Tag: Democracy and Rule of Law
Rot at the top
Two Bulgarian researchers, Ruslan Stefanov and Martin Vladimirov, yesterday presented Shadow Power: Assessment of Corruption and Hidden Economy in Southeast Europe here at SAIS. Their powerpoints are here and here. Corruption is now in many ways the most important challenge in the Balkans today, as it hinders economic growth, exacerbates inter-ethnic relations, heightens political tensions, slows the pace of reforms needed to qualify for NATO and EU membership, reduces state legitimacy, and threatens instability. Corruption is second only to unemployment as a concern the public’s estimation. What the Southeast European Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI) has managed to do is to measure corruption pressure and practices (not just perceptions, as the Transparency International index does) as well as elucidate “state capture,” in particular in the energy sector.
The results are not edifying: corruption pressure (share of citizens reporting demands for bribes from public officials) has not improved overall since 2014 in the region and has worsened in Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, while declining in Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia (notably the countries in which the European Union has arguably been most active on corruption issues). More than half of the population in these Southeast European countries believes it will have to bribe someone to get things done. In all but Montenegro, more than half the population believes corruption cannot be substantially reduced. Irregular, “hidden,” employment is one of the consequences. Another is use of the non-liberalized energy sector to extract rents for state officials.
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, and to a lesser extent Albania and Kosovo, stand out as countries in which corruption levels are worsening. Tolerance of corruption in those four countries is also highest, and they are among the countries in which 50% or more of the population believes corruption cannot be substantially reduced. The public thinks the most corrupt officials in the region are political party and coalition leaders, members of parliament, ministers, and local political leaders. In short, what we’ve got here is deep-seated, endemic corruption, with the rot worst at the top.
What is to be done?
The report recommends “effective prosecution of corrupt high level politicians and senior civil servants,” EU Commission engagement with civil society, and independent monitoring mechanisms. That is certainly logical, but I challenged whether this was adequate after the presentation at SAIS, noting that the successful prosecution of my wartime friend and former prime minister Ivo Sanader in Croatia seems to have had the opposite impact: the “Sanader effect” has made top politicians more cautious about reforms. Ruslan wisely underlined that the prosecutions could not be one-off but rather should be sustained, as they are in the US. I can’t fault the idea of stronger EU engagement with civil society, which Ruslan and Martin thought had been much weaker than in Romania and Bulgaria, where improvements are evident.
I am however still skeptical about anticorruption bodies. The kind of civil society monitoring SELDI has done is important, but most official anticorruption agencies are ineffectual, because corruption is not an aberration of the system but rather the system itself. The opposite of corruption in these countries is not anticorruption. It is good governance. I see more promise in improving transparency and accountability, in particular in political parties. Most of them in the countries of greatest concern are run as fiefdoms of the party bosses, with little possibility of changing the guard and lots of opportunity to reward loyalists with corrupt rents. Srdjan Blagovcanin and Boris Divjak have made this point for Bosnia and Herzegovina. It seems to me likely to be valid in other countries as well.
But that point should not detract from the courageous and perspicacious work Ruslan and Martin have done. They have greatly enhanced the tools available to measure corruption and corruption pressure and offered some important suggestion of what to do about it. That these accomplishments are coming from inside the Balkans, not outside, represents real progress. Bravi!
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No seal of approval
I’ve taken some flak for meeting with former Macedonian Prime Minister Gruevski on his visit to Washington last week. Here is a sample:
I would like to ask you something, please don’t give a chance together anymore to politicians like Gruevski to seat with you. They will again and again misuse you for their purpose. And if you go and read some newspapers this night you will find he already did it. Milosevic had done it so many times using meetings with west politicians on TV to show the people that ‘he is in line with the western politicians’ and that he was the one they like to speak with….You who have been our hope that it can be better future for our people back home. At least please do not do that ahead of so significant elections that may happen in Macedonia. Just figure out how many people will read what you wrote and how many people will see the picture of you and Gruevski on how many TV all under the cup of the corrupted government.Yet it is up to us aways not to you to bring him down, out of power. I admit I may ask to much from you.
You do ask too much, but let me explain why.
I am a university professor, no longer a government official. When a foreign politician comes to the US and asks to talk with me, I rarely say “no.” Mine is a society based on the free exchange of ideas. I treasure that exchange, even with people with whom I disagree or criticize. Meeting with me is no endorsement. It is only an acknowledgement that you exist and have something to say that I might want to hear. I even happily provide opportunities for people I disagree with to speak at SAIS, where they will be intelligently and politely challenged on all fronts.
Of course I know that in their home countries some of these politicians will try to exploit a meeting with me or other American academics to burnish their reputations at home, even claiming at times that I have given a good democracy seal of approval. Nothing could be further from the truth. I am blunt and forthright in telling politicians what I think. I also try to publish material that informs the inquiring public what my attitude on the main issues is, while maintaining the confidentiality of the actual conversations, which is only polite.
I may of course make mistakes. If I am smart enough to realize what they are, I try to publish something that corrects them. I am confident that these corrections are read by the politicians in question, even if no one else pays them mind.
Let there be no doubt about my attitude towards other politicians, from Macedonia or elsewhere. They are welcome at SAIS, so long as the US government will give them visas to visit. Opposition leader Zaev, whom I don’t know, or parliamentary leader Sekerinska, whom I do know, would be just as welcome as Gruevski and his colleagues. I don’t play favorites, even if I might have them.
My personal preference will always be for politicians seriously committed to democracy and rule of law. That includes free and fair elections, an independent judiciary, transparent, accountable, and inclusionary governance. But I am only too well aware that few will meet that standard in every respect. Talking to them about how they can move in the right direction is for me an obligation, not a seal of approval.
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Peace picks, October 10-14
- Conflict Prevention and Resolution Forum: Fragile States and Conflict Prevention Challenges | Tuesday, October 11th | 9.30am – 11am | Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies | click HERE to register
Approximately 1 billion individuals live in “fragile and conflict-affected countries” across the world. A fragile state is considered one in which a lack of governmental capacity leaves citizens vulnerable to a range of shocks, amongst which violence prevails. With a lack of funding for conflict prevention in fragile states, these countries are left without recourse. It is important to examine the lifesaving role conflict prevention can provide these countries as they move towards sustaining long term peace and social cohesion.
Join us on October 11th for an in depth discussion with two leading experts:
Nancy Lindborg, President, United States Institute of Peace
Ozong Agborsangaya-Fiteu, Senior Operations Officer, World Bank FCV
The discussion will be moderated by:
Daniel Serwer, Director of the Conflict Management Program, SAIS.
The experts will discuss their work in fragility, conflict and violence and provide recommendations for promoting peace in the most fragile segments of the world.
- The Current State of US-Russian Relations with Ambassador Kislyak | Tuesday, October 11th | 4.30pm – 6pm | Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies | click HERE to register
Dean Vali Nasr, The Foreign Policy Institute and the SAIS Russia-Eurasia Club cordially invite you to join Ambassador Sergey I. Kislyak, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the US, for a discussion on “The Current State of US-Russian Relations.” The conversation will be moderated by Ambassador Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Institute.
Ambassador Kislyak currently serves as the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the United States, and previously as the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2003 to 2008. Prior to that, he served simultaneously as the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Kingdom of Belgium and as the Permanent Representative of Russia to NATO in Brussels, Belgium, from 1998-2003.
- US Foreign Policy on Transitional Justice | Tuesday, October 11th | 5pm – 6.30pm | Center for Strategic and International Studies | click HERE to register
The Human Rights Initiative invites you to attend a Book Launch and Conversation: U.S. Foreign Policy on Transitional Justice
Please join the Human Rights Initiative for the launch of U.S. Foreign Policy on Transitional Justice, (Oxford University Press, 2015) by Dr. Annie Bird. Featuring Keynote Speaker Stephen Rapp, Former Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S. Department of State, and author Dr. Annie Bird
- RAND Study: ‘Money as a Weapon’ Works in Afghanistan | Thursday, October 13th | 10am – 11.30am | US Institute of Peace | click HERE to register
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are raising new debate on their complex mixing of military operations and relief and development work. This includes CERP, which U.S. forces in Afghanistan have called “money as a weapon system.” Last year the U.S. government’s Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction raised questions about the accounting for $2.2 billion in CERP funds. RAND experts Charles Ries and Daniel Egel have completed a study on the impacts of CERP projects in Afghan localities. Their research finds that CERP projects improved local economic conditions and security for Afghans, helped build U.S. forces’ rapport with local residents, and eventually led to reduced hostilities. The authors will discuss their forthcoming RAND report, “Investing in the Fight: Assessing the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan.”
Scott Worden – Director of Afghanistan, U.S. Institute of Peace
Ambassador Charles Ries – Vice President, International at RAND
Daniel Egel – Economist, RAND
Stephen Lennon – Director, USAID Office of Transition Initiatives
- The Middle East and the Next Administration | Thursday, October 13th | 1pm – 3.30pm | Middle East Policy Council | click HERE to register
Please join us for our 86th Capitol Hill Conference on Thursday, October 13th from 1:00 p.m to 3:30 p.m. Our panel will offer diverse perspectives on the challenges for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and opportunities for the next administration.
Speakers:
Chairman, Projects International Inc.
Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense
Former President, MEPC
President, Arab American Institute
Member, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
Author of Arab Voices: What They Are Saying to Us and Why it Matters
Senior Fellow & Director, Middle East Security Program, Center for a New American Security
Former Senior Professional Staff Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Former Iran Team Chief, Office of the Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy
Former Special Advisor on the Middle East, Office of the Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy
- State-Building and Economic Development in Palestine Without a Political Horizon: The Promise and Pitfalls | Thursday, October 13th | 2pm – 3.15pm | New America Foundation | click HERE to register
The possibility of relaunching meaningful peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians is remote given the political realities in both countries. The challenges facing states across the Middle East—civil conflict, refugee flows, and the threat posed by terrorism—have dominated the policymaking space to the exclusion of Israeli-Palestinian peace. The priority seems now to have become one focused on preventing violent extremism from taking root in Palestine, shoring up the Palestinian institutions of government and supporting economic development and opportunity for Palestinians until the environment is ripe for a comprehensive agreement.
On October 13, New America will host an expert panel from Al Shabaka—The Palestinian Policy Network—that will explore the promise and pitfalls of development and “economic peace” in the absence of a political horizon in the occupied Palestinian territory. The panelists argue that a focus on economic development should complement rather than be seen as a substitute for progress on the political front. They also examine efforts to nurture the Palestinian social, political, and cultural fabric as the occupation enters its 50th year.
Introduction:
Zaha Hassan, Esq. – Middle East Fellow, New America
Panelists:
Nur Arafeh – Jerusalem-Based Al-Shabaka Policy Fellow
Tareq Baconi – DC-Based Al-Shabaka Policy Fellow
Nadia Hijab – London-Based Al-Shabaka Executive Director
- A New Strategy for US-Iran Relations | Friday, October 14th | 12pm | Atlantic Council | click HERE to register
Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series – A New Strategy for US-Iran Relations
A conversation with:
Ellen Laipson – Distinguished Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council
Michael Connell – Director, Iranian Studies Program, Center for Naval Analyses
Amir Handjani – Fellow, Truman National Security Project
The implications of the P5+1 nuclear agreement with Iran for the regional order could include prolonged instability and insecurity, but also new opportunities. Dynamic and innovative thinking on how regional and international stakeholders can help tackle present and future challenges and work toward a more secure and stable Middle East is very much needed. A New Strategy for US-Iran Relations, written by Ms. Ellen Laipson, Atlantic Council distinguished fellow and president emeritus of the Stimson Center, constitutes an important addition to this larger conversation. Dr. Michael Connell, director of the Iranian Studies Program and the Center for Naval Analyses, and Mr. Amir Handjani, board director at the Atlantic Council and Truman National Security Project fellow, will join Laipson for a discussion of this latest installment in the Atlantic Council Strategy Paper series.
The paper features a foreword by former US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, and proposes a US policy towards Iran that carefully balances effective deterrence and containment measures with more proactive engagement, with the goals of reducing the prospects for military confrontation with Iran and improving the regional security environment. Laipson’s strategy rests on several policy themes: expanding diplomatic engagement, sustaining security cooperation, improving mutual understanding, clarifying economic and financial opportunities, and protecting the nonproliferation success. Notably, this is not a plan for navigating the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), but rather is a forward-looking strategy document for the next decade.
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Dodik’s folly
American University Professor Ulas Doga Uralp asked last night whether I had written anything about the Bosnian Serb referendum, which passed Sunday with over 99% voting “yes.” Turnout was modest: somewhere around 55%. The issue on the ballot was whether Republika Srpska’s national day should be celebrated January 9. I won’t bother to explain why that is important to some people. Nor do I regret not having written something about it, though I believe I wasted a few breaths on it in an interview.
The substance of the referendum deserves to be ignored. The significant thing was that it was held at all, after the Bosnian constitutional court ruled it unconstitutional, rightly or wrongly. If the referendum is allowed to stand, Dodik intends to move ahead with an independence referendum in 2018. For some in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that would be a casus belli, just as it was in 1992.
I don’t really expect real war to ensue, though the risk of violence needs to be taken seriously. Many approved independence referendums don’t result in widely recognized sovereignty, most notably Russian-inspired referendums in Transnistria, South Ossetia, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Crimea. Don’t know all those places? That’s because they are under normal circumstances obscure provinces, now converted into poor, backwater satellites of Moscow with no prospect of wide international recognition. Their main function is to destabilize and retard the countries that continue to claim them, in service to Moscow’s anti-Western, anti-NATO and anti-EU ambitions.
That’s the best Republika Srpska can hope for if it proceeds with its current course: to become a poor, unrecognized, backwater satellite of a country whose GDP is now less than that of Spain and still decreasing. Russia is a declining regional power with little to offer even a strategically important place like Crimea. Republika Srpska as a self-declared independent state will get little recognition and even less money, since it doesn’t happen to sit on significant real estate. Dodik will no doubt have increased opportunities to line his pockets if RS declares independence, but the population is guaranteed to lose access to World Bank funds as well as American and European assistance.
I don’t expect it to come to that. It would be far better if Bosnia’s courts would handle the issue, declaring the referendum null and void and doing what they can to hold Dodik accountable for conducting it in spite of a constitutional court decision. This is Bosnia’s Marbury v Madison moment, when the court’s authority to review legislation and executive decisions requires affirmation. If the Americans and Europeans have any interest left in Bosnia, they need to make sure that happens.
Of course they might have just used the “Bonn powers” of the High Representative, who has said the referendum violates the Dayton agreements. They can no longer readily do that because they have somehow allowed Moscow to acquire a de facto veto over their use, and they fear they have no way of implementing the HiRep’s decisions. Putin’s Russia is happy to use the veto and ostentatiously provided support to Dodik with a visit to Moscow just before the referendum.
But none of that changes reality: Republika Srpska won’t become a widely recognized independent state but may well join half a dozen other Moscow-sponsored backwaters in serving Moscow’s commitment to destabilization. The EU and NATO may not be perfect, but they offer a lot better future than Russia does. That’s Dodik’s folly.
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Happy birthday Blic!
1. As the talk about Chinese growth intensifies, its military is getting stronger, and while Beijing is defying even USA in the South Chinese sea dispute…what is your prediction for the decades that are coming: Could China become a world’s number one superpower?
A: No. China is a rising power, but it also still very poor and undeveloped. It faces enormous internal challenges: environmental conditions are deplorable, economic growth is slowing, social tensions have few political outlets, global warming will have a big impact on its infrastructure. China will be an important regional power, and it is already economically active in Africa and Latin America. But it will be a long time before it can play the kind of varied and multi-valent security, political and economic leadership role that the US plays globally.
2. It seems that Russia is getting support from some political factors in the EU countries. Is it possible that some of them will abolish the sanctions and open a wider cooperation with Moscow, especially now when the EU has a lot of its problems?
A: Russia is also getting support from “some political factors” in the US, but our sanctions will remain in place.
The EU will need to review again its sanctions against Russia, but there aren’t any positive developments in Ukraine to justify loosening them.
None of the EU’s problems would be ameliorated by dropping sanctions. The Russian economy is in a deep recession from which it is unlikely to recover without a big increase in oil prices. That isn’t happening.
3. Right-wing movement is getting stronger in Europe, and it seems it could reshape the EU as we know it today. Is that comeback of national states good or bad for Europe?
A: I’ll let Europeans decide. I can see positive developments emerging from the current euroskepticism, but I also see big risks to the single market.
4. Angela Merkel’s popularity has never been lower. If she decides not to run for fourth term, or if she loses, who do you see as her successor? Do you think that Germany will stop with the open door policy, with or without Merkel, because it is obvious that there is no solidarity between the member states?
A: I wouldn’t count Merkel out yet. She is at a low point in her personal popularity, but her political party is still polling very well. Europe is already controlling the inflow of migrants better than it had done. I expect that tighter control to continue.
5. Migrant crisis is shaking the EU for a while, but despite that, it seems that Brussels is avoiding to fulfill the promises given to Turkey, the main dam which is stopping the refugees to come in even bigger number to Europe. For how long could that take, especially now when Erdogan has grown warmer relations with Russia and Putin?
A: Brussels is in a bind. Turkey is taking an autocratic turn. It will be very hard to continue on the path to closer relations with Brussels if Ankara moves in a non-democratic direction. Erdogan has got some solace from Putin, who of course has no problems with autocrats, but Russia really has little to offer Turkey compared to the EU.
6. ISIS has become the world’s number one boogie-man. It seems that the strong actions in Syria has hurt this terrorist organization, but they didn’t destroy it, like something is missing. In your opinion, what is necessary to finally end “ISIS era”?
A: ISIS won’t “end.” It will be defeated in Raqqa and Mosul, then peter out. There never was an ISIS era. There was only an ISIS moment. ISIS has now lost lots of important territory in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. It will survive at least for a while as a terrorist group causing real harm to real people, but it is not, and never was, an existential threat to the West.
7. Hillary or Trump? What would the USA look like if Trump wins?
A: I am a supporter of Hillary Clinton for President. A Trump win would be bad for the US, bad for Europe, bad for the Balkans and good for Russia.
8. What is the best path for Serbia? Our ruling political elite is eager to bring Serbia in the EU, majority of people thinks the same, but that same majority wants good relations with Russia. Is it possible to sit on two chairs like that, or not? Also, do you think that some members of the EU will demand from Serbia to recognize Kosovo independence as a condition of joining the EU?
A: Lots of countries in Europe want good relations with Russia. Washington would also like good relations with Russia. It has become difficult to “sit on two chairs” only because of Russia’s renewed aggressiveness, especially in neighboring areas it regards as part of its “near abroad.” Russia’s behavior in Ukraine in particular is unacceptable and has aroused a strong–but peaceful–NATO response. It has also pushed several non-member countries to tighten relations with NATO. This is precisely the opposite of what Putin should want.
There is not now, nor has there ever been, any possibility of Serbian membership in the EU without Belgrade’s acceptance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kosovo, which is already de facto acknowledged in the Brussels political agreement. Belgrade has a choice of methods by which it can act to accept Kosovo’s de jure sovereignty and territorial integrity. It can recognize Kosovo and establish diplomatic relations. Or it can allow Kosovo to enter the UN General Assembly. There may be other clever solutions that I haven’t thought of. But the EU states that have already recognized Kosovo will not allow Serbia’s accession if this issue is still outstanding. Remember: this is not only a question for European presidents and prime ministers but also for their parliaments, which have to ratify accession.
Everyone in Belgrade knows that. But the current authorities don’t want to pay the price, and some like to think they can get a better deal on this issue at the end of the EU accession process than now. I think they are wrong about that. At the end of the process, Belgrade will be under enormous pressure from internal public opinion to remove any obstacles to EU accession, including Kosovo recognition. Serbia today could hope that Kosovo would accommodate some of its needs in return for recognition. I’ll leave it to Serbs and Albanians to cut that deal.
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Ain’t happening
Bill Burns, Michele Flournoy, and Nancy Lindborg unveiled this morning a report on U.S. Leadership and the Challenge of State Fragility. It says all the right things: we should be strategic in choosing where we engage, systemic and selective in our engagement, and sustain the the effort for however long it takes. Its all about partnerships (within the US government, between the US government and fragile states, and within fragile states). The aim is inclusive, legitimate, accountable states. What’s to complain about?
My main complaint is that isn’t happening. Asked about the considerable capacity the US built up in Iraq and Afghanistan in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), Bill replied that yes, we need to make sure that the experience acquired in the last 15 years is preserved. I don’t think the State Department could name even its own officers who had PRT jobs, never mind the many contractors and Defense Department people involved. Asked about how to deal with a country like Turkey that is turning towards autocracy, no one had much to say. Never mind Egypt. Audience members, not panelists, were quick to point out that President Obama’s budget requests have not emphasized fragile states or the programs aimed at repairing them.
The sad fact is that the Obama Administration has dismantled many of the capacities in the US government to deal with fragile states and reduced use of diplomatic leverage (sanctions, conditionality, etc.) to counter human rights violations and other international abuses associated with them. Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel are all enjoying to one extent or another immunity. All these states fail to provide full inclusion to portions of their populations, but at least in public Washington has pulled its punches in order to achieve high priority security objectives. We are seeing in South Sudan the results of immunity. When will we seem them in Rwanda? What do you do when local authorities simply aren’t willing to acknowledge or act on the problems we see all to clearly?
The two positive examples the study provides are instructive: Colombia and Myanmar. Plan Colombia was extraordinarily expensive and sustained over a long period, but the study group rightly emphasizes the importance of local political and financial commitment. The October 2 referendum on the peace agreement is still pending, but we can hope things will turn out all right. Myanmar has been far less expensive, but the outcome is still in doubt. It will be at least another 5-10 years before we can really say whether it has been able to overcome its internal conflicts and make the transition to a democratic state and society.
How do we get to the point of being able to make such long-term commitments?
The Study Group wants a strategic foresight cell at the National Security Council, consultation with Congress to identify priority fragile states and provide necessary resources, and personnel policies intended to enhance interagency cooperation. It also wants to expand the partnership model based on the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, build local capacity in fragile states, and increase US government capabilities in a grab bag of areas: security sector reform, conflict mediation, anti-corruption, assistance to support peaceful elections, civil society support, public-private partnerships, sanctions implementation, international education and exchanges, as well as the de rigeur learning and evaluation.
I’m fine with all of this, even if I’d have included things this report skips. I’d certainly want to think about whether our current institutions–State, Defense and AID–are suitable to the tasks defined. I doubt it. I would also want a much clearer definition of the end states we should seek in fragile states–that among other things is what makes the New Deal compelling. “Inclusive, legitimate, accountable” are nice, but how would we recognize them? What is required to achieve them? What indicators are most appropriate, or are they entirely context dependent?
But my main concern is just that it ain’t happening.
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