Tag: Counterterrorism
The angel sings, but the devils are in the details
President Biden today gave his first speech to the United Nations outlining his foreign policy priorities and approach more clearly than he has so far. He aimed to restore trust in American leadership, not only in the aftermath of the Trump Administration but also in the wake of the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan and controversy surrounding the deal to sell nuclear submarines to Australia that shocked and annoyed France.
The priorities were strikingly different from Trump’s:
- Ending the COVID-19 pandemic.
- Slowing climate change
- Encouraging respect for human rights
- Rebalancing geopolitcs
- A level playing field for trade
- Ensuring benefits, and limiting harm, from technology
- Countering terrorism
The first three items would not have appeared on any Trump Administration list. Numbers 4-7 would have, but with a distinctly America First (i.e. alone) spin.
Biden’s means are at least as different from Trump’s as his priorities. He favors diplomacy over war, multilateralism over unilateralism, and the power of America’s example at home over American intervention abroad.
In my book, this is all well and good, but then come the difficulties in applying these methods to actual issues. Encouraging booster shots to Americans is likely not the best way to end the COVID-19 epidemic, but exporting vaccines to poor countries exposes the Administration to criticism, so Biden is trying to split the difference by doing both. Slowing climate change is a grand idea, but can Biden get the legislation through Congress to meet his own goals for limits on American production of greenhouse gases. Encouraging respect for human rights is fine, but what do you do about Saudi Arabia, whose Crown Prince is thought culpable for the murder of a US-based journalist? Rebalancing geopolitics is fine, but what if selling nuclear submarines to Australia requires you to blind-side and offend your longest-standing ally?
And so on: a level playing field for trade is hard to achieve when a major competitor is using prison (or slave) labor to produce manufactured good. Responding to state-sponsored cyber attacks is proving a particularly difficult challenge. Facial-recognition technology, with all its defects, is spreading rapidly around the world even though it is prone to misidentification and other abuses. You may prefer a less military approach to counter-terrorism, but if there is a successful mass casualty attack in the US the military response will be dramatic. Never mind that 20 years of military responses have not been effective and have killed a lot of innocent non-combatants.
As for methods, there too there are problems. The State Department is a notoriously weak diplomatic instrument. Can it carry the weight of additional responsibilities? Diplomacy may be preferable to prevent Iran and North Korea from getting a nuclear weapons, but will Tehran agree? A two-state solution would be best, but how can we get there from here? Multilateralism is often preferable, but not always possible. One of my mentors used to quote President Carter (I think) saying multilaterally where we can, unilaterally when we must. But that judgment is not a simple one. America should be a shining “city on the hill,” as President Reagan hoped, but what then about the January 6 insurrection and the anti-voting legislation in more than two dozen states?
Biden’s angel sang well this morning at the UN. But the devils are in the details. It isn’t going to be easy to get those right in a divided country and a competitive, if not downright chaotic, global environment.
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Peace Picks | May 3 – May 7, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream
1. Rebalancing security and governance in the Sahel: Possible avenues for German intervention | May 3, 2021 | 9:30 AM – 10:30 AM ET | European Council on Foreign Relations | Register Here
Speakers
Andrew Lebovich: Policy Fellow, ECFR
Heike Thiele: Director, Civilian Crisis Prevention and Stabilisation, Federal Foreign Office (TBC)
Denis Tull: Africa and Middle East Fellow, SWP
Theodore Murphy (moderator): Africa Programme Director, ECFR
In the past several years, Germany has repeatedly expressed its strong commitment to stabilisation in the Sahel, and pushed for approaches encouraging political reform and improvements in governance and in internal security provision in the region. However, ongoing insecurity and international critiques of European approaches in the region show the need for continued rebalancing in international approaches. This panel will examine Germany’s approaches to stabilisation in the Sahel and how new approaches and policies could help improve the region’s tumultuous conflicts and political uncertainty.
2. Report launch—The impact of Western sanctions on Russia | May 3, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Speakers
Anders Aslund: Resident Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center
Maria Snegovaya: Nonresident Fellow, Eurasia Center
Sergey Aleksashenko: former deputy chairman, Central Bank of Russia
Elina Ribakova: deputy chief economist, the Institute of International Finance
Ambassador Daniel Fried (moderator): Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council
Since 2014, the US and its allies have countered the Kremlin’s growing “hybrid warfare” with sanctions. Moscow’s malign activities have included military aggression in Ukraine, election interference, cyberattacks, assassinations, and disinformation. Western sanctions have imposed serious costs on the Russian economy and President Vladimir Putin’s cronies, though the Kremlin and some others question the efficacy of sanctions on Russia. How successful have the sanctions been in altering Putin’s actions? How can future sanctions become more effective in imposing costs on the Kremlin?
3. New START: The Future of Arms Control Diplomacy and U.S.-Russian Relations | May 3, 2021 | 4:00 PM – 5:00 PM ET | Belfer Center | Register Here
Speakers
Rose Goettemoeller: Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer, Stanford University
Matthew Bunn: Professor, Harvard University
Ambassador Paula Dobriansky: Senior Fellow, Future of Diplomacy Project
Ambassador Doug Lute: Senior Fellow, Future of Diplomacy Project
Nicholas Burns: Professor, Harvard University
The extension of New START – the last remaining treaty limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear forces — sustains verifiable limits on Russian nuclear weapons that can reach the United States for the next five years. Can that time be used to negotiate a follow-on accord that serves both sides interests? With the collapse of the INF Treaty following Russian cheating and U.S. withdrawal, what can be done to address threats to U.S. and Russian security posed by INF-range missiles? What other key issues need to be addressed in strategic stability talks – with Russia, with China, or with others? How can the world community best address the danger of nuclear proliferation – especially when ongoing nuclear modernization in all of the nuclear-armed states is adding to long-standing tensions between nuclear haves and have-nots? Could the United States and Russia revive their past cooperation to control proliferation and prevent nuclear terrorism? Given the challenging relationship between Russia and the United States, Russia’s violations of some arms control agreements, its annexation of Crimea and military and cyber incursions and provocations along its border and beyond – and Russia’s equally long list of complaints about the United States – what might strategic arms diplomacy look like in the future? How can the proposed U.S.-Russia Summit advance arms control, nonproliferation, and a broader working relationship between the two countries?
4. Negotiating New START | May 4, 2021 | 3:00 PM – 4:00 PM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
Speakers
Rose Gottemoeller: nonresident senior fellow, Nuclear Policy Program
Peter Baker (moderator): chief White House correspondent, New York Times
In February, the Biden administration extended the New START treaty with Russia for another five years, buying time and space for future arms control with Russia. Secretary of State Blinken promised to use future arms control efforts to address all of Russia’s nuclear weapons and reduce dangers from China’s modern and growing nuclear arsenal. As the United States embarks on this new arms control approach, what can we learn from the negotiations of the last remaining strategic arms control treaty?
Join us for the launch of Rose Gottemoeller’s new book, Negotiating the New START Treaty, and a discussion with Peter Baker on the New START negotiations with Russia and the biggest hurdles, challenges, and insights that can serve as a window to the future of U.S.-Russia arms control.
5. They call it diplomacy: A conversation on the broader Middle East and the critical role of diplomats | May 5, 2021 | 2:00 PM – 3:15 PM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Speakers
Suzanne Maloney (moderator): Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy
Bruce Riedel: Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy
Sir Peter Westmacott: Former British Ambassador to the US
In his new memoir “They Call it Diplomacy,” former British Ambassador to the United States Peter Westmacott looks back on 40-years of service as a diplomat for the United Kingdom. Over the course of his distinguished career, Ambassador Westmacott served in many important roles, including as ambassador to Turkey, ambassador to France, and most recently, as ambassador to the United States. His career spanned the end of the Cold War to the post-9/11 era. And as second secretary in Tehran, Ambassador Westmacott spent four years as a diplomat in Iran in the lead up to the 1979 revolution. As the Biden administration develops its strategy for U.S. foreign policy and charts a way forward in arms control and nuclear policy, it is a critical time to evaluate the importance of diplomats and the role they play in engaging on the ground with communities in key regions across the globe.
6. Report Launch | Russia in the Middle East: National Security Challenges for the United States and Israel in the Biden Era | May 5, 2021 | 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
Speakers
Major General Amos Gilead: Executive Director, Institute for Policy and Strategy
James F. Jeffrey: Chair, Middle East Program
Matthew Rojansky: Director, Kennan Institute
Udi Evental: Senior Researcher, Institute for Policy and Strategy
Ksenia Svetlova: Senior Researcher, Institute for Policy and Strategy
Michael Kimmage: Professor, Catholic University of America
Susan Glasser (mooderator): Founding Editor, Politico Magazine
As U.S.-Russian tensions continue to escalate, Russia’s role in the Middle East is of urgent concern both to Israel and the United States. Potential flashpoints include Syria and Iran, new spheres of Russian engagement from Afghanistan to North Africa, and sensitive cybersecurity issues. Russia is also moving in tandem with China to push back against U.S. dominance, including in the Middle East. Leading experts from Israel and the United States address these challenges in a new report published by the Kennan Institute and the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. In an upcoming discussion moderated by Susan Glasser, the report’s contributors will address the challenges Russia poses in the region and the decisions that policymakers in the U.S. and Israel face.
7. Transatlantic relations after President Joe Biden’s first 100 days in office | May 5, 2021 | 8:00 AM – 8:45 AM ET | European Council on Foreign Relations | Register Here
Speakers
Jeppe Kofod: Minister for Foreign Affairs, Denmark
Mark Leonard: Director, ECFR
Lykke Friis (moderator): Director, Think Tank Europa
President Joe Biden has come into office with the promise of restoring alliances and having the US reengage in global issues like climate, tax and fighting the covid-19 pandemic. At the top of the new administration’s agenda is also the approach to China. Where does this leave the EU and transatlantic relations? How central is the EU to the US and its interests in Europe?
8. The Post-Cold War Middle East: Iran, Iraq and International Politics in the 1980s | May 6, 2021 | 11:00 AM – 12:30 PM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
Speakers
Timothy Nunan: Freigeist Fellow, Center for Global History
Katelyn Tietzen: Military Historian, US Army Center for Military History
Samuel J. Hirst (moderator): Associate Director, Bilkent CRS
Barin Kayaoglu: Professor, American University of Iraq
The fourth event of the Global Middle East Seminar Series, organized in partnership with the Center for Russian Studies at Bilkent University, features Timothy Nunan and Katelyn Tietzen. They will be joined by Barin Kayaoğlu, who will act as discussant. The panelists will discuss Iranian and Iraqi foreign policies in the 1980s, and they will look beyond the Iran-Iraq War to questions about the transformation of the international politics of the Middle East in a formative decade. Among other issues, they will examine the Iranian and Iraqi pursuit of influence abroad, including through the activities of transnational actors in Lebanon and Libya. Situating Iranian and Iraqi politics in these terms highlights a moment that transcended Cold War divisions and reshaped regional politics in ways that remain significant today.
9. What’s Next for U.S.-Taiwan Economic Relations? | May 6, 2021 | 7:00 PM ET | Hoover Institute | Register Here
Speakers
Evan A. Feigenbaum: vice president for studies, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Kharis Templeman: Research Fellow, Hoover Institute
Innovation has been a source of comparative advantage for Taiwan—and an important basis for American firms, investors, and government to support Taiwan’s development while expanding mutually beneficial linkages. Yet Taiwan’s innovation advantage is eroding in the face of technological change and strategic risk. What should the next phase of U.S.-Taiwan economic cooperation look like? And how can the new U.S. administration work with Taiwan not just to build on legacy advantages, like in semiconductors, but also to invest in the emerging fields that are rapidly reshaping the future of work, industry, service delivery, and defense?
10. Fragility in Chad and counterterrorism strategies in West Africa | May 7, 2021 | 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Speakers
Kamissa Camara: Senior Visiting Expert for the Sahel, United States Institute of Peace
John Mukum Mbaku: Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development
Joseph Siegle: Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Vanda Felbab-Brown (moderator): Director, Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors
The April 20 death of the President of Chad, Idriss Déby, and the subsequent military coup have profoundly destabilized the country and other parts of West Africa. Likewise, over the past year, the security situation has deteriorated significantly in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and northern Nigeria. The region is facing many severe challenges from climate change and desertification, poverty, and inequality to poor governance, militancy, and terrorism, precipitated by a diverse set of local militants and international terrorist groups. During President Déby’s three decades of authoritarian rule, Chad came to be seen as a crucial lynchpin of counterterrorism in the region and a key ally of the United States and France. Yet President Déby’s death once again highlights the dangers of building counterterrorism strategies around authoritarian leaders and the struggle to find effective policy alternatives.
On May 7, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host a panel of experts to examine the latest developments in Chad, as well as the regional implications and deeper policy dilemmas of counterterrorism, stabilization, and good governance.
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Toward a critical C/PVE perspective
Terrorism and violent extremism represent some of Africa’s greatest security threats in 2021. Local groups with international terror links are embedded in East, West, and Southern Africa. They exacerbate local conflicts and enable organized crime rackets—destabilizing an already fragile political landscape. Meanwhile, years of government-led security force interventions, many supported by the US and European governments, have not dislodged the insurgents. On February 24, the United States Institute of Peace convened a panel in conjunction with the RESOLVE Network to discuss local approaches that incorporate tactics beyond kinetic counterterrorism. Speakers and their affiliations are listed below:
Dr. Alastair Reed (opening remarks): Senior Expert, US Institute of Peace; Executive Director, RESOLVE Network
Dr. Akinola Olojo: Senior Researcher, Lake Chad Basin Program, Institute for Security Studies
Dr. Phoebe Donnelly: Research Fellow, International Peace Institute; Member of the RESOLVE Research Advisory Council
Dr. Joseph Sany (moderator): Vice President, Africa Center, U.S. Institute of Peace
Bethany L. McGann (closing remarks): Program Officer, Program on Violent Extremism, US Institute of Peace; Research and Project Manager, RESOLVE Network
Framing Violent Extremism
All of the panelists acknowledged the importance of beginning any discussion of countering/preventing violent extremism (C/PVE) methods with an examination of the definitions that undergird these policies. Olojo stressed that counterterrorism is often a particularly problematic term. State actors, particularly in Africa, have frequently exploited the concept of counterterrorism to abuse their political power. By shifting to discussions of preventing violent extremism rather than counterterrorism, policymakers and scholars can begin to focus on risk factors, early warning mechanisms, and root causes, as opposed to security responses to violence.
In addition to the effect for high-level actors, definitions and terms matter for local actors. As Donnelly noted, women’s groups in particular have raised concerns about threats they have received due to their association with counterterrorism and counterviolent extremism programming. Moreover, Western groups frequently engage with African countries with a preconceived idea of what constitutes the most significant security threats, while ignoring contradictory information from local groups. As a result, Sany emphasized that local actors must own the framing of C/PVE programming.
The COVID-19 pandemic and violent extremism
The COVID-19 pandemic has been a significant development in the evolution of violent extremist organizations in Africa. Olojo pointed to two groups in Africa in particular: Boko Haram and al-Shabab. Since the onset of the pandemic, Boko Haram has pushed narratives that the pandemic is a punishment from God. Through these narratives, the group has sought to capitalize on the crisis to aid their recruitment strategies. In the Horn of Africa, al-Shabab established a COVID-19 prevention and treatment center. The group’s decision to form this center highlights both how the pandemic has exacerbated governance failures. Violent extremist organizations are exploiting these failures to increase their standing.
Community-oriented C/PVE
Discussions of community-oriented C/PVE methods and the role of gender dominated much of the panel’s discussion. Olojo identified four key ideas regarding the inclusion of communities in C/PVE programming. First, community voices ought to be included because they bear the brunt of violence from these groups. Second, research on communities should not simply focus on gathering data, but should also allow communities to express their views. Third, emphasis should be placed on developing a shared vision across communities, which is ultimately a prerequisite to successful dialogue. Finally, policymakers and scholars should remember that their ultimate responsibility lies with enhancing the welfare of these local communities.
Donnelly remarked on the importance of including women’s voices–and a discussion of gender more broadly–in engagements with local communities. She delineated three particularly pressing issues along these lines for Africa in 2021:
- Deep concern about the upcoming elections in Somalia and the prospects for election violence perpetrated by al-Shabab. In particular, she fears that an election crisis could sideline the activism of women.
- Frustration that PVE policy and programming has continued to fail with respect to the re-integration of women participants in violent extremist organizations. Re-integration programming to date has focused almost entirely on male participants in these organizations, despite the fact that women experience unique barriers to re-entering society.
- Societies have not reckoned with the reality of child members of these organizations. Many children were either born into these groups or have been integrated into them, and as a result many children have now been imprisoned due to their connections to Boko Haram.
To watch the event in full:
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Stevenson’s army, February 27
– Earmarks are returning. More background from CRS.
– Administration releases ODNI report on Khashoggi killing but stops short of punishing MBS.
– WSJ reports new US rules to fight China technology threat.
– Pentagon releases materials for countering extremism in the ranks.
– VP Harris more active in foreign policy.
– New push on war power rules.
– Lawfare on how new cyber director is supposed to work.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, February 23
– Spencer Ackerman says administration is reviewing drone and counter-terror operations.
– Pew says 1/4 of Democrats and GOP get their news only from partisan news bubbles.
– In week 6, you will play roles seeking policies to offset economic & technological aspects of the rise of China. Axios says the Biden people are doing the same already.
-Brookings author says Trump in effect amended the Constitution in 5 significant ways.
– Newly analyzed archives show that starting around 1907, the Army assigned black Buffalo Soldiers to West Point to teach cadets horsemanship.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The problem no one really wants to solve
Ten years after its internal conflict started, Elizabeth Thompson of American University hosted a panel on what the the Biden Administration might be able to do about Syria. Conditions there are dire. US policy has been disappointing. What can a new president do to establish a legitimate government able to rebuild? Mustafa Gurbuz, also of American University, moderated.
Hadeel Oueis of BBC Arabic reminded what has gone wrong in Syria. The Assad regime responded brutally to protests, which pushed them in the the direction of militarization and Islamicization, as militia groups and Islamists had advantages in financing and organization. Peaceful change was quickly ruled out. Today, the best prospects are in the Northeast, where the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control security and the autonomous administration governs in a decentralized way, with strong participation by women as well as checks and balances.
Amy Austin Holmes of the Council on Foreign Relations suggested we don’t know what to expect from Biden about Syria specifically, a subject neither he nor his people have addressed except for humanitarian imperatives, but if he wants to reclaim US credibility and moral authority bold steps are needed on three issues concerning vulnerable people:
- ISIS still a big problem, especially at the Al Hol camp. Washington should take back its own citizens from there for trial in the US and establish a timeline for other countries to take back theirs.
- Christians and Yezidis still under threat. Hundreds of thousands have fled the Turkish intervention in northern Syria intervention and should be enabled to return home.
- Kurds, and in particular Kurdish women, have been excluded from diplomatic talks on Syria. They play strong roles in northeastern Syria in both the SDF forces and in the civilian autonomous administration. Biden has given women important roles in his own cabinet, and it has been demonstrated repeatedly that women’s participation in peace talks leads to improved outcomes.
US forces are likely to remain in northeastern Syria to work by, with, and through the SDF, which has demonstrated significant capacity to overcome Arab/Kurdish tensions.
Dafne McCurdy of CSIS underlined that Syria will not be a top priority for Biden but that its humanitarian crisis ranks high, especially with Samantha Power at USAID. The situation is dire, but the US can have a positive impact because it is the biggest donor. It will need to focus on two priorities:
- Renewal of cross-border assistance in western Syria: The UN Security Council will vote in July on whether to keep open the one remaining authorized border crossing for aid to Idlib. If it fails to do so, the US may still be able to use nongovernmental organizations to ship aid across the border, but not at the scale that the UN is capable of.
- Reform of aid to regime-controlled areas, which Assad has used to reward supporters.
Humanitarian aid is not political, but stabilization assistance is, especially in an area of geopolitical competition. The US needs to buttress local authorities who stand up to outside meddling. But US goals have not been clear, because they are limited to one part of Syria and therefore disconnected from a nation-wide strategy. President Trump’s erratic policy did not allow stabilization to play its proper role in geopolitical competition.
Aaron Stein of the Foreign Policy Research Institute agreed that Syria is not a high priority for the Biden administration. The Syrian opposition won’t be a strong factor in its decisionmaking. The main issues will be humanitarian assistance and counter-terrorism. Washington needs to be talking with the Russians, who are in a strong position in Syria. Sanctions work to impoverish the Syrian regime, but they have been ineffective in producing a sustained political outcome. Some eventual sanctions relief in exchange for release of political prisoners is a possibility. The proliferation of arms and the large numbers of fighters will be problems for many years.
Idlib is essentially a stalemate, with Russia and the regime on one side and Turkey on the other, along with the HTS al Qaeda offshoot who are trying to soften their image. The best outcome is the status quo from the US perspective, but it leaves the US dependent on designated terrorist groups in both northwestern (HTS) and northeastern Syria (the PKK, which is the core of the SDF). The US is stuck with bad options.
Joshua Landis, University of Oklahoma, views Assad as having won militarily, as he now controls 65-70% of Syria’s territory but he wants it all. Washington wants political change and has used aid as a tool to feed the opposition as much as regime has used it against the opposition. Assad will focus in the immediate future not on Idlib, which is hard, but on northeastern Syria, because it is a soft spot. He may go after Tanf, which is important to trade links with Iraq and Iran. The Syrian people are pawns in larger geopolitical struggle
Trump used Turkey against Iran and Russia, thus limiting what Assad could do in the north. Biden is likely to be less friendly to Turkey but won’t want to undermine the Turks in Syria. Some Americans are talking about a federal Syria, with Idlib and the northeast remaining outside Damascus’ control as the US presses for regime change there. But in the end the big issues for the Americans are pulling Turkey out of Russia’s orbit and dealing with Iran. Biden might toughen on Iran in Syria because of the nuclear deal, where he will need to soften.
Bottom line: Syria is not a problem Washington will focus on, as there are no good solutions. But they are likely to keep troops there. If the Americans were to withdraw, the Kurds would be sitting ducks and would have to make a deal with Damascus. Their civilian and military organizations would crumble. At least now in the northeast there is a military command under a civilian government. In the northwest, military and Islamist forces rule under Turkish control.
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