Tag: Democracy and Rule of Law
Peace picks July 15 – 21
1. The Legacy of the July 15 Coup Attempt on Civil-Military and US-Turkey Relations | Monday, July 16, 2018 | 10:30 am – 3:30 pm | The SETA Foundation | Register Here
On July 15, 2016, the Turkish people demonstrated their commitment to democracy and civil rights by peacefully resisting and stopping an attempted coup by a faction within the Turkish Armed Forces. In the two years since, Turkey has changed its system of government and overhauled its military forces, reforms which have had marked effects on the nature of civil-military relations in Turkey. These changes will have significant impact on the future of the US-Turkey relations as well as the democratic development of the country.
On July 16, The SETA Foundation at Washington DC will host a conference on the anniversary of the July 15 coup attempt with a Keynote Address by Dr. Ravza Kavakci Kan, Deputy Chairperson of the AK Party. Two panel discussions will focus on the future of civil-military relations in Turkey and the changes in Turkey since the 2016 coup attempt will mean for the future of the US-Turkey security partnership, which has long been a strong bond between the two nations.
10:30 – 12:00 Panel I: The Future of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey
Sener Akturk, Associate Professor, Koç University Department of International Relations
Edward Erickson, Scholar-in-Residence in the Clark Center for Global Engagement, State University of New York at Cortland
Mark Perry, Author and Foreign Policy Analyst
Moderated by Kadir Ustun, Executive Director, The SETA Foundation at Washington DC
12:00 – 1:00 Keynote Address by Dr. Ravza Kavakci Kan, Deputy Chairperson of the AK Party
1:00 – 1:30 Lunch
1:30 – 3:00 Panel II: The Future of the US-Turkey Security Partnership
Mark Kimmitt, Defense Consultant, MTK Defense Consultants
Richard Outzen, Senior US Army Advisor & Member of Policy Planning Staff, US Department of State
Kadir Ustun, Executive Director, The SETA Foundation at Washington DC
Moderated by Kilic B. Kanat, Research Director, The SETA Foundation at Washington DC
2. Second Anniversary of the July 15 Coup Attempt | Monday, July 16, 2018 | 11:00 am – 12:30 pm | Turkish Heritage Organization | Held at the United States Institute for Peace, Auditorium – 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037 | Register Here
Please join THO and Bau International University on Monday, July 16, for an exclusive interview with Ret. General, Commander of the Turkish Land Forces, Salih Zeki Colak. This event will focus on the second anniversary of the July 15 coup attempt that took place in 2016.
Speakers:
Salih Zeri Colak – Retired General, Commander of the Turkish Land Forces
Dr. M. Hakan Yavuz – Professor of Political Science, University of Utah
Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr. – Chairman Emeritus, Stimson Center
3. JCPOA 2.0: Iran, Europe, Trump, and the Future of the Iran Deal | Monday, July 16, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm | National Iranian American Council | Capitol Visitor Center, Room SVC-210/212 | Register Here
Nearly two months have passed since President Trump exited from the Iran nuclear deal and announced the reimposition of nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. While major businesses have withdrawn from the Iranian market in the wake of the decision, the remaining parties to the accord have continued to engage in dialogue about how to keep the accord alive.
Speakers:
John Glaser – Director of Foreign Policy Studes, Cato Institute
Kelsey Davenport – Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association
Reza Marashi – Research Director, National Iranian American Council
Jamal Abdi – Vice President of Policy, National Iranian American Council
4. Are Americans Giving Up on Democracy? | Tuesday, July 17, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm | New America | Register Here
How committed are Americans to the values, norms and processes of democracy itself? As non-democratic and illiberal movements take hold across the globe, and with democratic norms and voting rights under threat in the U.S., this question has gained urgency. Recently, two major studies of public attitudes, from the Democracy Fund’s Voter Study Group and from Pew Research Center, have delved deeply and rigorously into this question.
Please join us for a lunchtime conversation about the state of our democracy, what citizens want to see from their country, and how to move forward. Lee Drutman of New America and Jocelyn Kiley from Pew Research Center will present the key findings of the results, followed by a discussion involving journalists and academics who have watched the shifting ground of American democracy from different angles.
Speakers:
Lee Drutman – Senior Fellow, Political Reform, New America
Jocelyn Kiley – Associate Director, US Politics, Pew Research Center
Perry Bacon, Jr. – Political Writer, FiveThirtyEight
Vanessa Wiliamson – Fellow, Governance Studies, Brookings Institution
Henry Olsen – Senior Fellow, Ethics and Public Policy Center
5. Supporting Democracy in Challenging Times | Tuesday, July 17, 2018 | 1:00 pm – 2:30 pm | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here
For more than three decades, the United States has provided bipartisan support to secure freedom, human rights and democratic governance for countries around the world through the work of the National Endowment for Democracy, along with its four core institutes, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the Solidarity Center.
Over the past decade, the work of promoting democracy has been increasingly challenging amidst a phenomenon of democratic recession and resurgent authoritarianism, which is increasingly viewed by scholars as a new era of ideological and political contestation. Systemic corruption, deep inequality and injustice, and the failure of governments to address the needs of ordinary citizens breed political instability, terrorism, and massive flows of refugees – conditions that threaten our own security and well-being. Authoritarian leaders are capitalizing on these conditions and accelerating their efforts to penetrate and corrupt fragile states through aggressive political, economic, technological and cultural mechanisms with the goal of reaping political influence and acquiring strategic resources. Please join us at CSIS on July 17 as we host the heads of the NED, CIPE, IRI, NDI, and the Solidarity Center to discuss the new challenges in supporting democracy.
Speakers:
Carl Gershman – President, National Endowment for Democracy
Andrew Wilson – Executive Director, Center for International Private Enterprise
Daniel Twining – President, International Republican Institute
Kenneth Wollack – President, National Democratic Institute
Shawna Bader-Blau – Executive Director, Solidarity Center
Daniel F. Runde – William A. Schreyer Chair and Director, Project on Prosperity and Development, CSIS
6. Oil and Iran: How Renewed Sanctions Will Affect Iran and World Markets | Wednesday, July 18, 2018 | 1:00 pm – 2:30 pm | Atlantic Council | Register Here
In exiting the Iran nuclear deal, the Trump administration has vowed to drastically reduce Iran’s oil exports below figures reached during negotiations over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Administration officials have been traveling the globe urging importers of Iranian oil to cut purchases to zero by Nov. 4, the deadline for re-imposition of US secondary sanctions. The panel will discuss whether this goal is realistic and the impact the US campaign is having on global production and prices as well as on Iran.
Speakers:
Moderator: Barbara Slavin – Director, Future of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Anna Borshchevskaya – Ira Weiner Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Amos J. Hochstein – Senior Vice President, Marketing, Tellurian Inc.
Robin Mills – CEO, Qamar Energy
Brian O’Toole – Non-resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Sara Vakhshouri – Founder and President, SVB Energy International
7. From Washington to Brussels: A Discussion on the NATO 2018 Summit | Thursday, July 19, 2018 | 8:30 am – 9:15 am | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here
Please join us on Thursday, July 19 for a timely conversation with Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Senator Thom Tillis (R-NC), Co-Chairs of the Senate NATO Observer Group and members of the U.S. delegation to the July 11-12 NATO Summit, for post-summit analysis as well as a discussion of the vital role that bipartisan Congressional leadership plays in tackling transatlantic security challenges. Our speakers will share details about the specific role the newly constituted Senate NATO Observer Group will play in providing Congressional support for NATO and U.S. strategic interests in Europe.
8. No Friends, No Enemies? Trans-Atlantic Relations after Trump’s Europe Trip | Thursday, July 19, 2018 | 4:00 pm – 5:30 pm | Brookings Institution | Register Here
What is the state of the Atlantic alliance following the July NATO summit and the meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki? Where are relations heading between the Trump administration and the European Union, which Trump has claimed “was set up to take advantage” of the United States? What are the implications of the Trump administration’s protectionism for trans-Atlantic relations? Where do Brexit Britain and post-election Turkey fit in an evolving West? Under pressure from within and without, can the European Union forge a stronger independent foreign policy and preserve multilateralism and liberal order in a world where these concepts are under assault?
On July 19, the Center on the United States and Europe, in partnership with the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD), will host a panel discussion examining recent developments in Europe and trans-Atlantic relations, including the outcomes of Trump’s July trip to Brussels, London, and Helsinki. Following the discussion, the panelists will take questions from the audience.
Speakers:
Introduction: Bahadir Kaleagasi – CEO, TUSIAD
Moderator: Susan B. Glasser – Staff Writer, The New Yorker
Robert Kagan – Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
Kemal Kirişci – Senior Fellow, TUSIAD; Director, The Turkey Project, Brookings Institution
Angela Stent – Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
Thomas Wright – Director, Center on the United States and Europe, Brookings Institution
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All eyes on Russia
On Friday, a large convoy of tanks and military vehicles flying Syrian and Russian flags arrived at the Nasib-Jaber crossing into Jordan, marking the return of regime control over Syria’s strategic southern border for the first time in five years. Hours later, Al Jazeera reported that opposition fighters agreed to a cease fire with Russian negotiators representing regime forces in Dera’a Province. The story is familiar. Rebel forces will give up their heavy weapons and civilians in Dera’a will return to living under Assad’s rule, while fighters who refuse to surrender are transported to the last remaining opposition strongholds: a small area of Idlib Province and a thin sliver of land east of the Golan Heights.
One key aspect, however, differentiates this cease fire from its predecessors in Homs, Aleppo, and Eastern Ghouta: Russian military police will administer the newly-recaptured areas in an attempt to encourage the 320,000 Syrians displaced by the offensive to return to their homes. While largely symbolic, continued Russian influence on the ground, even after fighting ceases, represents another step in Russia’s evolution from one of several powerful players to the key actor in the Syrian conflict. The message is clear: Moscow will control how this conflict ends. Past inaction indicates that the US cannot do anything about it.
This development is particularly troubling at a time when US president Trump is angling to score a big win with President Putin at their summit in Helsinki on July 16, with Ukraine and Syria at the top of the agenda. In an April 9 interview with the Washington Post, King Abdullah II of Jordan argued that isolating the two conflicts would not lead to any significant progress on either issue. Instead, he said, the US must deal with the Russians on Syria and Ukraine simultaneously and “horse-trade.”
The problem is that Trump does not have a horse to trade in either case, making prospects for Russian deescalation in Syria or Ukraine unlikely. On the Syrian front, Trump has already made his intentions clear. He wants to remove the 2,000 US special forces headquartered in At-Tanf as soon as possible. Withdrawal would open the door for Assad to take back eastern Syria, as the US represents the driving force behind the fragile alliance that holds the area.
Trump has already shown his cards. His attitude during the southern Syria offensive demonstrates that Trump will not stand in Putin’s way if push comes to shove in eastern Syria. Further, Trump’s behavior at the G7 summit, where he argued that Crimea rightfully belongs to Russia and argued for Putin to be allowed back into the group, indicates that US sanctions imposed against Russia in retaliation for the invasion of Ukraine could be up for negotiation, for little to nothing in return.
Trump has weakened his position in recent months at a time when Putin has significantly strengthened his. This means that the US delegation will go into Helsinki with barely any of what Trump, of all people, should know is necessary: leverage. Putin will likely get what he wants in Syria: US troop withdrawal. In exchange, Trump will get no more than vague pledges to curb human rights abuses in Syria as well as the Iranian presence. He may also get a nonbinding agreement to deescalate in Ukraine.
All parties will leave the summit satisfied; Trump will have his tweetable win, while Putin will solidify his status as kingmaker in Syria and Ukraine. This result will continue to erode US credibility on the Arab street. US popularity in the Arab world is at a nadir after “nation building” turned Iraq into a failed state, Assad’s chemical weapons use was met mostly with military silence, and Jerusalem was given to Israel on a platter. Betrayal in Syria will only further damage American interests in the region, which are already hanging by a thread.
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Who can fix Bosnia?
Delvin Kovač of Bosnian website Vijesti.ba asked questions; I replied:
- Should the international community increase its presence in Bosnia, since Bosnian politicians can’t come to an agreement on any important issues regarding Bosnia’s future?
A: No. It may need to adjust its presence, for example by moving all the EU military forces to Brcko to forestall any attempt to seize it by one entity of the other, but Bosnia’s politicians need to learn to deal with their own problems.
- Will Bosnia be sliding into a constitutional crisis after the autumn elections this year, as some politicians already announced such scenario due to unresolved electoral law issue?
A: No. As I’ve explained, there are adequate provisions in the existing Federation constitution to deal with any issues that may arise.
- Bosnian Croat lawmakers refused to attend a session of the lower house of the Federal Parliament because the body recently adopted an election-related law without them. Is boycotting a Parliament maybe a part of a Croat Democratic Party Leader Dragan Covic’s so called “Plan B”?
A: You’ll have to ask him. For me, boycotting is a way of eliminating yourself from the political equation, not getting what you want. If you want to protect your rights, show up.
- A coalition of parties representing Bosnian Serbs in the Government said that it would not allow Bosnia to enter NATO while neighbouring Serbia is not part of the international alliance. Should Bosnia really depend on neighbouring countries Serbia’s and Croatia’s decisions when it comes to foreign policy issues?
A: No. But it is up to Bosnia’s voters to punish at the polls politicians who want to follow foreign leaders rather than their own.
- Milorad Dodik is no longer the only ally of Russian Federation in Bosnia, since it is expanding an influence in Bosnia and Croatia through the Croat Democratic Party Leader Dragan Covic and the group of lawmakers in the Croatian Parliament. Russian Federation is obviously penetrating NATO countries territory increasingly. Is that to be considered dangerous?
A: Yes, but again it is up to voters to punish at the polls those leaders who kowtow to the Russians.
- Dragan Covic said that local parties cannot agree on the solution for the local election in Mostar and that the local election will almost definitely not be held in this city, which faces an indefinite wait for a new municipal council. What do you think is a adequate solution for this problem?
A: I think an adquate solution for this problem is one Bosnians can agree on. I don’t think you should expect foreigners to be very interested any longer in your municipal elections. I spent a lot of time on Mostar at the Dayton peace talks. It is time for you to invest the political energy needed to overcome the problems there.
- What can Bosnian citizens expect if Milorad Dodik and Dragan Covic become the Serb and the Croat member of the Bosnian tripartite Presidency. They both openly call for the destruction of Bosnia and the creation of a para-state – third entity? Who can confront such dangerous politics of the two?
A: Bosnia’s citizens, principally. But the West can be relied upon not to recognize any state that attempts to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nor will Croatia or Serbia want that.
PS: Here it is in Bosnian.
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Bad assumptions make bad policy
The Post recently published Jamal Khashoggi’s “It’s time to divide Syria.” A few assertions that Khashoggi made jump out as pertinent examples of biases and assumptions that can often be found in Western media reports about Syria. Here are a few examples of this:
To bring about a permanent peace in Syria, the southern part of the country must be protected. Victory for Assad there is not a complete solution so much as it is a pause. The territories governed by Assad are ruled by fear and a loss of hope for prosperity.
Assad has been responsible for the murder of hundreds of thousands of his own people. He has chemically attacked his compatriots and will go down in history as one of the cruellest and bloodiest despots in modern history. This can lead people to assume that he has managed to stay in power only by keeping the population under his control in a constant state of fear and oppression. It is this assumption – that Assad’s dictatorship commanded little or no popular support – that led international actors, particularly regional powers such as Turkey and Qatar, to believe that Assad’s regime would collapse quickly in 2011.
They were ultimately proven wrong. Syrian sectarian tensions, as well as the government’s historical use of clientelism and patronage to foster elite support, provided Assad with broad support from some ethnic minorities in Syria – particularly his own group, the Alawis. In addition, many non-minority Sunnis see Assad as the sole source of stability in the country. Judging and condemning Assad for the way in which he has treated his people is justified and right. It is, however, a tenuous and possibly counter-productive justification for intervention, particularly if we repeat the mistakes of Iraq in failing to properly plan for the aftermath.
The United States should propose partition in Syria. Assad can keep what he controls, and the rebels can form local governments and establish a new entity. With international recognition and support, it would be possible to hold elections for local councils [and] curtail radicalized individuals […].
Portraying Islamist and jihadist rebels as “radicalized individuals” makes them sound like a few bad apples within a more moderate rebel ensemble. Yet broad swathes of the Syrian opposition are radical, with the salafist Ahrar al-Sham or the jihadist Tahrir al-Sham among the largest and most effective opposition groups in Syria today. These are not just individuals but unavoidable strategic actors, determined power players, who will have a role to play in Syria for years to come.
The ideological composition of the opposition, and its fragmented nature, mean that distinguishing between “radical” and “moderate” elements is near-impossible. Curtailing radical groups would not only require more military power than any international actor is willing to currently provide, it would also require a level of insight and decisiveness in determining who needs to be curtailed and who should participate in governing a new Syria that no foreigners currently possess.
The assertion that we can – and should – eliminate radical elements of the opposition also underestimates the support these groups command within the population. American hostility and distaste for radical Islam clouds the fact that for many Syrians, particularly those who are Sunni Arabs, these groups are a viable and even desirable alternative to Assad’s rule. Many also see them as a necessary evil to counter creeping Iranian influence in Syria, a sort of counter-Hezbollah that will fight fire with fire.
What would Khashoggi recommend if his elected local councils installed radical Muslims in power? More generally, Western commentators should not assume that radical elements in Syria will be “curtail[ed]” by the Syrian population once it votes.
Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State will always be threats, but they will likely be rejected by the local Syrian community if there are international and regional forces supporting Syrian aspirations for moderate civilian rule.
Many Syrians want peace and stability more than they want “moderate civilian rule;” many fear that a transition to a more democratic form of government would prove a new source of chaos and instability, as it was in Iraq after 2003 and Egypt after 2012.
The assumption that democracy is something people inherently yearn for has plagued Western interpretation of Middle Eastern political crises for decades. It was particularly visible during the “Arab Spring” uprisings of 2010-11, when news organizations such as The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal heralded the popular desire for democratic rule in the region.
Of course there are large numbers of local activists and citizens who call and hope for more popular representation and participation across the Middle East; but assuming this a basic and widespread concern for everyone is misleading. Not because they are inherently attached to strongman rule or too passive for civic participation, but because democracy is for many a privilege that comes after security and prosperity. If foreign powers intervened in Syria assuming that its citizens are on the same page as they are about what Syria should look like post-civil war, they could be in for a big surprise.
We should stop making assumptions and generalizations that we can’t back up with evidence. Western powers have too often intervened in Middle Eastern politics – often with destructive consequences – because of false assumptions and an inflated belief in the obviousness and infallibility of their liberal and democratic values.
The United States could do a lot to help the Syrian population today: more humanitarian assistance to the displaced Syrians in the South, and more political support to ensure that Syrian Kurdish interests are represented in negotiations about the future of Syria, for instance. For productive American involvement in the Syrian conflict to happen, however, it can’t be obscured by flashier plans based on misleading statements; they may sound more appealing, but are not grounded in reality. Accurate information should be a prerequisite, not an afterthought, of American foreign policymaking in the Middle East.
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Peace Picks July 8 – 15
You can find more events for the upcoming week here
1. A Vision: Ukraine – 2030: Sustainable Development Doctrine | Tuesday, July 10, 2018 | 1:30 pm – 3:00 pm | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Ukraine has made significant progress on ambitious economic and financial reforms in recent years. Steps have been taken to intensify the fight against corruption and boost economic growth across a range of sectors. However, much work is still needed for Ukraine’s economic development and improvement of the socio-economic situation. In addition to focus on specific reforms and bolstering investor confidence, strategies for long-term sustainable development must also be considered.
At this event, Mr. Serhiy Taruta, Member of Parliament, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, will present a paper, entitled Ukraine 2030, a vision which lays out a framework for the strategic direction of Ukraine’s long-term development. This will be followed by a discussion on the challenges and opportunities for Ukraine’s sustainable development will be discussed.
Speakers:
Moderator: Ambassador John Herbst, Director – Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Mr. Serhiy Taruta, Member of Parliament, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
Dr. Anders Åslund, Senior Fellow – Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council; Independent Member, Supervisory Board, Ukrzaliznytsia
Dr. Vira Nanivska, Policy Research Director, Collegium Anna Yaroslavna: East
Dr. Edi Segura, Chairman of the Board, The Blezyer Foundation; Partner and Chief Economist, SigmaBleyzer
Ms. Michelle Small, Director, Head of the Washington DC Representative Office, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Mr. Morgan Williams, President, US-Ukraine Business Council
2. Elections in Zimbabwe: Autocracy and Stasis, or Democracy and Change? | Tuesday, July 10, 2018 | 3:00 pm – 4:30 pm | National Endowment for Democracy | Register Here
Since the Movement for Democratic Change’s founding in 1999, Zimbabwe has been going through a protracted struggle for democratization. An entrenched incumbent, fortified by a strong political-military network, has met aspirations for democratic improvement with strong resistance. This network, however, underwent a serious rupture last November when former allies effectively deposed its long-serving leader, Robert Mugabe. The new president, President Emmerson Mnangagwa, has scheduled general elections for July 30, 2018. The upcoming polls present new political dynamics and a heightened level of anticipation both within and outside Zimbabwe. In his presentation, Dr. Alex Magaisa will consider the struggle to achieve greater democratic accountability in today’s Zimbabwe. He will assess preparations for the approaching elections and discuss the prospects for democratization, including possible post-election scenarios and the roles of the military and the international community. Comments by Dr.Alexander H. Noyes will follow.
Speakers:
Moderator: Natalie Kay, Program Officer, Southern Africa, National Endowment for Democracy
Alex Magaisa, Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow, National Endowment for Democracy
Alexander H. Noyes, Senior Associate (Non-Resident), Africa Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
3. July 15 Coup Attempt: Two Years Later | Wednesday, July 11, 2018 | 11:00 am – 12:30 pm | Turkish Heritage Organization
Please join the Turkish Heritage Organization and the Global Policy Institute on July 11 for a panel discussion on the second anniversary of the July 15 coup attempt that took place in 2016. Since this critical event in Turkey’s recent history, the country has witnessed profound changes within both its foreign and domestic politics. Our distinguished guests will discuss how the coup attempt shaped present day Turkey and the potential implications regarding U.S.-Turkey relations.
Speakers:
Moderator: Deniz Karatas, Global Policy Institute
Abraham Wagner, Adjunct Professor of International and Public Affairs & Senior Research Scholar, Columbia University
4. Future of US-Turkish Relations After Erdogan’s Victory | Wednesday, July 11, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 2:00 pm | Endowment for Middle East Truth | Register Here
Join EMET on Capitol Hill as we host Congressman Gus Bilirakis, FDD scholar and former Turkish parliament member Dr. Aykan Erdemir, the pro-Kurdish opposition US representative of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), Giran Ozcan, and EMET’s Director of the Kurdistan Project, Diliman Abdulkader. The panel will be moderated by EMET founder and President Sarah Stern. Our panel will analyze the implications of the June 24th Turkish elections called by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Leading Turkey since 2002 with the Justice and Development Party (AKP), internally Erdogan has tilted state institutions to further solidify his position, he has targeted political opposition groups, academics, journalists, and the Kurdish minority all while labeling those speaking against his rule as “terrorists.” Erdogan has distanced himself from his short-lived “zero problem with neighbors” policy as he has made more foes than friends in the region. He has threatened Greece with military action while continuing to have a foothold in Northern Cyprus. His incursions into Syria targeting US-backed Kurdish forces has created a diminishing of relations with the United States. Under Erdogan, Turkey has pivoted towards Russia by purchasing Russian missiles incompatible with NATO defense systems. The panel will examine the outcome of the elections, what Turkey’s future holds under Erdogan and how this will affect US-Turkish relations.
5. Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent After the Fall of the Caliphate | Wednesday, July 11, 2018 | 12:00pm – 1:45pm | Foreign Policy Research Institute | Register Here
In 2014, the United States stated its intention to “degrade and destroy” ISIS. Since then, a diverse array of forces has worked tirelessly to liberate key territories in Iraq and Syria from ISIS’s Caliphate. Now, in the summer of 2018, ISIS’s Caliphate largely has been dismantled as a territorial entity. However, the group is far from destroyed, and its ability to maneuver is much improved as it reverts to an insurgency. What’s more, there is very little to prevent yet another non-state armed group from retaking the very same lands that ISIS once held. Accordingly, American diplomacy, military strategy, and intelligence collection likely will focus on Iraq and Syria for many years to come. Thus, the question for policymakers is how the U.S. can prevent non-state armed groups from regaining a territorial foothold, further destabilizing these territories, and ultimately threatening U.S. interests in the region. Relatedly, the question of what to do about the likes of al-Qaeda and ISIS even if they do not hold territory remains equally pressing.
“Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent After the Fall of the Caliphate,” a special issue of Orbis: FPRI’s Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018) and the subject of this panel, seeks to provide a framework for thinking about the threat of terrorism emanating from the Fertile Crescent now that ISIS’s Caliphate is being undone and to provide concrete policy recommendations to establish a tenable politico-economic status quo.
Speakers:
Tally Helfont, Director of Program on the Middle East, Foreign Policy Research Institute
Samuel Helfont, Assistant Professor, Naval War College, Monterey
Barak Mendelsohn, Associate Professor, Haverford College
Assaf Moghadam, Adjunct Associate Professor, Columbia University
6. Next Steps on North Korea: Denuclearization and Building a New Relationship | Thursday, July 12, 2018 | 9:00am – 10:30 am | Korea Economic Institute of America | Register Here
With the historic first meeting between a sitting U.S. president and the leader of North Korea now complete, the difficult process of negotiating North Korea’s dismantlement and building a new relationship between the United States and North Korea begins. What are the key steps the United States and North Korea need to take to achieve the goals of the Singapore Statement? What is the role of South Korea as the process moves forward? What challenges beyond denuclearization are there for building new U.S.-North Korea relationship?
Please join the Korea Economic Institute of America and the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy for a discussion of the key next steps in dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program and moving towards the new relationship called for in the Singapore Statement.
Speakers:
Moderator: Jenna Gibson, Korea Economic Institute of America
Patrick Cronin, Center for a New American Security
Katrin Katz, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Kim Seok Hwan, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy
Kim Yong Hyun, Dongguk University
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Fixing democracy
Fitim Gashi of Pristina daily Koha Ditore asked some questions last week. I answered:
1. Having in mind the growing alarm about the wave of populism sweeping the Europe and USA, as well as the erosion of democratic safeguards in particular European states, such as Hungary, Poland, what can be said about the state of democracy today? Is it fair to say that democracy is in decline?
A: Democracy is facing serious challenges, but it still has capacity to respond to them. Leaders need to listen more carefully to citizens and try to represent them more fully.
2. Why is this happening? Which are the main factors contributing to the decline of the democracy?
A: It seems to me trade and immigration are the main issues, though in many countries corruption is a contributing factor. We should also recognize that racism and xenophobia are important contributing factors.
3. What can be done to prevent the situation from deteriorating?
A: Reducing the negative impacts of trade and immigration on relatively uneducated people in America and Europe would help. So too would more vigorous defense of a trading regime that has raised living standards and greater recognition that both America and Europe need young workers. I really don’t know what to do about racism and corruption. Exposing them may be the best antiseptic.
4. As it was recently seen in Hungary and Turkey, as well as in many cases in the past, leaders who have shown disregard about democratic norms have been reelected through popular vote. How can that be interpreted? Are people losing faith in democracy?
A: In Turkey, the election was certainly not free or fair. I hesitate to comment on Hungary, because I don’t follow it as much. Demagogues are using democratic forms to enhance their power. The only things that can stop that are the voters, parliaments, the media, and the courts.
5. In Balkans, we have leaders who are in power for decades, while the West, preoccupied with its problems, seems to have chosen “stabilitocracy” over democracy. Do you expect this situation to continue?
A: All countries deal with leaders who have come to power through the constitutional system in place, which is true of the current Balkan leaders. Only occasionally, when there is evidence of gross malfeasance, do the US and Europe weigh in against them, as they did recently in Macedonia against Gruevski. The only conscious choice I know for stability over democracy is in Bosnia, where Germany and the UK initiated a reform effort aimed at preventing the Americans from attempting one more time to change the Dayton constitution to make it more democratic.
6. Which is your opinion about the state of democracy in USA itself?
A: I think we have systemic problems. Our constitution favors states with smaller populations, enabling election of a president like Trump (and George W. Bush in his first term) who failed to win a majority of votes. We also have grossly gerrymandered Congressional districts that enable the Republicans to gain many more seats than the Democrats. And we have allowed Russian interference in our elections. These problems are unlikely to get fixed anytime soon. People who want change are going to have to come out to vote.
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