Tag: Civil society
Covid crackdowns and mobilization
“Government responses to the new coronavirus are disrupting civil society all over the world. But while government measures are dramatically restricting civic space, the global crisis is also catalyzing new forms of mobilization.” On May 20, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a discussion on “Global Civil Society and the Pandemic.” The discussion was moderated by Thomas Carothers and featured three other guest speakers:
Thomas Carothers (Moderator): Senior Vice President for studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Yousseff Cherif: Deputy Director of Columbia Global Centers, Tunis
Maureen Kademaunga: Doctoral Researcher at the Human Economy Research Program, University of Pretoria, South Africa
Janjira Sombatpoonsiri: Associate Fellow at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)
Vijayan MJ: Independent researcher and writer, Research Collective, New Delhi, India
Current context
In his opening remarks, Carothers touched on the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s current research on the state of civil activism throughout the world. There are conflicting narratives. On one hand, there has been a trend toward governmental restriction on the role and function of civil society. On the other hand, a new generation of dynamic, fluid, and tech-savvy civil activists has emerged despite increasing state restrictions.
Carothers believes that the COVID-19 pandemic intensifies this dualism within civil society. Many governments throughout the world have implemented state lockdowns and have increased restrictions on freedom of movement, freedom of association, and freedom of speech. Carothers views the current period as “the most restrictive period in living memory for civic activism.” Despite this fact, Carothers highlights that the COVID-19 pandemic creates an enormous need for citizens to engage, respond, and find ways to improve governmental responses to the virus.
Changing roles
Cherif highlights new roles the COVID-19 pandemic has created for civil society groups in Tunisia. Many organizations have shifted their work from democracy promotion and governance to combating COVID-19. This includes aiding hospitals, distributing masks, and cleaning public spaces. In places where the government has proven to be inefficient or too weak to act, civil society groups have continued the work of government and have led COVID-19 relief initiatives. Although the Tunisian government has shown interest in working with these groups during the pandemic, Cherif believes that future cooperation remains unlikely.
Kademaunga believes that the government of Zimbabwe has utilized the COVID-19 crisis to justify further restrictions on civil society groups. Government human rights abuses against civil society groups in Zimbabwe are increasing. Simultaneously, these groups continue to increase their efforts in assisting the government of Zimbabwe in the provision of essential services during the current lockdown.
Vijayan states that civil society groups in India quickly changed their agendas at the start of the COVID-19 crisis. During the initial stages of the pandemic, civil society groups took charge when the Indian government remained absent. Indian civil society groups have been more efficient than the Indian government in devising a plan of action.
Transformation of activist means
Cherif observes that the COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically increased the online presence of civil society groups on various digital platforms throughout the Arab world. Civil society groups have utilized webinars as spaces for new online discussions. Notably, some have started to increase their educational initiatives online.
Kademaunga predicts that the shift towards online platforms post-COVID-19 will harm those in rural areas who do not possess widespread digital access. Previously, in Zimbabwe they accounted for the majority of civil society participation. Kademaunga stressed that this changing dynamic will foster heightened inequality between rural and urban areas. Ultimately, those within urban centers will dominate the agenda making processes for civil society groups.
A pivotal moment for legitimacy
Cherif regards the COVID-19 pandemic as pivotal to how ordinary citizens view the legitimacy of civil society groups. Previously, the majority of Tunisians viewed civil society groups as unfavorable and distant from the rest of society. Due to their integral role in providing support during the current crisis, these groups have gained legitimacy and favorability.
Kademaunga believes that the COVID-19 pandemic will bring about a major change in the perception of civil society society groups in Zimbabwe. Traditionally, the government of Zimbabwe has fueled negative discourse against civil society groups. However, the role of civil society groups in providing aid amid the COVID-19 pandemic disproves negative stereotypes that portray these groups as being in opposition to the interests of general citizens.
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South Sudan’s six month delay
June 18 the United States Institute of Peace held an event discussing the political, military, and humanitarian situation of South Sudan following a May agreement wherein ruling and opposition parties extended the pre-transitional period of the peace agreement by six months. Under the agreement, the ruling and opposition parties will work to form a unified Government.
The panel included David Acouth, founder of the Council on South Sudanese-American relations, Brian Adeba, Deputy Director of Policy at the Enough Project, Mark Ferullo, Senior Advisor at the Sentry, Morgan Simpson, Deputy Director of Programs at Democracy International, and Emily Koiti, a frequent representative at South Sudanese peace talks. Susan Stigant, Director of Africa Programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace, moderated the discussion.
Adeba shared general sentiments of people on the ground in South Sudan regarding the peace agreements and recent events. As violence has subsided in the wake of the peace agreement, there is a general sense of optimism in South Sudan. However, he stressed that humanitarian issues, lack of resource provision, and the lingering threat of latent military groups are still present. The biggest challenge facing the people of South Sudan is the subtle increases in militarization of certain opposition groups, despite the peace agreement. Adeba suspects that because many of these groups have access to complicated weapons, they may have connections to various politicians within the ruling party, further complicating peace proceedings.
Acouth echoed Adeba’s sentiments regarding the general attitudes of the South Sudanese regarding the peace agreement. The message of decreased violence has reached people living in camps, prompting their hasty return to the cities and homes they abandoned. This has exacerbated humanitarian and economic issues, since there is not enough food or employment in metropolitan areas. Adeba theorizes that the issues that there is a larger underlying economic and humanitarian crisis in the absence of widespread fighting. Koiti continued this line of argument, noting that a reduction in violence has not translated into amelioration of other problems in the country. People leaving camps are not aware of the challenges that they might face when they return home. In addition to economic issues and food shortage, many locales and residences are still occupied by armed groups.
Morgan believes that the decision to extend the pre-transitional period by 6 months was the correct decision. Compared to the failed peace process of 2015, there is more movement to implement the polices detailed in the peace agreement. There is also greater participation of civil society groups, scholars, and women. However, the issues of security sector reform and the redrawing of state lines are still stagnant. Morgran believes that in order to form a new, functional government, cantonment sites in civilian areas must be dismantled. Furthermore, transitional justice mechanisms are difficult to implement because of their emphasis on accountability.
Koiti is less optimistic about the situation and does not believe that ruling and opposition forces will be able to form a unified government at the end of the six-month period in November. The government is not allocating the resources needed to address pressing issues like security sector reform and cantonment sites. Furthermore, she notes that the responsible commissions are opaque about why they are unable to achieve goals.
Adeba believes the lack of reform provisions for the National Security Service of South Sudan in the peace agreement is particularly concerning. The organization is oppressive and infringes upon civil rights—often holding people indefinitely and without trial. There is also a “parallel army” emerging for the sole purpose of serving the President. On paper, it answers to the National Security Minister, but in reality they are responsible to the President and are funded through his budget. This is concerning because the president’s budget is private, making oversight of this branch of the security services difficult, and contributing to a general lack of transparency.
Regarding the future of South Sudan, Ferullo describes two areas of key importance. First is the formation of a committee to deal with the issue of drawing state boundaries. The way that boundaries are drawn will determine resource allocation, governance, and the economy of South Sudan. A focus on transparency is needed to ameliorate some of the economic woes of the country. Increases in transparency can be accomplished through building an “e-transparency” system to track financial transactions of government departments, and by providing more support to local civil society groups. He posits that civil society groups are more familiar with the needs of specific locales and can direct funding more effectively and equitably than a larger, centralized body might.
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Peace Picks – August 6 – 13
1. Building the Bench for Inclusive U.S. Foreign Policy: Civil Society Leading by Example | Monday, August 6, 2018 | 4:00 pm – 6:00 pm | Open Society Foundations | Register Here
The Open Society Foundations, in collaboration with other partners, has supported research to better understand how civil society can drive inclusive innovation in foreign policy and national security. To this end, a new report, Advancing Diversity and Inclusion in the Foreign Policy Sector, demonstrates how think tanks and nongovernmental organizations can empower a diverse pool of experts to solve the world’s greatest challenges.
Civil society, as the core pool for expertise in government service, can address deficits in cultural, linguistic, and religious lived experiences to offer powerful insight and cultural competency for foreign policy. Experts will discuss best practices and recommendations for the field on how to draw from the United States’ tapestry of diverse communities to gain strategic contributions to diplomacy and national security outcomes.
Please join us for the Washington, D.C., launch of Advancing Diversity and Inclusion in the Foreign Policy Sector, in conversation with Vestige Strategies and the Truman National Security Project.
The panel discussion will be followed by a reception.
Speakers:
Moderator: Alex Johnson – Senior Policy Advisor for Europe and Eurasia, Open Society Foundations, Washington D.C.
Stefanie Brown James – Chief Executive Officer and Founding Partner, Vestige Strategies
Anthony Robinson – Director of Training and Public Engagement, Truman Center for National Policy and Truman National Security Project
2. Israel’s Nation-State Law: Consequences and Costs | Tuesday, August 7, 2018 | 10:00 am – 11:00 am | Wilson Center | Register Here
Last month, the Nation-State law enshrining the principle that Israel is the “national home of the Jewish people” became one of Israel’s Basic Laws, giving it a quasi-constitutional status. The new law, which polls indicate a majority of Israeli Jews support, has generated enormous controversy at home and abroad, alienating and angering Palestinian citizens of Israel and the Druze community with its focus on Jewish primacy.
What are the consequences of the new law for comity, politics and governance in Israel?
Join us as three veteran observers of Israel’s politics and policies discuss the new law and its consequences.
U.S. toll-free number: 888-942-8140
International call-in number: 1-517-308-9203
Participant passcode: 13304
Speakers:
Introduction: Jane Harman – Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center
Moderator: Aaron David Miller – Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director, Wilson Center
Ayman Odeh – Head of the Joint List, the third largest parliamentary group in the 20th Knesset
Anshel Pfeiffer – Correspondent, Haaretz; author, Bibi: The Turbulent Life and times of Benjamin Netanyahu
Shibley Telhami – Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development, University of Maryland, College Park
3. Pakistan: After the Elections | Tuesday, August 7, 2018 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm | Hudson Institute | Register Here
Pakistan has spent almost half of its 70 years as a nation under military rule and the rest under a semi-authoritarian democracy. Since 2008, Pakistan has ostensibly had civilian rule with a peaceful transfer of power in 2013. Analysts are hopeful that Pakistan’s 2018 election on July 25 will continue this trend of democratization.
Elections do not make a democracy. Yet free, fair, and inclusive elections are one of the pillars of a democratic nation. Most observers and analysts, both within and outside the country, have raised concerns about the influence of Pakistan’s military intelligence establishment on the July 25 general election.
On August 7, Hudson Institute’s South and Central Asia Program will host a panel to discuss Pakistan’s 2018 elections. Panelists will include Professor C. Christine Fair, Provost’s Distinguished Associate Professor in the Peace and Security Studies Program at Georgetown University; Dr. Muhammad Taqi, a columnist for The Wire; and Ambassador Husain Haqqani, former Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States and director of South and Central Asia at Hudson Institute.
4. Pakistan Elections: What Now? | Wednesday, August 8, 2018 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
Pakistan’s national elections on July 25 ushered in a new government, with the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) party now set to head a new governing coalition and former cricket star Imran Khan expected to become prime minister. After a controversial campaign period, the incumbent Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)—whose former leader Nawaz Sharif was imprisoned just days before the elections—has alleged rigging, military manipulation, and media censorship. Several political parties have also challenged the results of the elections. Should the results stand, the PTI appears to have swept races around the country, and now faces the challenge of governing.
To discuss the outcome of the elections, the shape of the next government, and the complaints and challenges to the outcome, USIP will hold a conversation with senior representatives from Pakistan’s top three political parties (PTI, PML-N and the Pakistan Peoples Party) via Skype along with experts Daniel Markey, Kiran Pervez and Moeed Yusuf in Washington, D.C. The event will take place from 9:30am – 11:30am on Wednesday, August 8, 2018 at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Join the conversation on Twitter with #PkElectionsWhatNow.
Speakers:
Moderator: Moeed Yusuf – Associate Vice President, Asia Center, U.S. Institute of Peace
Syed Tariq Fatemi (via Skype) – Special Assistant to the Prime Minister
Daniel Markey – Senior Research Professor, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Kiran Pervez – South & Central Asia Regional Chair, U.S. Department of State
Shah Mahmood Qureshi (via Skype) – Vice Chairman, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
Sherry Rehman (via Skype) – Leader of the Opposite of the Senate, Pakistan
5. U.S. Arms Transfer Policy – Shaping the Way Ahead | Wednesday, August 8, 2018 | 10:30 am – 12:30 pm | Center for International and Strategic Studies | Register Here
The Trump Administration released its new Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) export policy in April 2018. It constitutes the first update to the CAT policy since January 2014.
Please join CSIS as we host a public event to discuss the Administration’s new CAT policy. The event will commence with keynote remarks by Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Tina Kaidanow. Following these remarks, a moderated panel consisting of government, think tank, and industry experts will contextualize and discuss challenges in implementation, as well as opportunities presented for U.S. strategy and U.S. business as a result of this policy update.
Speakers:
Ambassador Tina Kaidanow – Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Alex Gray – Special Assistant to the President for the Defense Industrial Base, White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy
Laura Cressey – Deputy Director for Regional Security and Arms Transfers, U.S. Department of State
Jeff Abramson – Senior Fellow, Arms Control Association
Keith Webster – President, Defense and Aerospace Export Council, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Melissa Dalton – Deputy Director, International Security Program and Director, Cooperative Defense Project, CSIS
Dak Hardwick – Assistant Vice President, International Affairs, Aerospace Industries Association
Andrew Philip-Hunter – Director, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group and Senior Fellow, International Security Program, CSIS
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Peace Picks – July 30 – August 5
1. Where Do We Go From Here? One Year after the Rohingya Crisis | Monday, July 30, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm | Heritage Foundation | Register Here
On August 25, 2017 violence broke out in Rakhine State that led to the mass exodus of more than 700,000 Muslim Rohingya from Burma. Thousands of fleeing Rohingya men and boys were brutally murdered, women and girls were raped and sexually abused, and babies were killed before their family’s eyes at the hands of the notorious Burmese military. The United Nations calls the situation ethnic cleansing. And according to The Economist the refugee flow from Burma was faster than the exodus from Rwanda in the midst of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The United States has responded by providing substantial humanitarian assistance to alleviate suffering. As the protracted crisis continues, it will be critical for the U.S. to implement a comprehensive long-term strategy to address the Rohingya crisis. That may require a larger-scale shift in broader U.S. strategy toward Burma. Please join us for a conversation nearly a year after the crisis began to discuss solutions to the long-term challenges facing Rohingya.
Speakers:
Keynote: Kelley E. Currie – Representative of the United States on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, and Alternate Representative of the United States to the General Assembly of the United Nations
Moderator: Walter Lohman – Director, Asian Studies Center, Heritage Foundation
Francisco Bencosme – Asia Pacific Advocacy Manager, Amnesty International
U Kyaw Min – Former Member of Parliament, Burma
Olivia Enos – Policy Analyst, Asian Studies Center, Heritage Foundation
2. The Nuclear Future: Can There Be Order Without Trust? | Monday, July 30, 2018 | 12:30pm – 2:00 pm | Stimson Center | Register Here
Developments in relations between major powers and nuclear-armed states in tense regions render the future of arms control, nuclear confidence-building, and U.S. leadership in the global nonproliferation regime uncertain. Please join the Stimson Center for a luncheon discussion addressing trust deficits in the global nuclear order. Our featured speaker, Heather Williams, lecturer in Defence Studies, Kings College London, will offer recommendations for how the United States can rebuild trust within the global nuclear order, to include increased transparency and unilateral measures in the absence of new treaties. Justin Anderson, senior research fellow, National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Rebecca Gibbons, post-doctoral fellow, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and Sara Kutchesfahani, senior policy analyst, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, will offer comments. Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Stimson Center, will convene our luncheon meeting, and Hannah Haegeland, a South Asia analyst at Stimson, will moderate the discussion.
3. Governing the Ungovernable: Institutional Reforms for Democratic Governance in Pakistan | Monday, July 30, 2018 | 3:00 pm – 4:30 pm | Wilson Center | Register Here
Why has Pakistan experienced an extended economic slowdown since 1990? Why has it suffered through volatile and inequitable growth over the last 25 years? In his new book, Governing the Ungovernable, Ishrat Husain, a distinguished Pakistani economist, Wilson Center global fellow, and former Wilson Center public policy fellow, argues that the answer lies in the decay of institutions of governance. At this event, Dr. Husain will discuss his new book, which proposes a selective and incremental approach for reforming key public institutions in Pakistan in order to make them perform better. This event will be moderated by Michael Kugelman, Deputy Director and Senior Associate for South Asia at the Wilson Center.
4. Yemen’s Silent Crisis: Elevating Local Perspectives | Tuesday, July 31, 2018 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm | International Center for Religion and Diplomacy | 740 15th St NW #900, Washington, DC, 20005 | Register Here
As Yemen continues to unravel, discussions of the crisis in media and policy circles too often focus solely on the geopolitics, and overlook the realities on the local level. Even in the absence of resources and functioning national institutions, Yemeni community leaders are finding ways to confront dire humanitarian and security challenges. With no political resolution to the conflict in sight, it is more important than ever to examine this crisis through the eyes of those who are impacted most directly.
The International Center for Religion & Diplomacy (ICRD) will host a discussion with Yemen experts and civil society leaders from across a range of disciplines and sectors, in order to take a holistic view of what has been happening at the local level. As Yemen faces a crisis on multiple fronts – famine, civil war, terrorism, political and economic instability – it is important to bring together voices from distinct fields of work.
In this event, panelists will elevate stories of resilience and adversity from Yemeni communities, touching on issues of conflict transformation, humanitarian relief, and the role of civil society in filling the gaps left by absent governing institutions.
Speakers:
Moderator: James Patton – ICRD President & CEO
Fatima Abo Alasrar – Senior Analyst at the Arabia Foundation
Anwar Khan – President of Islamic Relief
Salwa Alssarhi – Independent Consultant – Yemen
5. The Code of Putinism | Wednesday, August 1, 2018 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here
What is Vladimir Putin up to? In the new book The Code of Putinism, Brian Taylor argues that we can only understand Putin’s Russia if we understand the set of ideas, emotions, and habits that influence how Team Putin views the world. Key features of Russian politics today–such as increasing authoritarianism, Putin’s reliance on a small group of loyal friends and associates, state domination of the economy, and an assertive foreign policy–are traced to the worldview and mindset of Putin and his close associates. The Code of Putinism also shows how Putin’s choices, guided by this mindset, have led to a Russia that is misruled at home and punching above its weight abroad.
Speakers:
Moderator: Jeffrey Mankoff – Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, CSIS
Brian Taylor – Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, Maxwell School, Syracuse University
Stephen Hanson – Vice Provost for International Affairs, College of William and Mary
Olga Oliker – Senior Advisor and Director, Russia and Eurasia, CSIS
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Reconciliation Syrian style
At a roundtable discussion in Washington DC earlier this week, knowledgeable people discussed the local reconciliation and evacuation strategies applied to besieged areas of Syria, including the recent evacuation of the Damascene suburb of Darayya.
On August 28, the Syrian government took full control over Darayya following negotiations with the Darayya Reconciliation Committee and evacuated its civilian population to makeshift centers in Damascus and its fighters to Idlib in northern Syria. This manner of ‘reconciliation’ with Damascus has occurred in a number of cities and towns in Syria. The government uses this approach to establish its authority in opposition held areas.
The process is essentially a negotiation between the Syrian government and an appointed body within the besieged area called the reconciliation committee and composed of local elites. Often local Sharia courts or local councils are repurposed to serve as reconciliation committees. The committee negotiates with the government on behalf of the area that it represents. So long as the reconciliation process is occurring, the Syrian government will provide supplies and minimal services to civilians in the besieged area.
By sending convoys of food and other supplies to the besieged areas, the Syrian government effectively prevents local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from providing substantial humanitarian aid to these areas. If local NGOs, which are usually backed by international NGOs, do provide aid and services, Damascus considers it a violation of the reconciliation process and will cease negotiations and recommence airstrikes. Thus, local NGOs are unable to carry out their missions and often lose the support of the international NGOs as a result.
Once an agreement is reached, the government will transfer all the “unreconciliables” in the area out to either Idlib or Damascus. These unreconciliables usually consist of fighters, humanitarian workers and political activists, though in the case of Darayya the entire population was transferred. This practice of population transfer allows opposition fighters who were fighting losing battles to move north where they can join the fight for Aleppo, one of the most hotly contested areas in Syria.
While it appears that Damascus has the upper hand in these negotiations, the besieged communities hold considerable leverage. The Syrian army has a manpower problem. An effective siege requires a significant number of troops. The longer the besieged area can hold out, the weaker the army will get. Additionally, areas are often targeted because they hold a strategic resource or infrastructure that the government desires. The reconciliation council can leverage that resource to get a better deal out of the negotiations.
An analyst recommended that local NGOs should consider embedding in existing bodies (such as a religious charity or a local business) in order to operate in besieged areas. He also recommended that when considering how to assist besieged areas, we shouldn’t only look at whether the people in these areas are having their day-to-day needs met, but also whether they can sustainably provide for themselves once the government convoys stop coming.
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Beware the monopoly of power
To many in the West, the Kurds have long seemed the sanest group left in Syria, as well as the safest and most effective option as an ally in the fight against ISIS. They appear organized, united, secular, and pluralist, standing out against the backdrop of the fragmented factions of the Syrian opposition, including Islamist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.
However, the political situation within this community, and their ties to the rest of Syrian society, are more complex than this image suggests. Their dominance of the new ‘coalition’ of the Syrian Democratic Forces engaged in the offensive against Raqqa makes it important to elucidate this complexity.
The Syrian Kurdish party PYD (Democratic Union Party) is the entity that makes the news. It is running the show throughout the north and northeast of the country. Their affiliated militia, the People’s Protection Units (YPG, and the women’s equivalent, the YPJ), made headlines last summer in their battle for Kobani against ISIS, and then again in another border town, Tel Abyad, this summer.
The YPG is also leading the fight against ISIS in Raqqa now, with grudging cooperation from Sunni Arab groups. After the US decided to suspend its train and equip program, it airdropped ammunition with the intention of supporting an offensive against Raqqa, but the Sunni Arab groups participating in the newly-formed coalition, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), say they have seen none of this material aid. The YPG dominates the SDF.
Taking advantage of their military successes, the PYD established the Democratic Autonomous Government of Western Kurdistan (i.e. within Syria, as opposed to the well-established Kurdistan Regional Government inside Iraq) in January 2014, consisting of three cantons under a federated ‘Rojava’ government. Afrin canton lies to the northwest of Aleppo, Kobani on the Turkish border east of the Euphrates, and the third canton, Qamishli, falls in the northeast corner of Syria, bordering Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey. The PYD in addition claims towns in the region between Afrin and Kobani, including A’zaz, Manbij, al-Bab, and Jarablus, as parts of historical Kurdistan.
The PYD administers health, education, security, and the judiciary within their cantons. They operate under an umbrella coalition TEV-DEM (Movement for a Democratic Society), which runs civil society organizations and ‘peace councils’ – civil courts – in Kurdish population centers, and aids local poor. The ‘peoples’ courts’ in the cantons are staffed by PYD members and take an eclectic approach to established and codified law, like other opposition groups, selecting from Syrian criminal law, Swiss or German legal codes and customary law.
Though the PYD has been consolidating its control of these cantons, they deny that they are seeking an independent Kurdish state, stating their aim of remaining within a whole and united Syria, though one with a higher degree of regional autonomy than before. They have publicly expressed tolerance and inclusion of other ethnicities and sects.
Bassam Barabadi and Faysal Itani reported in August that both ‘Kurdish and Arab senior sources in northern Syria’ confirmed ‘joint or divided Arab-Kurdish rule’ in liberated territories, evidencing some degree of cooperation, which is crucial for stability. The recent move to annex Tel Abyad reflects the PYD’s intentions to unite the three cantons and maintain control throughout the contiguous territories along the Turkish border.
Divisions in the Kurdish community and antagonisms with other Syrians remain. TEV-DEM is not the only coalition on the Syrian Kurdish political scene. Other less militant or nationalist parties have combined to form the Kurdish National Council (KNC), which has joined the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) and is politically closer to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq than the radical Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey. The PYD accepts the PKK’s founder, Abdullah Öcalan, as their ideological leader.
One of the more prominent of the KNC parties is Yekiti (Kurdish Democratic Unity Party in Syria), which has often criticized the PYD. In May, for instance, the PYD are alleged to have told two Yekiti members to leave their homes in Qamishli canton because they had criticized the PYD on TV.
In addition to earlier allegations of press intimidation and aggression against other Kurdish parties, last month the Rojava Student and Youth Union, also in Qamishli, raised concerns to local and international human rights organizations about the PYD using Kurdish-language instruction in primary schools for political and ideological indoctrination. Indeed, on Tuesday the KNC called for demonstrations in Hasaka governorate against PYD educational policies. The resulting turnout in Malikiyya (Derek) was forcefully dispersed by PYD’s internal security arm, the Asayış, which also made several arrests.
Meanwhile, Sunni Arabs and Syrian Turkmen have levelled accusations of ethnic cleansing and property confiscation directed at the YPG, after their battles with ISIS in the Kobani and Tel Abyad countryside and their consequent control of new territories. An investigation conducted by Amnesty International affirmed war crimes committed by the PYD in razing Sunni Arab villages.
Cooperation between the Kurdish cantons and rebel-held territories, or the YPG and rebel militant forces, is generally low. Rebel groups distrust the PYD and YPG because their primary goal is driving ISIS out of their territories – showing, in the rebels’ view, lack of dedication to the revolution. The YPG command has stated that they would work with Russia to combat ISIS if Russia were to present the opportunity, which garners further distrust from other opposition groups.
Kader Sheikhmous is the co-founder of an NGO, Shar for Development, which focuses on enhancing civil society, governance, and economic development in Kurdish areas of Syria. Much of its work promotes the unity and good relations of the Kurdish and Sunni Arab communities, including a bilingual magazine that is distributed in the towns of Hasaka.
Sheikhmous highlights the dangers of the international and regional actors offering support exclusively to armed groups, such as the YPG, without investing in civil society actors and economic development. USAID, for example, in 2014 sharply diminished support to Kurdish NGOs in Syria. That risks creating dependence on the YPG not just for security but for other services, in the absence of civil society, will increase the YPG’s tendency toward authoritarian behavior.
These concerns raise the question of the viability of PYD-run autonomous cantons, their suitability as a military or security ally for the US, and their role in a future Syrian state. Exclusive or excessive support for one party in the Syrian Kurdish regions will allow it to consolidate its monopoly on power and violence.
Syrians generally endorse the unity of their country and its people, regardless of ethnic or sectarian background. Kurds, Turkmen, Alawis, Sunnis, and others want to regain their normal lives and continue living together. Though the Kurdish autonomous regions have provided measures of stability and security for the civilians of the north, it will be counterproductive if it comes at the price of single-party rule and exacerbated social divisions.
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