Tag: China
Kofi time
Huffington Post has just published my latest on Syria:
With Kofi Annan chosen to be the joint UN/Arab League Special Envoy and today’s Friends of Syria meeting in Tunis, the stage is set for a more serious diplomatic effort to bring the Syrian crisis to a close. Kofi’s marching orders include:
The Special Envoy will provide good offices aimed at bringing an end to all violence and human rights violations, and promoting a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis.The Special Envoy will be guided in this endeavor by the provisions of the General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/253 and the relevant resolutions of the League of Arab States. He will consult broadly and engage with all relevant interlocutors within and outside Syria in order to end the violence and the humanitarian crisis, and facilitate a peaceful Syrian-led and inclusive political solution that meets the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people through a comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition.
This broad mandate, which the five permanent members of the UN Security Council have approved, implicitly points in the direction of the Arab League plan that Russia and China previously vetoed, even if it does not explicitly mention the need for Bashar al-Assad to step aside. The ambiguity is intended to hide the differences of view on the UNSC, but clearly no political solution can meet the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people with Bashar still in office.
Kofi will surely meet with Bashar al-Assad. The question is whether he will be able to tell him that the P5 want him out. Colum Lynch notes that in his last trouble-shooting effort Kofi arranged for power-sharing in Kenya. Bashar has spilled far too much blood in Syria for the opposition to accept sharing power with him. The Russians should by now be wondering whether their best bet for holding on to port access and arms sales in Syria is Bashar. Once they decide differently, Kofi will have the support he needs for defenestration.
Anne-Marie Slaughter today in the New York Times calls for “no-kill” zones established by the Free Syria Army (FSA) near Syria’s borders with Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. This would require a major effort to arm the FSA and provide it with special forces advisors. The notion that this can be done “to protect all Syrians regardless of creed, ethnicity or political allegiance” without precipitating the chaotic ethnic and sectarian civil war that Anne-Marie herself recognizes as the worst outcome is unrealistic. And doing it without taking down Syria’s air defenses would condemn the effort to failure.
Only the U.S. can quickly and effectively destroy Syria’s Russian-supplied air defense and severely damage his artillery, which is bombarding his opponents. At yesterday’s Syria event at the Center for National Policy, colleagues evoked the image of President Clinton reacting to the shelling of Sarajevo, suggesting that President Obama might do likewise.
We too readily forget that Clinton waited three and half years — until Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole started taking him to task for not carrying out his campaign promise to bomb the Serbs — before initiating the military action that ended the war in Bosnia. I doubt even a Republican candidate bemoaning what is happening in Syria would get the White House to drop other priorities in favor of another Middle East war.
The Syrian opposition doesn’t have years, or even months. It needs protection quickly. The best bet is a vigorous diplomatic effort by Kofi Annan.
Today in Tunis the Friends of Syria called for a ceasefire, humanitarian relief to the cities under attack, deployment of UN peacekeepers and the beginning of a dialogue process aimed at a political settlement. They also named the Syrian National Council “a” legitimate representative of the Syrian people and promised further sanctions and diplomatic isolation of Damascus. They did not call for arming of the opposition, which has been left up to individual states. The Saudis made it clear they thought it a good idea (and they will presumably do it).
Few believe Bashar al-Assad will cave. I won’t be surprised if he eventually does, though I’m not prepared to predict when. His army and other security forces are exhausted and won’t want to enter the cities they have been shelling from afar. If Bashar can get the international community to accept responsibility for feeding the inhabitants and maybe even maintaining law and order, he may count himself lucky. His security forces could then lick their wounds and prepare to fight another day, while blaming the internationals for anything that goes wrong.
Syria is showing us the limits of military force. It is a blunt tool that in this instance is likely to bring about the civil war that we should most want to avoid. Diplomacy won’t be pretty. It will require negotiations with Bashar al-Assad and acceptance of compromises that are odious. But it is our best bet for the moment. Kofi time.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Wising up
Two weeks ago, I was getting ready to write a post suggesting that Bashar al Assad would likely win his current contest with Syrian protesters. It looked as if they had made a definitive choice in favor of a violent uprising, one that the Syrian security forces are capable of defeating. The net result would have been a low-level insurgency, aka civil war, one that would lead to increasing sectarian separation and destabilization of neighboring countries, including Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. That outcome–the worst of all possible worlds for the United States–is still possible.
But Friday’s 41 peaceful demonstrations in Damascus, a few of them large, suggest that the opposition has wised up. Rather than a force-on-force confrontation they are bound to lose, the protesters spread out their efforts and kept them non-violent. Such coordinated risings in the capital are far more important for gaining adherents and defying the regime than killing a few soldiers or even Shabiha (non-uniformed regime goons) would be. It has forced the regime today to rush its security forces into the capital to squelch the defiance and re-establish fear. With any luck, they’ll find nothing to repress, as the protesters will hopefully be ready to ignite efforts elsewhere.
This is smart revolution. Drawing lines around specific territory and trying to defend it would be dumb revolution, because it identifies precisely the territory that the regime has to attack to kill its enemies. It has shown no hesitancy to do that. Safe areas and humanitarian corridors are unsafe unless defended with adequate force, which no one has yet shown any sign of readiness to field.
Meanwhile on the diplomatic front, the Chinese are showing some signs of veto remorse, averring openly that they support the Arab League plan calling for Bashar al Assad to step aside and allow his vice president to take charge of a transition to democracy. I’d be the first to admit that a similar scheme is not looking so great in Yemen, where yesterday’s one-candidate election will presumably lead to Vice President Hadi’s takeover of power and initiation of some kind of transition. The problem in Yemen is that those sharing power do not include the protesters who initiated the revolution and who reject amnesty for former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
The situation in Syria is different. There really is no question of amnesty for Bashar. The best he can hope for is exile in Iran, which backs him to the hilt. But he could just as well end up dead like Muammar Qaddafi or on trial like Hosni Mubarak, prospects that are presumably inspiring his murderous attempts to repress the demonstrations.
“Friends of Syria,” the international coalition in favor of the revolution, plans to meet Friday in Tunisia. This is a good occasion to reiterate support for the Arab League plan, tighten sanctions, press for greater unity among the Syrian opposition and reiterate support for nonviolent protest. It may also be a good opportunity to strategize about bringing China and even Russia into the fold. The Chinese seem halfway there. The Russians will need some guarantees on access to port facilities in Syria before signing on.
Meanwhile, watch those Iranian warships that traversed the Suez Canal yesterday. They have now docked at Tartus. If they deliver weapons or personnel to Syria, it would be a good moment for someone to intervene. That’s not trivial, since there is no arms embargo, but that’s why we’ve got all those clever lawyers in the State Department. I hope they are busy scribbling the decision memos.
PS: The Iranians claimed the ships docked, but the Pentagon says they never did. Maybe someone in Tehran understood the risk.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Boning up on China
As readers of this blog will know, I am not an Asia expert and hesitate to write about a part of the world with vast significance to the United States. But it is hard to ignore China when its heir apparent, Xi Jinping, comes to town. I thought it might be useful for me to list a few readings I am finding interesting:
1. Kenneth Lieberthal and J. Stapleton Roy in this morning’s Washington Post argue for restraint by both Beijing and Washington, hoping to avoid strategic rivalry turning ineviably to military confrontation. But this they suggest will require not only dialogue but a new set of agreements far more explicit and formal than the widely accepted American hegemony in the Pacific that has provided an unprecedented period of peace and stability there in recent decades.
2. Colleagues at CSIS have prepared a briefing specifically on Xi Jinping’s visit, which the Americans and Chinese are advertising as focused on “getting to know you,” even though he is in fact a fairly well-known figure here. But lots of issues will lurk just below the surface.
3. Americans are amply familiar with U.S./China issues like trade and monetary policy, but a relatively few Americans worry about the South China Sea, which according to Patrick Cronin and colleagues is vital to American interests in the Pacific. I may not be able to buy their proposed naval buildup, but the discussion of the issues is the best I’ve seen.
I’m sure there is a lot more good material out there and will welcome suggestions from readers. We are all going to have to bone up a bit on China.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
This week’s “peace picks”
Loads of interesting events this week:
1. Georgian-South Ossetian Confidence Building Processes, Woodrow Wilson Center, 6th floor, February 6, noon- 1pm
Dr. Susan Allen Nan will discuss the Georgian-South Ossetian relationship, including insights from the 14 Georgian-South Ossetian confidence building workshops she has convened over the past three years, the most recent of which was in January. The series of unofficial dialogues catalyze other confidence building measures and complement the Geneva Talks official process.
Please note that seating for this event is available on a first come, first served basis. Please call on the day of the event to confirm. Please bring an identification card with a photograph (e.g. driver’s license, work ID, or university ID) as part of the building’s security procedures.
The Kennan Institute speaker series is made possible through the generous support of the Title VIII Program of the U.S. Department of State.
-
Associate Professor of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University
by
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Former National Security Adviser and CSIS Counselor and Trustee
Willard Room, Willard InterContinental Hotel
1401 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC
Introduction by
John Hamre, CSIS
Remarks by
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Interviewed by
David Ignatius, The Washington Post
Book Signing
from 4:00 to 4:30 p.m.
-Books will be available for purchase-
This invitation is non-transferable. Seating is limited.
To RSVP please e-mail externalrelations@csis.org by Wednesday, February 2.
This book seeks to answer 4 questions:
What are the implications of the changing distribution of global power from West to East, and how is it being affected by the new reality of a politically awakened humanity? Why is America’s global appeal waning, how ominous are the symptoms of America’s domestic and international decline, and how did America waste the unique global opportunity offered by the peaceful end of the Cold War? What would be the likely geopolitical consequences if America did decline by 2025, and could China then assume America’s central role in world affairs? What ought to be a resurgent America’s major long-term geopolitical goals in order to shape a more vital and larger West and to engage cooperatively the emerging and dynamic new East? America, Zbigniew Brzezinski argues, must define and pursue a comprehensive and long-term geopolitical vision, a vision that is responsive to the challenges of the changing historical context. This book seeks to provide the strategic blueprint for that vision.
5. The Unfinished February 14 Uprising: What Next for Bahrain? Dirksen, 9:30-11 am February
|
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 106
|
|
|
POMED DC Events Calendar
|
|
|
alex.russell@pomed.org
|
|
|
As the February 14th anniversary of the start of mass protests in Bahrain approaches, now is a critical time to analyze events over the past few months and discuss expectations for the coming weeks. With the release of the BICI report in late November, which detailed systematic human rights abuses and a government crackdown against peaceful protesters, the Government of Bahrain was tasked with a long list of reforms and recommendations. At this juncture, nearly two months after the release of the report, it is essential for the United States to debate the Kingdom’s reforms and how to move Bahrain forward on a path of democratic progress. Human rights groups continue to raise significant human rights concerns with respect to the situation on the ground. What are some of these concerns? What are the current realities on the ground in Bahrain? What are the strategies of the country’s political opposition parties and revolutionary youth movement, and how is the monarchy reacting? What are some expectations and challenges regarding the palace-led reform process? And, importantly, what constructive roles can the U.S. play in encouraging meaningful reform at this time? Please join us for a discussion of these issues with: Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) Elliott Abrams Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations Joost Hiltermann Deputy Program Director, Middle East and North Africa, International Crisis Group Colin Kahl Associate Professor, Georgetown University; Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security Moderator: Stephen McInerney Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy To RSVP: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/viewform?formkey=dGFWVEU3dzBVNUtiTzFKYW5OVlZ3UXc6MQ This event is sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), the National Security Network, and the Foreign Policy Initiative. For more information, visit: http://pomed.org/the-unfinished-february-14-uprising-what-next-for-bahrain-2/
|
6. An Assessment of Iran’s Upcoming Parliamentary Elections, Woodrow Wilson Center, 12-1:15 pm February 9
with
Hosein Ghazian
and
Geneive Abdo
Location:
-
Geneive Abdo //Director, Iran Program, The Century Foundation
-
Visiting Scholar, Syracuse University
This event requires a ticket or RSVP
The Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) and the Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding
invite you to
One Year Later:
Has the Arab Spring Lived Up to Expectations?
A public panel featuring:
John L. Esposito
University Professor & Founding Director
ACMCU, Georgetown University
Heba Raouf
Associate Professor
Cairo University
Radwan Ziadeh
Fellow, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding
Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace
Moderated by:
Farid Senzai
Director of Research
Institute for Social Policy and Understanding
February 9, 2012 – 4:00-6:00 pm
Georgetown University Hotel & Conference Center | Salon H
One year has passed since protestors took to the streets across the Arab World. Join the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding and the Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding for an engaging panel on what progress has been made on the ground and where the revolution will go from here.
_______________________
John L. Esposito is University Professor, Professor of Religion and International Affairs and of Islamic Studies and Founding Director of the Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. Esposito specializes in Islam, political Islam from North Africa to Southeast Asia, and Religion and International Affairs. He is Editor-in-Chief of Oxford Islamic Studies Online and Series Editor: Oxford Library of Islamic Studies, Editor-in-Chief of the six-volume The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, The Oxford History of Islam (a Book-of-the-Month Club selection), The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, The Islamic World: Past and Present, and Oxford Islamic Studies Online. His more than forty five books include Islamophobia and the Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century, The Future of Islam, Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think (with Dalia Mogahed), Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (a Washington Post and Boston Globe best seller), The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, Islam and Politics, Political Islam: Radicalism, Revolution or Reform?, Islam and Democracy (with J. Voll). His writings have been translated into more than 35 languages, including Arabic, Turkish, Persian, Bahasa Indonesia, Urdu, European languages, Japanese and Chinese. A former President of the Middle East Studies Association of North America and of the American Council for the Study of Islamic Societies, Vice Chair of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, and member of the World Economic Forum’s Council of 100 Leaders, he is currently Vice President (2012) and President Elect (2013) of the American Academy of Religion, a member of the E. C. European Network of Experts on De-Radicalisation and the board of C-1 World Dialogue and an ambassador for the UN Alliance of Civilizations. Esposito is recipient of the American Academy of Religion’s Martin E. Marty Award for the Public Understanding of Religion and of Pakistan’s Quaid-i-Azzam Award for Outstanding Contributions in Islamic Studies and the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University Award for Outstanding Teaching.
Heba Raouf Ezzat holds a Ph.D in political theory and has been teaching at Cairo University since 1987, and is also an affiliate professor the American University in Cairo (since 2006). She currently serves as Visiting Senior Fellow at the Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding. Her research, publications and activism is focused on comparative political theory, women in Islam, global civil society, new social movements and sociology of the virtual space. She is also a cofounder of Islamonline.net which is now Onislam.net, an academic advisor of many youth civil initiatives, the member of the Board of Trustees of Alexandria Trust for Education – London, and the Head of the Board of Trustees of the Republican Consent Foundation – Cairo. She was a research fellow at the University of Westminster (UK) (1995-1996), the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies (1998 and 2012), and the Center for Middle East Studies, University of California-Berkeley (2010). She recently participated in establishing the House of Wisdom, the first independent Egyptian Think Tank founded after the Egyptian revolution 2011.
Radwan Ziadeh is a Fellow at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU), a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, and a Dubai Initiative associate at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is the founder and director of the Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies in Syria and co-founder and executive director of the Syrian Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Washington, D.C.
Farid Senzai is Director of Research at ISPU and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Santa Clara University. Dr. Senzai was previously a research associate at the Brookings Institution, where he studied U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East, and a research analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he worked on the Muslim Politics project. He served as a consultant for Oxford Analytica and the World Bank. Dr. Senzai is currently on the advisory board of The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life where he has contributed to several national and global surveys on Muslim attitudes. His recent co-authored book is Educating the Muslims of America (Oxford University Press, 2009). Dr. Senzai received a M.A. in international affairs from Columbia University and a Ph.D. in politics and international relations from Oxford University.
_______________________________
Please RSVP here: http://arabspringispu.eventbrite.com/
For a map and directions to the GU Conference Center, please visit: http://www.acc-guhotelandconferencecenter.com/map-directions/
mem297@georgetown.edu
-
Dr. John Hamre
President and CEO, CSISModerated by
Dr. Bulent Aliriza
Director and Senior Associate, CSIS Turkey ProjectCenter for Strategic and International Studies
B1 Conference Room
1800 K. St. NW, Washington, DC 20006
9. China, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Security and Trade, 12:30-2 pm, Rome Auditorium, SAIS
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Plan B
Yesterday a treasured Twitter follower described me as optimistic on Syria, because I saw some promise of a serious transition in the current draft UN Security Council resolution. The caveats did not fit in 140 characters: I was optimistic if the draft resolution were to pass and if the Americans, Europeans and Arab League continued to insist that Bashar al Assad step aside and allow the transition to begin.
Today it is clear that the first of my caveats has not been realized: the Russians and Chinese have both voted against, with 13 other members of the Security Council voting in favor. This is a real setback, heading us into scenarios 2 or 4 of my previous post on how bad things could get: the regime wins or civil war. We’d be lucky now to get into scenario 1: divided sovereignty, with some areas held by the opposition.
Moscow and Beijing will no doubt sell the vetoes back home as necessary to defy the U.S. and stop Western imperialism of the sort that took down Muammar Qaddafi in Libya. In fact what they have done is to protect Bashar al Assad at a moment when he is killing more of his own people than ever. Over 200 are reported to have lost their lives in overnight shelling of a neighborhood in Homs, an epicenter of the uprising. Yesterday’s commemoration of the father’s slaughter of people in Hama thirty years ago has sadly led to ferocious confirmation that the son is struck from the same mold.
What is to be done now? Some will propose military intervention without Security Council approval. That was done in Kosovo, where the UN blessed the outcome in Security Council resolution 1244 even if had not blessed the intervention before it happened. I doubt the U.S., NATO or the Arab League have the stomach or resources for that. If they had wanted to do that, they would not have allowed a vote at the Security Council.
They are much more likely to feed the violent opposition to the regime by arming and perhaps training the Syrian Free Army, which appears to have liberated parts of the country but is unable to hold them if the unfree Syrian army strikes back. Encouraging the Syrian Free Army will unfortunately put the country on the path to civil war, with frightening consequences for minorities and secularism if the rebels win and even worse consequences for the Muslim Brotherhood if they lose. And terrible consequences for everyone if the fighting is prolonged.
Far preferable in my view would be a return to nonviolent protest, with Arab League observers once more deployed in an effort to protect demonstrators from the worst abuses. Certainly the situation has deteriorated badly since the Arab League monitors were confined to quarters. Getting them out into the main contested areas as soon as possible would at least provide the eyes and ears required to communicate what is going on to the rest of the world, even if Bashar al Assad now seems unlikely to accept restraints.
President Obama this morning issued a statement that includes this:
The Syrian regime’s policy of maintaining power by terrorizing its people only indicates its inherent weakness and inevitable collapse. Assad has no right to lead Syria, and has lost all legitimacy with his people and the international community.
I agree that Assad has no right to lead Syria and has lost legitimacy, but unfortunately it does not follow that the regime’s collapse is inevitable. No doubt even a defeated UNSC resolution, when the vote is 13 to 2, confirms a loss of international legitimacy. But the father also lost legitimacy and nevertheless survived for many years thereafter, successfully passing power to the son.
What the United States, Europe and the Arab League need to do now is to keep up the pressure by maintaining and tightening sanctions, redeploying the observers if it is safe enough to do so and encouraging continued nonviolent protest in forms (boycotts in particular) that do not expose large numbers of people to the regime’s violence. They also need to consider new measures: blockade of arms shipments? extension of the financial sanctions used against Iran to Syria? Reinforcement of the Arab League observers?
Yesterday’s worldwide demonstrations focused on Syria’s embassies abroad. The next round should focus on Russia’s and China’s.
Some of the bodies from the massacre in Homs that the regime says didn’t happen:
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Threats should drive responses
I’m not big on Administration testimony in Congress, as it tends to the soporific. But I enjoyed skimming Director of National Intelligence James Clapper’s testimony Tuesday in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. This “Worldwide Threat Assessment” is worth a glance.
First the obvious caveats: this is unclassified testimony lacking in vital details. Clapper would not want to tip our policy hand by saying too much about Iran, China, Al Qaeda or any number of other challenges. This is testimony meant to give a broad picture of many challenges, not a deep dive into even the top priorities. The fact that the media has focused principally on its mention of the possibility of Iranian terrorist acts in the U.S. tells us more about the U.S. media than about Clapper’s view of the threats.
His introductory remarks give a hint of where he is going:
Although I believe that counterterrorism, counterproliferation, cybersecurity, and counterintelligence are at the immediate forefront of our security concerns, it is virtually impossible to rank—in terms of long-term importance—the numerous, potential threats to US national security. The United States no longer faces—as in the Cold War—one dominant threat. Rather, it is the multiplicity and interconnectedness of potential threats—and the actors behind them—that constitute our biggest challenge. Indeed, even the four categories noted above are also inextricably linked, reflecting a quickly changing international environment of rising new powers, rapid diffusion of power to nonstate actors and ever greater access by individuals and small groups to lethal technologies.
It is nevertheless striking that many threats have receded and others have developed more slowly than many of us imagined they might. According to Clapper, global jihad is fragmenting, a mass casualty attack in the U.S. is unlikely, Al Qaeda central is in decline, Iran and North Korea are not imminent nuclear threats, Afghanistan faces problems that arise as much from its own government as from the Taliban… Of course the price of liberty is eternal vigilance, as the sign in our high school coaches’ room said, but this is not the worst of all possible worlds.
It behooves us to use this respite well. It won’t last. The odds are for trouble with Iran this year, and there is no ruling out a successful terrorist attack, no matter how weak Al Qaeda gets. Clapper is remarkably silent on Pakistan and even China–I imagine that most of what he had to say is classified. Either one could cause serious difficulty, Pakistan by continuing to exploit the Taliban inside Afghanistan and China by challenging U.S. efforts to contain its growing military and political presence in the Pacific, the Middle East and Africa.
In the meanwhile, it would be wise to prepare well for the priorities Clapper cites. Their distinguishing characteristic is that none of them are amenable to purely military solutions. Terrorism, proliferation, cybersecurity and counterintelligence all fall in the unconventional warfare box. They are far more amenable to policing, diplomacy, strategic communications, and cooperation with allies than the more conventional military threats.
This is the context in which we should be evaluating the Defense, State and intelligence community budgets. The civilian side of the budget equation should be strengthened, in the name of national security. The military side should be maintained and even improved in important respects, but the notion that current cuts in personnel and hi-tech conventional weaponry are sufficient is not likely to hold. Fighter aircraft are just not very useful in dealing with the main threats, and the improved performance of the new ones is bought at a very high price.
What we need to do is begin considering the defense budget in a broader context. What can the weapons we are buying do to counter the threats we are facing? This is such an obvious question it is almost embarassing to ask it. But threats should indeed drive responses.
RSS - Posts
