Tag: Democracy and Rule of Law
Impunity spawns carelessness, the time for accountability is nigh
Donald Trump and his minions are shocked. New York State has indicted the Trump Organization for tax fraud. A Federal grand jury has indicted about 500 of the people who stormed The Capitol on Trump’s instructions January 6. There is now a real possibility that they and their leader will be held accountable for their criminal behavior. How did this happen?
The January 6 rioters have mostly indicted themselves. Their own cell phone videos and social media communications will constitute a lot of the evidence presented at trial. They felt they were immune from prosecution. After all, they were following the President’s instructions and defending their version of democracy, in which the votes of black people and immigrants don’t count. Some thought they were entitled to arrest members of Congress for certifying the electoral votes of the 50 states. Such “citizens arrests” are legal in DC during commission of a felony, though it is not clear to me that applies on The Capitol grounds. I’d be astonished if it were permitted for members of Congress. Only people intoxicated with the impunity that white privilege bestows could imagine they would get away with it.
The Trump Organization is similar. It apparently kept detailed records of the off-the-books perqs with which it compensated selected employees, who didn’t pay taxes on the implicit income. New York State alleges they got away with it for 15 years, but I imagine it is closer to 50. This is just the tip of the iceberg. The prosecutors have filed these charges in part to turn the CFO of the organzation into a cooperating witness. If ever they succeed, there will be far more tax fraud revealed. Even without that, Trump’s gaming of the value of his properties–high for the banks when seeking a loan but low for the tax authorities–is sure to get the company, if not Trump himself, into big trouble. The impunity white privilege bestows is beginning to evaporate.
It will not be hard to show that Donald Trump approved the tax returns of the Trump Organization, just as it is easy to show that he approved and even encouraged the storming of The Capitol on January 6. But showing that he intended to commit tax fraud and intended the demonstration to turn violent will be harder. Trump has always avoided written communications. His style is that of organized crime groups: everything is done orally, and often implicitly rather than explicitly. Trump did not explicitly tell the rioters to be violent, only to “stop the steal.” He also stood by and watched on TV while they entered and trashed The Capitol, but that only implies intent.
Still there will be consequences for Trump personally. What bank would be interested in renewing his loans, hundreds of millions of which are coming due soon? Who would want his name attached to their property? The value of much of his own real estate has likely declined during the epidemic and may not recover for years. He can of course use bankruptcy as a shelter, but this time around it may be his personal bankruptcy rather than his all too often used corporate bankruptcy. This man is in financial trouble.
Trump’s supporters remain fervent, but there is growing evidence they are a fraction of the Republican Party. A declining percentage of Americans is identifying as Republican or independents leaning Republican. Trump has still managed to hold on to his leadership in the Party, largely by raising a lot of money and threatening those who don’t toe his line with primary competition. But the Democrats are also raising a lot of money and winning primaries doesn’t necessarily get you a seat in Congress. The Democrats have only a thin majority in both Houses right now, and it will not be easy to expand it. But Trump’s strength in the Republican Party will help them with independents and disenchanged Republicans.
The best hope of the Republicans is to limit the number of people, especially the poor and minorities, who can vote. They are pursuing that objective brazenly, and with support from the Republican majority on the Supreme Court, by imposing restrictions on voting in the states they control. That works because of the over-representation of those states in the Senate and in the Electoral College. This strategy too is careless, as success requires that people don’t react by coming out in even greater numbers to vote. They appear to have done that in the 2020 election.
This is where the Democrats need to find a solution, by reducing barriers to voting and the gerrymandering of Congressional districts, as well as admitting at least two new states to the Union. The Douglas Commonwealth (aka DC) and Puerto Rico as states would help to offset the gross inequity of representation in Congress, where the Democratic Senators represent tens of millions more people than the Republican Senators and House seats are engineered by state legislatures to favor Republican candidates.
2022 will be a crucial year for Trump, his organization, and his supporters. If they are all held accountable and the Democrats retain control of the Congress, accountability really will be night.
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Radicalization thrives as French Muslims lack a coherent identity
The position of French Muslims has become increasingly controversial. The experience of several terrorist attacks and the proliferation of Salafism met a government response. A new “Islamist separatism” bill, which would further expand separation of church and state, is currently being passed through the French parliament. It would prohibit any civil servant or contractor for the public sector from wearing religious symbols. Although the bill does not explicitly mention Islam as such, many fear that it could unfairly target and further alienate Muslims in France.
The Wilson Center June 16 held a seminar on the position of French Muslims in the French state. The panel agreed that the current bill is an attempt by President Macron to appeal to right-wing voters. He faces reelection in 2022. Extreme right-wing candidate Marine Le Pen is polling well. France’s “Muslim Question” emerged from the political tradition of laïcité, which enforces strict separation of church and state, and decades of marginalization and exclusion of French Muslims. If French society doesn’t find better ways to engage this community, radicalization will continue. Nonetheless, the panel conceded that internal discussions in the Muslim community to find alternative Islamic narratives are also needed.
The speakers were:
Amel Boubekeur
Sociologist
EHESS (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales)
Steven Philip Kramer
Global Fellow
Wilson Center
Professor of National Security Studies
Eisenhower School, National Defense University
Hakim El Karoui
Senior Fellow
Institut Montaigne
Senior Partner & Paris Office Head
Brunswick
William Drozdiak (moderator)
Global Fellow
Wilson Center
Author of “The Last President of Europe: Emmanuel Macron’s Race to Revive France and Save the World”
A history of laïcité
Drozdiak introduced the tradition of ‘laïcité’ (secularism) in French politics. He mentioned that it is central to French political life, as it is enshrined in the first article of the constitution since 1905. It is more far-reaching than the separation of church and state in most democracies, and essentially relegates religious affiliation to the private sphere. Today it is a controversial topic. To some it is the glue that allows the French to live together despite their religious differences, but to others it has become an anti-religious tool used to discriminate against Muslims in France. El Karoui further nuanced this controversy. To him there are three visions of laïcité:
- Laïcité as an essentially legal term: the separation of church and state, a core democratic right.
- Laïcité as a historical battle between the Catholic church and the state that some think is being waged today between Islam and the state.
- Laïcité as a tenet of the Enlightenment. Here the discussion is cast in terms of reason as opposed to religion. The protection of the rational political process requires the exclusion of religious considerations.
Failed integration of Muslims in France
Muslims today often feel disconnected from the French state and society. Kramer outlined five historical reasons for this based on his forthcoming book:
- The shadow of colonialism and harsh decolonization processes scarred and uprooted huge populations of Muslims in the 20th century. Around a million Muslims left for France from Algeria alone. The atrocities of colonialism left deep impressions on these migrants.
- The historical timing of Muslim migration to France also affected their integration. The major wave of immigration came during the industrializing boom after World War II. Muslim men migrated to France to work and eventually brought their families. After this initial boom, however, the economy slowed down and began to deindustrialize, leaving many Muslims unemployed and marginalized.
- French urban policy also pushed Muslims to the fringes. During the boom period, massive social housing projects were set-up on the peripheries of cities. Many French natives left these areas when mortgages became more easily attainable in the 1970s, leaving behind Muslim ghettos in the ‘banlieues’.
- Kramer sees laïcité as part of the issue as well. He believes that opposition to public religiosity has turned anti-religious ideas against Muslims in particular. This is worsened by the Rassemblement National party, which was founded by returning white settlers from North Africa and has always held anti-Islamic sentiments.
- Most recently, the impact of Islamic terrorism on the Western world and in France has led to a mutual cycle of distrust and alienation between French society and its Muslim members. This has also pushed politicians such as Macron into security-based thinking surrounding Islam to counter the political rise of his main rival, Marine Le Pen.
The position of Muslims today and the new law
Boubekeur and El Karoui then spoke on the current issues the Muslim community in France faces. Boubekeur believes that the way the French state engages with Muslim communities has been entirely unsuccessful. It focuses on using appointed representatives of the Muslim community to speak for Muslims. However, this treats French Muslims as believers, rather than citizens. Furthermore, these representatives (often foreign Imams) lack local legitimacy. Their inability to address Islamophobia in France has left young Muslims disillusioned with their leadership.
Further adding to Muslims’ alienation is the fact that the state’s relationship to them has always been led by political agenda:
- In the 1970s, this meant Islam was seen as an immigration issue (not French, but migrants);
- In the 1980s and 90s it was seen as a banlieue issue;
- In the 2000s it has become securitized and linked to threats of radicalization and terrorism.
El Karoui identified three main issues among the current Islamic community in France:
- There is now a real Muslim middle class (10% hold a Master’s degree or higher, 1/3 a Bachelor’s) but there remains an undereducation problem among Muslims.
- A portion of young Muslims are looking for an identity. They don’t feel fully French, but also don’t feel Algerian, Tunisian, etc. They have increasingly started to identify primarily as Muslims, and some have made a very conservative interpretation of Islam their identity.
- Other Muslims feel that there are no adequate representatives for them in society. They are not tied to foreign states, nor do they identify as Muslims (i.e. they don’t want the Islamic community leaders to represent them). If this group cannot be represented and engaged, Islamism will continue to be an issue and the far right will continue to abuse it.
New ways to engage Muslims and new narratives to counter radicalization
The panel offered some solutions. Boubekeur focused on the ways in which the French state interacts with Muslims. El Karoui emphasized the need for new, authentic, Islamic counternarratives.
Boubekeur said the state has two options:
- Let Muslims engage in discussions with the French state as citizens (whomight have certain special needs, e.g. their desire to wear the veil in public spaces) or;
- Stick to a neutral, secular state, and let French Muslims express themselves without the weight of being associated with terrorists. Also allow them to organize themselves better, which is now frustrated in the name of countering Islamist networks.
According to El Karoui, the current proliferation of Salafist and Islamist ideologies can only be solved if Muslims find their own solutions in the struggle between Salafism, Islamism, and faith. The solution is in their hands. Muslims need to create symbols against Salafism and alternative narratives of Islam that appeal to young people.
Watch the recording of the event here:
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Peace Picks | June 21-25, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- World refugee day: Stories of resilient women | June 21, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
The Atlantic Council hosts a powerful conversation with refugee – and former refugee – women from around the globe as they share their stories of hope and triumph after surviving unforgettable hardship. These are stories of true resilience.
Speakers:
Adrienne Arsht (opening remarks)
Executive Vice Chair, Atlantic Council; Founder, Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center and Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council
Reena Ninan (moderator)
Journalist and International Correspondent
Suzana Vuk
Account Executive, Zoom Video Communications
Priyali Sur
Founder & Managing Director, The Azadi Project
José Felix Rodriguez
Regional Coordinator of Migration, Social Inclusion and Non-Violence (Americas Region), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Lilia
Interviewed by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Sedighe
Interviewed by the Azadi Project
Masouma
Interviewed by the Azadi Project
Rebecca Scheurer (closing remarks)
Director, Humanitarian Initiatives, Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center, Atlantic Council
2. What Iran’s election results portend | June 21, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Following the June 18 presidential elections in Iran, a panel of experts discuss the political landscape and the ballot’s regional and international implications. The Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative invites you to a discussion of the implications of the election results for US-Iran relations, the 2015 nuclear deal, and Iran’s regional and domestic politics, including the succession to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Speakers:
Borzou Daragahi
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Fatemeh Haghighatjoo
Director, Nonviolent Initiative for Democracy
Azadeh Zamirirad
Iran Researcher and Deputy Head of the Africa and Middle East Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs
Sadegh Zibakalam
Author and Professor, University of Tehran
Barbara Slavin (moderator)
Director, Future of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
3. Prioritizing clean energy investments in emerging and developing economies | June 21, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Around the world, developing markets are facing a daunting challenge: how to strengthen their economies to improve the lives and livelihoods of citizens while not relying on high-carbon avenues for growth which have been deployed for generations. In many ways, the future of climate action relies on the decisions made in these emerging markets, and additional fiscal pressure brought about by the pandemic has made investing in necessary energy transformations to create sustainable, long-term growth even more difficult. A new report from the International Energy Agency (IEA), in collaboration with the World Bank and the World Economic Forum, outlines a plan for mobilizing and prioritizing clean energy investments in these economies.
The Brookings Initiative on Climate Research and Action will convene an event to discuss the new IEA report, “Financing clean energy transitions in emerging and developing economies” and the obstacles to mobilizing and deploying finance for clean energy transitions.
Speakers:
David G. Victor (introduction)
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Energy Security and Climate Initiative, Brookings Institution
Fatih Birol (keynote)
Executive Director, International Energy Agency
Michael Waldron (paper presentation)
Head of the Energy Investment Unit, International Energy Agency
David Dollar
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Global Economy and Development, John L. Thornton China Center, Brookings Institution
Samantha Gross
Director, Energy Security and Climate Initiative; Fellow, Foreign Policy, Energy Security and Climate Initiative, Brookings Institution
Rachel Kyte
Dean, The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Steven M. Rothstein
Managing Director, Ceres Accelerator for Sustainable Capital Market
4. Terrorist Attacks, Cultural Incidents And The Vote For Radical Parties: Analyzing Text From Twitter | June 22, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Hoover Institution, Stanford University | Register Here
The Hoover Institution announces a new seminar series on Using Text as Data in Policy Analysis. These seminars will feature applications of natural language processing, structured human readings, and machine learning methods to text as data to examine policy issues in economics, history, national security, political science, and other fields. This third session features a conversation with Francesco Giavazzi speaking on Terrorist Attacks, Cultural Incidents and the Vote for Radical Parties: Analyzing Text from Twitter.
Speakers:
Francesco Giavazzi
Professor of Economics, Bocconi University; Research Fellow, Centre for Economic Policy Research; Research Associate, NBER
5. Views From the Ground: Perceptions of Domestic Conditions in MENA | June 22, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
The Middle East Institute (MEI) holds the third event in a four-part series in cooperation with Arab Barometer, on the occasion of the publication of Arab Barometer’s findings from the sixth wave of its surveys. The third panel will bring together experts from the US and Middle East alongside Abdul-Wahab Kayyali, senior research specialist with the Arab Barometer, to discuss the findings relevant to domestic conditions in the region. What have been the views of governments throughout the pandemic and ongoing crises? How are the economic conditions, and in what ways has the change of global work conditions impacted regional populations? What are the perceptions of civil liberty and freedoms?
Speakers:
Abdul-Wahab Kayyali
Senior Research Specialist, Arab Barometer
Sahar Khamis
Non-Resident Scholar, MEI
Saloua Zerhouni
President, Rabat Institute for Social Science
Ibrahim al-Assil (moderator)
Senior Fellow, MEI
6. Iran’s Pivotal Presidential Election | June 22, 2021 | 10:30 AM ET | Wilson Center and United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
The election on June 18 could mark the most important political transition in Iran for more than 30 years since the new president is likely to be in power when the next supreme leader is selected. Most Iranians—and now the majority of voters—were born after the 1979 revolution. One of the looming questions is how many will vote—and what will turnout say about public support for the regime.
The election intersects with critical negotiations between Iran and the world’s six major powers over the future of the JCPOA nuclear deal. Iran’s next president will set policy for years to come on foreign relations, including talks with the outside world on its nuclear and missile programs as well as on domestic affairs and the economy, which have been stifled by economic sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic.
This expert panel will discuss the election results and the implications for Iran, the Middle East, and the United States. How will the new president fare with the Biden administration?
Speakers:
Robin Wright
Distinguished Fellow, USIP-Wilson Center; Author and Columnist, The New York Times
Suzanne Maloney
Interim Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution; Senior Fellow, Brookings Center for Middle East Policy
Ali Vaez
Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
James F. Jeffrey (moderator)
Chair of the Middle East Program, Wilson Center; Former Ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, US State Department
7. Re-Seeding Culture: Syrian Artists in Berlin | June 23, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
The Middle East Institute’s Arts and Culture Center in collaboration with the Goethe-Institut Washington host a conversation about the development and influence of a thriving Syrian creative community in Berlin over the past decade with a panel of members of this community.
How did Berlin emerge as a new hub of Syrian arts and culture in diaspora? What challenges did Syrian artists face? How did they adapt and engage with this new artistic landscape? And what sort of influence has this exchange of cultures had on Berlin’s artistic community and cultural institutions?
Speakers:
Khaled Barakeh
Contemporary Artist
Kinan Hmeidan
Actor
Diana El-Jeiroudi
Filmmaker & Producer
Malu Halasa (moderator)
Writer
8. Advancing the role of women in Sudan’s transition | May 23, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Chatham House | Register Here
The contribution of women to Sudan’s transition is crucial to ensuring long-term peace, stability and development. In March 2020, the transitional government adopted its National Action Plan on women, peace and security, in line with UN Resolution 1325 which reaffirms the important role of women in peace and security efforts. Earlier this year, the cabinet also announced its priority to empower women in public affairs yet implementation of these commitments remains slow
At this event, panellists reflect on the role of women in the implementation of peace in Sudan and discuss how to increase the participation of women in political roles and other fields. They also examine outstanding priorities for legal reform, the impact of gender-based discrimination and the need for action to secure the rights and safety of women in the country.
Speakers:
Samia El Hashmi
Co-Founder and Chairwomen, Mutawinat Benevolent Company
Samia Nihar
Head, Gender Unit, Development Studies and Research Center, University of Khartoum
Manara Asad Begira Arbab
International Cooperation and Public Relations Officer, Sudan Youth Organization for Climate Change
Yousra Elbagir (moderator)
Freelance Journalist and Writer
9. A Conversation with Iraq’s Planning and Migration Ministers | June 23, 2021 | 10:30 AM ET | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
Join USIP for a discussion with Iraq’s Minister of Planning Khalid Najim and Minister of Migration and Displacement Evan Jabro on the current situation and challenges to stabilization, reconstruction and reform efforts in Iraq. The discussion will also shed light on the status of Iraq’s displaced communities and recent returnees — including ethnic and religious minorities and those at al-Hol camp — as well as the Iraqi government’s plans for the future.
Speakers:
Michael Yaffe (opening remarks)
Vice President, Middle East and North Africa, U.S. Institute of Peace
Minister Khalid Batal Najm
Minister of Planning, Republic of Iraq
Minister Evan Faeq Jabro
Minister of Migration and Displacement, Republic of Iraq
Sarhang Hamasaeed (moderator)
Director, Middle East Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace
10. Book Discussion | Transforming Our World: President George H.W. Bush and American Foreign Policy | June 24, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
From the fall of the Soviet Union to the Gulf War, the presidency of George H. W. Bush dealt with foreign policy challenges that would cement the post-Cold War order for a generation. Transforming Our World: President George H.W. Bush and American Foreign Policy offers readers a unique perspective on international events in the Bush administration — in the words of distinguished U.S. foreign policy insiders who helped shape them. They shed new light on and analyze President Bush’s role in world events during this historic period, his style of diplomacy, the organization and functioning of his foreign policy team, the consequences of his decisions, and his leadership skills.
Speakers:
Andrew H. Card Jr.
Author, Transforming Our World; Former White House Chief of Staff; Former Chair, National Endowment for Democracy
Andrew S. Natsios
Author, Transforming Our World; Director, Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University
Ambassador Mark Green (moderator)
President, Director, & CEO, Wilson Center
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Russians love their tsars, until they don’t
Russian President Putin is all about power: getting it, exercising it, holding on to it. He also knows when he meets it.
That is what happened with President Biden in Geneva today. Unlike his predecessor, Biden was clear and forceful about Russia’s malfeasance, both internationally (especially the invasion of Ukraine) and internally (especially the jailing of Alexei Navalny and restrictions on the press). The result was a relatively productive confrontation leading to future meetings on strategic weapons, cybersecurity, and prisoner exchanges. Putin did his usual “what about malfeasance in the US” for the TV cameras to broadcast back home, and he got the formal respect he always seeks and responded in kind. But this meeting was a win for Biden: the contrast with President Trump’s embarrassing performance in Helsinki is striking. Trump got nothing. Biden got Russia into conversations the US favors.
Biden claims persistently that personally knowing other world leaders is vital to foreign policy. But his description of his own side of conversations often contrast dramatically with this notion. He is all about convincing other leaders to think about their own country’s interests, not about their personal relations with him. He denies being “friendly” with Xi Jinping, only claiming to know him well. He has consistently downplayed his own remark about Putin being a killer and ignores Putin’s support for Trump. Biden wants the relationship to be about the interests of the two states, not the two leaders. Instead of flattery, he warns that Russian malfeasance could end hopes for foreign investment, in particular if Navalny were to die in prison. He tries, not always successfully, to cast what he wants in terms his adversary might be able to accept. Putin couldn’t care less that blocking cross-border humanitarian aid to rebel-held territory in Syria will cause humanitarian problems.
But Putin did not come to this meeting his usual braggart self. Russia’s economy is in bad shape, he is unpopular after so many years in power, and China is rapidly becoming the superpower he would like Russia to be. Moscow is bogged down in Syria and losing in Libya. Putin needs a better relationship with the US at least as much as Biden needs what he terms a more “stable and predictable” relationship with Russia. Putin also needs the US not to reciprocate interference in the 2016 and 2020 American elections with Washington interference in his re-election effort in 2024. Closing down a few cyberhackers and allowing some independent media might be a reasonable way to try to prevent that. Nor is Putin any more anxious than Biden to spend billions more on strategic nuclear weapons. If they can agree to stand down and focus on getting China to do likewise, Putin won’t be unhappy.
No one should expect a sea change in Putin’s behavior. He is a murderer, as Biden once said, and won’t hesitate to do it again if he thinks it will serve his interests and he can get away with it. Putin is Putin, not Yeltsin. The US should think less about Putin and more about what comes next. As one Muscovite put it to me, Russians love their Czars, until they don’t.
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Nationalism is rising, but sectarianism won’t fade quickly
The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) June 9 organized a discussion on issues of nationalism and sectarianism in the Middle East. The Sectarianism, Proxies & De-sectarianization project (SEPAD) co-organized; its director Simon Mabon joined the panel as an expert on Saudi Arabia. Together with two experts on Lebanon and Iraq, respectively, he assessed the state of sectarianism and nationalist projects in these three countries. Iraq and Lebanon are experiencing grassroots protest movements to overcome sectarianism while Saudi Arabia is seeing a major top-down drive through the Vision 2030 project spearheaded by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). Should these be understood as attempts to let national identity overcome sectarianism in politics? If so, can we expect them to be successful? The panel agreed that these issues are unlikely to be solved quickly or by MbS’s preferred economic means, but a clear shift in political thinking is occurring in the younger generations.
The speakers were:
Geneive Abdo
Visiting Fellow
AGSIW
Simon Mabon
Chair in International Politics
Lancaster University
Director
Richardson Institute
Director
SEPAD
Maha Yahya
Director
Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
Kristin Smith Diwan (moderator)
Senior Resident Scholar
AGSIW
Two protest movements and one grand vision
As Simon Mabon explained, SEPAD analyzes the events in the modern Middle East and tests the theory that secularist national identities are replacing sectarian political identities. The focus for his talk lay on the three countries Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. As Abdo and Yahya indicated, Lebanon and Iraq are experiencing major protest movements that attack the corruption, lack of accountability, and cronyism in their countries. Both have democratic systems that reserve political positions and parliamentary representation to specific sectarian groups. In practice, as Yahya said, this “turned the relationship between individuals and their state into one that is mediated by sectarian community.” The political system has become a way to divide the cake among power brokers, who in Lebanon are referred to as ‘mafia’.
The protest movements in both of these countries self-identify as secular. As Abdo underlined, Iraqi protesters are overwhelmingly Shia and use Shia religious symbolism (such as references to the martyrdom of Shia Imam Hussein) in their demonstrations. Moreover, the Shia clergy in Iraq openly supports and collaborates with the protest movement. In this younger generation there is a clear division between personal religious identity and political identity. It is in the latter that desectarianization has occurred. Furthermore, the protesters emphasize that their agenda is issue-based.
Maha Yahya noted that Lebanon differs. The current protests go beyond clear-cut issues (such as the Whatsapp-tax that triggered the current protest movement) and aim at a complete overhaul of the sectarian political system. The individual controversies and issues that abound in Lebanese politics are seen as symptoms of a broken regime.
The situation in Saudi Arabia might appear unrelated. The Arab Spring saw some demonstrations in the Shia East of the country, but nothing on the scale of the other two countries discussed here. MBS is seeking to transform and modernize his country under his ambitious ‘Vision 2030’ project. Funded by billions of petrodollars, MBS wants to wean Saudi Arabia off its reliance on oil and modernize its economy. His vision includes relaxation of the strict religious laws for economic and political purposes. MBS hopes to transform Saudi citizenship to a secularist, civic nationalism in which both Sunni Wahhabi and Shia groups participate. According to Mabon, the ambitious pace and huge investments that go along with this show that MBS believes he has a ‘magic switch’ that can achieve this transformation of identities.
Sectarianism won’t go away easily
The panel agreed it would be naïve to think that deep-seated sectarian social and political systems will go away quickly. Vision 2030 aims to remove sectarian divisions by offering everyone a seat at the economic table, and therefore a stake in the state. The systems of marginalization and othering cannot be undone with a ‘magic switch’ and some ‘bread and games’, and centuries of repression cannot so easily be erased. Investing hundreds of millions into shopping malls in Shia areas could be seen as tokenism and introduces new issues of gentrification and marginalization along class lines. Nonetheless, a less cynical view could see these as the first steps towards change according to Mabon.
In Lebanon and Iraq, a major obstacle is the lack of unity within the protest movements. Groups and proto-parties are forming, aiming for Iraqi elections planned for October and Lebanese parliamentary elections to come in 2022. However, the grassroots movements have not yet coalesced into clear protest parties. Yahya and Abdo agreed that in both Lebanon and Iraq the political system discourages new parties, and the existing political establishment is unlikely to disappear in one electoral cycle. Yahya is cautiously optimistic in the medium term about the grassroots developments in Lebanon. Abdo indicated that Iraqi proto-parties are also emerging and receiving donations. However, there is a serious debate on whether the protesters should boycott the elections or try to get as many seats as possible. Iraq’s 2018 elections had an official turnout of 44%, although the real number is estimated to have been as low as 20%, meaning that turnout is already a critical issue for the established elite’s legitimacy. Moderator Diwan pointed out that boycotts in the region (such as in Bahrain or Kuwait) haven’t generally been a successful way to challenge entrenched elites.
Watch the recording of the event here:
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NATO 2030: focus on cyber, Russia, and China
On June 4, the German Council on Foreign Relations together with the Brookings Institution hosted NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg for a keynote address on NATO in 2030. This address was held ahcommead of the NATO summit in Brussels on June 14, when a new policy paper will be published. The Secretary General provided an overview of NATO’s key challenges and opportunities, emphasizing. He emphasized NATO’s achievements and ambitions in the field of cyber security, as well as the new focus on China as a global competitor. In the Q&A, he acknowledged the differences between certain NATO allies on democracy and human rights, but stressed the alliance’s strength in finding common ground.
The speakers were:
John R. Allen (opening remarks)
President
Brookings Institution
Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook (introduction)
Designated Director and CEO
German Council on Foreign Relations
Constanze Stelzenmüller (moderator)
Fritz Stern Chair, Center on the United States and Europe
Brookings Institution
Jens Stoltenberg (keynote)
Secretary-general
NATO
The keynote: achievements, challenges, ambitions
Secretary General Stoltenberg acknowledged the challenges facing NATO today. While the Alliance leaving Afghanistan, its longest mission ever, it faces authoritarian threats from Russia and China. Russia threatens the Arctic Circle and perpetrates cyber attacks. China’s rise is obvious to all. It will soon be largest economy and already has the second largest military. Beijing doesn’t necessarily see NATO as an enemy. Cooperation on issues such as arms control or climate change is possible. Nonetheless, Beijing’s rise poses a challenge as it does not share NATO’s values of democracy, rule of law, and individual liberty. None of NATO’s members can face these challenges alone, but Stoltenberg declared “the countries of Europe and North America are not alone. We stand together.”
He then proceeded to outline the key areas NATO will focus on in the next decade in nine points:
- NATO is the key theater in which to tackle transatlantic challenges such as Syria and Iran. Even if NATO does not intervene directly, its members still coordinate on such issues. After all, “NATO is not just a military alliance, but a political-military alliance.” It therefore has to resolve its differences and enhance cooperation.
- NATO will boost its collective response to threats and invest in modernizing and expanding its capacities.
- NATO members must strengthen their domestic resilience against outside interference. “Strong societies are our first line of defense.”
- Transatlantic innovation must be given a boost as well. NATO’s technological edge should be sharpened and gaps between allies need to be prevented. For this purpose, the Alliance will establish a Transatlantic Defense Accelerator in which members will cooperate in innovation.
- NATO will play its part in upholding the rules-based international order and speak with one voice to defend its values and interests. This means encouraging others to play by the rules; upholding freedom of navigation, as well as a safe and secure cyber space; and setting rules and standards for emerging technologies.
- NATO will continue capacity building in friendly neighboring states, as conflict in NATO’s periphery undermines its safety. Examples include Georgia and Iraq.
- NATO recognizes that climate change is a crisis multiplier and must confront its security implications. The Alliance will integrate climate change considerations into its operations. Sustainable technologies will be prioritized in procurement. NATO will work with industry to create climate neutral capabilities that eventually lead to net-zero emissions.
- NATO will develop its next strategic concept. It will recommit to its values and consider its changing purpose in a changing world.
- To achieve all this, NATO members will have to invest more. Developments on this front are on the right track, as defense spending has increased in seven consecutive years after decades of cuts. NATO will “not just invest more, but invest better,” doing so collectively, as NATO is a force multiplier. This increases efficiency, and sends a clear message of unity and resolve to adversaries.
The Q&A: overcoming internal challenges
Many of the public’s and moderator Stelzenmüller‘s questions focused on the apparent internal disunity in NATO. Stoltenberg made it clear that NATO is a group of 30 different nations and that it will never speak as one. These are democracies and their disagreements and internal discussions are part of their strength. That said, it is important that the allies remain unified on the main issues. They need to rally behind their core values and stand up to authoritarian encroachments by Russia, China, and others, as the regime plane hijacking in Belarus recently demonstrated. Ukraine is a key partner on this front. While the Secretary General shied away from giving explicit commitments, his main message to Kiev is to focus on domestic reform and combating corruption. These matters are valuable in themselves, but also key to eventual NATO accession.
Several questions addressed Turkey’s apparent disregard for NATO’s core democratic values. Stoltenberg has expressed his concerns on this front in Ankara, as have other allies, and he believes that NATO can also be a platform to have open discussions on such issues. However, Turkey remains a key member of the Alliance. It is the only state to border Syria and Iran. It plays a key role in combatting ISIS and the refugee crisis. NATO’s presence in the Aegean, where it provides a bridge between Greece and Turkey, showcasesits capacity for resolving and preventing conflicts when views diverge.
Cyber threats
NATO has explicitly refocused on cyber as a military domain. Cyber attacks can trigger NATO’s article 5 (which considers an attack on one of its members as an attack on all) in the same way as kinetic attacks. Stoltenberg was not explicit on the threshold, as this would only be a favor to adversaries. However, NATO’s message is clear: cyber warfare is warfare.
China and Russia
The Secretary General promised that the communiqué to be issued at the coming NATO summit will mention China more often and more explicitly than ever before. He considers this a major oversight of previous strategy papers. Cooperation with Pacific states such as Australia will be increased, as will resilience against the domestic threats that China poses to member states. NATO will not look to declare China an enemy. There are many fields in which cooperation and trade with China are possible and beneficial. The differences in opinion on such matters between, for example, the US and Germany, will not undermine the Alliance’s consensus or resolve. The same is true for Russia. NATO will continue to talk to Russia while challenging it. “There is no contradiction between being clear-eyed about the threat that Russia poses, and the need to talk to them.” At the core, NATO must acknowledge changing global power dynamics, which have real consequences for the Alliance.
Watch the event here:
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