Tag: China

OK Santa Claus, here’s what I want

I’m hoping it’s true Yemen’s President Saleh is coming to the U.S.  As that eagle-eyed young journalist Adam Serwer tweeted:  “not to prosecute him…would be, u know, awkward.”  That set me thinking about other good fortune that might come our way this Christmas eve:

1.  Syria’s president Bashar al Assad decides he really wants to practice opthamology in London.

2.  North Korea’s “supreme commander” Kim Jong Un wants to see professional American basketball so much he decides to give up the nuclear nonsense and buy an NBA team for Pyongyang instead.  Lots more prestige and very lucrative.

3.  Iran follows suit, abandoning its pan-Islamist pretensions, separating mosque and state and restoring close relations with Israel.  It also buys an NBA team for Tehran.

4.  Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki declares peace on earth and good will towards Sunnis and Kurds, steps down from power and invites Iraqiyya to name a replacement.

5.  The new Islamist-run governments in Tunisia, Egypt (and yes, eventually) Libya follow the Iranian example, which convinces them separation of mosque and state are the best protection for religious freedom and will encourage religious devotion, as it seems to do in the U.S.

6.  The Saudis rise to the occasion and do likewise, making the king a constitutional monarch to boot.

7.  Bahrain does the same.  Yemen gets not only a democratic government but lots of water.

8.  Without implacable enemies, Prime Minister Netanyahu reaches a quick agreement with the Palestinians, whose state is admitted to the UN with no opposition.

9.  The Taliban see that their Islamist counterparts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya are on to a good thing and reach a power sharing agreement with the Northern Alliance, jettisoning President Karzai and precipitating an early American withdrawal.

10.  Pakistan follows up American withdrawal and the new government in Kabul by reaching a broad-ranging agreement with India, including self-determination for Kashmir.

11.  Al Qaeda opens a resort on the Somali coast called “The Caliphate.”

12.  I retire to observe the peaceful competition between China and the United States, who compete in ping pong but do everything else collaboratively.

If Santa Claus really does exist, children, he’ll bring me those things for the 12 days of Christmas.  If he doesn’t, then…

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North Korean winter: stability or discontent?

As regular readers will know, North Korea is not my thing, even if I have a good deal of experience on nuclear nonproliferation issues.  The last time I posted a piece devoted to it was more than a year ago, though I’ve mentioned it more often as an American priority.  In the wake of Kim Jong-il’s death, the best I can do is offer a summary of what I think obvious.

North Korea is a priority for the U.S. because of the risks its nuclear weapons program poses, both for proliferation and for targeting America and its allies in South Korea and Japan.  Kim Jong-il’s regime managed to test something like nuclear weapons twice (in 2006 and 2009), was developing longer-range missiles and is thought to be on the verge of acquiring substantial quantities of enriched uranium.  North Korea has already been involved in murky missile and nuclear technology trade with Pakistan and Iran.

The first American concern will be short-term stability.  The Obama Administration is quite rightly indicating that it is watching the situation and consulting with Seoul and Tokyo, but it would be a mistake to say or do anything that could provoke military action by Pyongyang, which readily perceives threats and uses attacks on the South both to rally internal support and to extract assistance from the international community.

This will put Washington for the moment on the same wavelength with Beijing and Moscow, which fear instability.  China in particular is concerned about millions of refugees crossing its border.  It will also worry that the Americans intend to take advantage of Kim Jong-il’s death to liberate North Korea and reunify it with the South.  That is something Seoul says it wants and the Americans would be hard put not to support, but the process by which it happens could be dramatically problematic as well as costly.  China does not want a reunified, Western-oriented, strong Korea on its border.

A great deal now depends on what happens inside North Korea.  The New York Times quotes an unnamed American military source:

Anyone who tells you they understand what is going to happen is either lying or deceiving himself.

I would be deceiving myself.  So I won’t try to tell you I understand what is going to happen.  Things to watch for?  Whether calm prevails for the next week or so, whether the funeral comes off on December 28 without signs of tension in or with the army, whether the succession to Kim Jong-un is orderly, whether food prices remain more or less stable, whether there are military maneuvers against the South. So far, the announcements out of the North suggest things are under control.

Past the next few weeks, Washington will need to decide what to do.  In a remarkable but little remarked shift of policy, the Americans–who had said they would not meet with North Korea bilaterally unless it gave up its nuclear weapons programs–began meeting bilaterally with the North Koreans in 2006 as soon as they tested a nuclear weapon.  Now they say they won’t return to the six-party talks (involving China, Russia, Japan, and the Koreas) unless than the talks are substantial (which means progress can be made on nuclear issues).

My guess is that we’ll see talks, but with a few months delay.  North Korea is not as desperate as once it was.  It will not want to rush into international talks before settling its domestic situation.  The regime will want to reconsolidate itself and bargain with the five other parties from a position of strength, which likely means continuation of the nuclear and missile programs in the interim.

The wild card could be the North Koreans themselves.  If protests start, the regime will crack down hard.  There are signs the security forces are deploying to prevent trouble.  Markets are closed.  North Korea is a brutal dictatorship far beyond the imagination of Tunisia or Egypt, where protests have felled long-ruling presidents.  Could this be the winter of discontents?

PS:  Written before Kim Jong-un became the designated successor, but still of interest:  Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea – Council on Foreign Relations.

PPS:  Just imagine what these people will do the day they are free to do as they like:

 

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What threatens the United States?

The Council on Foreign Relations published its Preventive Priorities Survey for 2012 last week.  What does it tell us about the threats the United States faces in this second decade of the 21st century?

Looking at the ten Tier 1 contingencies “that directly threaten the U.S. homeland, are likely to trigger U.S. military involvement because of treaty commitments, or threaten the supplies of critical U.S. strategic resources,” only three are defined as military threats:

  • a major military incident with China involving U.S. or allied forces
  • an Iranian nuclear crisis (e.g., surprise advances in nuclear weapons/delivery capability, Israeli response)
  • a U.S.-Pakistan military confrontation, triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations

Two others might also involve a military threat, though the first is more likely from a terrorist source:

  • a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
  • a severe North Korean crisis (e.g., armed provocations, internal political instability, advances in nuclear weapons/ICBM capability)

The remaining five involve mainly non-military contingencies:

  • a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, electrical power, gas and oil, water supply, banking and finance, transportation, and emergency services)
  • a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
  • severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attacks
  • political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
  • intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis that leads to the collapse of the euro, triggering a double-dip U.S. recession and further limiting budgetary resources

Five of the Tier 2 contingencies “that affect countries of strategic importance to the United States but that do not involve a mutual-defense treaty commitment” are also at least partly military in character, though they don’t necessarily involve U.S. forces:

  • a severe Indo-Pak crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by major terror attack
  • rising tension/naval incident in the eastern Mediterranean Sea between Turkey and Israel
  • a major erosion of security and governance gains in Afghanistan with intensification of insurgency or terror attacks
  • a South China Sea armed confrontation over competing territorial claims
  • a mass casualty attack on Israel

But Tier 2 also involves predominantly non-military threats to U.S. interests, albeit with potential for military consequences:

  • political instability in Egypt with wider regional implications
  • an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Syria, with potential outside intervention
  • an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Yemen
  • rising sectarian tensions and renewed violence in Iraq
  • growing instability in Bahrain that spurs further Saudi and/or Iranian military action

Likewise Tier 3 contingencies “that could have severe/widespread humanitarian consequences but in countries of limited strategic importance to the United States” include military threats to U.S. interests:

  • military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
  • increased conflict in Somalia, with continued outside intervention
  • renewed military conflict between Russia and Georgia
  • an outbreak of military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, possibly over Nagorno Karabakh

And some non-military threats:

  • heightened political instability and sectarian violence in Nigeria
  • political instability in Venezuela surrounding the October 2012 elections or post-Chavez succession
  • political instability in Kenya surrounding the August 2012 elections
  • an intensification of political instability and violence in Libya
  • violent election-related instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
  • political instability/resurgent ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan

I don’t mean to suggest in any way that the military is irrelevant to these “non-military” threats.  But it is not the only tool needed to meet these contingencies, or even to meet the military ones.  And if you begin thinking about preventive action, which is what the CFR unit that publishes this material does, there are clearly major non-military dimensions to what is needed to meet even the threats that take primarily military form.

And for those who read this blog because it publishes sometimes on the Balkans, please note:  the region are nowhere to be seen on this list of 30 priorities for the United States.

 

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Zimbabwe: peaceful transition?

One more interesting session at the Achebe Colloquium today at Brown.  The original subtitle was “Prospects for a Stable Democracy or Dictatorship.”  Robert Rotberg proposed the refocus to peaceful transition, which seems to me right.  One way or another the Mugabe dictatorship is finished.

Alex Vines, Chatham House:  The economy is improved (inflation down), but the political situation is highly uncertain. The peace agreement of 2008 has run its course.  Any election by 2013 will be a tight contest. Mugabe, now 89, likely to stand again (!).  SADC (the Southern African Development Community) is underperforming economically, which is one reason South Africa is engaging on Zimbabwe.  SADC election observers are a good idea.

Blair Rutherford, Carleton University: Who opposes democratic state?  “Those with horns are hard to hide behind grass”:  security forces, diamond and land tycoons, dominant culture of national politics (“politics is war”).  These forces will continue to shape the results.

John Campbell, Council on Foreign Relations:  Elections in Zimbabwe will likely occur in the first half of 2012, followed by bloodletting.  What does the U.S. do to avoid this?  American leverage is weak, maybe nonexistent.  Zimbabwe is a marginal issue in Washington.  Zimbabwe does however impinge on South Africa, where demands for expropriation of white-owned land are growing.  Washington should be engaging with South Africa, SADC and China.  American NGOs and U.S. government should object to Mugabe’s exclusion of international election observers.  USG should commit to holding individuals perpetrating electoral violence accountable.  This would be a policy of skim milk:  words and symbols, no sticks and stones.

Robert Rotberg, Harvard:  The dictatorship will not continue in its current form.  We need a strengthened dialogue and accountability, as suggested by Campbell.  What is happening that suggests a peaceful transition is possible?  Eighty-ninety per cent of the country supports MDC (Movement for Democratic Change), which has serious talent able to run a democracy.  ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front, Mugabe’s political party) loses in anything like a fair election.   The country has diamonds and infrastructure, even if it has lost two-thirds of its GDP per capita.  Still it has the best-educated population in Africa.  SADC is more active, Mugabe is aging and ill, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is interested.  But Mugabe is still alive and killing his opposition,  corruption is rife, diamonds make it possible, the Chinese help ZANU-PF, media are government controlled, there is no constitution, ZANU-PF will is experienced and accomplished at rigging  elections (especially the count).  Net assessment:  at best mildly hopeful, until SADC takes a firmer stand.

Chitsaka Chipaziwa, Zimbabwe ambassador to the UN:  No-show.  No surprise.

Vivian Nkechinyere Enomoh, Nigerian Independent Electoral Commission:  Need truly independent electoral commission, fully funded by the international community.

Emeka Anyaoku, Former Secretary General The Commonwealth:  Speaking from the floor, he underlined the historical role of Mugabe, the centrality of the land issue and the resulting support for Mugabe both inside Zimbabwe and in the rest of Africa.  It is not clear that he will lose the election.  Chinua Achebe concurred in that view.

Bottom line:  Prospects for free and fair elections and peaceful transition are uncertain.  It is up to AU, SADC and the Chinese to counter ZANU-PF securicrats and ensure it happens.

 

 

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More China in Africa: collaboration or colonialism?

There was a second session on Africa at the Achebe Colloquium this morning.  Here is my effort to capture main points.

Tijan Sallah, World Bank:  Africa is doing well economically, because of Chinese Brazilian trade and investment and because of improved policies within Africa.

Richard Dowden, Royal African Society:  China has been good for Africa economically.  Western companies moved back in to compete and to subcontract to the Chinese.  Africa has been growing ever since The Economist declared the continent hopeless.   China has no mission to change Africa.  Africans can play off Chinese against the West, freeing Africa from colonial legacy.  Problems for the Chinese:  political role at the UN, lack of employment for Africans in Chinese projects, illegal immigration of Chinese to Africa, Chinese purchases of land and indiscriminate arms trading.

Mark Wells, Human Rights Watch:  In Zambia, Chinese are good investors but bad employers.  They have purchased and revived copper mines, but conditions of employment (health and safety standards, hours, pay) are deplorable.  Result is many strikes and some improvements.  Effective regulation is lacking.  It is the African governments that need to protect worker rights.  When there is enforcement, the Chinese respond appropriately.

Muna B. Ndulo, Cornell:  Chinese have no colonial history in Africa and supported liberation struggles.  Africa has benefited from higher commodity prices and Chinese trade and investment.  The Chinese are doing what others do.  The issue is how Africa can avoid squandering the benefits.  In Zambia, regulation is weak not because of the Chinese but because of the period of nationalization of the mines.  The Zambians now have to rebuild capacity to regulate.  Africa needs improved governance.

Brent Huffman, Northwestern: His documentary film showed the Chinese in Senegal enterprising and successful but preferring to spend time within their own community and importing many needs from China.  Ordinary Senegalese are unhappy with cheap, low quality Chinese goods, but official Senegal welcomes the Chinese with open arms.

Tony Gambino, former USAID mission director, Democratic Republic of Congo:  Collaboration, yes, but for whom and for what?  China came into DRC in a big way after 2006.  Focus is on commercial benefit (metals) with tied loans for social or infrastructure projects, repaid by profits from commercial activity.  Unlike Western companies, Chinese build infrastructure far from their mining interests.  DRC presidency benefits from the Chinese activity, contravening World Bank-sponsored mining code.  But in the end the Chinese have had to accept internationally-imposed requirements.

Xiaohon He, Quinnipiac University:  China’s rural entrepreneurs are the real engine of reducing poverty in China.  Unlike the Western model, political development is coming after economic development.  Now China is running into labor and environmental issues, as well as criticism of its currency practices.  Chinese are being forced to move abroad prematurely, with bad labor and environmental practices.  But the Chinese model may be more appropriate for Africa than the Western model.

Joseph E. Ahaneku, Nnamdi Azikiwe University:  China is providing a lot of education and cultural aid.  Confucius institutes are successful.  Chinese are open to a two-way street, including teaching of Ibo in China.  Africa should embrace Chinese and propagate African culture in China.

Bottom line:  Chinese economic activity in Africa looks positive from the African perspective, even if it raises issues because of the weakness of African states.  The right response is to strengthen those states so that they can deal with the Chinese more effectively (but that conclusion is more mine than that of any of the panelists).

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China and the U.S. in Africa

I’m at the Chinua Achebe Colloquium on Africa at Brown this weekend.  I thought this session on “China and the United States in Africa:  Cooperation or Confrontation” would be of particular interest:

  • Robert Rotberg, Harvard:  Chinese goods and traders are ubiquitous in Africa, Chinese growth is Africa’s great hope but Chinese human rights record in Africa is appalling.  China’s focus is access to resources:  trying to convince Khartoum and Juba to settle pipeline issues (which is a good thing), helping with the Zimbabwe crackdown on protests.  Chinese and Americans in Africa have different agendas and will have to find a mutual accommodation.
  • Walter Carrington, former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria:  China offers trade and aid without onerous Western conditions.  But United States also is there for its own interests, and it was indifferent to moral considerations throughout the Cold War.  U.S. business would gladly see Washington behave the way Beijing does.  Africom assures access to African oil supplies.  We should avoid competition with China, which behaves like the capitalists we hoped they would one day become.
  • James Hentz, VMI:  Strategic framework is important:  either realist, in which China challenges the U.S. (power transition model) and tries to deny U.S. resources, especially oil, metals; or liberal, in which growing trade and commerce is a good thing, Chinese construction of infrastructure benefits other powers as well.  China and U.S. both have huge stakes in stability in Africa, but China does not like American advocacy of democracy.  Chinese will want good governance and transparency in Africa, but not American-style democracy.
  • Scott D. Taylor, Georgetown:  U.S. and China so far moving along parallel tracks.   How do Africans view the two?  China viewed favorably in most countries.  Even in Zambia, China has traction.  Views of China are approaching the highly positive levels of views of the U.S., which are slipping because of Africom, hunt for Lord’s Resistance Army, use of drones in Somalia, reduction of PEPFAR funding, toppling of Qaddafi.  Anti-U.S. sentiment is growing, to the benefit of the Chinese.
  • Omer Ismail, Enough!  China and the U.S. compete for resources and markets.  The approaches are different:  China leads with the state, the U.S. with the market.  China has now passed the U.S. in trade with Africa, in corporate deals with Africa, in percentage of oil imports from Africa, supplying weapons to all sides.  Possible areas for cooperation:  agriculture, security and diplomacy, and environment.  What is in it for the people of Africa?  That is what U.S. and China should focus on.  There is a real possibility for cooperation. 
  • Deborah Brautigan, American University:  China represents a big challenge that echoes for Americans the Cold War and Japanese economic competition.  It is a developing country with low labor and environmental standards.  Chinese foreign policy emphasizes mutual benefit and non-interference.  But China is changing rapidly, we often exaggerate Chinese activities in Africa and have little understanding what they are actually doing.  Chinese credit practices can be good because they guarantee that the Chinese get what they pay for, which is better than much Western foreign assistance has done.

Overall message:  some competition is inevitable, but the Chinese role in Africa is already more positive that many think (finance, infrastructure) and more like U.S. private sector behavior than we like to admit.  There is a negative side:  supporting unworthy rulers, use of veto at the UN, Chinese racial attitudes, and company exploitation of diamonds in Zimbabwe.  But Chinese are evolving in a direction that may allow more cooperation on Africa in the UN and in an Africa that is increasingly democratic and resistant to exploitation.

Chinua Achebe at his Brown Colloquium, December 4, 2011
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