have immersed themselves in multicultural environments throughout their careers, infusing their artwork with related themes. Xu Bing has experimented with innovative methods of expression that reflect his personal philosophical journey, his exposure to diverse viewpoints, and his pursuit of common bonds across cultures. Fan Di’an has advanced global recognition of Chinese avant-garde artists in various regions and across different styles. Together, these two artists have greatly enriched international understanding of this rapidly changing country. On August 2, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings will host these two distinguished pioneers of Chinese contemporary art for a discussion on how global and local forces influence artwork in China and how art reflects the views and ideas of Chinese society. Following presentations by Xu and Fan, Jan Stuart, who has worked with both artists at the British Museum and is currently the curator of Asian art at the Freer and Sackler Museums, will provide a commentary on their remarks. Cheng Li, director and senior fellow of the China Center, will then moderate a conversation with the group and take questions from the audience.
- Madaya: Portrait of a Syrian Town Under Siege| Wednesday, August 3rd | 12:00 -1:30 pm | Middle East Institute | Click HERE to RSVP | July marked one year since the beginning of the siege of the town of Madaya in southern Syria. The town’s 40,000 residents have been surrounded by landmines, checkpoints, and snipers, and forced to survive on meager supplies. Halted aid deliveries, denial of humanitarian evacuations, and unmet healthcare needs have already led to dozens of preventable deaths. The Middle East Institute, Syrian American Medical Society, and Physicians for Human Rights are pleased to host Dr. Ammar Ghanem (SAMS) and Elise Baker (PHR) for the release of a new report, Madaya: Portrait of a Syrian Town Under Siege. The report examines the public heath effects of the siege and puts forth recommendations about best practices in humanitarian assistance to besieged areas.
- A Multi-Pronged Analysis of the Causes and Effects of the Coup in Turkey | Thursday, August 4th | 4:00pm | The Institute of World Politics | Click HERE to RSVP | Today’s talk by Mr. Khlgatyan will focus on the recent coup attempt in Turkey: a discursion on its causes, immediate and long term effects, and implications for regional security and geopolitics. Vilen Khlgatyan is the founder and president of Global Research Center (GRC). He specializes in the geopolitics of energy, non-kinetic warfare, and the post-Soviet region with an emphasis on the Caucasus.
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