Tag: Democracy and Rule of Law

Croatian Assembly of Bosnia says I’m wrong

Posted in Daniel Serwer - May 4, 2018 - 4 Comments

Josip Merdžo, Secretary General of the Croatian National Assembly BiH, writes: 

In your article ‘Bosnia’s teapot tempest’ released at peacefare.net, May, 2nd, 2018, several inaccurate facts were made regarding the decision of the Constitutional Court of BiH U-23/14 related to the request made by Mr. Ljubic for reviewing the constitutionality of the Election Law. Obviously, you did not read this request because in your article you said that „… Ljubić asked the Court to forbid the Croats from Sarajevo, Tuzla and Bihać from becoming members of the House of Peoples of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina“, which is not true, and you can check it by reviewing the Constitutional Court’s decision U-23/14.

You also claim „He argued that Croat candidates should be elected only out of the majority Croat cantons, thus ensuring that only Croats vote for Croat delegates“,obviously not knowing the provisions of the Constitution FBiH and Election Law which precisely foresee that each constituent people within their own club in cantonal assemblies elect delegates for The House of Peoples.

Mr. Serwer, this is not about politics, it is just about legal arguments. The elections are conducted in accordance with the Election Law. Currently, the Election Law lacks a part that the Constitutional Court has abolished and there is no possibility to form the House of Peoples of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the House of Peoples at the state level.

Yes, this provision remains in the Entity Constitution of FBiH, but if I am not mistaken, the Constitution of BiH and the decision of the BiH Constitutional Court are above the Entity Constitution. So there is no legal ability to carry out what you are writing about.

You mention the situation after the 2010 elections when the OHR suspended the CEC decision when the session of the House of Peoples was annulled because the President of the Federation was elected in an improper manner. If you had tried to be better informed, you would never use this shameful move by the OHR and international community as a positive example.

According to the Election Law, the mandate of the legislative bodies lasts four years. It is unclear how you make the conclusion that this mandate can be extended after the expiry of this deadline. An example is found in the OHR standpoint on the City Council of Mostar. After the end of the mandate, the City Council no longer exists although the elections were not held for reasons because no amendment to the Election Law was made.

How little do you know about the things you are writing about is demonstrated once again in the fact that you are looking for the OHR and the international institutions not to apply the 2013 census but 1991 census! The BiH Constitution does not mention any census regarding electoral issues at all. The Entity Constitution of the FBiH in Amendment 52 Article 11a, states that the public institutions apply a 1991 census, namely: “Ministries in the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cantonal Governments, Municipal Authorities, Cantonal and Municipal Courts in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina . “, So the 1991 census does not apply to the legislative bodies.

If you look at the valid provisions of the Election Law of BiH, you could also find that the “last census” is mentioned as a benchmark on a number of occasions, and the latest census is 2013. Also, Constitutional Court decisions U-23/14 and U-3/17 refer exclusively to the application of the 2013 census.

Dear Mr. Serwer, I do not intend to comment on your dealing with the HDZ, third entity, separatist tendencies, etc., which are commonly found in the performances of extreme Bosniak elements. That just proves that you are dominantly trying to enforce political interpretations instead of legal ones, and here we are talking about the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s decision.

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Bosnia’s teapot tempest

Posted in Daniel Serwer - May 2, 2018 - 8 Comments

In December 2016, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) ruled partially in favor of a complaint lodged by former Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ) politician Božo Ljubić. At issue was the state election law provision dictating that cantons delegate at least one representative from each of the country’s three main ethnic groups to the Federation BiH House of Peoples. Ljubić argued that the Croat influence in cantons with majority Bosniak populations was unfairly diminished in the selection of delegates. He argued that Croat candidates therefore should be elected only out of majority Croat cantons, thereby ensuring that only Croats vote for Croat delegates. In effect, Ljubić asked the Court to forbid the Croats from Sarajevo, Tuzla and Bihać from becoming members of the House of Peoples of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Court partially agreed with Ljubić. The ruling struck down a portion of the country’s election law, stating that it must be amended within six months, without specifying changes. In previous, unrelated cases, the Court prescribed temporary solutions that enabled a ruling implementation; however, it declined to do so in this instance.

This has led some, especially HDZ leadership, to argue that a  legal vacuum now exists, claiming that the failure to amend the law could render the October general elections invalid or, alternatively, prevent government formation at the Federation entity level, ultimately leading to a total political paralysis and the collapse of the social security system.

This argument is not legal, but political.

The Constitution of the Federation BiH clearly regulates the election of delegates to the entity and state-level House of Peoples, as based on Annex VII of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). Annex VII provides that all citizens can live and exercise their civil and political rights – including the right to vote and be elected – in their pre-war residence, as well as throughout the country. Furthermore, the Federation entity Constitution states that the 1991 Census has to be used in determining the number of delegates in the Federation House of Peoples. Disregarding this requirement amounts to rewarding the results of ethnic cleansing and genocide.

The said provisions of the Federation Constitution remain fully valid. Moreover, they are in line with the European Court of Human Rights rulings. Consequently, some of the members of the Central Election Commission (CEC) have publicly stated that the CEC can and will use the Federation BiH Constitution and the valid provisions of the state election law to elect delegates to the Federation entity House of Peoples.

The HDZ appears to be misreading the Court’s decision in order to justify its planned prevention of the election of delegates from four cantons controlled by the HDZ (West Herzegovina, Posavina, Livno, and Herzegovina-Neretva) to the Federation entity’s House of Peoples. The ruse of electoral illegitimacy and the resulting crisis is simply another effort toward the HDZ’s territorial ambitions of creating a so-called “third entity.” In this, the HDZ leaders are publicly backed by the Government of Croatia and the Russian Federation.

The HDZ staged a similar production following the 2010 election, when it tried to block government formation by refusing to elect delegates from the four aforementioned cantons. Their abstention from political participation failed – despite support afforded by Milorad Dodik’s SNSD – when the Office of the High Representative (OHR) intervened to enable the formation of the Federation BiH government.

The DPA envisages the OHR as the final arbiter precisely because no other final adjudicating authority exists within the legal order established by the DPA, of which Constitution of BiH is an integral part.  Should the HDZ employ the same tactic following the October 2018 elections, the OHR can end the impasse by intervening in the same manner as in 2011 or, alternatively, by simply imposing the Federation BiH 2019 budget before the December 31, 2018 deadline. Marinko Čavara, the HDZ-appointed Federation BiH president, can dissolve the Federation BiH parliament only if the legislative body fails to adopt the entity budget before the end of calendar year.

Furthermore, the HDZ cannot prevent formation of the BiH Council of Ministers, which is elected solely by the state-level House of Representatives. In its 2011 decision, the Constitutional Court recognized the legal status of Sulejman Tihić as a standing member of the BiH House of Peoples despite the HDZ’s and SNSD’s claims that the delegates’ previous mandates expired after new elections had been held. The Court ruled in favor of the continuity of government in principle, meaning that officials must continue performing their tasks until new ones are sworn in. Thus, the state-level legislature continued to function despite HDZ and SNSD belligerence.

Under this precedent, similar attempts at disruption by HDZ (or other) delegates will not lead to the disruption of the BiH legal order, as the HDZ and others falsely claim, nor will it be the end of BiH as an internationally recognized state, as both the HDZ and SNSD hope. The Ljubić ruling will not render invalid the results of the 2018 general election or deny government formation as long as the international community stands by the letter and the spirit of the DPA. The OHR should continue to fulfill the legal obligation thrust upon it by the international guarantors of the DPA, of which the US – the architect of the Bosnian peace – is of supreme importance.

The OHR and the international community cannot allow the 2013 Census results to be used as the basis for determining the formula for allocation of House of People delegates because that would directly violate the Federation BiH Constitution, annul the Annex VII of DPA, and amount to accepting the results of ethnic cleansing.

The implementation of the Ljubić decision in the spirit of HDZ’s interpretation would be equivalent to a contemporary “Three-Fifths Compromise.” The United States has a moral obligation not to allow such “solutions” to be implemented under its watch.

Furthermore, the implementation of the Ljubić decision in the spirit of HDZ’s interpretation would only embolden HDZ’s and SNSD’s ever-growing separatist ambitions, spelling instability and a likely return to conflict in the not too distant future – a security nightmare in the heart of Europe that would be more than welcomed by the Kremlin.

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Stay the course

Posted in Daniel Serwer - April 30, 2018 - 1 Comment

I spent last week visiting two allegedly dysfunctional states in the Balkans: Macedonia and Kosovo. Rumors of their incapacity or even demise are exaggerated. I visited with government officials, parliamentarians, NGOers, journalists, and old friends. I saw their presidents and prime ministers, but not their foreign ministers, as both were traveling. Despite their real problems, both states are functional and have made enormous progress over the past twenty years.

I started in Macedonia, which is saddled with two current issues: a law on language that the President refuses to sign and a dispute concerning its name with Greece.

The former raises constitutional questions, as the parliament has passed the law twice, after which the President is obliged to sign. He claims however that the law, which increases the required use of Albanian by state institutions,  contradicts the constitution, which he is sworn to uphold. People get really worked up over this, but I just don’t see how it compares even remotely to the political crisis that enveloped the country in 2016 and 2017, when the opposition was publicizing wiretaps that demonstrated abuse of power. I’m betting Macedonia’s citizens and politicians will figure out how to get the constitutional court to decide who is right. That would be an institutional solution appropriate to the challenge. Not so bad.

The second problem is a congenital one. From the moment of independence, Athens challenged Skopje’s right to use “Macedonia” and has refused to accept Macedonia into NATO either as the Republic of Macedonia (its constitutional name) or as The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (The FYROM), the appellation Greece agreed in 1995 would apply to membership in international organizations.

This is the moral equivalent of the United States objecting to Mexico’s official name (Estados Unidos Mexicanos), or the Mexicans objecting to “New Mexico.” As in the rest of the Balkans, the real issues are territory and identity, not the name. Here too there are lots of solutions and an ongoing negotiation that appears to be making progress. Current betting is on “Republic of Upper Macedonia,” but precisely when and where that would be used is still uncertain. Any solution will have to pass muster in parliament and get approved in a referendum: again, institutional solutions.

Kosovo has also been through a rough patch, with two issues that created disorder in both the streets and parliament: demarcation of the border with Montenegro and creation of an Association of Serb Municipalities (ASM).

The former verged on silly, since only a few hundred hectares were involved and the agreement had already been concluded as well as ratified in Montenegro before it became controversial in Kosovo. It is now solved and the waters have calmed.

The ASM is still a problem, as it is part of the plan that got Kosovo its independence 10 years ago but risks making Kosovo like Bosnia, which is to say so ethnically divided as to be dysfunctional. The constitutional court has made clear within what parameters the issue should be solved, but some think it will be necessary to go further. That is going to be difficult, especially as the situation in Bosnia is worsening because the leader of its Serb 49% “entity” is using its power-sharing arrangements to block effective governance at the state level. Kosovo Albanians are right to want to avoid that kind of trouble.

Another recent incident has also roiled Kosovo’s waters: Turkish security officials were allowed to seize some of President Erdogan’s political opponents on Kosovo territory and deport them to Turkey, where they face a court system that is doing the President’s bidding. The proper court proceedings were not followed in Kosovo. A parliamentary committee has been commissioned to investigate.

The distinguishing characteristic of all these issues is that they touch on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states that are not yet consolidated, or self-confident (I’m grateful to Veton Surroi, a tough critic of Kosovo’s state-building process so far, for this realization). The result is a level of political (and occasionally physical) conflict that challenges weak institutions.

America’s own early republic had quite a few such challenges to sovereignty (look up Whiskey Rebellion and Marbury v Madison) that had to be decided in the courts, and we are still capable of creating new ones. It would be a mistake to conclude from their existence that the state-building process in the Balkans is a failure. The citizens’ preference for institutional solutions in both Macedonia and Kosovo is clear, even if the politicians don’t always abide by it.

Sovereignty is not yet complete, and territorial integrity not yet ensured. Reassurance on those scores is critical. In the 21st century Balkans, the US and EU need to continue to play their vital roles in ensuring that borders are not moved, minorities are treated in ways that make loyalty to the states in which they live appealing, and governance is not only fair but also functional and effective in producing services and prosperity.

I would guess Kosovo and Macedonia are a lot more than midway between independence and EU membership. Completing that trajectory is the shortest distance to regional peace and stability. We and they should stay the course.

 

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The US, EU and Kosovo: can they sync up?

Posted in Daniel Serwer - April 26, 2018 - 0 Comment

Here are the speaking notes for the talk I gave this morning under the auspices of KIPRED in Pristina, Ambassador Lulzim Peci presiding:

  1. It’s great to be back in Pristina, and an enormous privilege to talk with you here at the Swiss Diamond, though I hope next time to have a Marriott at our disposal as well. Don’t tell your foreign minister I said that!
  1. I’d like to discuss with you the triangle that has so often driven progress in the Balkans in general and in Kosovo in particular: the US, the EU and of course you.
  1. When those three are in sync, nothing stops us. When they are out of sync, little progress is made on big issues, including those that can threaten peace and stability.
  1. Let me start with the US. Its circumstances have changed dramatically since the 1990s and early 2000s, when relatively small American interventions—military and diplomatic—ended and prevented wars in the Balkans, including the 2001 conflict in Macedonia.
  1. That was the unipolar moment, when Yeltsin’s Russia was on the ropes and China had not yet started to show its financial muscle.
  1. In the 1990s, the US was not yet tired of playing the role of global policeman and it was confident of its own strong democratic tradition.
  1. The 17 years since 9/11 have changed that. The attack on the World Trade Center prompted a justified US invasion of Afghanistan and an unjustified US invasion of Iraq, both of which seemed to go well at first but bogged down into quagmires that sapped American finances, strength and confidence.
  1. Now we live in a multi-polar world, one in which President Putin is trying to reassert Moscow’s claim to great power status and President Xi doesn’t even have to try.
  1. The financial crisis of 2008 sent the world’s economy into a tailspin. Though the American recovery was relatively steady and even fast compared to Europe’s, a large portion of the relatively uneducated, white, male working population still hasn’t recovered.
  1. It was their discontent, especially in the Midwest, that led to President Trump’s election in 2016. He lacked a majority of the popular vote but gained a modest margin in the electoral college, which gives less populous states greater weight in determining who wins the presidency.
  1. The Trump Administration is not a conservative one: it has abandoned a central conservative tenet—concern about the budget deficit—in favor of a massive tax cut for the wealthy and an unprecedented boost in military spending as well as sharply increased military activities focused on Islamic extremism, especially in the Middle East and Africa.
  1. It has also been sometimes belligerent towards North Korea and always towards, while abandoning both the Trans-Pacific and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnerships and throwing down the gauntlet on trade and investment as a challenge, especially to China.
  1. The Administration’s initial hostility towards NATO has been corrected, but the President has little use for the EU, whose sharing of responsibilities is anathema to an America First attitude.
  1. I need only mention briefly that the Administration is also preoccupied with a series of dramatic scandals that involve Russian tampering in the US election, the President’s many sexual affairs, and his financial and other legal improprieties. This is a confused White House under siege.
  1. As a consequence, Trump focuses on keeping his big money donors and his white working-class base happy. He explicitly states that he has no interest in how others govern themselves and has warmed to autocrats like Presidents Duterte, Putin, Xi, and Sisi.
  1. The kind of liberal democracy “of the people, by the people and for the people” that many in Kosovo aspire to is under threat in America and out of fashion in much of the rest of the world, as ethnic nationalists and kleptocratic elites feel unconstrained by Trump.
  1. So you shouldn’t be surprised when I say that the Balkans and their governance failures are one of the last things on minds in Washington. Even if he is married to a Slovene, President Trump hasn’t spent more than a few minutes on the Balkans since taking office.
  1. Instead, career officials in the State and Defense Departments have thankfully kept US Balkans policy on their previous course, and Vice President Pence as well as former National Security Adviser McMaster have intervened constructively.
  1. But it is going to be difficult to match even the low Obama-level interest in Balkans democracy with President Trump in the White House.
  1. The situation in Europe is better. The Europeans were for years preoccupied with their own financial crisis, the Greek debt debacle, and their consequences for the euro and for growth.
  1. Europe was also deeply scarred by the refugee influx from the Middle East and Africa and its implications for terrorism. More than 100,000 illegal border crossings occurred here in the Balkan, putting economic, logistical and political strain on the region.
  1. Some Europeans even within the EU have turned to demagogic leaders who promise to protect nativist groups from foreigners, while the British made the enormous mistake of voting narrowly to withdraw from the EU, in large part due to xenophobia.
  1. But Europe’s economy is now slowly recovering, and the Europeans have become much more alert to Putin’s trouble-making since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the attempted coup in Montenegro in 2016, and this year’s attempted murder of defectors in Britain.
  1. To my delight, the European Commission, alarmed by Putin, seized an opportunity in February to reopen the political window for EU accession in 2025, saying that those who qualify by 2023 will be welcomed in two years later. They did not say when the window would close.
  1. For good reasons, many doubt the sincerity, and even the feasibility, of this promise to enlarge once again. It is explicitly conditional on internal reforms to strengthen the Union, and it will require ratifications by current members that may prove difficult to elicit, including referenda in France and maybe the Netherlands.
  1. This is nevertheless an extraordinary opportunity. It is my hope that as many Balkan countries as possible will take advantage of it. Most of the benefits of EU membership come in preparing for accession.
  1. Montenegro and Serbia lead the regatta, as they have achieved candidacy status and are making their way as quickly as they can through the chapters of the acquis.
  1. But others are not so far behind: the Commission has recommended candidacy status for Albania as well as Macedonia, and Kosovo has approved border demarcation with Montenegro and will now I hope get the visa waiver. That will be an important milestone in synching up with the US and the EU.
  1. Bosnia and Herzegovina, although it has applied for candidacy, is in many respects the laggard, as its governing system is based on the awkward constitution Americans wrote at Dayton.
  1. Nevertheless, a process that has been frozen pretty much since Croatia acceded to the EU in 2013 has restarted. Opportunities like this one don’t come often.
  1. That brings me to the Commission’s Progress Report on Kosovo and its implications for your government, parliament, and civil society.

Read more

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Peace picks, April 23 – 29

Posted in Adam Friend, Sebastian Gerlach - April 20, 2018 - 0 Comment
  1. Washington’s Shifting Syria Policy: Implications for U.S.-Turkey Relations | Monday, April 23 | 11:00am – 12:30pm | Turkish Heritage Foundation | Register here |

As the Syrian civil war enters its eighth year, political dynamics are beginning to shift. On April 4, a tripartite summit to further discussions on the resolution of the conflict was held in Ankara between Turkey, Russia, and Iran – critical countries that once had deeply conflicting priorities in Syria. Notably absent from this high-level diplomacy is the U.S., whose priority in Syria remains fixated on defeating ISIS. On the same day that the presidents of Turkey, Russia, and Iran were meeting in Ankara, President Trump stated his intention to withdraw U.S. troops after the defeat of ISIS, raising questions and concerns about Washington’s long-term role in Syria. The Syrian civil war has heavily strained U.S.-Turkey relations, with Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch in Afrin against the YPG being the most recent example of the troubling rift between the NATO allies. The impact of the shift in Washington’s Syria policy and post-ISIS long-term role will determine the next phase of the relations between the U.S. and Turkey. Featuring Mariam Jalabi (Representative, Syrian National Coalition’s office at the UN), Bradley A. Blakeman (Former White House Senior Staff under President George W. Bush; Commentator, Fox News), Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Peter B. Zwack (Senior Research Fellow, Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies), Dr. Mesut Hakki Casin (Academic, Ozyegin University, Air Force and Turkish Military Academies), and Dr. Sahar Khan (Research Fellow, CATO Institute).

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  1. ISIS in North Africa: Past and Future Trajectories | Monday, April 23 | 12:15pm – 1:45pm | New America | Register here |

From 2013 through 2014 ISIS recruited thousands of fighters from North Africa to fight in Syria and established a fallback position in Libya. Today, ISIS has lost much of its territory both in Syria and in North Africa. How did ISIS emerge in North Africa and what is its future in the region? Featuring Sarah Yerkes (Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Aaron Y. Zelin (Richard Borow Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy), and David Sterman (Senior Policy Analyst, New America; Co-author, All Jihad is Local: ISIS in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula).

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  1. The Future of Political Islam: Trends and Prospects | Tuesday, April 24 | 9:30am – 11:00am | Brookings Institution | Register here |

Since the 2011 Arab uprisings, the progression of events in the Middle East has provoked new questions on the role of political Islam in the region. The Arab Spring offered Islamist parties the opportunity and challenge of governance, and the widely varying results led many observers to reconsider basic assumptions on political Islam. Lines drawn between ideology and politics have become blurred. Common conceptions of Islam and the nation-state as incompatible have come under review. As scholars and Islamists alike imagine the future of political Islam, these considerations and others will play a central role. Featuring Shadi Hamid (Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution), Peter Mandaville (Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution), and Jocelyne Cesari (Professor of Religion and Politics, University of Birmingham; Senior Fellow, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs, Georgetown University).

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  1. Public Protests and Prospects for Reform in Iran | Tuesday, April 24 | 1:30pm – 3:00pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |

Over the last few months, Iran has experienced a series of street protests in rural areas and social arenas once seen as the key support base for the Islamic Republic. Politically active youth are voicing their frustrations with the country’s political, social, and economic prospects. Many of these protests as well as online activism have been met with pushback from conservatives and crackdown from the government. What are the prospects for change in Iran’s existing political system? Is there a dynamic that might foster greater openness, pluralism and democratization? Who are the rising political figures who may lead such a change? How can the international community support a political shift in Iran that benefits its own society? The Middle East Institute is pleased to host Daniel Brumberg (Co-editor (with Farideh Farhi) of Power and Political Change in Iran), Azadeh Pourzand (Co-founder and executive director, Siamak Pourzand Foundation), and Shadi Mokhtari (Professor, American University) to examine the unfolding political struggles in Iran and their potential implications for the Islamic Republic. Alex Vatanka (Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute) will moderate the discussion. ___________________________________________________________

  1. The Battle for the New Libya | Tuesday, April 24 | 5:30pm – 7:00pm | Carnegie Endowment | Register here |

The death of Muammar Qadhafi in 2011 freed Libya from forty-two years of despotic rule, raising hopes for a new era. But in the aftermath of the uprising, the country descended into bitter rivalries and civil war, paving the way for the Islamic State and a catastrophic migrant crisis. What went wrong? Based on years of field reporting in Libya, Carnegie’s Frederic Wehrey will discuss his new book, The Burning Shores: Inside the Battle for the New Libya, which tells the stories of Libyan lives upended by the turmoil, sheds new light on the country’s afflictions, and provides valuable lessons for the future. Longtime Libyan activist and medical doctor Laila Bugaighis will serve as a discussant and journalist Robert F. Worth will moderate. The discussion will be followed by a short reception, and copies of the book will be available for purchase. Featuring Frederic Wehrey (Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Laila Bugaighis (former deputy director general and CEO, Benghazi Medical Center), and Robert F. Worth (contributing writer, New York Times Magazine; author, A Rage for Order: The Middle East in Turmoil, from Tahrir Square to ISIS).

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  1. Iraq’s Upcoming Elections: Likely Outcomes and Impact on US-Iraqi Relations | Wednesday, April 25 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |

Please join the Atlantic Council for a conversation with a panel of experts to discuss Iraq’s upcoming parliamentary election, post-election dynamics, alliances to form a new government we may see emerge, what political and constitutional reforms the next government needs to adopt, and how the election may impact US-Iraq relations. Featuring Ambassador Feisal al-Istrabadi (Founding Director, Center for the Study of the Middle East, Indiana University, Bloomington), Ambassador Rend al-Rahim (Co-Founder and President, Iraq Foundation), Dr. Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee (Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council), Ambassador Ryan Crocker (Visiting Lecturer and Diplomat-in-Residence, Princeton University), and Ms. Vivian Salama (Political Reporter, NBC News) as moderator. With introductory remarks by Frederick Kempe (President and CEO, Atlantic Council).

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  1. New Year, New Strategy: Shifting Policies on North Korea in 2018 | Wednesday, April 25 | 1:30pm – 3:00pm | Wilson Center | Register here |

After more than a year of escalating tensions over North Korea’s nuclear provocations and a war of words between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump, we have seen an abrupt shift in strategy on the Korean Peninsula. Declaring himself content with North Korea’s nuclear weapons arsenal in late 2017, Kim Jong Un began 2018 with a new approach: diplomatic outreach. A summit between Kim and ROK President Moon Jae-in inside the Demilitarized Zone will be held later this month, the first inter-Korean summit in more than a decade. On the eve of the summit between the leaders of the Koreas, several leading scholars will discuss this shift in strategy, including lessons from history, prospects for peace and reconciliation, and implications for the United States as President Trump prepares for his summit with Kim. Join the Wilson Center for a discussion that will provide background and context as a season of summits between the North Koreans and its Korean War foes unfolds. Featuring Abraham Denmark (Director, Asia Program, Wilson Center), Jean H. Lee (Director, Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy), Jung H. Pak (Senior Fellow, SK-Korean Foundation Chair in Korea Studies, Brookings Institution), and Jake Sullivan (Martin R. Flug Visiting Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School). With introductory remarks by Joonho Cheon (Minister, Embassy of the Republic of Korea).

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  1. Afghanistan in 2020: Is Peace Possible? | Wednesday, April 25 | 2:30pm – 4:30pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |

The search for peace has become a central focus of Afghanistan policy in Washington and for Kabul. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani offered the Taliban constitutional reform and status as a legitimate political party in late February on the condition that the group makes peace. In recent months, the Taliban have also publicly offered talks with the United States and prominent Afghan powerbrokers, and high-profile peace demonstrations in conflict-torn Helmand province have spread across much of the country. Featuring Ambassador Timothy Carney (Former U.S. Ambassador to Sudan and Haiti), John Wood (Associate Professor, National Defense University; former U.S. National Security Council Senior Director for Afghanistan), Johnny Walsh (Senior Expert, Afghanistan, USIP; former DOS lead for Afghan reconciliation), Courtney Cooper (International Affairs Fellow, CFR; former U.S. National Security Council Director for Afghanistan), Ahmad Mohibi (Founder and President, Rise to Peace), and Michael Sherwin (Assistant United States Attorney, DOS; former U.S. Navy Intelligence Officer) as moderator.

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  1. Iran: As Anti-Government Protests Continue, Can the U.S. Help Maintain Momentum? | Thursday, April 26 | 3:30pm – 4:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |

In January, the Iranian regime announced that the anti-government protests that unexpectedly swept through the country had successfully been suppressed. In truth, this struggle continues–if not in the streets, then on social media, on city walls, and in the private lives of citizens. In the eyes of the younger generation of the Shiite majority, who are the backbone of the protests, the mullahs are losing legitimacy. This discontent is not limited to economic grievances and has taken aim at the political and social leadership as a whole. Many of these protests have begun to target laws like mandatory headscarves. Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, the mandatory headscarf for women has been the enduring symbol of the mullahs’ political control and of women’s restricted status. Foregoing the hijab in public is to risk arrest, job loss, lashing, reeducation classes or other punishments, so these protesters have resorted to posting photos and videos of themselves on social media. Featuring Masih Alinejad (Founder, My Stealthy Freedom), Mehrangiz Kar (Iranian feminist scholar), Mariam Memarsadeghi (Co-founder and Co-director, Tavaana), Nina Shea (Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Religious Freedom, Hudson Institute).

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  1. Investing in Iraq: Reconstruction and the Role of the Energy Sector | Thursday, April 26 | 5:00pm – 6:00pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |

On the heels of the Kuwait conference in February, and with an oil and gas bidding round and elections on the horizon, this wide-ranging conversation will focus on the state of investment in Iraq, including the role the energy sector can play in enabling recovery, and the challenges ahead in terms of rebuilding and recovery. Featuring H.E. Dr. Fareed Yasseen (Iraqi Ambassador to the United States), Majid Jafar (CEO, Crescent Petroleum), Ben Van Heuvelen (Editor in Chief, Iraq Oil Report), Ellen Scholl (Deputy Director, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council) as moderator. With introductory remarks by Frederick Kempe (President and CEO, Atlantic Council).

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Peace picks, April 16 – 22

Posted in Adam Friend, Sebastian Gerlach - April 14, 2018 - 0 Comment
  1. Colombia Peace Forum: Elections & Peace Processes in Colombia | Monday, April 16 | 9:30am – 11:30am | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |

While threats of violence marred recent legislative campaigns in Colombia, the March 11 election was Colombia’s most peaceful in decades. Although the FARC’s new political party underperformed, its comprehensive demobilization was palpable and the National Liberation Army (ELN), the country’s second-largest rebel group, respected a temporary unilateral ceasefire. For the first time in 50 years, ballots were cast freely throughout the country and not a single incident of violence was recorded. With the composition of Colombia’s next Congress set, jockeying and coalition-building among the main candidates is fully underway ahead of the May 27 presidential polls. The outcome will have important implications for the precarious implementation of the 2016 FARC peace accord. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace for a discussion on security and protection throughout the electoral process, analysis of the impact the outcome may have on the implementation of the FARC peace agreement, and the implications for the ongoing process with the ELN. Featuring Alejandra Barrios (Director, Electoral Observation Mission), Juanita Goebertus (Colombian Congresswoman and Former Member of the Government Peace Delegation with the FARC), Mark Schneider (Senior Advisor, CSIS), Jonas Claes (Senior Program Officer, Preventing Election Violence, USIP), and Steve Hege (Senior Program Officer, Security & Justice, USIP) as moderator.

This event will be webcast live.

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  1. Hidden Wounds: Trauma and Civilians in the Syrian Conflict | Monday, April 16 | 1:30pm – 3:00pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |

Seven years of conflict in Syria have exacted an enormous human toll and led to widespread physical destruction. The psychological impact of the war, although less visible, has been just as devastating. The levels of trauma and distress impacting Syrian civilians, especially children have been staggering with nearly 500,000 killed, half the population displaced and more than 13 million Syrians in need of humanitarian assistance. The traumatic impact of the Syrian conflict is less often acknowledged, but could significantly impair the ability of Syrian civilians to recover and build a more peaceful future. Syrian doctors and humanitarian relief experts have increasingly engaged on this issue and are developing new and innovative approaches to help address and heal these invisible wounds. Please join USIP and specialists from the Syrian American Medical Society, the U.S. State Department and Save the Children for a panel discussion, addressing an aspect of the Syrian conflict that often receives less attention than it deserves. Featuring Catherine Bou-Maroun (Foreign Affairs Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, DoS), Dr. Mohamed Khaled Hamza (Mental Health Committee Chair & Foundation Board Member, Syrian American Medical Society), Amy Richmond (Director, Child Protection in Emergencies, Save the Children), and Mona Yacoubian (Senior Advisor, Syria, the Middle East and North Africa, USIP) as moderator. With opening remarks by Nancy Lindborg (President, USIP).

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  1. US-Europe Cooperation and The China Challenge | Tuesday, April 17 | 10:30am – 12:00pm | The Heritage Foundation | Register here |

The U.S. and nations of Europe are allies across a range of issues that have kept much of the world free, secure and growing in prosperity for decades since the end of World War II. Is there a future for greater such cooperation in the Indo-Pacific – particularly in the face of challenges presented by China? In areas like international trade and investment, China presents American and European capitals a dilemma. It brings capital to the table, but capital laden with state ownership and support that distorts the global economic environment, sometimes to the detriment of domestic concerns. Politically, Beijing models a system of governance that runs contrary to centuries of Western political tradition, while its growing clout gives comfort to some of the world’s most repressive regimes. And in some areas, like international maritime law, Beijing threatens to overturn standards that have underpinned not only the region’s peace and prosperity, but its own. How can the U.S. and Europe promote their common values in the face of these challenges? What is the balance between cooperation with China and opposition to the negative byproducts of its rise, and can the U.S. and Europe agree on that balance? Featuring Theresa Fallon (Director, Center for Russia Europe Asia Studies), Philippe Le Corre (Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, HKS), Jamie Fly (Senior Fellow & Director, Future of Geopolitics & Asia Programs, GMF), and Walter Lohman (Director, Asian Studies Center, Heritage Foundation) as moderator.

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  1. Democracies Under Duress: Are We Losing Central Europe? | Tuesday, April 17 | 11:00am – 12:00pm | CSIS | Register here |

Central Europe’s reintegration with the West and its commitment to democracy and the rule of law were signature foreign policy achievements in the post-Cold War era for the United States. Increasingly, European and U.S. policymakers question whether Central Europe is really committed to democratic values and principles. Corruption, nativism, anti-Semitism, and weak institutions and civil society contribute to the drift of some NATO and EU members in Central Europe toward illiberalism. Join CSIS for a timely conversation on what policy tools Washington and Brussels can use to address democratic backsliding in Central Europe. Featuring Dr. Charles Gati (Senior Research Professor of European and Eurasian Studies, Johns Hopkins SAIS), David Frum (Senior Editor, The Atlantic), Radek Sikorski (Distinguished Statesman, CSIS), and Heather A. Conley (Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic & Director, Europe Program, CSIS).

This event will be webcast live.

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  1. Countering Russian Kleptocracy | Tuesday, April 17 | 11:00am – 12:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |

Kleptocratic regimes use corruption and as a means of control at home and a weapon of influence abroad. Russian oligarchs and other Kremlin agents have become adept at exploiting the global financial system to launder illicit funds and convert them into new forms of power projection, including attacks on Western democratic institutions. The Kremlin’s attempts to influence elections have exposed a series of systemic vulnerabilities in the United States, whose national security now requires a sustained response. Hudson Institute’s new report, Countering Russian Kleptocracy, outlines policy that, if implemented, would provide a comprehensive and effective strategy to counter Moscow’s aims. Featuring Charles Davidson (Executive Director, Kleptocracy Initiative, Hudson Institute), Clay Fuller (Jeane Kirkpatrick Fellow, AEI), Jeffrey Gedmin (Senior Fellow, Georgetown University), Ben Judah (Research Fellow, Kleptocracy Initiative, Hudson Institute), and Nate Sibley (Program Manager, Kleptocracy Initiative, Hudson Institute).

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  1. Sustaining Growth in Africa: Economic Diversification, Job Creation, and Infrastructure Financing | Tuesday, April 17 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Brookings Institution | Register here |

Improved economic and political governance, together with a favorable global external environment, over the past two decades or so, have set the foundation for Africa’s economic prosperity. Most economies across Africa responded with resilience to the 2014 commodity price shock, and the recovery is gaining momentum. However, obstacles, including jobless growth and increasing debt, loom in the distance. In its 2018 “African Economic Outlook,” the African Development Bank assesses these challenges and provides some policy recommendations, including economic diversification, development of labor-absorbing sectors, as well as investments in human capital, and in industries with high payoffs. It also recommends a focus on smart and catalytic debt management and infrastructure development. In particular, policymakers should consider institutional, regulatory and project-level challenges to infrastructure development and prioritize sectors and access given large infrastructure financing needs of $130-$170 billion, almost double the long-accepted estimate of $93 billion a year. Featuring Bongi Kunene (Executive Director, The World Bank), Alan Gelb (Senior Fellow and Director of Studies, Center for Global Development), Jeffrey Gutman (Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development), Louise Fox (Chief Economist, USAID), and Brahima Sangafowa Coulibaly (Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development & Director, Africa Growth Initiative, Brookings Institution) as moderator. With introductory remarks by Charles O. Boamah (Senior Vice President, AfDB), and a presentation by Abebe Shimeles (Manager, Macroeconomic Division, AfDB).

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  1. Politics and Policy of East Asia’s Economic Future | Thursday, April 19 | 1:90pm – 4:00pm | Wilson Center | Register here |

The Trans-Pacific Partnership is the most recent, and a highly ambitious, step along a familiar road of international economic liberalization and integration through multilateral trade-plus pacts.  It promised to deepen and extend openness through commitments on trade in goods and services, investment, harmonization of national regulation on a wide range of economics-related matters labor and the environment, and robust protections for intellectual property and processes for transnational dispute resolution.

Panel 1: After the U.S. TPP “Opt-Out” 1:00 PM to 2:15 PM

Shortly after taking office, President Trump announced that the U.S. would be opting out of the TPP. Although less prominent in the U.S. and elsewhere in the West, domestic political pressures and policies favoring greater protectionism have been on the rise in some East Asian states as well. At the same time, the China-centered alternative to the once-U.S.-led TPP—the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership—persists.  And the remaining members of the TPP have determined to go forward without the United States.  All of this has been occurring against the backdrop of the WTO’s fading as a force for global economic liberalization. What do these developments portend for economic relations within East Asia and U.S. economic relations with the region? Featuring Inu Manak (Visiting Scholar, Cato Institute), Derek Scissors (Resident Scholar, AEI; Chief Economist, China Beige Book), Bruce Hirsh (Principal and Founder, Tailwind Global Strategies), and Jacques deLisle (Director, Asia Program, FPRI; Professor of Law and Political Science and Deputy Director, Center for the Study of Contemporary China, University of Pennsylvania) as moderator.

Panel 2: Looking to the Future 2:30 PM to 3:45 PM

The politics of international economic policy have created much uncertainty.  But this is far from the only, or potentially the most disruptive, force in play.  Technological transformation, the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” and kindred developments pose additional challenges and impetuses for change.  These shifts are potentially especially significant in East Asia. The region is home to many of the world’s most dynamic economies, has long been a hub of technological innovation, and now faces the consequences of China’s ambitious agenda to create an “innovation economy.”  What do these trends and possible future developments portend for economies in East Asia? Featuring Eleonore Pauwels (Director of the Anticipatory Intelligence (AI ) Lab, Science and Technology Innovation Program, Wilson Center), Samm Sacks (Senior Fellow, Technology Policy Program, CSIS), Robert Atkinson (Founder and President, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation), and Shihoko Goto (Senior Northeast Asia Associate, Asia Program, Wilson Center) as moderator.

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  1. China’s Growing Influence in the Indian Ocean: Implications for the U.S. and Its Regional Allies | Friday, April 12 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |

For a long time, the Indian Ocean was considered a secondary concern with less strategic value than other parts of the region. This view is rapidly changing, driven in large part by China’s entry into the Indian Ocean. Recently, China signed an almost century-long lease of Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, demonstrating its interest in establishing a long-term presence in the region. China is already deploying warships in the Indian Ocean and playing a more active role in regional conflicts. The Hudson Institute is delighted to host a panel to discuss the growing strategic relevance of the Indian Ocean and the implications for the U.S. and its regional allies. Featuring Toshi Yoshihara (Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments), Asanga Abeyagoonasekera (Director General, Institute of National Security Studies of Sri Lanka, Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence), Aparna Pande (Research Fellow and Director, Initiative on the Future of India and South Asia, Hudson Institute), Satoru Nagao (Visiting Fellow, Hudson Institute), and Jonas Parello-Plesner (Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute) as moderator.

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