Tag: Democracy and Rule of Law
Stevenson’s army, December 14 and 15
December 15
NBC says Trump plans to pull 4,000 US troops from Afghanistan.
NYT says US secretly expelled two Chinese officials for spying at SOCOM base.
NYT says Chinese believe they just won the trade war with the US.
What goes around comes around: a judge has invoked a law passed by GOP Congress to limit Obama against Trump.
Trump campaign briefs press on its plans. Looks pretty good for them.
Dartmouth prof doubts effectiveness of various campaign reforms. Note especially the data on term limits.the evidence is at best equivocal on the effects of term limits. Some studies find they would actually enhance the power of special interest groups. The problem is that incumbents who lack a reelection incentive can reduce the effort they devote to their jobs, becoming less attentive to their constituents and working less on the legislative process. The political scientists Alexander Fouirnaies and Andrew B. Hall, for instance, use data from 1995 to 2016 to show that legislators facing term limits sponsor fewer bills and miss more votes. This shift can increase the influence of outside forces such as interest groups and lobbyists, who will happily fill the vacuum in expertise and effort created by term-limited legislators. These dynamics played out in California after term limits were enacted in 1990 that restricted members of the Assembly to three terms (six years) and state senators to two terms (eight years). Observers found that these short limits scrambled the legislative process, discouraging legislators from acquiring experience while in office and creating constant turnover in leadership positions. Lobbyists, staffers and other unelected figures seemed to gain power as a result. In response, good-government groups endorsed Proposition 28, which passed in 2012, reducing lifetime limits to 12 years but allowing legislators to serve all of that time in one chamber.
Prof. Brands and others say Trump has abandoned the Carter Doctrine of protecting oil fields.
December 14
– British expat Andrew Sullivan says Boris Johnson won with “Trumpism without Trump.”
– I look at the electoral maps and conclude that more and more people voted their amygdala instead of their pocketbooks. Same trend in the US.
– WSJ says USMCA sets a model for future trade agreements. I agree.
– There’s pushback on the Post’s Afghanistan series, from a Dartmouth prof and Michael O’Hanlon of Brookings.
– WaPo notes winners and losers from first US China trade deal.
– NYT says Ukraine is looking for a US lobbyist. [They all do eventually.]
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Geopolitics in the Balkans
These are the notes that used in making remarks via Skype to the Geoffrey Nice Foundation Conference on “Transitional, Post-Transitional and Strategic Narratives about the Yugoslav Wars: from Wars and Search for Justice to Geo-Political Power Games” in Pristina today.
1. It is a pleasure to be with you remotely, even if I do wish my schedule would have permitted me to join you in Pristina.
2. The world has changed dramatically since the breakup of former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.
3. That was, we know now, truly the unipolar moment, when the US had no rivals and together with Europe could do what it wanted in the Balkans and much of the rest of the world.
4. With a lot of help from Croatia, NATO ended the Bosnian war at Dayton in 1995 and forced Serbia’s withdrawal from Kosovo in 1999.
5. Europe and the US together invested massive financial and personnel resources in Kosovo as a UN protectorate mandated to build self-governing democratic institutions.
6. The unipolar moment ended with the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001 and the US responses in Afghanistan and Iraq.
7. But the state-building process in Kosovo had significant momentum and continued, first with standards before status and later standards with status, leading eventually to supervised and unsupervised independence.
8. You have not had an easy time of it, but I think your young state has risen to at least some challenges quite well: the economy has grown, after an initial spurt you managed to limit Islamist radicalization, your courts have begun to prosecute high-level corruption cases, your army is incubating with nurture from NATO, and you have managed several power transitions in accordance with election outcomes.
9. Today’s world is however dramatically different from the one that existed in 2001 or at independence in 2008.
10. While still globally dominant, the US faces regional challenges from China, Russia, Iran and even North Korea that take priority in Washington over the Balkans.
11. Bosnia and Kosovo, the object of top-tier attention in the 1990s, now get much lower priority.
12. That is true in Europe as well, where Brexit, Ukraine, and illegal immigration are issues that, each in its own way, cast a shadow over Balkan aspirations to join Europe.
13. At the same time, Moscow and Beijing are paying more attention than ever before to the Balkans.
14. The Russians are interfering blatantly by both violent and nonviolent means in the Balkans: assassination, media manipulation, renting crowds and financing political parties are all being used to slow if not halt Balkan progress towards NATO and the EU.
15. The Chinese are using their financial strength to build and buy. Caveat emptor of course, though my own view is that Beijing’s behavior is a lot more salubrious than Moscow’s and likely to produce some positive results for those Balkan countries and companies that know how to do business.
16. Turkey—also a strong force in the Balkans for historical, geographic, and cultural reasons—has taken a dramatic turn in a more Islamist and autocratic direction. The secular Turkey that contributed forces to NATO interventions in the 1990s is moribund. Erdogan’s Turkey is building mosques, capturing Gulenists, and encouraging political Islam while trying to maintain its previous good relations with non-Muslim countries in the Balkans.
17. How does all this affect Kosovo?
18. The Turkish influence is direct and palpable: though still largely secular in orientation, Kosovo is far Islamic than it once was and has cooperated with the capture and rendering of Gulenists in ways that don’t seem right to me.
19. As for the Chinese, most Kosovars might welcome more interest in investment from Beijing. I wouldn’t fault you for that but only urge caution about the financial and political conditions, which can be onerous.
20. The Russians have no purchase on the Kosovo Albanians, but their weight with the Kosovo and Serbian Serbs is certainly felt here. Moscow is a strong advocate of land swaps and of course blocks Kosovo entry into the UN and opposes its entry into other international organizations.
21. How Moscow will be brought around to accepting Kosovo’s UN membership is still a mystery, even to those of us who think Kosovo independence and sovereignty is permanent.
22. Washington continues to have enormous influence in Kosovo, but it is not the same Washington as even three years ago. Today’s Washington has an ethnic nationalist, not a liberal democratic, administration. Trump and some of his closest advisors are self-avowed “nationalists” who do not believe in equal rights.
23. That in my view is why they were open to the failed land swap idea, which may have died in Kosovo but still survives in Washington.
24. As for Europe, it’s failure of nerve is all too evident to everyone in the Balkans: the French and Dutch vetoes on opening accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia—negotiations that might take a decade—was tragic. So too is the failure to provide the visa waiver to Kosovo.
25. The Western, liberal democratic influence in the Balkans has declined. The Eastern, autocratic and ethno-nationalist influence—if I can use that umbrella term to refer to the very different roles of Russia, China, and Turkey—has grown.
26. Bottom line: responsibility for keeping the Western aspiration alive now rests more than in the past with you: the government, citizens, and society of Kosovo. The Europeans have already disappointed you. The Americans may do likewise. The Chinese and Turks will try to lure you in bad directions while the Russians will give aid and comfort to your antagonists.
27. But you showed how unified and good Kosovo can be to the English soccer fans. I hope you will harness that spirit to the cause of maintaining a liberal democracy that treats all its citizens equally!
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Stevenson’s army, November 22
– Earlier, NYT said decision uncertain on Hong Kong bill. This Morning, Trump says he doesn’t like it.
– WaPo has background on effort to pardon military personnel. David Ignatius decries decision.
– Pause in South Korea-Japan spat,
CAP has ideas for reducing foreign influence in US elections.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, November 8
– The Guardian has a good piece explaining the election rules in the various states.
– I’d also draw your attention to the small number of states that still allow straight-ticket voting. It’s surprising that so few do in this era of hyperpartisanship.
– NYT suggests the US-China trade war is ending, but WSJ and Peter Navarro don’t agree.
– Excellent article in Atlantic explaining how isolated Trump is in his presidency.
– There is some movement on budget reform.
– Here’s the devastating memo criticizing the green light to Turkey to invade Syria.
– Here’s the NYT review of the Anonymous author’s critique of Trump.
I’d add: the President has been fined $2 million for blatant misuse of his family-controlled charitable foundation.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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What next?
In addition to today’s post on the Iraqi protests, I would recommend Rend Al-Rahim’s appearance on NPR this morning as well as my own appearance Monday with Namo Abdulla, Raed Jarrar, and Mazin Al-Eshaiker on CGTN’s The Heat, available below for your listening and watching pleasures. Bottom line: the likelihood of some sort of authoritarian takeover, by coup or martial law, is increasing dramatically:
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Good election, big challenges
On October 29 the Middle East Institute (MEI) and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) hosted an event entitled “Observations from the Tunisian Election.” Tunisian Ambassador Fayçal Gouia delivered the opening remarks and participated in the panel discussion. Georgetown Professor and North Africa specialist William Lawrence moderated the discussion. Panelists included Jeffrey England, deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the National Democratic Institute (NDI), Patricia Karam, Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa division of the International Republican Institute (IRI), Sarah Yerkes, Middle East Fellow at the Carnegie Institute for International Peace, and Thomas Hill, senior program officer for North Africa at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).
England emphasized that the joint election observation undertaken by NDI and IRI demonstrated several positive aspects of the Tunisian election. Despite the fact that the July 25 death of former President Essebsi required the election to be held sooner than originally planned, it was peaceful and administered professionally. England also highlighted that the Parliamentary and Presidential debates that were held for the first time are evidence that the democratic system continues to mature. He noted that while there are lingering questions about turnout in the election, there was a larger pool of voters in both rounds than expected. England felt that because President Kais Saied does not belong to a political party he may be better able to hold the parties in Parliament to account.
Karam agreed that the election observation demonstrated several positive developments but noted that Tunisia should amend several aspects of its electoral framework prior to the next election, including campaign finance regulations, media rules, and the interaction between the judicial and electoral systems. Polling shows a crisis of confidence in politicians, growing dissatisfaction with the democratic experiment, and the sense that Tunisian political parties lack a clear vision for economic reform. This dissatisfaction is particularly deep among Tunisian youth, with preliminary data showing that youth turnout in the election may have been as low as 16%. Karam believes Tunisians voted for Saied because they prioritized stability in government, even if it comes with older, more conservative ideas.
Yerkes argued that while Saied received 70% of the votes, giving him a strong mandate, the incarceration of his opponent Karoui during the election was a significant flaw in the democratic process. She believes the election was unquestionably free but does not think it was fair. Karoui’s incarceration highlighted the need for Tunisia to implement a system for absentee voting. The electoral law allows prisoners to vote but there is currently no mechanism for them to do so, meaning that Karoui was unable to vote for himself.
Several panelists agreed that Tunisia’s economy was the key issue in this election and will play a key role in the future of its democracy. Gouia stated that job creation and delivering economic reform will be the first priority of the new administration. England asserted that while the electorate’s main concern was revolution in 2011 and identity in 2014, now people want to see results, particularly on economic issues. Hill argued that the Tunisian social contract has shifted so that graduates expect the government to create jobs for them rather than being entrepreneurial. England agreed, stating that the economic problems cannot be solved before the next election. He felt that the government should focus on developing a long-term plan to reform the economy and attempt to reframe the people’s expectations so that they understand that economic change will take time.
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