Tag: Democracy and Rule of Law
Bravo, but Kosovo can wait
On the eve of today’s 11th anniversary of its independence, Kosovo has published its “Platform for Dialogue on a Final, Comprehensive and Legally Binding Agreement on Normalization of Relations Between the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia.” There are a lot of things to like in this document, including:
- A clear statement of Kosovo’s negotiating goals, which has been lacking: Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state.
- Re-assertion of the validity of the Kosovo constitution on the state’s entire territory and explicit rejection of any cession of part of that territory.
- Reciprocity: for Albanians in Serbia to be treated as well as Serbs in Kosovo, for war crimes committed by Serbs to be treated like war crimes committed by Albanians, including in a special tribunal.
- Refusal to create any layer of government between the central one and municipalities (read any association of Serb municipalities with governing authority or responsibility).
- Approval of the ultimate agreement in a referendum and by parliament in both Kosovo and Serbia.
- Provisions for transparency, inclusivity, and accessibility of the state negotiating team.
- Settlement of outstanding wartime issues (accounting for missing persons, return of displaced people, return of property, compensation, reparations, division of sovereign debt, etc.).
- An end to UN Security Council resolution 1244 and approval of the final agreement in the Council and the General Assembly.
- Conditioning of progress in EU accession on implementation of the final agreement.
All good. So what’s missing?
Two things:
- Clarity on how and when UN membership will occur. It may be implicit in the reference to UNSC approval of the agreement, but it will need to be explicit before the negotiations are concluded. The controlling powers are China and Russia: how will they be brought around to allow a breakaway province to enter the UN? China won’t like it because of Tibet. Russia may like it but will want a quid pro quo in Crimea and possibly also South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria.
- Any indication of what Serbia might get in the deal. It is not Pristina’s responsibility to worry about this in the first instance, but it will need to worry about it in due course. What would be helpful is for Serbia to publish a similar platform. It has never been clear what Belgrade wants from the talks with Pristina, other than convincing Washington and Brussels that Serbia is willing to talk. That itself does have value, especially as it has been done on an equal basis that implicitly acknowledges that Kosovo has a legitimate and independent governing structure (already also recognized in the April 2013 “Brussels agreement”).
Of course Belgrade has also appeared to want territory, especially the majority-Serb municipalities north of the Ibar River. The Platform however is unequivocal in seeking “recognition of Kosovo’s independence and statehood within the existing borders.”
There are outstanding issues that might have value for Serbia: the composition and capabilities of the Kosovo army, the functions (other than governing) of the not yet created Association of Serb Municipalities, and Kosovo’s assumption of its share of Yugoslavia’s debt (mentioned in the Platform). But I doubt these will be sufficient to lead to an early agreement. More likely, Serbia will not engage seriously until the failure to reach an agreement with Kosovo noticeably slows its progress toward EU accession. Then it will be too late: all the leverage in the endgame of EU accession lies with the individual member states, which have to ratify accession, not with the candidate country.
One member state has dared to say what we all have known for years but no one wanted to say out loud. At the Security Council 10 days ago Christoph Heusgen, the German representative, said bluntly in a prepared (therefore cleared in Berlin) statement:
The only way that Serbia will enter the European Union will be with a successful normalization dialogue, with the recognition of Kosovo.
Belgrade would be wise to enter a serious negotiation sooner rather than later, while it can hope to still get something in exchange for recognizing Kosovo. Now that it has made its position clear, Pristina can afford to wait, as its EU accession is much further in the future.
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My State of the Union
My fellow Americans,
The state of our union is confused and uncertain. Our economic recovery is aging and shaky. The rich are getting a lot richer while American workers struggle. Government revenue is insufficient. Medicare and Social Security are at risk. The national debt is growing by leaps and bounds. Our future is mortgaged to the hilt.
We no longer have a clear idea of what we stand for or how to deal with the poverty, drug abuse, obesity, gender bias, and racism that infects much of our population. One of our major political parties has committed itself to voter suppression, sharply curtailing immigration, and courting white supremacists. A $25 billion wall on the Mexican border is their totem, despite its predictable ineffectiveness in blocking undocumented entries and drug trafficking.
Our institutions are not functioning well. The Justice Department and FBI are struggling to maintain their professionalism. The State Department has been eviscerated and marginalized. The courts are being politicized. Big parts of the Federal Government–Interior, EPA, HUD, Education, Commerce–are headed by people who oppose the missions Congress has given them. The Congress itself is polarized and only occasionally able to pass legislation on a bipartisan basis.
Abroad we have surrendered our leadership role. Withdrawals from the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris climate change agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty have signaled disdain for our friends, weakness to our enemies, and lack of confidence in our ability to cooperate with others to mutual advantage. It will be very difficult to convince anyone to enter into a future agreement with the United States, as we have proven unreliable and unpredictable. Our only friends abroad are the would-be autocrats of the world: Xi, Putin, Kim, Duterte, various Crown Princes, and Netanyahu.
We continue to rely excessively on military instruments to try to shape the world to our liking. Unwise threats of military intervention in Venezuela and an ill-considered declaration that we would use the American troops remaining in Iraq to counter Iran have cast long shadows on otherwise reasonable propositions. Precipitous withdrawals from Syria and Afghanistan announced without laying the required diplomatic basis threaten to end in debacle. We are unable to calibrate the use of our superb military so that it serves the national interest.
Current American weakness comes at a moment of revived, if still far from existential, threat. Russia is challenging US hegemony in Europe and the Middle East. China is challenging US hegemony in the Asia Pacific and in global markets. We are unwilling, though perhaps not unable, to counter Moscow’s roguish behavior. Our response to China has precipitated a tariff war that is as harmful to the US economy as it is to the Chinese.
My fellow Americans, the pace and direction of our Union are speeding us to where we should not want to go. We need to stop the downward spiral before it becomes irreversible. We need to point ourselves in the direction of restoring American ideals. We need to once again show leadership on the international stage and willingness to sacrifice for the common good.
The sooner we do it, the better. The longer we wait, the harder it gets.
The state of our Union is bad. Let’s make it better.
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The Balkan regatta
I’m not a handicapper, but it seem to me the race for EU membership in the Balkans is shifting. Serbia is often referred to as the “frontrunner,” but it no longer really is, if it ever was. Macedonia has been a laggard, but that too is no longer the case. Kosovo is having a hard time keeping up, but that is in part due to an unreceptive EU. Bosnia and Herzegovina still occupies last place.
Serbia was arguably never really in first place, but by now it has certainly yielded to Montenegro, which has opened 32 chapters of the acquis communautaire required to become an EU member (and closed 3 of the 32). Serbia has opened 16 and closed 2. But Montenegro also has an easier path to EU membership, as it lacks many of the industries that Serbia needs to make comply with EU regulations. Montenegro also has a far freer press, whereas Serbia’s is under the government’s informal but still tight control. Both countries lack the fully independent and professional judiciary that will be necessary before accession. That is the long pole in the tent throughout the Balkans.
The big difference between Montenegro and Serbia lies in foreign policy. Montenegro, already a NATO member, is fully aligned with the EU on Russia. Serbia is not: it hosts a Russian “humanitarian” base and has refused to go along with sanctions against Moscow for its annexation of Crimea. Belgrade has no intention of seeking NATO membership. Serbian President Vucic recently gave President Putin a hero’s welcome in Belgrade, complete with paid crowds bused in from the provinces.
Skopje’s resolution of its “name” dispute with Athens has thrown the door to NATO wide open. Accession for “the Republic of North Macedonia” will follow as soon as ratifications are received from the 29 other members. The name change will also re-initiate Macedonia’s stalled EU accession process. As with Serbia and Montenegro, the long pole in the tent will be an independent and professional judiciary, but North Macedonia will likely make quick progress on other chapters.
Kosovo carries several burdens that the others don’t, even though all its legislation has been required to be EU-compatible since independence. Its stalled dialogue with Serbia needs to get restarted. Only after a fully normalized relationship can it hope to open accession talks, because of opposition from the EU’s five non-recognizing members. In addition, the EU sets a particularly high bar for Kosovo. This was apparent in its postponement of a visa waiver program even after Pristina had fully met many more requirements than any other country in the Balkans. Judicial professionalism and independence will also be a serious challenge in a country where personal relations count for a lot and institutional consolidation is still limited.
Still, Bosnia brings up the rear. It has been saddled with a coordination mechanism that gives both its entities, the Federation and Republika Srpska, as well as the ten Federation cantons and the Brcko District veto power over negotiation and implementation of the acquis. This is unworkable. Only when the Sarajevo government gets full authority to negotiate and implement the acquis will Bosnia be able to make serious progress on EU accession. NATO membership for Bosnia is ruled out for now by the leadership of Republika Srpska, which shares Belgrade’s antipathy for the Alliance as well as its affection for Russia and Putin.
So here is my sense of the regatta: Montenegro>Macedonia>Serbia>Kosovo>Bosnia. Serbia has slipped a couple of places, Macedonia is gaining, Kosovo is lagging in part because the EU wants it that way, and Bosnia is bringing up the rear.
Of course there are serious questions about the condition NATO and the EU will be in when any of these countries accede. Brexit, President Trump, and ethnic nationalist populism are real drags on the liberal democratic evolution of the former Yugoslav states, where ethnic nationalist populism in the 1990s became homicidal and even genocidal. But let there be no doubt that the accession processes are still the best thing going for the Balkans: they give people and governments there purpose and hope.
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Doha impressions
I’ve been slow to write my impressions of Doha, where I spent four days last week after four days in Riyadh the week before (my impressions there are reported here). It’s fitting though that I should publish on Qatar the very day that its soccer team won the Asian Cup, defeating Japan 3-1 after triumphing in the semifinal 4-nil over arch-nemesis United Arab Emirates (in addition to beating Saudi Arabia).
The Qataris are riding high, at least in their own estimation and not only on the soccer field. They have more than survived what they term the blockade by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt imposed in June 2017. After an initial panic that emptied grocery stores, cut off family and other personal ties with compatriots, and caused a sharp fall in central bank reserves, the Doha government triggered a successful emergency response planned since the 2014 flare-up of their frictions with the Saudis and Emiratis.
The costs have been high, but the plan stabilized the situation and enabled Qatar to take advantage of its natural gas-derived wealth to make alternative arrangements and also begin to stimulate domestic production to replace imports. People recount the story of flying in 3000 cows for milk production with smiles on their faces. Saudi food supplies, which dominated the market before the “blockade,” are no longer missed.
Relations with Iran and Turkey have improved. Turkey is often credited as having prevented a Saudi invasion early in the Gulf crisis by deploying 3000 troops. The massive US air base at Al Udeid is seldom mentioned, but Qataris clearly treasure their close relations with Washington. Outreach around the world to other countries has grown. Qataris regard the Gulf crisis as a “blessing in disguise,” a phrase heard repeatedly. It compelled Qatar to diversify and strengthen its ties around the world.
The result is pride and allegiance, including (from my limited contact) among the 90% of the population that is expats. Qataris and foreign experts think the government has done well and that the country’s star is rising. Portraits of the Emir, once ubiquitous, are still much in evidence, despite government instructions to remove them. World Cup 2022 preparations are said to be going well. Criticism of labor conditions on the many construction projects has declined, as accidents have proven much less common than some had predicted. The $6-7 billion of direct World Cup spending is only a drop in the bucket, as the government is building another $200 billion or so in new infrastructure. That’s on top of already lavish spending over the last two decades.
The ideological underpinnings are not, of course, democratic. Qatar is an autocracy that does not permit political organizations of any sort. But a lot of people we talked with are convinced that the traditional system of tribal consultations enables the top to hear from the bottom and the bottom to register its discontents. There is talk of elections this year or next for a newly empowered Shura Council, which now issues legislation on behalf of the Emir. But there are also concerns that elections will give the largest tribes dominance that the current system does not permit, thus reducing the diversity of voices and narrowing the political base of the monarchy.
Why did tiny, non-democratic Qatar support the Arab Spring and in particular the Muslim Brotherhood? The most common answer is that Doha supported the political forces it thought Egyptians, Syrians, Yemenis, Tunisians, Libyans, and others wanted. It has dialed back on that support and blocked private financing of radical groups, monitored by the US Treasury.
Doha claims to be a strong supporter of economic and military integration through the Gulf Cooperation Council, whose work has been disrupted. But Qataris want to conduct an independent foreign policy, not one dictated by Saudi Arabia or least of all by the UAE, which is believed to still resent Qatar’s choice to remain independent and not join the other sheikhdoms. Bahrain is the paradigm for what the Qataris do not want: a country forced to follow in the Kingdom’s footsteps wherever it goes.
What about Al Jazeera, the TV news channels that spare only Qatar and not its Gulf neighbors from criticism? Qatar’s neighbors view Al Jazeera Arabic in particular as promoting rebellion and extremism. At least some Qataris are willing to contemplate modifications in editorial policy, but all assume Al Jazeera is not going away, as the Saudis and Emiratis would like. Though said to be privately owned, it is under the government’s thumb and can be reined in when and if need be.
At times in Doha and Riyadh, I felt I was in a hall of mirrors: both claim leadership in modernizing the Arab world, both see the Gulf conflict as a struggle over what one Saudi termed “seniority” in the region and many Qataris termed Saudi/Emirati “hegemony.” In both Saudi Arabia and Qatar these days conservatism is bad, diversity is welcome, dialogue and consultation are promoted, and freedom to organize political activity is restricted. These are absolute monarchies with the deep pockets required to buy their way into the 21st century.
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The Berlin Wall is falling in Venezuela
The Atlantic Council held a discussion on January 30 about supporting the new Venezuelan interim government (VIG) led by Juan Guaidó. The panel included Carlos Vecchio, chargé d’affairs to the United States of the interim government of Venezuela, Julio Borges, VIG representative to Lima Group, David Smolansky, former Mayor and exiled activist. They were joined by David O’Sullivan, Head of EU delegation to the US, Manuel Maria Cáceres, Paraguay ambassador to the US, Alfonso Silva, Chile Ambassador to the US, and Edward Royce, former chairman of the House International Relations Committee.
Vecchio spoke about three types of pressure to make President Maduro quit power: internal pressure by the opposition; pressure from the National Assembly, which Vecchio sees as the legitimate democratically elected institution; and pressure from the international community. The regime has always tried to play the dialogue card to get enough oxygen and to divide and manipulate the international community. But unless Maduro is gone, the sociopolitical condition will not change and constitutional transition to a stable democracy will not be possible.
Borges spoke about three intersecting factors that prevented Maduro from falling quickly: the military, oil, and Cuba. Nowhere in Latin America have these three factors ever coincided. Maduro came to power and led Venezuela to ruin, including the economy. A few generals along with Cuba are keeping hold of the country. According to Borges, two dynamics persist in Latin America: the axis of Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela still play the Cold War card and the rest of the countries, who follow the post-Cold War rules of freedom and democracy. But Borges is optimistic the Berlin Wall is falling in Latin America thirty years later, opening the door to a new system of democracy, human rights, and freedom.
Exiled in Washington DC for almost eighteen months, Smolansky described Guaidó as the interim president, head of state, and commander of arm forces, promising fair and democratic elections. Almost 3.5 million migrants are the result of the current crisis, the largest in the history of Latin America. Venezuelans are fleeing to neighbors: Colombia has one million, Ecuador seven hundred thousand, Chile two hundred thousand, Brazil more than one hundred thousand, and US more than half a million. For Smolansky, the most viable way out to this crisis is by restoring democracy in the country, regaining its freedom and establishing rule of law.
O’Sullivan presented the EU’s position, which supports transition in Venezuela. The EU did not accept the May election results and decided not to attend the inauguration, preferring to back the National Assembly and interim president Guaidó in restoring democracy. Alarmed by the humanitarian crisis in the country and its implications for the region, the EU provided $66 million for humanitarian support. EU countries have allowed Maduro some time to hold democratic elections, and the member states continue to engage with each other to have one stand on the issue.
As the first country recognizing the interim government, the newly appointed ambassador of Paraguay to the US, Cáceres, stated it was the right thing to do as Venezuelan people are suffering beyond imagination. Cáceres added that upon his recent inauguration, the president of Paraguay gave a pledge to support the people of Venezuela. A few days later, Paraguay broke diplomatic relations.
Silva stressed the commitment of Chile to the freedom in Venezuela. Although losing the resolution to recognize the interim government by one vote at the Organization of American States (OAS), Silva stressed the importance of more diplomacy to convince countries in the region and elsewhere to recognize Guaidó as legitimate. Venezuela needs humanitarian aid; pressure should be brought on Maduro to allow it in.
Royce painted the humanitarian situation as dire. Maduro’s military controls the importation of food and medicine. He also brought in the Chinese ZTE cooperation to run the social credit system, which makes Venezuelans rely on a card from the government to get food, pension, medicine, and basic services. ZTE, which belongs to Chinese intelligence, tracks people who write on social media through a database, and if you are against the regime, you will end up in jail. Jails are at over capacity. Out of 83,000 people in jail, 60% do not have potable water, leading to malaria and tuberculosis outbreaks.
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Take the money, ask no questions
The Wilson Center held a discussion this week on “Democratic and International Impacts of Kleptocracy,” with Edward Melon, Kennan Institute Fellow, along with Casey Michel, reporter at Think Progress, and Jodi Vittori, a Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The panelists touched on kleptocracy in Asia, mainly in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and its implications for democracy. They also addressed the implications of financial secrecy as practiced in some states.
Edward Melon diagnosed the political situation in Tajikistan as extremely corrupt, with one leader, Emomali Rahamon, holding a grip on the country for decades. Since coming to power, Rahamon has built an authoritarian regime grounded on nepotism and favoritism. His family controls politics and business all over the country. His eldest son is the current mayor of the capital city. His daughter is the chief of the staff. His sons-in-law and other family members monopolize the biggest companies and projects that render the most lucrative benefits. The also embezzle money embezzlement and export capital. Tajikistan is one of the most kleptocratic countries in Asia, with a highly unequal distribution of wealth.
The state apparatus silences voices of opposition and even, as Melon puts it, engages in “transnational oppression” by targeting its opponents outside the country. This strengthened authoritarianism could revive the civil war that tore the country apart from 1992 to 1997.
Michel focused on the US. It is increasingly a hub of explicit financial secrecy internationally. The small state of Delaware has been in the forefront of implementing financial secrecy rules. Friendly laws and a unique model of “take the money, ask no questions” has captivated myriad corporations. Big companies, embezzlers, traffickers and shady corporations moved there to cloak their money in secrecy. Michel claims, “Delaware now has more corporations than people.”
But Delaware is not the only state exploiting secrecy. Nevada and Wyoming have joined it. According to Michel, in 1991 Nevada loosened its laws to model itself as Delaware of the west. By 2001, it further increased financial secrecy to attract more corporations. The same thing goes for Wyoming; it has adopted similar policies to accommodate corporations. Shell companies find such states a safe haven for their money.
Michel argues the US is ranked as the second contributor to financial secrecy in the world after Switzerland. Delaware, Nevada and Wyoming are at the bottom of the barrel in terms of financial stanadards.
Vittori offered an overview of kleptocracy in Afghanistan. Corruption there has become endemic in almost all segments of the Afghan state. High level officials are involved in payoffs, embezzlement, and drug trafficking, fueling insurgent groups instead of combating them. The insurgents are readily recruiting, as they can provide protection and money. Vittori sees the kleptocratic environment in Afghanistan as becoming normalized, rendering the status quo more beneficial for some than reform would be.
Security sectors in a majority of Third World countries are maintained by loyal people, mostly family members or trusted individuals. Their role has more to do with defending the regime than the borders or citizens. Vittori says around 50% of the budget in sub-Saharan Africa goes to security sector. Transparency and accountability are rarely raised. Patronage and nepotism cover things up.
Bottom line: kleptocracy is inherent in weak states. It undermines democracy and the rule of law. It feeds grievances, terrorism, and criminal groups. But some democratic countries do not care about kleptocracy in other countries, as long as the money flows to them.
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