Tag: Democracy and Rule of Law
Pompeo pontificates
Secretary of State Pompeo took the occasion of his speech in Cairo today to assert what few in the Middle East believe: that the US is a force for good in the region. Offering little evidence for this assertion that would be convincing to anyone but Middle Eastern autocrats, he instead focused on criticizing the Obama Administration.
He criticized it for failing to respond adequately to Sunni extremism, to the Iranian crackdown on the Green Revolution, and to Bashar al Assad. He also praised President Trump for destroying the Islamic State (ignoring completely Obama’s role in that fight) and for bombing Syria when it used chemical weapons (to little effect). The message was clear: American foreign policy is going to be unfailingly partisan. No more non-partisanship at the water’s edge. That’s for sissies.
Iran, Pompeo suggested while vaunting his evangelical credentials, is evil. He reviewed the full array of US efforts to counter Tehran, ignoring US withdrawal from the nuclear deal and its negative implications for relations with Europe and its impact on America’s credibility in future nonproliferation efforts. He ignored the lack of progress in getting Tehran to renegotiate the agreement, which is what he has been pleading for.
While acknowledging President Trump’s decision to withdraw from Syria and underlining that Middle Eastern partners will need to do more, Pompeo reiterated America’s maximal demands without considering the means available. The US won’t provide assistance to Syria until Iran withdraws and a political transition is irreversible. He also challenged Hizbollah and Iranian dominance of Lebanon, promised to work for peace in Yemen, and pledged an agreement on Israel and Palestine.
As Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass put it,
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@SecPompeo articulated ambitious goals-to expel every last Iranian boot from Syria, to reduce Hizballah’s missile arsenal, to help build an Iraq free of Iranian influence-while backing reduced US presence in the Middle East. No policy can succeed with ends and means so divorced.
In concluding, Pompeo claimed that the US had never been an oppressor or empire-builder. That betrayed a serious lack of education on American history, especially in the Western Hemisphere, and insensitivity to how Washington is viewed in the Middle East, where US interventions are often viewed as imperial. Pompeo pledged allegiance to all the autocrats of the region except Iran’s and ignored even the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. How should Middle Easterners who want more open societies and freedom of expression feel about that?
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Make Plan A work
I’ve had several requests from Balkan publications for my end-of-year views on the situation in the region. I’ve so far passed them up, but a few words here seem appropriate.
The Balkans are at peace and far more prosperous than they were in the early 1990s, when war ripped apart former Yugoslavia. Now European Union members, Slovenia and Croatia were then fighting for survival as Serbia tried by force to hold the Federation together, or at least hold on to territory it regarded as “Serb.” Bosnia suffered three and a half years of war, ethnic cleansing, and eventually genocide. Kosovo endured less, but only because NATO was prepared to intervene sooner. Macedonia and Montenegro mostly escaped war, but only with difficulty and international help.
Things are much better now. Per capita income is markedly higher. Ethnic nationalism barks a lot but seldom bites. No army in the Balkans is capable of sustained warfare and no public would support it. All the region’s citizens except Kosovo’s can travel visa-free throughout the European Union. All the remaining non-members of the EU have been promised an opportunity to join the EU. All have signed agreements with Brussels that provide many of the trade and financial benefits of membership, along with ample pre-accession funding.
People in the Balkans are nevertheless dissatisfied. Resurgent ethnic nationalism plagues Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Economic growth is slow, corruption is endemic, and the prospect of European Union accession distant. Big issues remain unresolved. Approval of Macedonia’s far-reaching Prespa agreement with Greece is uncertain. Kosovo and Serbia are far from normalization of their relations, despite years of negotiations. Governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina is increasingly dysfunctional, due to a peace settlement that is difficult to change. Complaints rather than satisfaction are dominant 25 years after the Dayton peace agreements began to bring an end to the Balkan wars of the 1990s.
I think it is wrong to be discouraged. The post-war Balkans region is uniquely advantaged. Its proximity to Europe brought it far more attention and assistance than is typical after conflict. Think of Syria, which will get precious little Western help after far more destructive wars than anyone in the Balkans suffered. Each of the Balkan countries emerged from the 1990s with the prospect of democratic, even if illiberal and imperfect, governance. Only one of the Arab Spring countries, Tunisia, comes even close to that. Except for Iraq and Israel–each imperfect and illiberal in its own way–none of the Middle East can come even close to the freedom of expression and association Balkan citizens today enjoy.
So my message, argued at length in From War to Peace in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Ukraine, is that Plan A is far better than any conceivable Plan B.
The path into EU and NATO for those who want it is getting steeper. But neither has closed its doors. I can well understand those in Kosovo who are discouraged because Brussels has delayed giving the country visa-free status, even though it met all the manifold requirements. But 2020, when the EU says it will be ready to proceed, is just around the corner. It would be a colossal error not to stay on track. Montenegro, already in NATO, seems to understand that and is likely to qualify next for EU membership. Serbia needs to clean up its courts and free up its media, in addition to meeting the technical requirements of the acquis communautaire and normalizing its relations with Kosovo. Skopje and Athens need to maintain their agreement, even if it faces a setback in one of their parliaments. Bosnia and Herzegovina will be the last piece of the Balkans puzzle to find its proper place, but it will do so if it focuses on making the Sarajevo government capable of negotiating and implementing the acquis.
There is nothing insoluble in the Balkans. 2019 should be devoted to making Plan A work. There is no better Plan B.
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Another red line erased
President Trump has apparently decided to withdraw US troops within 30 days from the one-third of the country they control with the help of allied Kurdish-led but partly Arab-staffed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in anticipation of a Turkish attack on the Kurds. This contradicts official statements of US policy, which claimed the troops would remain until Iranian forces were withdrawn. Pentagon and other officials are said to still be arguing against the decision to erase this red line.
If implemented, this withdrawal will leave a vacuum in northeastern Syria that the Turks, Syrian government with its Iranian allies, and various extremist factions will try to fill, while the SDF tries to hold the territory. A great deal will depend on which of these forces the Americans favor. If they plan to leave via Turkey, that will favor Ankara. I’d bet on that, because the Patriot sale approved less than 24 hours ago suggests a broader rapprochement with the Turks. If they go out by air or through Iraq, they might be able to help the SDF retain control. It is said the SDF are expected to continue to target extremists for American attack.
The outcome of this free-for-all is difficult to predict, though more than likely it will boil down to a fight between Turkey and the Syrian regime. That might end in a pact, with the Turks withdrawing in exchange for commitment from Damascus to crack down on the SDF, especially its Kurdish leadership. Alternatively, the extremists–ISIS or Al Qaeda–may end up with a de facto safe haven, only nominally controlled by the regime or Turkey. The SDF is unlikely to be able to hold its dominance for long without on-the-ground US support, even though they include some ferocious fighters.
Trump’s decision, assuming it holds, would be consistent with both his and President Obama’s assessment that Syria is not worth fighting for. But unlike Obama, Trump claims a firmly anti-Iranian stance. It is hard to square withdrawal from Syria with wanting to back Iran out of its regional efforts at power projection, unless the withdrawal is prelude to all-out war against Iran. Americans are not ready for that, but a president in domestic difficulty, including manifold legal troubles, might try it as a grand distraction. Woe if that is what is happening.
American withdrawal will deprive Washington of any diplomatic leverage in the chimerical Geneva talks on a political solution in Syria. But even with a US presence they weren’t going anywhere. The withdrawal will also limit US capabilities against extremists, especially once the SDF succumbs to Turkish and/or Syrian attacks.
Is this the right decision or the wrong one? Let’s put it this way: if the US was not going to commit itself to a serious rebuilding effort in eastern Syria, one that would provide a model of well-functioning governance for the rest of Syria, staying had little point. That project would have been a difficult and expensive one. Trump, like all his predecessors since 1989, has no stomach for “nation-building.” But if you want to avoid the resurgence of extremists, statebuilding is what is needed. Now it will be up to the Russians, Iranians, and Turks. Let’s see how well they do.
One consequence is apparent: Trump has demonstrated repeatedly that he takes strong positions and backs down from them quickly. Witness his almost simultaneous backdown on the closure of the US government due to the budget fight. Trump bluffs and caves. Those who thought Obama made a big mistake not enforcing the “red line” on chemical weapons in Syria should be screaming foul. But many of them won’t, because they are predominantly Republican. Another red line is being erased.
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Peace Picks December 10 – 16
- Reflections on the Middle East in 2018 | Tuesday, December 11 | 12 pm – 1:30 pm | Middle East Institute and Arab American Institute | 1319 18th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
The Middle East Institute (MEI) and the Arab American Institute (AAI) are pleased to host James Zogby (Co-founder and President, AAI and Director, Zogby Research Services) to reflect on his latest poll of perspectives from across the Middle East and North Africa. The report includes the opinions of 8,628 adults from eight Arab countries as well as Turkey and Iran on the current landscape of employment opportunities, confidence in governmental institutions, and the future of Palestine. The poll also assessed regional attitudes towards the U.S.’s role in the region, the Iran Nuclear Deal, the region’s refugee crisis, and the fight against extremism.
Joining James Zogby to discuss these findings are Nadia Bilbassy(DC Bureau Chief, Al Arabiya News), Steven Cook (Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies, Council on Foreign Relations), and Alex Vatanka (Senior Fellow, MEI).
The poll and resulting report were organized by the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The findings are available for use by the public on the website of Zogby Research Services.
2. The Open Society and its enemies in South Korea: from Right Authoritarianism – to Left? | Tuesday, December 11 | 3 pm – 5 pm | American Enterprise Institute | 1789 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
The North Korean nuclear crisis and the US–Republic of Korea (ROK) military alliance dominate international coverage of the Korean Peninsula, but what about South Korea itself? South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s administration has reportedly clamped down on media outlets, restricted freedom of speech, and encouraged partisanship in the judiciary and civil service.
Is the ROK government on a path to limit freedoms in the South? Or is this all just politics as usual in a democracy with different rules from our own? Please join AEI for a discussion on the domestic politics of South Korea and their implications for the ROK, the US, and North Korea.
Agenda
2:45 PM
Registration
3:00 PM
Panel: Toward illiberal democracy? South Korea under the Moon administration
Panelists:
Jean Lee, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Tara O, Pacific Forum; Institute for Corean-America Studies
Joshua Stanton, One Free Korea
Moderator:
Nicholas Eberstadt, AEI
4:10 PM
Conversation: The open society and its enemies in Korea: Reckoning with the ironies of history
Participants:
Nicholas Eberstadt, AEI
Sung-Yoon Lee, Tufts University
5:00 PM
Adjournment
3. Resilience in Conflict: Lessons from a Youth Exchange with the Dalai Lama | Wednesday, December 12 | 10 am – 11 am | US Institute of Peace | 2301 Constitution Ave NW, Washington, DC 20037 | Register Here
The world’s most violent conflicts are being fought within its most youthful populations. In the five countries that suffered nearly 80 percent of recent deaths from violent extremism, half of all people were younger than 22. The youth in these countries are also some of their communities’ most effective peacebuilders and best hopes for breaking cycles of violence. What does it take for these young leaders to overcome crisis, conflict, and displacement? Please join the U.S. Institute of Peace on December 12 for a streamed forum with thought leader and youth leader participants from USIP’s Youth Leaders’ Exchange with His Holiness the Dalai Lama as they share their expertise, discuss what it takes to build inner resilience and, crucially, examine how to strategically apply it to peacebuilding.
In the third year of the Exchange, USIP’s Generation Change program brought 27 youth leaders from 12 countries to Dharamsala, India, where they enhanced their peacebuilding skills through trainings in conflict management, leadership, and prejudice awareness and reduction. They engaged His Holiness the Dalai Lama on issues ranging from cultivating inner peace, building bridges across social divides, human rights and the refugee crisis, and youth leadership. By the end of the program, the participants had learned from and inspired each other, and returned home ready to redouble their efforts to reduce violence in their communities.
Speakers
Wadi Ben-Hirki
Founder, Wadi Ben-Hriki Foundation (Nigeria)
Jimmie Briggs
Executive Director, Leave Out Violence-U.S., (U.S.)
Meron Kocho
Member of Council, MESPO-Iraq (Iraq)
Maya Soetoro-Ng
Advisor, Obama Foundation (U.S.)
Gregg Zoroya
Editorial Writer, USA Today (U.S)
4. How Should the Trans-Atlantic Alliance Counter Russian Aggression? | Wednesday, December 12 | 10 am – 11:30 am | Brookings Institution | 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
The West is searching for a response to Russia’s ongoing malfeasance, including its recent attack on Ukraine in the Black Sea and its just-revealed effort to “muck around” in U.S. 2018 midterm elections. These are the latest in a long sequence of transgressions on the part of the Kremlin, ranging from the invasion of Georgia, to the violation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, to interference in the democratic processes of NATO member states, perhaps most dramatically seen in Putin’s assault on the 2016 U.S. presidential election. As a result, on both sides of the Atlantic, democratic values and institutions—and the trans-Atlantic alliance predicated upon them—are at risk.
On Dec. 12, Governance Studies and the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings will jointly co-host an event with the bipartisan Transatlantic Democracy Working Group (TDWG), featuring an expert panel that will discuss the threats emanating from Russia and elsewhere to security, democracy, and the trans-Atlantic alliance—and what the alliance can and should do about it.
Panel Speakers
Mary Louise Kelly, Host, All Things Considered – NPR
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Senior Fellow and Director, Transatlantic Security Program – Center for a New American Security
Bill Kristol, Editor at Large – The Weekly Standard
Alina Polyakova, David M Rubenstein Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, Distinguished Fellow – The Atlantic Council
5. Can International Organizations Promote Democracy? | Wednesday, December 12 | 10 am – 11:30 am | Stimson Center | 1211 Connecticut Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
Organizing Democracy, a new book by Paul Poast and Johannes Urpelainen, argues that new democracies are more likely to flourish when they receive support from international organizations to help them provide public goods to their populations. This event will present the findings of Organizing Democracy, analyze the relationships between new democracies and international organizations in the cases of Ukraine and Libya, and explore policy implications for democracy promotion by the U.S. government.
FEATURING:
PAUL POAST, Co-Author, Organizing Democracy, and Assistant Professor, Political Science, University of Chicago
STEPHEN LENNON, Director, Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID
STEVEN GRINER, Director, Department of Sustainable Democracy and Special Missions, Organization of American States
AMANDA KADLEC, Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation
ADITI GORUR, Director, Protecting Civilians in Conflict Program, Stimson Center (Moderator)
6. Discussion with Jerusalem Expert Daniel Seidemann | Wednesday, December 12 | 11 am – 12 pm | Foundation for Middle East Peace | 1779 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 |
Please RSVP to Blair Scott by no later than Monday, December 10
The Trump Administration has implemented a wholesale shift in US policy in Jerusalem. From the moving of the US embassy and recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, to de-funding Palestinian hospitals in East Jerusalem, to the decision to close down the US Consulate General, to removing the brakes on East Jerusalem settlement activity, the policies playing out today in Jerusalem have profound implications locally, regionally, and in the geopolitically. Please join FMEP and the Carnegie Endowment for a discussion with Jerusalem expert Danny Seidemann examining these and related issues.
Speakers:
Daniel Seidemann is a practicing attorney in Jerusalem who specializes in legal and public issues in East Jerusalem. He has participated in numerous Track II talks on Jerusalem between Israelis and Palestinians and served in an informal advisory capacity to the final status negotiations as a member of a committee of experts commissioned by Prime Minister Barak’s office to generate sustainable arrangements in Jerusalem. He is the founder and director of Terrestrial Jerusalem, an Israeli nonprofit that that works to identify and track developments in Jerusalem that could impact the political process or permanent status options, destabilize the city, spark violence, or create humanitarian crises.
Michele Dunne is the director and a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, where her research focuses on political and economic change in Arab countries, particularly Egypt, as well as U.S. policy in the Middle East. She was the founding director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council from 2011 to 2013 and was a senior associate and editor of the Arab Reform Bulletin at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace from 2006 to 2011. Dunne was a Middle East specialist at the U.S. Department of State from 1986 to 2003, where she served in assignments that included the National Security Council, the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff, the U.S. embassy in Cairo, the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. She also served as a visiting professor of Arabic language and Arab studies at Georgetown from 2003 to 2006.
Zaha Hassan is a Middle East Fellow at New America. She is a human rights lawyer and former coordinator and senior legal advisor to the Palestinian negotiating team during Palestine’s bid for UN membership (2010-2012). She is a member of Al Shabaka, the Palestinian Policy Network, and is a contributor to the Hill and Ha’aretz. Her political commentary and analysis has been published by the New York Times, CNN, Salon, the Oregonian, the Detroit News, and other outlets. She is the former cohost of the Portland, Ore.-based radio show, One Land Many Voices, on KBOO 90.7 FM.
7. Our Uncertain Nuclear Future: How Do We Proceed if Treaties are Trashed? | Wednesday, December 12 | 4 pm – 6 pm | Stimson Center | 1211 Connecticut Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
Donald Trump’s announcement of intent to withdraw from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty constitutes another severe blow to a treaty-based system of nuclear arms and threat reduction. One last treaty governing formal, verifiable draw-downs of nuclear forces remains — the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Mr. Trump has vacillated wildly in his comments on the future of U.S. strategic forces, ranging from an expressed interest in deep cuts to significant arms build-ups. For now, he has declined Vladimir Putin’s offer of extending New START. Trump’s national security adviser, John Bolton, might be expected to seek withdrawal from New START, and he might well succeed, rather than to leave the decision of its extension and further reductions to the winner of the next presidential election.
Please join us for a discussion of our nuclear future with Nina Tannenwald, Director of the International Relations Program at Brown University, Jon Wolfsthal, Director of the Nuclear Crisis Group and Senior Advisor to Global Zero, and Lynn Rusten, Vice President of the Global Nuclear Policy Program at the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Our speakers will address the following questions: What role will norms play in our nuclear future? What role will treaties play, with specific reference to New START? Will we be entering a future of “arms control without agreements”? If so, what might this look like? Stimson’s Co-founder, Michael Krepon, will moderate our discussion.
8. Targeted Sanctions on Human Rights Abusers and Kleptocracies: Lessons Learned and Opportunities from the Global Magnitsky Santions | Thursday, December 13 | 9 am – 10:30 am | Center for Strategic and International Studies | 1616 Rhode Island Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
Please join the Human Rights Initiative for reflections from U.S. Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD), the author of the Global Magnitsky Act. He will be followed by a panel examining the impact of the Global Magnitsky sanctions, opportunities to improve implementation, and how the sanctions fit within financial sector approaches to human rights and corruption. These sanctions enable targeted designations based on human rights abuse and corruption around the world, and have been imposed on officials and companies in a number of recent high profile situations, including Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nicaragua.
Keynote Speaker
U.S. Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD)
Panel
Robert Berschinski
Senior Vice President Policy at Human Rights First
Robert Peri
Director of US Sanctions at Citibank
Joshua White
Director of Policy and Analysis at The Sentry
9. How Can U.S. Foreign Policymakers Do Better for the Middle Class? | Thursday, December 13 | 9:30 am – 10:45 am | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | 1779 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
Americans are increasingly skeptical that the U.S. role abroad benefits them economically at home. What will it take to bridge the divide between America’s foreign policy and domestic imperatives? Join Susan Glasser for a conversation with two former White House chiefs of staff on how to make U.S. foreign policy work better for America’s middle class.
This event will launch a new report, U.S. Foreign Policy for the Middle Class: Perspectives from Ohio — the first in a series of state-level case studies from Carnegie’s bipartisan task force on foreign policy for the middle class
William J. Burns is president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He previously served as U.S. deputy secretary of state.
Joshua Bolten served as White House chief of staff under president George W. Bush, and is currently president and CEO of the Business Roundtable.
Denis McDonough is served as White House chief of staff for president Barack Obama’s second term, and is currently a visiting senior fellow in Carnegie’s Technology and Internatinal Affairs Program.
Susan B. Glasser is a staff writer at the New Yorker, where she writes a weekly column on life in Trump’s Washington. She was a founding editor of Politicoand editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy Magazine.
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Iraqi trends
The Washington Institute on Near East Policy hosted a panel on emerging political trends in Iraq’s post-election period on November 27th. The panel featured Munqith Dagher, CEO of Baghdad-based Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies (IIACSS), Ahmed Ali, program officer at the National Endowment for Democracy, and David Pollock, Berinstein Fellow at the Washington Institute and director of its Fikra Forum.
While many Americans are tired of Iraq, Pollock reminded that it is still of strategic importance to American interests, which include preventing the country from incubating terrorism and tipping the region in a hostile, pro-Iran direction. It is also a potential demographic, economic, and religious powerhouse in the region. Iraqi oil exports are half those of the Saudis. Because of the 2003 invasion, the success of Iraq reflects on America’s political clout in the region, with many people seeing Iraq as a US responsibility.
Pollock pointed out the importance of public opinion polling in Iraq, a powerful but underutilized tool. The rise of the Islamic State in 2014 and the divisions arising from Kurdistan’s 2017 independence referendum were in line with Dagher’s polling at the time. To avoid being taken by surprise in the post-election space, public opinion-informed policy is crucial.
Dagher stated that we are at a crossroads in Iraqi attitudes, with three transformative shifts in public opinion.
1. A shift in inter-sectarian dynamics
For the first time since 2003, Sunnis are overall happier than Shi’a and Kurds. More specifically, they have more trust in the central Iraqi government than their Shi’a counterparts, an increase from 20% in 2016 to 50% today. Sunni Arabs have been reluctant to participate in the political process since Saddam’s ousting, and Dagher emphasized that this moment should be capitalized on to get them involved in the political process.
2. From inter to intra-sectarian conflicts
Iraq has a long history of sectarian politics. We are finally seeing a shift towards interest-based politics. Sectarian identity as the most important source of identity has dropped to below 10% for all three groups. It was as high as 61% in 2013 among Kurds. Iraqi citizenship as the most important source of identity has increased significantly among Shi’a. While it is still very low for Kurds at 6%, there are so signs of further decrease. Across various polling questions, namely if Iraq is heading in the wrong direction, geography is playing a more important role than ever. For example, Sunni Arabs in Mosul are significantly more likely to believe that the country is heading in the wrong direction (69%) than Sunni Arabs in general (55%), as are the Shi’a Arabs of Basra than Shi’a at large.
3. Less international polarization
The ability of regional actors to take advantage of Iraq’s traditional sectarian divisions has also diminished. Iran’s popularity, when asked if it is a reliable partner, has dropped from 75% to 44% among Shi’a Arabs in the last two years alone. The most significant drop was between 2017 (70%) and today (44%), which Dagher attributed to the protests in Basra as well as the visible interference of both the US and Iran in the recent election. Access to information has increased as a result of growing internet use among Iraqis. It jas increased from 40% in 2014 to 80% today. Ninety per cent of Iraqi youth have at least one social media account. Among Sunni Arabs, favorable views of Saudi Arabia have decreased from 90% in 2012 to 61% today.
These trends are overshadowed by more alarming shifts under the surface. The population thinks the country is heading in the wrong direction more than ever, with 80% of respondents agreeing compared to 50% in April 2012. The most recent election has been marred by the fact that less than 1 in 5 respondents thought it free and fair. Dagher warned that lack of trust in the democratic political system might explain why 66% prefer a “strong leader who doesn’t care about Parliament nor elections,” accompanied by dramatic decreases in voter turnout. Ali attributed this legitimacy crisis to the gulf between politicians’ and the public’s views. He cited the Basra anti-corruption protests, which were predictable, and the lack of serious response from the Iraqi government.
For Ali, the big area for policy makers is post-ISIS reconstruction. Addressing grievances in post-ISIS regions and reunifying the country requires institutional governance reforms. Most importantly, the electoral process needs to be transparent and accountable to improve public trust, as demonstrated by post-election fraud allegations. The new Iraqi government has its work cut out for it.
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Trump is a sore loser
President Trump has taken a beating over the past week. The Democrats have won control of the House of Representatives by a wider margin than originally thought. They are now approaching a 40-vote majority. The suburbs, Hispanics, Asians, and white college-educated women abandoned the Republicans in droves. The uptick of one or two Republican seats in the Senate enables Trump to continue getting judges and other high officials approved, but the House will be conducting oversight as never before and initiating budget bills the Administration won’t like.
The Democrats will also pass legislation they know won’t get past the Senate but will lay out their own agenda for 2020. First up will apparently be a bill protecting the right to vote, something the Republicans have been trying hard to suppress, as well as the voting system (from foreign interference). Access to health care and education as well as environmental protection are likely in the queue.
Then last weekend Trump went to Paris for the World War I centennial, where he declined a visit to a cemetery because of rain, refused to join the other allied heads of state in a walk up the Champs Elysees, and got scolded by his erstwhile friend President Macron for his attachment to nativist nationalism. He looked out of sorts and out of place in the events he did attend, except when smiling broadly at President Putin.
Back in the US, Trump failed to make the traditional 3.3 mile trip to Arlington Cemetery on Veterans’ Day. Instead he sulked in the White House and has stayed there since, tweeting criticism of forest management in California while its first responders were risking their lives fighting a giant forest fire and dozens of Californians were dying. To boot: the Federal government controls 98% of the forests in California, so if forest management is really the cause… But it isn’t: Trump said that just to please logging interests. The main cause is climate change, which has made California much drier and windier.
Trump has good reason to be worried. Rumor has it that Special Counsel Mueller is getting ready to charge Don Jr., his eldest son and confidante, with conspiracy against the United States by plotting to gain Russian assistance during the election campaign. That will put Trump in the unenviable position of either throwing his son under the bus or admitting what we all suspect: his son did it with his father’s knowledge and encouragement. Even if that indictment doesn’t happen, the Mueller investigation and oversight hearings in the House threaten to expose financial and other malfeasance in the Trump real estate empire. There is little doubt that Trump was laundering Russian oligarchs’ ill-gotten gains.
So Trump fired his racist Attorney General Sessions, who had recused himself from the Russia investigation and failed to prevent Mueller from exploring the financial angle, and replaced him with an “acting” AG who has publicly advocated hogtying the Special Counsel. This Matthew Whitaker was quickly shown to be so blatantly unqualified, and associated with dubious business dealings, that Trump claimed not to know him well.
Anything Whitaker does with respect to the Mueller investigation will no doubt lead to a subpoena to testify in Congress. Mueller, expecting the worst, I trust has prepared a dead man switch in the form of evidence and investigations by US attorneys (Federal prosecutors in the states) as well as state attorneys general. It is hard to turn off the multi-layered US justice system completely. That thought will redouble the President’s concerns.
To compound Trump’s problems, his wife instructed him in public this week to expel the deputy national security adviser from the White House staff. Mira Ricardel had offended the First Lady or her staff in some fashion on her recent trip to Africa. Trump obeyed. You can imagine how that made him feel.
Some will worry that Trump’s ugly mood may make him take military action. He is certainly not above trying to use the military to bolster his own cause, as he did in pointlessly deploying US troops to the Mexican border to counter a dwindling “caravan” of asylum-seekers more than a thousand miles away.
But real military action seems to be something he shies from. The one-off 2017 cruise missile retaliation in response to a Syrian chemical weapons attack seems to be his kind of thing. He has not initiated any sustained military action since coming to office. In the absence of compelling national security issues this Administration would find it hard to convince Congress or the American people it was a good thing to do.
What we’ve got is a president whose surprising good fortune in getting elected along with a Republican Congress has peaked. He is now facing stark political and judicial realities. Some presidents would respond with reassessment and renewed energy. Not this one. Donald Trump, for whom winning is everything, is a sore loser.
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