Tag: Democracy and Rule of Law

The applause won’t echo for long

Bombast
Self-sacrifice

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s address to Congress yesterday was in sharp contrast to President Biden’s brief address from the Oval Office. Biden said he sacrificed himself for the sake of his country. Netanyahu is ready to sacrifice his country for himself.

The unmerited applause

The Congress members present, who were mostly Republicans, reacted positively to Netanyahu’s presentation. They applauded at virtually every sentence. There was particular enthusiasm for his introduction of wounded Israeli soldiers, one of whom was Druze and one Muslim. They represent however a small fraction of the force, especially at the officer level.

More important are the ultra-orthodox who serve in the IDF. Netanyahu did not mention them. The US has threatened their Netzah Yehuda (Judah’s victory) battalion with sanctions for their behavior on the West Bank. The US has already sanctioned settlers there. The IDF record of accountability for war crimes is weak. Its “much-vaunted “fact-finding mechanism” results in precious few indictments.

Quite a few Democrats, including the Vice President, absented themselves from the speech. Michigan Representative Rashida Tlaib held up a sign saying “war criminal.” Vermont Senator Sanders called Netanyahu a war criminal in advance of his speech:

Other things Netanyahu omitted

The Prime Minister neglected to mention other important things:

  1. His own responsibility for the intelligence and security lapses on October 7.
  2. The Israel Defense Forces have freed few hostages in rescue operations.
  3. The hostages freed so far have overwhelmingly been freed in negotiated exchanges with Hamas.
  4. A ceasefire is needed to enable further exchanges of hostages and prisoners.
  5. The majority of Israelis support a ceasefire and exchange.
  6. They also want Netanyahu out. He continues the war in order to prevent that.
  7. First-hand accounts of the IDF targeting of children and civilians in Gaza.
  8. Settler violence, supported by the IDF, in the West Bank against Palestinians.
  9. The expanding war with Lebanese Hizbollah in the north and Yemeni Houthis in the South.
  10. Iran becoming a nuclear threshold state because of Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal.
Yes, the Hamas attack was barbarous

I can agree with Netanyahu that the October 7 Hamas attack was barbarous. But Israel’s response has not been civilized. It has been excessive and ineffective. That is a particularly bad combination. Israelis know this and want him out. Most Americans also have little or no confidence in Netanyahu. The applause in Congress won’t echo for long.

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Getting to post-Dayton Bosnia

Here are the talking points I prepared for myself for today’s conference in Sarajevo on The Biden Administration’s Bosnia Policy: 30 Years of Federation of BiH sponsored by the US-Europe Alliance and the International University of Sarajevo:

  1. It is a great pleasure to be back in Sarajevo, truly one of the most beautiful and welcoming cities on earth.
  2. A great deal has changed since I first came here in November 1994, during the war, and even since I was here five or six years ago.
  3. I was the US embassy’s most frequent visitor during the war.
  4. The streets then were empty of both cars and people, the city was divided and isolated from its so-called suburbs, shelling was frequent, most shops were closed, heat and electricity were at best sporadic, telephones had stopped working, civilians needed to learn where they could walk without being targeted by snipers. Thousands of civilians were killed.
  5. Small arms fire hit my UN plane while landing the first time I came to Sarajevo.
  6. Things have changed a great deal. My compliments to those who have made it happen.
  7. I find Sarajevo much enlivened, younger, and more cosmopolitan. It is good that so many tourists are making their way here, that you have a Sarajevo School of Science and Technology that grants British as well as Bosnian degrees, that the Vijecnica is restored and occupied by a young woman who has more experience as a university professor than as a politician.
  8. But it is also true that the Dayton agreements froze the warring parties in place by institutionalizing the political divisions among Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats.
  9. Each group has a veto on almost everything at the state level and in the Federation.
  10. Dayton also reduced the role of people who refused to identify themselves with one of the three major groups, preferring to think of themselves as individuals with inalienable rights.
  11. I believe it is high time to correct those mistakes.
  12. The two entities are the warring parties of 1995. One is now threatening secession. The other is threatened with division by those who want a third entity.
  13. These objectives are ethnic war by political means. That is better than war by military means, but it is still not the best option available.
  14. You will later in this conference discuss the legal strategy aimed at reforming Dayton Bosnia, which has been notably successful at the European Court of Human Rights but remains largely unimplemented, due to the ethnic nationalist vetoes.
  15. That however should not be the only strategy aimed at making Bosnia a more functional and effective state.
  16. Others may talk today about economic strategies. Any Bosnian enterprise with ambition should be unhappy with today’s Dayton Bosnia.
  17. A serious company should want a more unified economic space with improved relations with the rest of the world, especially Europe but also the United States.
  18. But I want to focus mainly on political reforms, which I think are needed in two dimensions.
  19. One is reform within Bosnia’s political parties, which are largely fiefdoms of the party leaders.
  20. More competitive contests for party leadership would open up the existing political parties, enable them to have more policy and programmatic focus, and reduce the dominance of the political parties within the Bosnian state.
  21. Political party reform would also reduce the risks of state capture by people exploiting public resources and patronage. And it would reduce the risks that state investigations of corruption would be blocked.
  22. The second dimension of needed political reform is cross-ethnic cooperation.
  23. This is not entirely lacking. Croat and Serb ethnic nationalists cooperate quite well these days, as they did in southern Bosnia during the war.
  24. What is needed is creation of a more civic-oriented multiethnic coalition, one that would reinforce the legal strategy that has produced good results at the ECHR.
  25. Such a civic coalition would focus on improving governance, not only at the national level but also in the municipalities.
  26. That is where citizens and government interact most frequently. A coalition that proves it can meet citizen demands at the municipal level will have a much greater chance of winning at other levels.
  27. Despite my wartime role as Mr. Federation, I am no longer a friend to the entities or the cantons. It seems to me Bosnia and Herzegovina could be more effectively governed at the municipal level and at the state level.
  28. The state government should have full authority to negotiate and implement the EU’s acquis communautaire.
  29. The municipalities, in accordance with the European principle of subsidiarity, should have responsibility for everything else.
  30. It is not clear to me how you get to that kind of post-Dayton Bosnia from where things stand now.
  31. It will take political courage and smart strategy, beginning with redefinition of Bosnians as citizens rather than ethnic groups.
  32. Yes, you are correct in thinking that the Americans imposed the Dayton system on Bosnia. Some of you will want to fix what we broke.
  33. But we imposed what the wartime leadership said they would accept.
  34. Twenty-nine years later neither the Americans nor the Europeans have the clout to change the system.
  35. Nor do they have the incentive to do so. Many fear instability and some have confidence in the transformational power of the EU.
  36. It is now up to Bosnians to change the political system. There are good legal, political, and economic reasons to do so.
  37. The simple fact is that Dayton Bosnia will not be able to join the European Union or NATO.
  38. Many in the current political leadership know that but don’t mind. They fear their own political and economic fortunes would end in a Bosnia with strong judicial, legislative, and executive institutions.
  39. It is Bosnia’s citizens who are going to have to do the heavy lifting.
  40. The Americans and European should be prepared to help.
  41. The Americans tried with European support in 2006 when they supported the negotiation of what became known as the April package.
  42. That failed to get a 2/3 majority in parliament by just two votes.
  43. The EU tried more recently with American support through the Citizens’ Assembly, municipal versions of which have also convened in Banja Luka and Mostar.
  44. Much more of this kind of effort is needed to build a cross-ethnic constituency for peace.
  45. Let me turn now to the hard part. I regret to say Bosnia also needs to be ready for war, in order to prevent it.
  46. Milorad Dodik and Aleksandar Vucic have made their intentions clear. They are creating a de facto Serbian world that would remove Republika Srpska from any oversight by Bosnian institutions.
  47. This is a clever scheme, with each step kept below the level at which it might stimulate a negative European or American reaction.
  48. Nor would I rule out a military dimension to the Serb strategy like the attempt at Banjska in Kosovo last September. That would be a provocation intended to provoke a reaction that enables Republika Srpska or Serbia to justify intervention.
  49. The Bosnian Army, EUFOR and NATO also need to be ready for what we call in Washington “little green men” used to infest Brcko in a kind of stealth takeover.
  50. Only if Dodik and Vucic understand that there will be a rapid and effective US and EU military reaction can we be sure they won’t try these Moscow-inspired gimmicks.
  51. Preserving the peace requires both military strength and political reform. Getting beyond the Dayton state in Bosnia will require commitment and inspiration.
  52. Bosnia has come a long way in the past 29 years. But it still has a way to go before it is a normal democratic country, one without a High Representative, one whose unity and territorial integrity citizens of all ethnicities defend, and one in which individual rights are protected for everyone.
  53. I am not suggesting something less than what I myself want. I would never trade my individual rights—protected by the judicial, legislative, and executive branches—for group rights.
  54. I wish you well undertaking the worthy effort of creating a post-Dayton, civic Bosnia. One that can join the European Union and NATO without looking back!
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One key to Gaza’s future is inside Israel

Prime Minister Netanyahu refuses to define an end-state for Gaza, beyond Israeli control of security there. But it is becoming clear what he intends. Along with his extreme-right coalition partners, Netanyahu wants to reproduce something like the West Bank in Gaza. The Palestinians would be limited to relatively small enclaves. Israeli security forces, possibly with support from Jewish settlements, would control corridors that separate them. The first of those already exists. Israel would control all movement in and out of the Strip, including from Egypt and the Mediterranean.

Occupation is occupation

In the West Bank, the Palestinians control security and civil administration only in Area A, which represents 18% of the territory. That control is often merely nominal. Nothing like it will be allowed in Netanyahu’s concept for Gaza. At best, the model for Gaza is Area B, where Israel controls security and the Palestinians nominally control civil administration. That represents 22% of the West Bank. But the reality will more than likely be close to Area C, where Israel controls both security and civil administration. Area C makes up 59% of the West Bank.

This is a formula for occupation but without the protection the 4th Geneva Convention affords. Israel claims the Convention does not apply because Palestine was not a state or legitimately part of one before Israel occupied it. Whatever the legalities, the fact is that Israel has not respected the Convention in the West Bank or Gaza in the past and cannot be expected to do so in the future. But occupation is occupation, even if you claim the Convention does not apply.

What could prevent it?

Netanyahu’s intentions are not however the only factor in determining what is going to happen. America, Europe, Arab states, Iran and its allies, and the rest of the world all have some influence. So too do the Palestinians.

US concurrence in this formula is possible if Donald Trump is re-elected. President Biden’s constituency would object vehemently. But Biden has demonstrated little capacity to influence the Israelis, even when he has had the will. Would he really cut off arms supplies to get a better deal for the Palestinians in Gaza? The Europeans have been mostly supportive of Israel so far. They aren’t likely reverse course. Even if they did, their influence is negligible.

Arab states will be under greater popular pressure not to accept Netanyahu’s ambitions. But they have not been willing during the war to levy any serious pressure on Israel. The fact is they are mostly glad to see Hamas battered. They are also interested in normalization with a state that will help them maintain internal security and improve their economic and technological prospects. The popular pressure has proven manageable. Why say or do anything that might make it less so?

Iran and its allies in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen will speak up loudly against Israeli occupation and lob occasional missiles and drones at the Jewish state. But they have not been effective during the war and are unlikely to improve their performance afterwards. China and Russia will also shout denunciations of Israeli behavior, but they too have not been very effective in the past.

The rest of the world doesn’t like Israel’s occupation of the West Bank or Gaza, but what can they do about it?

Opposition has to come from within Israel

Within Israel, the main preoccupation so far among Netanyahu’s opponents has been the hostages. Israelis want them back. Netanyahu says military pressure will achieve that. A plurality of Israelis prefer a deal with Hamas. That implicitly would leave Hamas intact, even if weakened.

This situation is changing. Within the last week, Israeli officials, including the Defense Minister, have let it be known they are unhappy with not having a plan for how the war will end. They do not want the responsibility for a permanent occupation. Now Benny Gantz, by default Netanyahu’s key political rival, has demanded the Prime Minister enunciate a post-war plan by June 8.

Israelis would do well to contemplate what the failure to produce one could mean. Gaza may already be ungovernable. Chaos next door is never a good strategy. Burning down your neighbor’s house is a dangerous thing to do. Repression forever is no better. Like any agglomeration of more than 2 million people, Gaza reconstruction will need water, shelter, food, health, education, and security. That will require a major international effort. It is well past time to have begun thinking about it and organizing for it.

The odds of success for such a reconstruction effort are not high. But the outcome, even if only partly successful, would be a lot better than chaos or re-imposed occupation.

Resistance will continue

Whatever the Israelis decide–chaos, repression, or reconstruction–Palestinian resistance will continue until the Palestinian state becomes a reality. Jews should understand that better than they do, and better than those who have not suffered oppression, dispossession, and displacement. The question is whether the Palestinians will choose a more moderate path than the mass murder the Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades led them on, or an even more radical one.

There are signs of discontent with Hamas in Gaza. Encouraging the emergence of a more moderate resistance should be an Israeli priority. Israelis should be supporting aid into Gaza, not ransacking it. The International Criminal Court, whose prosecutor is seeking warrants for the arrest of Netanyahu and the Defense Minister as well as three top Hamas leaders, is doing so because of abuse of the civilian population of Gaza:

That gives Israelis an opportunity to reverse the decisions that have deprived Palestinians of the physical necessities of life. Israel can’t erase the past. But it can reverse counterproductive policies.

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Could the message be any clearer?

I spoke this morning at Hudson Institute-US/Europe Alliance event on Foreshocks in the Black Sea and Western Balkans: Repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine War. I drew on this post:

Serbia already has a “strategic partnership” with Russia.

All too often those who follow the Balkans view Moscow and Beijing as manipulating President Vucic. That is not the whole story. He “has agency” in the awkward syntax of political science. Vucic has decided to align his increasingly autocratic regime with Russia and China, as well as with Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Hungary. He likes their “might makes right” style, which gives him some hope of recovering Kosovo or part of it. He would no doubt befriend Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, if Pristina hadn’t beaten him to it by establishing its embassy in Jerusalem.

The many reasons why

Ethnonationalist, autocratic preference comes naturally to Vucic, who learned his politics at Slobodan Milosevic’s knee. But he had a choice when he became Prime Minister in 2014. He could have adopted a truly pro-Western approach. He has long talked pro-EU. If deed had followed words, Serbia would today have a consolidated democracy well on its way to accession. Instead, it has drifted towards authoritarian rule. Freedom House ranks it generously as “partly free.” Its ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) “has steadily eroded political rights and civil liberties, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition, and civil society organizations.”

Vucic has not only presided over Serbia’s democratic decline. He has encouraged it. Many Balkan watchers complain about “stabilitocracy.” They mean by that the alleged Western preference for incumbent rulers because they provide stability, despite democratic shortcomings. But that ignores the fates of Macedonian Prime Minister Gruevski, Montenegrin President Djukanovic, and Kosovo President Thaci. Vucic fears lack of Western commitment to stability. He worries, I hope rightly, that the day he faces defeat in an election or indictment in an international court no one in Europe or the US will trouble themselves with him.

There are no doubt ample economic reasons for Vucic’s autocratic drift as well. China is not beneficent, but its mining, rail, and tire projects and investments leave ample room for hiring well-connected locals and skimming off a percentage to support Vucic-connected oligarchs and politicians. Moscow deals are even less transparent. Both the Chinese and the Russians are all too willing to help as well with internal security cooperation that might go a yard further than the Americans or Europeans would countenance, including extensive electronic surveillance.

Vucic is serious about the Serbian world

But in the end the biggest factor in Vucic’s Eastern leanings is his admiration for those who take what they want, without offering any excuses. Vucic wants to govern all the Serbs of the Balkans, de facto if not de jure. His minions call that ambition the “Serbian world.” In Milosevic’s era it was known as Greater Serbia. Vucic is achieving his objective de facto in Republika Srpska and in Montenegro with minimal violence. That won’t be possible in Kosovo. Any violent move there would throw the Balkans back into chaos and ethnonationalist slaughter.

Belgrade’s new government includes the strongest Serbian world advocate, Deputy Prime Minister Vulin. He claims to have organized the terrorist incident in northern Kosovo last year. It was intended to provide an excuse for Serbian military intervention.

The new Prime Minister was Defense Minister last year when a rent-a-crowd injured dozens of NATO peacekeepers and when Serbia kidnapped police from the territory of Kosovo. He denies genocide in Bosnia and vaunts his ambition to get Montenegro “closer” to Serbia. He shows no sign of accepting as valid the two agreements negotiated last year on normalization with Kosovo. His predecessor disowned them. The new Foreign Minister, the former Ambassador in Washington, can talk for an hour or so with an EU diplomat without mentioning them.

Vucic himself has made it clear he is biding his time until geopolitical circumstances allow him to grab at least northern Kosovo.

This is where the Chinese, who want to do likewise with Taiwan, and the Russians, who have already annexed something like 18% of Ukraine, are most useful. They help Vucic keep alive the hope that some day he can seize what he wants.

So where will the fate of the Balkans be decided?

We should take Vucic’s ambition seriously. Washington and Brussels need to extinguish it. It will be difficult to do that until Biden wins in November and Ukraine evicts Russia. It will be impossible if Trump or the Russians win. Washington, Donbas, and Crimea will decide the fate of the Balkans.

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See no evil is not good policy

Serbia’s parliament approved the country’s new government last week. The personnel and program represent a further turn to the ethnonationalist, anti-EU right. AP makes many of the details easily accessible. The government includes ministers the US has already sanctioned for corruption as well as blatant Russophilic sycophants. Not to mention a prime minister who led the Serbian Defense Ministry last year, when it was complicit in a terrorist attack in northern Kosovo, the kidnapping of Kosovo police, and rioting against NATO-led peacekeepers. He has already reiterated Serbia’s desire for good relations with Russia and refusal to align with EU sanctions against Moscow.

President Vucic is leaving little room for those who argue that Serbia is headed West. In recent months he has ostentatiously met with the would-be dictators of Hungary and Azerbaijan as well as the all too real authoritarians governing Belarus, Russia, and China. Vucic is making no secret of his ambition to extend his authority to the Serb-controlled 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all of Montenegro, and Serb-majority northern Kosovo. Vucic also presided in December over a grotesquely unfair national election, and a fraudulent municipal election in Belgrade, that have prompted Freedom House to continue lowering Serbia’s democracy scores.

Why Europe and the US delude themselves

Still, officials in the US and Europe are prepared to tolerate and even reward Vucic. Some fear that any alternative might be worse. Others don’t want to admit the failure of three years of going easy on Vucic. Still others imagine that crumbs he hands out in the Western direction–Serbs using Kosovo license plates and identity documents–may presage improvement on bigger issues. The shells and bullets Serbia allows to reach Ukraine may influence some, though surely similar amounts–if not more–make their way to Russia.

But self-delusion is a big part of this story. Vucic has made clear that he will not implement agreements the US and EU regard as legally binding. Belgrade has opposed Kosovo membership in the Council of Europe. This is despite its qualifications and the benefits that could derive therefrom to the Kosovo Serbs. Surely intelligent Americans and Europeans understand that Serbian participation in NATO exercises generates a substantial flow of intelligence to Russia. But doing something about Serbia’s malfeasance requires heavy political lifting. Why take that on if no one above your pay grade objects to a “see no evil” policy?

An opportunity to shift

There should soon be an opportunity to take a more effective tack. The officials who forged the see no evil policy are headed elsewhere. Rumint says EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajcak and US Deputy Assistant Secretary Gabriel Escobar are both getting ready to move on. They invested heavily in Vucic and have little to show for it. So has the US embassy in Belgrade. Ambassador Hill has repeatedly denigrated Kosovo’s leadership while lauding Serbia’s.

The new leader of the State Department European Bureau, Jim O’Brien, has not fallen entirely into their unproductive rut. He has been notably blunt on some issues with Vucic. But he, too, continues to promise Serbia progress on instituting an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities in Kosovo that Vucic intends to use as an irredentist mechanism for governing Kosovo’s Serbs.

The Association requires fulfillment of the quid pro quo

This is unfortunate. Kosovo promised this Association in a 2013 agreement that included recognition of the validity of the Kosovo constitution on its entire territory and a commitment to allowing Kosovo and Serbia to accede to the European Union separately and without mutual interference. This amounted to de facto Serbian recognition of Kosovo, since only sovereign states can accede to the Union.

But Serbia has withdrawn from those commitments. Vucic has made it clear that he has no greater tolerance for de facto recognition than for de jure recognition. He has pulled the Serb mayors, police, judges, and other officials out of Pristina’s institutions in northern Kosovo. Belgrade encouraged the Kosovo Serbs to boycott the last municipal elections. Serbia is also opposing Kosovo membership in the Council of Europe and other regional institutions.

The problem is democracy

To expect Kosovo to form the Association without the benefits that Serbia promised in return is foolish. Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti has held a commanding position for most of the past five years in Kosovo politics. There would be no quicker way for him to lose it than to give the Association to Serbia without getting anything in return. He likely faces an election next year. To expect him to commit political suicide to please Belgrade is diplomatic malpractice.

Of course the same is true for President Vucic. Serbia may be headed towards autocracy, but it is not there yet. Few Serbian politicians risk saying the obvious: that Kosovo is lost and Serbia would be better off admitting it. Vucic’s main opposition for years has been more hawkish on Kosovo than he is. It would require unusual courage for him to buck the political currents in Belgrade.

The only way of reviving the Association is to revive the 2013 quid pro quo as well. That should include genuine participation of Serb citizens in Kosovo’s governance, Belgrade acceptance of Pristina’s constitutional and judicial authority in the north, and an end to Belgrade’s opposition to Kosovo membership in international organizations. Kurti might then be able to boast that he had made a good deal. Vucic could claim to have have gotten what Belgrade wanted. And the US and EU would be able to claim real progress in bringing both Serbia and Kosovo closer to EuroAtlantic institutions and values.

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Kosovo is more qualified than Serbia

She is a Serbian representative at the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly.

Serbia is currently engaged in a ferocious campaign to block Kosovo membership in the Council of Europe (CoE). This is despite an explicit commitment in the February agreement the Americans and Europeans claim is legally binding not to do that for any international organizations:

Serbia will not object to Kosovo’s membership in any international organisation.

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovo-and-serbia_en
The merits of the case

I don’t know if the CoE will admit Kosovo later this spring. It certainly should. The main CoE qualification is rule of law:

Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

https://rm.coe.int/1680306052#:~:text=Every%20member%20of%20the%20Council,as%20specified%20in%20Chapter%20I.

Kosovo has been steadily improving and ranks above the median regional average on eight dimensions of rule of law. It is third in the region, slightly behind Montenegro and more behind Georgia, but well ahead of Serbia’s declining scores. Pristina recently resolved a major complaint. It recognized the Decan/i monastery’s property rights, an issue outstanding for more than 20 years. Corruption, regulatory enforcement, and criminal justice are its weakest dimensions. All of these are symptoms of a new and relatively weak state.

Benefits for Serbs

The main purpose of the CoE is

To promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law across Europe and beyond

In principle, you would think that people who really are discriminated against would welcome their country’s membership in such an organization. Instead, Belgrade is dead set against it.

The issue is not only one of ideals. There are practical consequences of CoE membership. It opens to citizens access to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). That is a serious privilege. If a national justice system fails in the eyes of a citizen of a member state of the CoE, that citizen can appeal to the ECHR, which has a strong tradition of ruling in favor of equality and non-discrimination, including the Balkans. That doesn’t mean its decisions are always implemented, as Bosnians will be anxious to tell you, but it does strengthen those who suffer discrimination. Member states can also file complaints against other member states, another privilege that Belgrade should welcome.

Why not?

Belgrade opposes Kosovo CoE membership for several reasons. First, Belgrade doesn’t want to acknowledge that Kosovo is a state. Second, it fears that Kosovo will file complaints against Serbia. There is ample reason for such complaints stemming from discrimination and other human rights violations against the Albanian majority inside Serbia, the treatment of Kosovo citizens in Serbia, and the failure of Serbia to account properly for its wartime malfeasance in Kosovo.

Third, Belgrade is also trying to pressure Kosovo into creating an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities, which it sees as important to formalizing its relationship with the Serb population inside Kosovo. The CoE Parliamentary Assembly regards this as an issue Kosovo should resolve after membership. Such minority associations are common among CoE member states and Kosovo has promised to create one. But it quite reasonably doesn’t want to do so until Serbia acknowledges its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Bottom line

The sad fact is that non-member Kosovo today is more qualified for CoE membership than current member Serbia. It is high time to fix that.

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