Tag: Defense

Stevenson’s army, January 10

– The House on Thursday voted 224-194 to force the president to cease military operations against Iran within 60 days. The measure was H Con Res 83, and that’s significant in many ways. As a concurrent resolution, it would never be presented to the president for approval or veto, even if the Senate passed identical language. But it was not necessary toothless. Ever since the Chadha immigration case in 1983, lawyers have assumed that the provision in the War Powers Resolution allowing Congress to force a withdrawal of troops from combat by concurrent resolution — instead of a joint resolution that the president could veto — was inoperative. This measure would test that assumption, if approved by the Senate [which seems unlikely]. The measure also provides conditions superseding its effect: Congress hereby directs the President to terminate the use of United States Armed Forces to engage in hostilities in or against Iran or any part of its government or military, unless—

(1) Congress has declared war or enacted specific statutory authorization for such use of the Armed Forces; or

(2) such use of the Armed Forces is necessary and appropriate to defend against an imminent armed attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its Armed Forces, consistent with the requirements of the War Powers Resolution.

Both support and opposition to the measure was bipartisan

A Cornell prof has a concise piece explaining why Congress hardly ever really wants to limit warmaking presidents — they don’t want to be held accountable.

NYT reports on the debate and Senate prospects.

The Iraqi premier has called for talks with US on troop withdrawal. WaPo looks at the consequences.

Navy Times has a good piece explaining how countries without diplomatic relations — like US & Iran — communicate with each other.

On WOTR, a CSIS analyst says we misunderstand the value of China’s ocean bases.

Retired AU prof has good ideas for strengthening State Dept.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

Tags : , , , ,

Better Middle East policy

On Wednesday January 8, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) hosted an event titled The Land of Endless Wars: What Really Causes Instability in the Middle East? to showcase the recently published book co-edited by AEI Resident Scholar, Michael Rubin. The book, Seven Pillars: What Really Causes Instability in the Middle East? served as a launching point for the panel, which was comprised of three of the book’s authors and two editors: Michael Rubin, a Resident Scholar at AEI, Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and co-editor of the book, and A.Kadir Yildirim Fellow for the Middle East at the Baker Institute and chapter author.

The key takeaways from the discussion are consolidated here: 

Reform Islam

Katulis, while noting the multiplicity of factors involved in ISIS’s rise to power, specifically credited its ability to exploit and act upon the failed responsiveness of local governance. Many of the seeds of instability were the result of local government’s failure to respond effectively to and engage with its people. All three panelists agreed that ISIS exploited religion to leverage and gain power, rather than focusing on the particularities of faith. Yildirim noted that the rise of religious-backed regimes was a result of the failure of secular ideologies, particularly their failure to deliver on promises. This failure, Yildirim claims, led to the rise of Islamist, Salafists, and other radical religious groups. 

Yildirim underlined that Islam is not by nature different than other religions in terms of its ability to act as a stabilizing or disruptive force. The panelists largely agreed in their overall response to the moderator’s question regarding whether or not Islam needs reforming. While their individual interpretations and explanations varied, each agreed that reform is needed. 

Katulis alluded to a more hands-off approach, stating that the United States should not play a substantive role in initiating reform. On the other hand, Rubin insinuated that the United States should help shine the international spotlight on different Muslim schools of thought. He used the example of Saudi Arabia as an Islamic thought producer that consistently receives more international attention than Moroccan schools of  thought. Yildirim posited that there is a still a clash between modernity and Islam; many of the deep-seated issues with Islam are a result of this relationship. No panelist provided a clear, descriptive answer as to how best to ignite reform or what reform really consists of. 

Revitalize diplomacy

The discussion around the role of diplomacy commenced with Rubin’s remark about the continual ripple effect of Benghazi and its aftermath. Rubin highlighted that one of the fallouts from Benghazi was that diplomats are more isolated. Katulis concurred and further emphasized that diplomats should be engaging with the public sphere as a method of completing one of their essential duties: identifying local social trends and sentiments. Instead of American diplomats engaging on the local level and establishing human connections and trust, it appears that the US government is focusing on military moves. This generates mutually reinforcing cycles of violence and mistrust.

Raising Voices, Not Forces

The panel touched upon the historic role of the United States military in the region, which led to the discussion of more recent interventions and if they are worthwhile. The moderator cited the expense of trillions of US dollars spent only to have more coups and unrest in the region. Katulis warned against the promotion of war, as wars increase the hardline interpretation of religion, allowing the cycles to feed off each other. 

In connection with the aforementioned discussion of reforming islam, Rubin and Katulius emphasized that the US should help provide local safe spaces for reform and debate to take place in. In addition, the US should internationally condemn the imprisonment and execution of reformists who are vilified in these ‘safe spaces’ by oppressive regimes. The US should be mobilizing governments through outrage, rather than through military power.

Yildirim agreed, but added the caveat that these ‘safe spaces’ and the way in which they are created are important because of the constant anti-Western interventionist trope. In response to Yildirim’s caution against undermining the local government, Rubin countered that at some point you are damned if you do and damned if you don’t, thereby suggesting military use might be necessary at times despite it not being an ideal solution.

Tags : , ,

Stevenson’s army, January 7

– More US troops are being sent to the Middle East, but they’re not allowed to have cellphones.
– Just in case, US is preparing sanctions against Iraq.
– Mike Pompeo, who says for sure he’s not running for the Senate, is now viewed as shadow secretary of defense.
NSA O’Brien gets touted as especially close to Trump now.
-Another risk analysis firm has a good list of 2020 issues.
Travel to Israel tops congressional visits.
– Evan Osnos has long piece on US-China relations.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

Tags : , , , , ,

Stevenson’s army, January 6

-WaPo says SecState Pompeo has been pushing for months to escalate against Iran and kill Suleimani.
-SecDef Esper drastically limited group involved in Suleimani planning.
– US military has halted counter-ISIS operations.
– Speaker Pelsoi says House will vote on war powers measure on Iran similar to one offered by Sen. Tim Kaine [D-Va].
– Iran has announced end of compliance with Iran nuclear deal but will allow IAEA inspections to continue.
Maduro seized control of national assembly by blocking entry of pro-Guaido members.
– Yahoo News has long story on intelligence community’s problems protecting its spies in a digital age.
– WaPo’s media columnist, Margaret Sullivan, has suggestions for those not already in the far-right echo chamber to follow what matters there. Among other sites she recommends The RIghting and RightRichter.  Surf away.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

Tags : , , , , ,

Stevenson’s army, January 3

Columbia Journalism Review has a good collection of commentary on the US assassination of General Suleimani,which I’ll paste below.
Two other points: It’s fortunate that the US military blocked VIP travel to Iraq and Syria starting Dec 16 and supposedly lasting until Jan 15. I’ll be surprised if they allow it any time soon.
Even Turkey delayed sending its troops to Libya until the parliament had authorized it.

In addition to the items linked to below, see this by Heather Hurlburt and  this by Dan Byman.


The killing of Qassem Suleimani and the road to war with Iran
By Jon Allsop

In the early hours of the morning, local time, state media in Iraq reported that Qassem Suleimani, Iran’s top security and intelligence official, had been killed in a drone strike at Baghdad’s international airport, along with figures tied to Iran-backed Iraqi militias. In the United States, where it was Thursday night, the news quickly spread, albeit with key details missing; cable news shows and one broadcast network, CBS, cut into their programming with portentous reports that something serious had happened. An hour or so later, the US government confirmed that its military had killed Suleimani at the direction of the president. Trump remained strangely quiet, though he did tweet a picture of an American flag. In response, Iranian officials tweeted their country’s flag, and threats of revenge. Such is the road to war in 2020.

Some context: Suleimani was greatly influential in Iran and widely revered by his countrymen. As head of the Quds Force, an elite unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, he was responsible for Iran’s prodigious maneuvering throughout the Middle East. According to a former operative of the Central Intelligence Agency who spoke to Dexter Filkins in 2013 for The New Yorker, “Suleimani is the single most powerful operative in the Middle East.” In recent years, Suleimani was influential in buttressing the regime of Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian dictator, and other efforts that cost lives—including those of US troops—in countries from Iraq to Lebanon. According to the New York Times, Trump’s plan to kill Suleimani was initiated last week, after the administration accused an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia of killing an American contractor in an attack on an Iraqi military base. The militia denied involvement; the US bombed some of the militia’s bases anyway. Afterward, when militia members sieged the US embassy in Baghdad (staffers were trapped inside; none were hurt), American officials blamed Suleimani for being the instigator. 

Presidents Obama and Bush never took shots to kill Suleimani, fearing war with Iran. Trump went ahead and did it. Does that mean we’re now at war with Iran? Experts’ initial reactions, it seems, have fallen on a spectrum—from let’s keep things in perspective to war is now inevitable to we’re already there. (In The Atlantic, Andrew Exum, who served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East policy under Obama, wrote that the killing of Suleimani “doesn’t mean war, it will not lead to war, and it doesn’t risk war. None of that. It is war.”) Two points of consensus emerged: that we are in uncharted territory and that whatever happens next will not be good. “No ‘hot take’ makes any sense now,” Rasha Al Aqeedi of Irfaa Sawtak, a site associated with the US-funded Middle East Broadcasting Networks, wrote. “None of us who work on Iraq closely ever anticipated a scenario without him.”

Nevertheless, hot takes abounded—on Twitter, where everybody suddenly seemed to be an expert on Iran, and in the news. (In particular, a CNBC piece—“America just took out the world’s no. 1 bad guy”—took a lot of heatonline.) Cable shows invited guests with close ties to the military-industrial complex: Fox News hosted Bush stalwarts Karl Rove and Ari Fleischer; MSNBC interviewed Brett McGurk, a diplomat involved in Iraq policy during the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations; CNN had on Max Boot, a Washington Post columnist who was a vocal proponent of the Iraq war. For many progressive commentators, it was all a bit too 2003 for comfort. “Cable news is hard-wired to support war,” Carlos Maza, formerly of Vox, tweeted. “It relies heavily on ex-military, ex-national security people for commentary, and routinely marginalizes anti-war voices.”

Much has changed since the early 2000s, including Boot’s perspective. He has recanted his support for the Iraq war and warned that war with Iran would be worse. Still, as I wrote last year amid escalating tensions between the US and Iran, much mainstream coverage of the countries’ relationship has been too quick to paint Iran as the menacing, unilateral aggressor, and has parroted US government talking points without applying due skepticism. 

Last night, as reporters scrambled to fill in the details of Suleimani’s killing, news outlets turned repeatedly to press releases, including the Pentagon’s assurance that the strike on Suleimani “was aimed at deterring future attack plans.” As the Post’s Josh Rogin tweeted, “By the Pentagon’s own logic, if Iran retaliates, the strike mission failed its key goal. Remember that.” That’s sound advice. Already, Iran is promising “harsh retaliation.”

Tags : , , , , ,

New year, old problems

US sending nearly 5K more troops to Middle East.
– David Sanger assesses Trump’s problems with Iran and North Korea.
Kim warns of new tests.
– Marc Lynch foresees more problems in Middle East.

Cyber developments affecting the battlefield.
-Congress wants more civilian power in Pentagon.
– Bruce Jentleson wants more attention to history in US foreign policy.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

Tags : , , , , ,
Tweet