Tag: Democracy and Rule of Law
Peace picks July 2 – 15
1. Mexican Ambassador Discusses the Evolving U.S.-Mexico Relationship | Tuesday, July 3, 2018 | 11:30 am – 12:30 pm | Hudson Institute | Register Here
On July 3rd, Hudson Institute will host Gerónimo Gutiérrez Fernández, Ambassador of Mexico to the United States, for a discussion about the current state of U.S.-Mexico relations. The conversation will be moderated by Hudson Distinguished Fellow Walter Russell Mead.
The U.S.-Mexico relationship has recently faced new challenges. Immigration enforcement has intensified along the shared border; NAFTA renegotiations have progressed slowly, leading some in the Trump Administration to consider bilateral trade deals as an alternative approach with its North American partners; and new tariffs imposed on Mexican steel and aluminum have triggered retaliatory measures. Yet Mexico has long served as a strong regional trade ally and critical partner in efforts to combat narcotics trafficking. Voters in Mexico’s presidential elections on July 1st will likely be influenced by the rapidly evolving relationship between these two countries.
Gerónimo Gutiérrez Fernandez was named Ambassador of Mexico to the United States on January 13, 2017 by President Enrique Peña Nieto. During a more than 15-year career as a public servant, Ambassador Fernandez has served under four Mexican presidents. Prior to his most recent appointment, he was the Managing Director of the North American Development Bank (NADB).
Speaker:
His Excellency Gerónimo Gutiérrez Fernández, Ambassador of Mexico to the United States
Moderator:
Walter Russell Mead, Distinguished Fellow, Hudson Institute
2. Stabilizing Sino-Indian Security Relations: Managing Strategic Rivalry After Doklam | Tuesday, July 10, 2018 | 10:00 AM – 12:00 PM | Carnegie Institute for International Peace | Register Here
The Doklam standoff between Indian and Chinese troops in the summer of 2017 coincided with an ongoing deterioration in bilateral relations, and accelerated pre-existing military competition. Frank O’Donnell provides a detailed analysis of Indian and Chinese nuclear and conventional ground force posturing, and illustrates darkening rival perceptions of these actions and their underlying strategic intentions. Join Carnegie for a discussion with O’Donnell on his new paper, Stabilizing Sino-Indian Security Relations, which proposes new measures to limit the recurrence of future Doklam-like episodes and their inherent risk of escalation. Copies of the paper will be available.
Speakers:
Sameer Lalwani: senior associate and co-director of the South Asia program at the Stimson Center.
Tanvi Madan: director of the India Project and fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution.
Frank O’Donnell: Stanton junior faculty fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, and a nonresident fellow in the South Asia program at the Stimson Center.
George Perkovich: Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini chair and vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
3. Senator Jeff Merkley on Violence and Humanitarian Response in Africa | Wednesday, July 11, 2018 | 9:00 am – 10:00 am | US Institute of Peace | Register Here
Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR) recently returned from a five-country visit to Somalia, South Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to assess the region’s humanitarian crises while seeking to better understand their root causes. He held over 35 meetings with civil society, refugees living in camps, aid workers, government officials, and U.N. peacekeepers. During his visit, it became clear to Senator Merkley that U.S. diplomatic leadership, development aid, and humanitarian response are critical to addressing the root causes of conflict, climate change and corruption.
Senator Merkley will speak about Congress’ priorities on humanitarian- and conflict-related issues in Africa.
Speaker:
Senator Jeff Merkley, US Senator from Oregon, ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multilateral International Development, Multilateral Institutions, and International Economic, Energy, and Environmental Policy.
Moderator:
Nancy Lindborg, President, U.S. Institute of Peace.
4. Rethinking globalization: How do we rebuild support? | Wednesday, July 11, 2018 | 10:00 am – 11:30 am | American Enterprise Institute | Register Here
The Trump administration’s America First approach to economic policy has brought into stark relief the declining support among a growing number of Americans for what has come to be called “globalization.” But anti-globalization sentiment in the United States has broader support than the Trump base alone and reflects deeper social and economic drivers that policymakers have failed to address over time. Increasingly, Americans wonder what is in “globalization” for them. In today’s hyper-divisive environment, how can policymakers cut through the fractious political discourse and improve our understanding of the impact of an increasingly interconnected world on the American people?
Join AEI and the Brookings Institution for the launch of “Reconceptualizing Globalization,” a joint project to address globalization, anti-globalization, and the importance of engagement for all Americans.
Agenda:
9:45 am – Registration
10:00 am – Discussion
Participants:
Jared Bernstein, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
Daniel W. Drezner, Tufts University
Stephen J. Hadley, RiceHadleyGates
Merit Janow, Columbia University
Moderators:
Joshua Meltzer, Brookings Institution
Neena Shenai, AEI
11:10 am – Q&A
11:30 am – Adjournment
5. War or Deal? The Impact of Trade on the East Asian Economies | Thursday, July 12, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm | Stimson Center | Register Here
Whether a trade war or trade deal, U.S.-China trade disputes are guaranteed to have a spillover effect on the East Asian regional economies. The Trump administration’s recent escalation of tariffs on Chinese goods – with immediate reciprocation from Beijing – is already rippling through the global economy, but U.S. allies and partners in East Asia could be among the hardest hit. Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea have significant exposure to Chinese production, both as importers and exporters in the regional value chain. How does the ongoing trade war – or potential deals in the future – impact the interests of Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea? Join us for a panel discussion with Dr. Liu Shih-Chung, Vice Chairman at the Taiwan External Trade Development Council, Troy Stangarone, Senior Director at the Korea Economic Institute of America, Matthew Goodman, Senior Vice President at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (invited), and Yun Sun, Co-Director of the East Asia Program at Stimson (moderator). A light lunch will be served.
6. Beheading Dragons: Streamlining China’s Environmental Governance | Thursday, July 12, 2018 | 2:00 pm – 4:00 pm | The Wilson Center | Register Here
In March, China’s National People’s Congress passed sweeping reforms to streamline environmental governance in order to more rapidly mitigate China’s crushing air, water, and soil pollution. Natural resource and pollution regulation have long been fragmented and managed by overlapping bureaucracies in China, leading to infighting and buck passing. The Chinese idiom “nine dragons rule the waters” (jiu long zhi shui) aptly captures how nine different government agencies have competed to regulate water. Under today’s reforms, China’s lead environmental watchdog—newly renamed Ministry of Ecological Environment (MEE)—will share water regulation with the Ministry of Water Resources, decreasing nine dragons to two. Another major dragon-slaying reform was to grant most regulatory power over climate change to MEE, a move that will require this newly reconfigured agency to become significantly more powerful than its earlier incarnation.
On July 12, CEF has invited three speakers to unpack the drivers and impacts of this major reform in China. Liu Zhuoshi (Environmental Law Institute) will detail how legal and regulatory authorities around pollution and climate issues are changing. He will also reflect on hurdles Chinese government faces to expand these reforms at the subnational level. Hu Tao (WWF – U.S.) will explore how the new MEE could act more holistically to manage complex pollution issues, like a better coordination on the joint management of air pollution and carbon emission regulations. Liu Shuang (Energy Foundation China) will reflect on the implication of China’s recent governance reforms on efforts to create a national carbon emissions trading systems and what other policies and institutional changes are needed to make it succeed.
Speakers:
Zhuoshi Liu, Staff Attorney at Environmental Law Institute.
Tao Hu, Director of the China program at World Wildlife Fund – US.
Shuang Liu, Director of the Low Carbon Economic Growth Program at Energy Foundation China.
Moderator:
Jennifer L. Turner, Director, China Environment Forum & Manager, Global Choke Point Initiative.
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Get ready for 2025
Marija Jovicevic of Podgorica daily Pobjeda asked some questions. I answered:
- Montenegro entered NATO one year ago. Do You think that we, in Western Balkans, live in safer region?
A: I think Montenegro’s NATO accession was an important step in the right direction that gave encouragement to others in the region. It signified that the doors of the Alliance and the EU are not closed.
2. Do You think that Montenegro and Western Balkan are visible for the US administration? What do we need to do to be more visible?
A: They are visible to the Vice President, which I think is sufficient. Frankly, I worry that President Trump might be tempted to upset the applecart and sow confusion in the Balkans, which would be a bad idea.
3. People in Montenegro are slowly losing patient that we will enter European union soon. In that regard, European Commission announced that Albania and Macedonia can open negotiations by the end of next year. Is this a clear message that enlargement policy is on hold?
A: No. I think it is a clear signal that enlargement is progressing, albeit at a slower pace than some might like. The right strategy is to do the necessary political and economic reforms as well as meet all the requirements of the acquis. Those who fully qualify by 2025 are doing the right thing.
4. Can we expect better relations with Russia? Do You think that danger from Moscow is over after everthing they tried to do on election day on 2016?
A: The danger is not over. Moscow still supports anti-constitutional, anti-NATO political forces in Montenegro. Better relations with Russia will develop once a pro-EU, pro-NATO opposition emerge that can hope to govern. Ending Putin’s hopes for destabilizing Montenegro is the best route to a good relationship with Moscow.
5. How do you see relations between USA and EU?
A: They are bad, both because of the US tariffs (and EU retaliation) and because of President Trump’s hostility to the EU. Brussels will need to be patient while the Americans find a way back to sanity.
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Stabilization again
During the Stabilization Symposium on Tuesday, a panel consisting of Frances Brown (Fellow – Carnegie Institute), Ciara Knudsen (Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Secretary – Department of State), Katherine Donahue (Office of Transition Initiatives – USAID), and Colonel Joe Holland (Chief, Stability and Humanitarian Engagement Division, J-5 Global Policy & Partnerships – Department of Defense) discussed avenues for building peace and stability in post-conflict situations, using the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) as a blueprint.
According to Brown, three key obstacles make it complicated to transition from conflict to peace: defining success, measuring progress, and governmental organization. The SAR states that post-conflict stabilization is inherently political, allowing the US to better confront the first challenge. Specifically, it provides the US government with the flexibility to candidly judge whether the legitimate political actor on the ground wants peace and stability, making it possible for interventions to succeed. This mindset would have been crucial in Afghanistan, where large sums were poured into stabilization efforts that derailed because president Karzai’s government was not on board.
Brown argued that the SAR also allows the US to adopt more realistic measures for success in stabilization operations. In Afghanistan, cherry-picked stories were used to evaluate US peace building efforts, causing onlookers in Washington to mistakenly believe that the success of three, US-implemented district councils was indicative of the state of affairs in the country as a whole. Brown expressed confidence that the SAR’s emphasis on a coordinated, cross-government strategy for stabilization will make US implementers more accountable to each other, increasing the likelihood that future interventions will adopt more accurate measures of success.
Knudsen used her experience with the Defeat ISIS Campaign to critique the SAR’s inapplicability to situations where short-term, cosmetic interventions will not work because no legitimate on-site actors exist. ISIS has systematically destroyed entire communities’ physical and social infrastructure by reducing cities to rubble, planting IEDs, assassinating tribal leadership, and leaving sleeper cells behind in liberated areas.
These conditions breed a climate of fear and distrust in target communities, making it nearly impossible to find actors who enjoy the legitimacy to inspire the unity necessary to accomplish stabilization. Thus, stabilizing institutions in destroyed cities like Mosul and Raqqa will require meaningful, long-term engagement. Knudsen argued that the SAR does not recognize that most conflict situations call for more than quick, low-budget interventions to develop lasting peace.
Donahue struck a more positive tone than Knudsen, praising the SAR for being realistic and encouraging swift governmental interventions to stabilize conflict zones. The SAR’s declaration that stabilization is an iterative process falls directly in line with the philosophy OTI uses for its intervention strategy. According to Donahue, this will give the US government the flexibility to behave more like OTI, allowing it to mobilize quickly instead of getting bogged down in crafting grand strategies that often do not apply to the situation on the ground. Instead, the SAR strategy centers around learning on the go, recognizing that moving quickly and being correct at the 80% level is more productive than shooting for 100% effectiveness and failing because of inaction.
During his assignment to Kirkuk in the Iraq War, Holland was responsible for facilitating provincial reconstruction teams in the area. In what was indicative of the broader White House strategy at the time, military officers were under the impression that the Department of Defense was spearheading stabilization efforts in Iraq. Little interagency coordination occurred as a result. This military-centric approach led to planning gaps, causing stabilization attempts to end largely in failure. Iraqis remained employed for a snapshot in time, so communities slid back into conflict following US withdrawal. The SAR’s emphasis on interagency coordination represents a building block for future stabilization success, opening the door for long-term, sustainable development by legitimate regional partners after US troops end the mission.
The Bottom Line: The SAR is promising, but it has limits and presents little more than a framework to guide future US stabilization efforts in conflict regions. While this general blueprint will give US actors on the ground considerable flexibility in crafting case-specific strategies, the SAR’s desire for quick, low-cost interventions ignores that most conflicts are multidimensional and can only be solved by long-term stabilization initiatives. Reluctance to commit significant time and resources to stabilization means that future US peace building efforts will likely fail, or that the US will avoid intervening in these situations altogether.
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Elections have consequences
Here are the speaking notes I prepared for today’s noontime presentation at SETA DC:
- It wasn’t free or fair, but Erdogan has won his gamble: he has not only the enhanced presidency but also a coalition majority in parliament. He in effect controls the judiciary and press as well.
- The opposition is fragmented and likely to prove no more effective than in the last few years, though its hostility to Syrian refugees will guarantee it some support.
- Turkey looks headed deeper into one-man rule, even if Erdogan fulfills his pledge to lift the emergency.
- It would be foolish to imagine Erdogan will suddenly become generous to his enemies, end his crackdown on over 100,000 alleged coup-plotters, break with the Russians, re-focus attention on fighting Islamic extremism and qualifying for EU membership, negotiate peace with Turkey’s Kurds, or patch up the alliance with the US.
- I wonder if he would even restrain his body guards from beating up demonstrators were he to visit the US again.
- The question is what the US should do about it? How do we make it through the coming years, possibly even a decade or more, with an erstwhile ally moving in a direction it is hard to like?
- The current occupant of the White House makes these questions more difficult than they would normally be. He is on the outs with Erdogan, but not over human rights or relations with Russia. Trump and Erdogan might agree entirely on those issues.
- But President Trump has continued to insist on supporting the Syrian Kurds and hasn’t proven much help on the extradition of Gulen, which are the two things Erdogan cares about the most.
- Ironically, the best approach is one Trump might find attractive: a transactional relationship that relies less on Turkey as an ally and more on its usefulness to the US.
- The most important aspect of that usefulness is geography. The Incirlik air base is important to U.S. operations throughout the Levant. So long as it remains available, we are going to have to try to improve relations with Erdogan, who fortunately gets real benefits from those operations.
- As Syria’s northern neighbor with a long common border, Turkey is hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees. The US has spent around $600 million to support them and needs to continue.
- The immediate crunch issue is the sale of F35s to Ankara, which Congress is trying to stop. What is needed is a compromise, one that ends Erdogan’s threat to buy Russian S400 air defenses while allowing the transfer of the F35s. Secretary Mattis is said to be working a deal of that sort. I can’t help but wonder whether a Patriot sale might also still be something Erdogan still wants.
- The question of the Syrian Kurds is next. The agreement on Manbij appears to be working so far and needs to be completed with reformulation of the town’s governing body and withdrawal of YPG forces east of the Euphrates.
- Much tougher will be the issue of prisoner releases: Ankara holds dozens of Americans, apparently hoping to trade them for Gulen. It is hard to convince Erdogan that Trump does not have the same power over Gulen’s fate that Erdogan has over the Americans Turkey holds.
- If, however, a court decides in favor of extradition, I doubt the Trump administration will stand in the way.
- This, I’m afraid, is how we will need to proceed: issue by issue, looking for trades we can reasonably do that Erdogan will find attractive. It will be a hard slog, one during which concern about human rights abuses will likely find little public expression.
- I nevertheless hope the Administration will make a strong case in private against Erdogan’s continued crackdown. All but the immediate coup plotters should be freed, Kurdish political leaders and journalists should be released and amnestied or pardoned, jobs should be restored.
- The strongest potential leverage the Americans have now on human rights is economic: Turkey is headed in a bad direction that will be made much worse if secondary sanctions against Iran are instituted.
- Relief from secondary sanctions could be traded for easing the crackdown, but Trump isn’t likely to do that. Erdogan will have strong incentives to surreptitiously violate the sanctions, which he did even during the Obama era.
- Erdogan has won. Trump is in power. Elections have consequences.
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Israel’s “center”
On Monday, the Brookings Institution hosted M.K. Yair Lapid, founder of the centrist Yesh Atid party, the largest opposition party in the Knesset. Lapid shared his views about current Israeli domestic and foreign policy, including its relationship with the US, as well as his vision for the country’s future. John R. Allen, president of the Brookings Institution, gave introductory remarks, and Tamara Coffman Wittes, senior foreign policy fellow at Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, moderated the discussion. Below, I discuss key takeaways from Lapid‘s remarks.
Foreign Policy Flashpoints
At a time when regional conflict threatens Israel’s relative stability, Lapid described how his country and the international community should approach Israel’s main foreign policy challenges to ensure future Israeli security. On the Palestinian front, Lapid stressed the importance of breaking the silence that has stalled negotiations on a two state solution since the Trump embassy move. A return to dialogue represents the only road to peace. A Palestinian Jerusalem, however, is off the table. Lapid stated that “Jerusalem is a capital; if someone came to DC and asked [the US] to share it with Mexico, they would refuse.” Lapid also criticized UNRWA, arguing that having a refugee agency solely for Palestinians allows Arab countries to maintain a false moral high ground in the conflict.
Lapid blamed Hamas for the recent killing of hundreds of protestors in Gaza by Israeli snipers, saying that the violent protests threatened national security. Although it is not at fault for the violence, Israel must work quickly to solve the humanitarian crisis; after all, Gazan sewage contaminates Israeli water. However, any Israeli efforts to solve the crisis must be predicated by Hamas’ fall from power, clearing the way for humanitarian aid to reach Gazan hands without funding terrorist activities.
Lapid also used national security to defend his country’s controversial position in the Golan Heights. In addition to their strategic importance in fending off the rising Iranian and Hizbollah threat, giving the Golan Heights back to Assad is simply not an option, as it would put 22,000 Jewish lives at risk. Similarly, opening the northeastern border to Syrian Arab refugees also represents an unacceptable security risk. Instead, Lapid called on the US to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Heights, arguing that this move would allow the US to send the message that it does not tolerate Assad’s human rights abuses.
Israeli-US Relations: Troubling Times Ahead?
While Lapid lauded the Trump administration’s goodwill towards Israel, he expressed concern that positive relations on the executive level are papering over fissures that will emerge after Trump leaves office. Chief among these is American Jewry’s increasing disinterest in Israel. Orthodox Jews in Israel have criticized American Reform Jews too much, causing them to feel alienated. Increasing anti-Israel discourse on US college campuses has prevailed over American Jews’ ties to their ancestral homeland. Lapid also linked heightened partisanship under Trump to the erosion of the bipartisan support Israel has enjoyed in the past. As a consequence, bilateral relations could deteriorate during the next democratic administration, leaving Israel more exposed than ever to national security threats from within the Arab world.
Careful Optimism: A Winning Call?
As he discussed his chances for beating Netanyahu in the next parliamentary elections, Lapid emphasized that Israelis are more hesitant about large political shifts than US voters. For that reason, Lapid argued that emphasizing satisfaction with the status quo while calling for gradual crackdowns on corruption and moving towards a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict will be a winning call in 2019. In addition, Lapid advocated for a move away from using empty rhetoric to avoid confronting issues head-on, saying that “we need a government that actually does stuff, not [one] that just eloquently describes the problem.” While his strategy of emphasizing continuation and subtle changes might mean that Yesh Atid does not differentiate itself enough from Likud enough to win in 2019, Lapid hopes that centrist success in Germany and France might bode well for Israel.
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Winners should stabilize, like it or not
Throughout the two-day Stabilization Symposium – held at the Elliott School of International Affairs on June 26-27, 2018 – panels were held to provide “Perspectives from the Frontlines,” sharing witness accounts from a conflict, or recently deconflicted areas, in which a stabilization framework is most likely to be implemented. The Symposium thus hosted a panel entitled “Perspectives from the Frontlines: Syria and Iraq.” Moderated by Moises Venancio, UNDP Regional Advisor for Iraq and Syria, the panel included:
Linda Robinson – Senior Policy Researcher, RAND
Katherine Krueger – Senior Advisor, Stabilization and Development, Creative Associates International
Aya Aljamili – Al Jazeera
Robinson emphasized how important effective coordination is for the success of stabilization on the ground. Different operating partners in Raqqa, Syria – probably different branches of the US government and NGO partners of the government organizations – have differing conceptions of what stabilization meant. This apparently delayed effective implementation. Robinson also stressed the need for government actors to bring non-government actors to the planning table early on if effective stabilization is to happen. Stabilization in Raqqa had been more successful than in some other cases thanks to better communication between partners; but more could be done to improve the process.
Asked how best to go about implementing stabilization, Robinson highlighted the importance of detailed community research. We need to look at the perceptions and priorities of every demographic group, not just local leaders, when determining what is best for a deconflicted region. Gathering such information is difficult when local populations are traumatized and hostile to foreign powers, as is often the case. This is why community outreach to build relationships and trust are important facets of a successful stabilization process.
Krueger pointed out the biggest obstacle to implementing stabilization in Syria: as an inherently political process, successful stabilization requires clearly defined political objectives. The American government has failed to provide such clear political objectives, leading to what Krueger called “stabilization lite.” Implementation is further complicated by the US struggle to find a satisfactory stabilizing intermediary on the ground, with American support for Kurdish troops proving particularly controversial with local Arab populations. She also pointed out how important continued American presence is to deterring radical groups such as ISIS.
In the same vein, Krueger reminded the audience not to forget about reconstructing Mosul and dealing with the huge number of internally-displaced people in Iraq. While the Iraqi elections were reassuring in their focus on corruption and the reduced role of sectarianism, international actors still have a lot to do to ensure that ISIS does not resurge in Iraq.
According to Aljamili, stabilization can only succeed in eastern Syria if a government is formed that not only provides basic services, but also unites disparate local communities under a common banner. According to the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), stabilization should function through cooperation with legitimate local actors. Unless the US succeeds in fostering a local government that satisfies the needs of both the Kurds and Arabs, stabilization efforts will flounder.
Because of this, Aljamili emphasized the need to take the time to work within communities, to ascertain what the population wants, before undertaking a stabilization process and “elite bargaining” that may run counter to popular desire. It is also essential to remember that Iraq and Syria are not one entity; even within each state, regions differ substantially, meaning that stabilization processes must be highly tailored to the region in which they are to be implemented.
During the Q&A portion of the panel, I asked whether – seeing the Turkish government’s apparent opposition to the creation of an autonomous Kurdish enclave in the north-east of Syria – stabilization in eastern Syria could function without American political support for the Kurds. To this, Aljamili answered that Turkey will at some point have to face the reality of a strong Kurdish political presence in northern Syria, whether that is as part of a negotiated settlement with Assad’s government or as an autonomous enclave for the foreseeable future.
Krueger said that two possible solutions exist for northern Syria. Maybe multi-sectarian local community rebuilding could occur with the consent of Assad and Turkey. Now that President Erdoğan has won a decisive victory at home, he may reopen negotiations with the PKK from a stronger negotiating position. The other solution would be an official deal between the PYD and the US, with Russia and the US then putting pressure on Turkey to accept the facts on the ground and some form of Kurdish autonomy in Syria, as Assad may be open to such autonomy in majority-Kurdish regions.
The bottom line: it is awkward to talk about an American-support stabilization process in Syria when President Trump has been advocating full American withdrawal. All three panelists emphasized the importance of the American presence in eastern Syria and in Iraq to not just stabilizing, but also rebuilding communities in these regions once the conflict with ISIS is over. Stabilization and peace-building are vital in the aftermath of the fight with ISIS, but the Americans may abandon the effort.
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