Tag: Democracy and Rule of Law
Conservative will likely win, but foreign policy will change little
Candidates in Iran’s presidential election scheduled for June 18 were vetted more heavily than before. Only seven were allowed to run out of some 500 applicants. Most are prominent conservatives. Judiciary chief Ibrahim Raisi is likely a shoe-in. If and how will these elections affect the negotiations in Vienna and Iran’s regional activities? How do Iranians view this process and what should we make of the predicted record low turnout?
A Chatham House panel convened June 9 agreed the election will consolidate the regime in a conservative direction. However, foreign policy and Iran’s activities in Syria, will change little, as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) have long been in firm control of those projects. The domestic implications of the elections are significant, not due to the results but rather to the vetting process and the public’s increasing apathy.
The speakers were:
Nazila Fathi
Independent journalist;
Non-resident scholar
Middle East Institute
Kenneth Katzman
Senior analyst in Iran and Persian Gulf affairs
Congressional Research Service
Vali Nasr
Majid Kadduri Professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at the School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University
Non-resident senior fellow
Atlantic Council
Raz Zimmt
Research fellow
Institute for National Security Studies
Sanam Vakil (moderator)
Deputy director and senior research fellow at the Middle East and North Africa Programme
Chatham House
A predictable outcome, but nonetheless significant
The panel agreed that Rais is the likely winner, though Nasr warned that surprises are possible, as the 1997 and 2005 elections demonstrate. Nazila Fathi also pointed out that the greater freedom to criticize one another that exists among the candidates could hurt Raisi.
The real shock in this election cycle was the vetting process, according to Zimmt. The regime prevented any serious moderate or reformist candidates from running. Fathi pointed out that the reformists (such as former president Khatami) have been isolated and persecuted since the protest movement that followed Ahmadinejad’s fraudulent re-election in 2009. Rouhani was not considered part of the reformist camp. His transition towards more moderate viewpoints is what caused the regime to remove moderate and even some conservative candidates from the roster this year. A particular surprise was the exclusion of the conservative former speaker of the parliament Larijani, who the regime considered to be at risk of moderating, according to Fathi.
Rather than the winner, voter turnout might be an indicator of public sentiment. Vakil cited a recent poll that indicates turnout could be as low as 38%. This would be a record low for Iran, where turnout has never fallen below 50%. Fathi affirmed that disillusionment within Iran is high. Due to the impact of COVID and economic hardships, there were calls to boycott the election even before the vetting process was completed. The 2019 parliamentary elections also contributed, as the stringent vetting process then led to harshly repression of protests.
Nasr warned that voter turnout is a bigger issue to Western observers than to the Iranian regime. Engineering an election can be done after the vote (as in 2009), but this led to major resistance. This is why the regime used the vetting process this time, after testing the waters with the parliamentary elections of 2019. The deep state understands that a low-turnout election is advantageous to conservative candidates. Its primary goal is to end up with a reliable, and controllable president. Raisi is the ideal candidate for this purpose. He has few connections, as Rouhani had within the religious establishment in Qom and even within the IRGC.
The core issues for Iranians are economic. Runaway inflation and price hikes on primary goods force people to work multiple jobs. This hit the middle classes as much as the poor. According to Fathi Iranians only care about the JCPOA to the extent that it contributes to economic improvements. The candidates have failed to put forward any clear plans for solving these issues.
The role of the new president
As for the new president’s role and significance, the panel saw a clear divergence between domestic and foreign affairs. Nasr suggested Iran is on the cusp of a ‘Third Islamic Republic’ for three reasons:
- Supreme Leader Khamenei’s advanced age indicates that his decades-long rule might soon be over, potentially leading to a constitutional overhaul, as after Khomeini’s death.
- Iran is moving to relieve maximum pressure, which will lead to major changes in its economic and foreign outlook.
- The deep state is increasingly strengthening its grip on the country.
The IRGC is starting to look more like the Pakistani military, controlling key foreign policy agendas and exerting major influences on the political process. They are positioning themselves for the post-Khamenei era.
A new president will have little influence on Iran’s foreign policy. As Katzman warns “these elections are not for the ‘leader’ of Iran.” The real leader, Khamenei, has indicated that Iran will recommit to the JCPOA if the US does so. The negotiations in Vienna are not at risk. Nasr indicated that the key foreign policy dossiers are all in the hands of the IRGC. Iran’s regional activities in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen fall under IRGC control. The same is true for the Saudi-Iranian negotiations now underway in Baghdad, where the Saudis are talking with top IRGC brass, rather than the Foreign Ministry.
The view from Israel and Washington
According to Zimmt, the outcome of these elections matter little to Israel, which viewed Ahmadinejad as a wolf in wolf’s clothing, while Rouhani was a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Israel is mainly concerned with the nuclear program, Iran’s regional activities (particularly in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza), and its long-range missile capabilities. None of these issues are controlled by the government or president, but rather by the deep state.
For Israel a controversial, conservative president is preferable because it makes it easier to rally support against Iran. Ahmadinejad was Israel’s biggest asset, because he openly denied the Holocaust and the existence of homosexuals in Iran. Raisi’s controversial viewpoints and his involvement in the 1988 prison massacres could serve a similar purpose. Nasr also thought that a post-JCPOA Iran seeking to establish trade relations with the world might be served poorly by a controversial president.
The Biden administration does follow these elections with interest according to Katzman, who spoke in an official capacity. According to him, Iran is becoming a major regional and even supra-regional power. Its missile and drone capacities are extensive and sophisticated, and Tehran has extended them to allies and used them itself. The attacks on Saudi oil in Abqaiq, as well as the strike on the American al-Asad base in Iraq, were examples. Katzman called the strike on al-Asad “the most significant missile strike on American troops in American history.”
Iran’s serious capacities mean that they should be taken seriously by the US. Meanwhile, US sanctions have had no effect on Iran’s regional strategy or Iran’s regional influence. In 2014 Iran was under sanctions but became more involved in Syria and Yemen. When sanctions were lifted these policies continued. Iran’s regional activities are extremely inexpensive and sanctions don’t affect them significantly.
The key is to get some resolution to regional conflicts. Iran has expressed an interest in doing so. Iran won’t project power if there are no opportunities or interests that require it.
Watch the recording of the event here:
https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=197859625537872&ref=watch_permalink
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Engagement with armed groups is necessary, “good” or “bad”
The Crisis Response Council and the Brookings Institution’s Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors June 3 convened a discussion on challenges posed by armed groups to security sector reform (SSR) in the Middle East and beyond. Panelists agreed that SSR too frequently views armed groups from a unidimensional perspective. Militias are not inherent spoilers whose power is limited to the security sector. They are more often politically or socially embedded potential power brokers. State monopolies on violence are an anomaly in post-conflict states. Armed groups can contribute positively to SSR and governance.
The speakers were:
Vanda Felbab-Brown
Director – Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors; Co-Director – Africa Security Initiative; Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
Brookings Institution
Frederic Wehrey
Senior fellow, Middle East Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Bernadetta Berti
Head of Policy Planning in the Office of the Secretary General
NATO
Yaniv Voller
Senior Lecturer in the Politics of the Middle East
University of Kent; Stanford University
Ranj Alaaldin (moderator)
Visiting Fellow – Brookings Doha Center; Nonresident Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy
Brookings Institution
The present: thriving and misunderstood
Vanda Felbab-Brown highlighted the Corona pandemic’s effect on armed groups around the world. The associated economic downturn has pushed some states to their limits. 200 million people have been pushed into poverty, and many of those will be forced to engage in criminal activities to scrape together a living. Under these conditions, armed groups thrive. Hundreds of millions of people already live under total, partial, or shared control by armed groups. As state spending on social welfare, but also security provision, shrunk, armed groups moved in to fill the gaps.
Wehrey discussed the case of Libya, where armed groups have thrived in part because they were misunderstood by outsiders. Emerging after the fall of Gadhafi, they were useful security providers, but politicized and prone to state capture and corruption. The Libyan case could have ended more positively if the ‘prizes’ for militias had been placed under better oversight. Oil revenues, ministerial positions, ports, airports were targets for militia competition. Protection of such prizes could have prevented the militia growth that Libya has seen.
Multiple efforts to “train and equip” a Libyan army from scratch have failed. Such an effort takes years and the security vacuum that exists before its completion is sure to be filled up by someone. Furthermore, in Libya new armies have often recruited from specific tribal, communal, or political backgrounds. These are less national armies and more new militias. This is something Wehrey sees happening now with Turkish support for the Tripoli-based armed forces. The current effort to defer security issues while working on political unity is reminiscent of 2012. The outcome might be similar: a relapse into violence.
The panel agreed that armed groups are not anomalies and they will not go away. Ahram suggested states do not necessarily want to be centralized. There are many examples of leaders deliberately fragmenting power. Militia fighters are not unlucky souls whose dream is to join the regular army and leave the militia life behind them. These groups are an embedded part of their communities and not easily fixable aberrations.
What makes an armed group “good” or “bad”?
The exact drivers of armed groups are poorly understood by academia and policy makers. Voller focuses his research on the question of why certain pro-government militias act predatorily, while others do not. Rather than an inherent inclination to violence, he believes that a core determinant is whether an armed group acts in a theater where its constituency is present. The predominantly Shia PMF in Iraq became predatorial when they entered the Sunni northwest in the fight against ISIS, while the Kurdish Peshmerga refrained from doing so as they always operate among their Kurdish communities. Felbab-Brown countered that other factors must also be important, as there are plenty of examples of armed groups acting predatorily among their own communities. She posits that any armed group gets feedback from its community, even if it is only by means of resistance to violence. If a community lacks social cohesion, this feedback can be unclear or weak, allowing greater predatory behavior.
Wehrey warned against an overly economic focus when it comes to controlling militias. Paying off armed groups to steer them, or turning off their incomes to force their hand, only treats part of the reality. These groups are embedded in and motivated by communal identity, religion, and history. Ahram agreed. He added that armed groups are also not merely political, as there are many cases of armed groups engaging in negotiations or elections and still continuing their armed struggles. Normative motivations are also part of the equation, as local norms, national laws, and even international law (and the fear of a Hague tribunal) are all considered by militias. Ahram believes that the onus is on researchers to identify which of these different levers matter under which circumstances, and how they can be used effectively.
Berti joked that she would enjoy this academic exercise, but that the policy maker in her called for a different course of action. She warned that all of these tools are highly context specific. What works best in practice is a willingness to enter a long-term commitment to a peace building effort. An intervening power needs to engage in a dynamic relationship with local power brokers and be willing to deal with new actors and change course when the situation calls for it.
Policy makers’ task: flexibility and pragmatism
The panel agreed that thinking in terms of “good” or “bad” militias is a fruitless exercise. Voller emphasized once more that militias are embedded in their communities. He used the example of Syrian militias that might align with Assad and engage in repression in order to protect their own constituencies. We might not call these actors “good”, but we can understand what motivates them. Felbab-Brown explained that it is better to think in pragmatic terms of available alternatives. An armed group might be odious, yet be the best option in terms of service provision, behavior, and accountability. Local populations as a rule adapt to harsh and illiberal actors if they provide stability and security.
The task that faces policy makers is a daunting one, as current tools and theories are poorly equipped to deal with the realities. The key is to be flexible and to accept militias as an embedded part of society. Berti and Ahram underlined this. We often speak of ‘allowing’ armed groups to exist or participate in a society. In practice, however, we usually have little influence over their existence. Voller emphasized that engaging with a militia directly as the state, rather than condemning and ignoring it, is usually the best way to have a positive influence on its behavior. Using the example of the Lebanese Hezbollah, however, Berti warned us to beware of who’s steering whom in these dynamics.
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Stevenson’s army, June 2
Ransomware is big business. New Yorker explains how it works and how payments are negotiated.
Israel is asking for extra military aid.
Fred Kaplan lists the laws limiting military freedom of speech.
Bloomberg says Iran expects nuclear talks to continue in July.
Late addendum:
Summertime means more time to read books stacked in my study. Here’s another book worth checking out.
For me, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis was the two weeks of American crisis decision-making detailed by Graham Allison, Bobby Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and Ted Sorensen. Now we have a superb account that includes what was happening in Moscow, and on the ground in Cuba.
Serhii Plokhy, a Ukrainian-American history professor at Harvard, has written Nuclear Folly. Instead of the typical story of smart decisions that avoided nuclear war, Plokhy says he wants to tell about the many mistakes that came close to making that catastrophe a reality. And there were many, at the strategic and operational levels.
Graham Allison explored the bureaucratic behaviors and missteps over U-2 flights that were foolishly cancelled when needed and carried out when they were quite provocative and Navy blockade rules that almost triggered a Soviet nuclear exchange. Plokhy shows the same for the Soviet military.
His basic conclusion is that Kennedy and Khrushchev deescalated the crisis because both feared nuclear war. Both overcame strong pressure to risk actual combat.
Plokhy also details Kennedy’s extraordinary efforts to keep secret the fact that he agreed to withdraw medium-range Jupiter missiles from Turkey as part of the deal. The media seized on the narrative that Kennedy won by being tough while Khrushchev backed down. In fact, there was a deal which gave important concessions to both.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, May 31
[In memory of my ancestor, Captain Levi Ely of the Massachusetts militia, killed at the battle of Stone Arabia, October 19, 1780.]
– LTG [Ret.] Mike Flynn calls for a coup.
– Politico says the Danes helped NSA spy on Merkel.
– North Korea criticizes US decision on South Korea.
– Susan Glasser of the New Yorker wonders about threats to American democracy.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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What it’s not about, and what it is about
Framing is important, both at home and abroad.
At home, the Republicans are trying to focus on voter fraud. They all know that is not even remotely a problem. There is no evidence that fraud affected the outcome of the 2020 election in any state. But defining voter fraud as a major issue provides the excuse Republicans need to limit voting in hope of favoring their own candidates. Making voting harder, they think, will reduce the numbers of minority citizens, especially Blacks, who bother to turn out. Liz Cheney was voted out of her House leadership position because she refused to go along with the Big Lie about voter fraud, which is the ultimate test of loyalty to Donald Trump and the objectives of the January 6 insurrection on Capitol Hill.
Abroad, the Israeli government is focusing on Hamas rocket fire from Gaza, ignoring the evictions of Palestinians from their homes in East Jerusalem and the brutal repression of Muslim demonstrators on the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif that initiated the current frictions between Palestinians and Jews. The former Netanyahu would prefer to define as “real estate” disputes; the latter he defines as law enforcement against militants. Having lost his bid to form still another government, Netanyahu hopes to prevent Yair Lapid, the current holder of the mandate, from doing so. War with Hamas is a convenient amplification of a pre-existing crisis, one that might bring Netanyahu the support he was lacking, extend his caretaker status, or precipitate still another, likely inconclusive, Israeli election.
So where do real solutions lie?
At home, the Republican Party has shrunk to 25% of the electorate. Most of what remains is loyal to Trump and the Big Lie. This will guarantee that most of its candidates in 2022 come from his white supremacist corner. That is not the worst thing that can happen for Democrats, who have a good chance of going in to the next Congressional election with the epidemic under control and the economy restored at least to its prior 2% or so growth path. Predicting the outcome of elections is a fool’s errand, but even if Republican-majority state legislatures succeed in limiting minority voting, Democratic prospects could still be good. Control of the House and Senate will come down to a very few seats in even fewer states. A focused, unified effort could produce continued Democratic majorities in both Houses.
In the Middle East, prospects are not so good. Hamas is figuring it will gain political support from its “resistance” rocket fire, at least in the West Bank if not in Gaza. The bombardment will move Israelis in a more militant direction, especially as it appears to have ignited strife between Jews and Arabs inside Israel proper. Insecurity is a powerful political incentive that does not favor moderation. The only realistic alternative to a right-wing government in Israel is one with Arab support, but that has never happened and isn’t likely in the aftermath of the current fighting. Netanyahu may not survive, but his siege politics will, especially if the current covert war with Iran continues.
Ilan Goldenberg suggests the US has a supporting, not primary, role to play in ending the current fighting between Hamas and Israel. The UN and Egyptians he says should lead. That may well be so, but I still think it good that Secretary Blinken said today:
Israelis and Palestinians need to be able to live in safety and security, as well as enjoy equal measures of freedom, security, prosperity, and democracy.
This points clearly in the direction of equal rights, whether in one state or two. That is what the Israeli government needs to understand: its current policy of “mowing the grass” and maintaining a regime of unequal rights, both inside Israel and in the West Bank (not to mention Gaza!) is not sustainable. Israel cannot be both democratic and Jewish without allowing creation of a Palestinian state. Netanyahu doesn’t care, because he isn’t a democrat. He is as much a Jewish supremacist as Trump is a white supremacist. But Israel is rapidly losing support among Democrats in the United States, most of whom are committed to equal rights at home and abroad. That is what it is really all about.
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Ending the Kosovo conundrum
The Conflict Managment program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies sponsors a trip every January to a conflict area, after a semester of related study and briefings in DC. This year we did the trip virtually (via Zoom) to Pristina and Belgrade. You are cordially invited to attend our presentation of research results and recommendations for the future, 4:30 pm May 18, register here:
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