Tag: Democracy and Rule of Law

The nine lives of Erdoğan

The day after the Turkish parliamentary elections last Sunday, the Brookings Institution hosted a panel to discuss the results, ‘Turkey’s Snap Elections: Resuscitation or Relapse?’ The panel featured Ömer Taşpınar, professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and nonresident fellow at Brookings; Kadir Üstün, executive director of the SETA foundation; Gönül Tol, director of the Center for Turkish Studies at the Middle East Institute; and former congressman Robert Wexler, currently president of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace. Kemal Kirişci, director of Brookings’ Turkey Project, moderated the discussion.

The election results proved a surprise to most observers, with the AKP winning nearly 50% of the vote after they had been expected to gain perhaps 43-44%. As Kirişci established, they took back about 4.5 million votes in 5 months, including 2-2.5 million from nationalist party MHP and 1 million from the ‘Kurdish’ party, HDP. This places the AKP in a position of strength similar to that of 2011.

Taşpınar highlighted the disappointment that followed the June elections upset, including the failure to negotiate and build a coalition. It had been thought that disappointed voters for the MHP would migrate to the other nationalist party, CHP, but instead they switched to the AKP. Taşpınar stated that the surge in AKP voters from all parties stemmed from Erdoğan’s strategy of ‘controlled chaos,’ demonstrating that failure to vote for the AKP would mean instability, violence, and economic decline.

Üstün agreed that the electorate decided only the AKP, out of all available options, could deliver on the central concerns of Turkish voters today: security, stability, and economic development. No other party presented a positive platform, only setting themselves up as anti-Erdoğan. The HDP in particular, as a Kurdish party, had promised to the people to become an all-Turkey party, but failed after June to distinguish itself from the PKK insurgency, especially after the ceasefire ended and conflict resumed.

Tol discussed the Kurdish dynamic of the elections: after Kobani, observers had assumed the Kurdish vote had deserted Erdoğan and the AKP. However, it is now clear that the current security situation, AKP’s local electoral strategies in Kurdish areas, and conservative Kurds’ disappointment in the HDP resulted in a resurgence of Kurdish votes for the AKP. The standing conflict with the PKK, Tol observed, hurts local Kurdish civilians the most. Nevertheless, these elections are still a win for the HDP, as they attained the 10% threshold for participation in parliament.

Wexler opined that Erdoğan had the chance, during the Gezi protests in 2013, to exhibit become a transformational leader for Turkey, but he failed. Now, Wexler believes that he has a second chance, but Erdoğan must improve his relationships with Israel and other US allies in the region before the US can offer more support.

Taşpınar sees the elections as free but not fair, since media expression is increasingly restricted and opposition voices curtailed. Indeed, just two days before the election several opposition newspapers’ offices were raided. However, Wexler disagreed outright that access to information through free media had any effect on voters’ opinions, stating that voters simply had come to the conclusion that the AKP was the best party to deliver on their central interest, security.  Üstün saw a more general ‘sea change’ in public opinion, but he also disagreed that the media played a large role in the election and did not support Taşpınar’s view that censorship today is comparable to the situation under previous military dictatorships.

The unexpected election result refocuses attention on consolidation of AKP rule, with potential for a renewed push for a referendum to create a stronger executive power under a presidential regime, as Taşpınar sees it. Reconciliation with the PKK is crucial to the stability of the country, but Tol does not believe the AKP is interested in giving up the fight yet. Until that happens, it is also unlikely there will be new developments in Turkey’s foreign policy towards Syria especially.

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Declining is the right answer

The Middle East is one of the few foreign policy areas other than climate change and trade that will get many electrons during the upcoming election year. Discord will dominate the discourse: President Obama is insufficiently resolute, he needs to stand up more against {you fill in the blank}, we should or should not intervene {here} or {there}. We should support our allies {more} or {less}, we {should} or {should not} condition aid on human rights concerns, and we should {defeat}, {deter} or {contain} one terrorist group or another.

You wouldn’t know that there is wide area of agreement among Americans and their political leaders on what US goals in the Middle East should be. Here they are, more or less in order of their salience to national security:

  1. Nuclear non-proliferation: no (more) nuclear weapons states in the greater Middle East (which stretches more or less from Mauritania to Pakistan).
  2. Free flow of energy: oil and gas should flow unimpeded from the Middle East to world markets.
  3. Counterterrorism: extremist groups in the region should not be able to mount a mass casualty attack against the United States or Europe.
  4. Support for allies: America’s regional allies should wield the means necessary to confront internal and external adversaries successfully.
  5. Spreading democratic values: all other things being equal (which they aren’t on most days), Washington prefers to deal with inclusive governments that reflect the will of their people.

If there is agreement on these goals, why so much dissonance on the Middle East?

It comes from two things: different priorities accorded to these generally agreed goals, and differences over the means to achieve them.

Priorities are important. The Obama Administration arguably has prioritized nuclear non-proliferation over support for allies, reaching an agreement with Iran that if implemented fully would prevent it from getting nuclear weapons for a decade or more but giving it relief from sanctions that strengthens Tehran’s position in the region and enables it to confront American allies. Washington would prefer a democratic government in Egypt, but has prioritized support for President Sisi and his fight against what he defines as terrorism. Some argue Washington’s focus on anti-American terrorism  is leading us to over-emphasize security cooperation and under-emphasize political reform.

So too are the means to achieve these goals. President Obama has preferred killing terrorists with drones to risking American lives in efforts to build up states in the region capable of confronting the terrorist threat with law enforcement means. He has also followed a long American tradition of keeping oil flowing through Hormuz principally through military means rather than encouraging oil producers to build pipelines to carry oil around the strait. Some still think threatening the use of force is necessary to ensure compliance with the Iran nuclear deal.

So yes, there is discord, but the discord is about priorities and means, not about goals. Basically, all American politicians are singing the same lyrics, even when they strike up different tunes or use an orchestra instead of a rock band.

The bigger question is whether these goals in the Middle East are increasing or declining in importance. Let’s look at the goals one by one.

With the Iran nuclear deal, we have at least postponed the major non-proliferation issue in the Middle East. There are still others: will Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Turkey now be tempted to at least match Iran in nuclear technology? Will Pakistan deploy battlefield nuclear weapons as a deterrent against India? Will Israel’s nuclear weapons generate increasing concern in the region? But on the whole I think we can say the issues are less urgent and less compelling, now that the Iran question is settled for a decade or more.

The US is now far less dependent on Middle East oil than it has been for decades, but energy experts will quickly counter that oil prices are determined in a global market, so a serious supply disruption would be felt economically in the US even if we imported no oil at all. Still, with prices around $50/barrel and Iran soon to regain and eventually expand its export position, there is little to worry about for the moment. The people who should worry most are in China, Japan and elsewhere in Asia, which is increasingly dependent on Middle East oil and gas exports. They should bear the burden of protecting energy flows.

Little can be said about the terrorist threat. An attack can always sneak through. 9/11 was less a probability than a “black swan”–a rare and unpredictable deviation from the norm. Ever since, the number of Americans killed by international terrorists has been less than the number killed by (non-Muslim) domestic ones (even if we don’t always call them terrorists). With Al Qaeda Central much diminished and the Islamic State preoccupied with taking and defending territory in Syria and Iraq, not to mention heightening of counterterrorist defenses worldwide, it is harder to plan and execute a major terrorist plot than it was 15 years ago.

Support for allies is arguably more important in the aftermath of the Iran nuclear deal, but the means we have chosen to achieve it are such that it involves little in-depth engagement with the Middle East. We ship truly gargantuan quantities of advanced armaments to the Gulf and Israel. We have also supported, despite a lot of doubts, the Saudi war against the Houthis in Yemen. The main purpose of our support for allies is to reduce the need for direct American engagement, not increase it.

Apart from guys like me and my friends in the thinktank community who make a living (or not) thinking and writing about the Middle East, there is little support left in the US for spreading democratic values in the region. The positive results of the Arab uprisings are so paltry–a fragile transition in Tunisia and some reforms in Morocco and Jordan–that most Americans (and certainly the presidential candidates) wouldn’t want to waste much taxpayer money or electoral breath on what they regard as a quixotic pursuit.

So declining is the right answer, even without considering the rising threats to the US from China in the Pacific and from Russia in Europe. Those of us who still worry about the Middle East need to figure out more economical and effective ways to achieve the goals that Americans agree on. More about that in future posts.

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Peace picks October 26-30

  1. 20th Anniversary of Dayton Peace Accords Series – The Balkan Wars of the 1990s: Reflection and Reconciliation | Monday, October 26th | 10:00-12:00 | Johns Hopkins, SAIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | This event is hosted by SAIS’s Center for Transatlantic Relations (CTR), which is a non-profit research center that engages opinion leaders on contemporary challenges facing Europe and North America. The goal of the Center is to strengthen and reorient transatlantic relations to the dynamics of a globalizing world. Panelists: Thomas J. Miller, Former U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina; Robert E. Hunter, Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO; and Robert M. Beecroft, Former OSCE Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moderator: Sasha Toperich, CTR SAIS Senior Fellow and Director, Mediterranean Basin Initiative.
  2. Putin’s Crimea Gamble: Russia, Ukraine, and the New Cold War | Monday, October 26th | 10:30-12:00 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Since the time of Catherine the Great, Crimea has been a global tinderbox. Most recently, the world was stunned when the forces of Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded and seized Crimea in March 2014. In the months since, Putin’s actions in Crimea, eastern Ukraine and, more recently, in Syria have provoked a sharp deterioration in East-West relations. Basic questions have been raised about Putin’s provocative policies, his motivations, and the future of U.S.-Russian relations—and whether the world has now entered a new Cold War.On October 26, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings will host Nonresident Senior Fellow Marvin Kalb for the launch of his new book, Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine, and the New Cold War (Brookings Institution Press, 2015). In Imperial Gamble, Kalb examines Putin’s actions in Ukraine, the impact on East-West relations, and how the future of the post-Cold War world hangs on the controversial decisions of one reckless autocrat, Vladimir Putin. Joining the discussion are Thomas Friedman, The New York Times columnist, and Nina Khrushcheva, professor of international relations at The New School. Brookings President Strobe Talbott will provide introductory remarks, and Martin Indyk, Brookings executive vice president, will moderate the discussion.
  3. A Global or Regional Future for Central Asia? | Tuesday, October 27th | 9:00-10:30 | CSIS | RSVP: rep@csis.org | The United States, China and Russia have developed competing visions for Central Asia. The U.S. and China both use the imagery of the Silk Road to describe their visions, but thus far dialogue between the two countries remains modest in scope and pace. At the same time, Russian-Chinese collaboration on Central Asia is growing quickly. What may be the future development of U.S.-Russia-China relationship in Central Asia? And why is Central Asia important for international security more broadly? Featuring: Ivan Safranchuk, Deputy Director of the Institute of Contemporary International Studies, Diplomatic Academy (Moscow); with Jeffrey Mankoff, Acting Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, CSIS, as discussant. The conversation will be moderated by Olga Oliker, Director and Senior Adviser, Russia and Eurasia Program, CSIS.
  4. Indonesia in the changing world: A conversation with President Joko Widodo of Indonesia | Tuesday, October 27th | 11:00-12:00 | Brookings | For more info: events@brookings.edu | On October 27, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings will host President Joko Widodo of Indonesia for a discussion on the role of Indonesia in the changing world, focusing on economic opportunities and reforms, geopolitics, ASEAN, and international commitments. Brookings President Strobe Talbott will provide introductions and Congressman Brad Sherman of California will deliver opening remarks. Director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies Richard Bush will moderate the discussion and conclude with his closing remarks. President Widodo took office in October 2014, defeating his opponent through an unprecedented, volunteer-based campaign that called for government reforms. Previously, he served as the governor of Jakarta (2012-2014) and as the mayor of Surakarta (2005-2012).
  5.  Captured News Media: The Case of Turkey | Tuesday, October 27th | 12:00-2:00 | Center for International Media Assistance | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Media capture –the systemic governance problem where political leaders and media owners work together in a symbiotic but mutually corrupting relationship – is a growing concern for media development around the world. It is becoming the dominant model of organization in a growing number of media markets, raising worrisome questions. Looking at the media market in Turkey as a case study, how does media capture affect journalists on the ground? What are the implications of media capture on Turkey’s upcoming elections? Join the Center for International Media Assistance at the National Endowment for Democracy in launching its latest report, “Captured News Media: The Case of Turkey” with an expert panel discussion featuring report author Andrew Finkel, Gönül Tol, Amberin Zaman, and Richard Kraemer.
  6. Global Security: What Does Gender Have to Do With It? | Tuesday, October 27th | 2:00-5:30 | US Institute for Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The imperative for women to participate fully in decisions about peace and security won unprecedented recognition 15 years ago with the U.N. Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 1325 calling for members to craft national plans to accomplish that objective. Now, the new U.N. Strategic Development Goals declare women’s equality as a precondition to resolving many of the world’s national and regional crises. Please join the U.S. Institute of Peace and the five Nordic Embassies on Oct. 27 for a discussion with Nordic representatives that have helped pave the way on the connections between gender and security.Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden are ranked as the top five countries in the 2014 World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index ratings. The discussion at USIP will explore the Nordic countries’ approach to gender equality and to global security more broadly. This event will celebrate the 15th anniversary of the landmark UNSC Resolution 1325 and the underlying principle that gender equality is at the core of peace and security. Speakers include: Mr. Geir H. Haarde, Ambassador of Iceland to the United States and Former President of the Nordic Council; Ms. Elisabeth Rehn, Former Minister of Defense of Finland and Independent Expert of the High Level Advisory Group for the Global Review on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325; Ambassador Dag Nylander, Norwegian Special Envoy to Colombia; Captain Anna Björsson, Gender Advisor at the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters; Brigadier Flemming Kent Vesterby Agerskov, Chief at the Regional Command South and former Director of the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat; and Ms. Carla Koppell, Chief Strategy Officer at U.S. Agency for International Development. Ambassador Donald Steinberg, President and CEO of World Learning, will moderate. Join the conversation on Twitter with #1325at15. A reception sponsored by the Nordic Embassies will follow the event from 4:00 pm – 5:30 pm.
  7. Democratizing Under Fire: Can Tunisia Show the Way? | Wednesday, October 28th | 10:00-11:30 | US Institute of Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As Tunisia struggles to build a stable democracy from its 2011 Arab Spring revolution, it must overcome terrorist attacks, high unemployment, a refugee crisis and the threat of social turmoil. The stakes are region-wide, as Tunisia remains the only one of five Arab Spring countries to be treading a non-violent, democratic path. A critical figure in Tunisia’s evolution—Sheikh Rachid Ghannouchi, the leader of the Islamist movement Nahda—visits USIP, together with the Center for the Study of Islamic Democracy, on October 28 to discuss how his country can consolidate its progress.Tunisia’s success or failure in building a peaceful democracy is central to U.S. and international interests in a stable North Africa, Middle East and Arab world—an importance recognized this month by the award of the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize to key mediators in the country’s political struggle. After two attacks by militant gunmen killed scores of people and crimped the country’s vital tourist economy this year, the government imposed a state of emergency—a step that raised fears among many Tunisians about a return to the country’s decades of authoritarian, police-enforced rule.Disillusion among young Tunisians has made the country one of the biggest recruiting grounds for violent militant groups such as ISIS. As Tunisian youth circulate to battlefields in the Middle East—and as this nation of 11 million people hosts one million or more refugees from the civil war in neighboring Libya—how can Tunisia manage its borders, improve its security, prevent violence, and also strengthen democratic politics?In discussing these questions, Sheikh Ghannouchi is a vital voice. His movement, Nahda, led the first post-revolution government, which wrote the country’s new, more democratic, constitution. It is now a coalition partner in the secularist government led by President Beji Caid Essebsi. Sheikh Ghannouchi will deliver remarks on the challenges facing his homeland and its region. He then will join Ambassador William Taylor and author Robin Wright in a discussion that will include questions from the audience. Join the question on Twitter with #USIPTunisia.
  8. Minorities in the Syrian War and Implications for U.S. Policy | Wednesday, October 28th | 12:30-1:45 | Johns Hopkins SAIS – Rome Building | RSVP: raman2@jhu.edu | The Middle East Studies program hosts Faysal Itani, Resident Fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council, to speak on this subject.
  9. Implications for Afghanistan: The Taliban Seizure of Kunduz | Wednesday, October 28th | 2:30-4:30 | US Institute of Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Taliban’s two-week seizure of Kunduz in September revealed weaknesses in Afghanistan’s security forces and unforeseen Taliban capabilities. It has generated deep concerns about stability, security, the future of the peace process, and underappreciated humanitarian issues. On October 28, USIP will convene experts to analyze Kunduz and its fallout, including President Obama’s decision to extend the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan beyond 2016. The fall of the northern city of Kunduz to the Taliban ignited serious concerns about the ability of the Afghan National Security Forces to maintain stability in their country. While Afghan forces recaptured Kunduz with international support, Taliban forces continue to pressure other northern cities while carrying out operations elsewhere.The government in Kabul and its backers are re-evaluating how security is provided. President Obama announced a reversal of his decision to remove all U.S. combat troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2016, saying that 5,500 would remain. While that decision had been under long discussion, it seems that Kunduz forced the issue. Meanwhile, pro-government factional leaders are urging Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to rearm local militias against the Taliban. Many analysts say predatory actions by existing militias were part of the problem in Kunduz. Since the takeover, reports of human rights abuses and humanitarian problems are emerging from Kunduz, and the Afghan government and international community seem ill-prepared to deal with the humanitarian crisis.Finally, the fall of Kunduz was a blow to Afghanistan’s “national unity” government, which so far has given the impression of being more focused on internal rivalries than on its core responsibilities. How did divisions within the government contribute to the fall of Kunduz? And might the city’s ordeal prompt better internal coordination?Please join USIP on Wednesday October 28 for a discussion among experts on these questions and what they may mean for stability in Afghanistan. Speakers include: Belquis Ahmadi, Senior Program Officer Asia Center, U.S. Institute of Peace; Deedee Derksen, King’s College London, Author, The Politics of Disarmament and Rearmament in Afghanistan; Ali Jalali, Distinguished Professor, National Defense University, Former Interior Minister of Afghanistan; and Christopher D. Kolenda, Former Senior Advisor on Afghanistan and Pakistan, Department of Defense. Scott Smith, Director for Afghanistan & Central Asia at USIP, will moderate.
  10. What is Next for Human Rights in Iran? | Thursday, October 29th | 2:00-3:30 | Freedom House | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Hassan Rouhani’s presidency has coincided with a deterioration of human rights. At least 800 individuals have been executed in 2015 – the highest number in 25 years. Over a thousand prisoners of conscience remain in Iranian jails, including American citizens, and many after serving their terms. Iran also has blocked efforts by the UN Human Rights Council to investigate abuses inside the country.Please join us for a discussion of the state of human rights in Iran today, and how the United States, the United Nations, and the international community should respond. Speakers include: Ahmed Shaheed, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran; Daniel Calingaert, Executive Vice President, Freedom House; and Mehrangiz Kar, Award-winning human rights lawyer and author. Carol Morello, Washington Post correspondent, will moderate.
  11. New Challenges to the Laws of War: A Discussion with Ambassador Valentin Zellweger | Friday, October 30th | 9:00-10:30 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | New technologies have altered the way nations conduct armed conflict. Advanced cyber techniques and autonomous weapons systems are two salient examples, and nations can wield these tools to great effect. As these technologies proliferate, international bodies need to consider how existing legal frameworks keep pace with on-the-ground realities.
    Join Ambassador Valentin Zellweger, Director General for International Law and Legal Advisor at the Swiss Foreign Ministry and a group of leading experts for a discussion on how the challenges posed by modern technology can be addressed within the existing laws of armed conflict (LOAC) framework. Ambassador Zellweger will particularly draw from past experiences, such as the regulation of private military and security companies in the Montreux process, in order to illustrate ways to address new challenges in LOAC. Other panelists include: Colonel Gary Brown, Professor of Cyber Security, Marine Corps University; Catherine Lotrionte, Director of the Institute for Law, Science and Global Security, Georgetown University; and David Simon, Counsel, Sidley Austin, LLP. Light refreshments will be served at 10:30 AM following the panel.
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New Turkish elections

On Wednesday, the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research in DC (SETA) hosted a conversation, ‘Turkey Ahead of the November Elections’, featuring Kılıç Kanat, research director at SETA; Ömer Taşpınar, non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution; and Andrew Bowen, senior fellow and director of Middle East Studies at the Center for the National Interest. The executive director of SETA, Kadir Üstün, moderated the discussion. Kanat has just published an analysis paper on the new elections, which have been called for November 1 because of the failure to form a ruling coalition after the June polling.

The June elections were the first in 13 years when no single party won enough votes to create a ruling majority government. Kanat laid out the reasons this occurred and the issues for the upcoming elections. In his view, the causes behind the decline of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) include:

  • The ‘Kobani effect’: the battle for the northern Syrian town had a galvanizing effect on Kurds and non-Kurds who voted against Erdoğan, who was seen as wanting ISIS to win;
  • Mobilization by smaller parties to pass the 10% threshold for inclusion in parliament;
  • For the first time, diaspora Turkish nationalists were allowed to vote in general elections;
  • Tactical voting: voters were certain the AKP would win the most votes, but attempted to decrease the margin in order to force a coalition.

Kanat evaluates the shift as a turn to the nationalist parties, whether Turkish or Kurdish: the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the conservative Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and the Republican People’s Party (CHP). The HDP saw the biggest gains in support, from those dissatisfied with Erdoğan’s position vis-à-vis Kobani, and the Kurdish resolution process in general, as well as from diaspora voters.

The middle class has also been increasingly worried in a time of slowing economic growth, losing some confidence in the AKP. The AKP since the Gezi Park demonstrations has had to work hard to keep its support base, but the constant effort at mobiliztion may have resulted in election fatigue among some voters.

Going forward, Kanat stated, the upcoming elections will be determined by voters’ perception of who holds the responsibility for three things: resolving the Kurdish question, as well as dealing with PKK terrorism; maintaining public stability on a nation-wide level; and economic growth or decline.

Taşpınar zoomed out, examining two long-term trends that have contributed to the current political situation. First is the personalization of political power: political analysis and action stems from an understanding of Erdoğan’s plans. There are fewer enduring institutions in this post-Kemalist era, and no unified ideology undergirding the state.

Second, there is increasing polarization in Turkish politics. This has been driven by personalization, as well as the Kurdish question and the identity of Turkey as a country – will it be democratic or autocratic? The Gezi protest was a very real demonstration of this polarization, as was the failure after last weekend’s terrorist attack in Ankara for political leaders to produce a unified vocabulary to bring the nation together.

The theme of personalization ran through Bowen’s comments as well, in particular because of the personalistic nature of foreign policy decisions, for Obama as well as for Erdoğan. Theirs is a bad marriage. One of the key sticking points is the difference in the way they prioritize threats: for Erdoğan, the PKK takes pride of place, with ISIS far behind. Obama, on the other hand, urgently prioritizes defeating ISIS.

The Syrian crisis has drawn out many of the tensions in this relationship, which will be difficult to repair, even after the July agreement on air bases in Turkey. The US is perceived in Turkey as not standing by its allies, but new political leadership in both countries could change the situation, especially if the US focuses again on the Middle East.

According to polls, 15% of Turkish voters are still undecided about the November 1 elections. Only a few percentage points are required to re-cement the AKP’s position of power. The Ankara terror attack, depending on who is understood to be the perpetrator and how the government deals with the aftermath, could be decisive.

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Governing Syria

I am writing from Gaziantep in southern Turkey, where I’ve enjoyed a week’s worth of meetings over the last three days. I came to have an upclose look at the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and some of the rest of the Syrian exile presence in this bustling city of 1.5 million located 60 kilometers or so north of the border, including both nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and a couple of quangos (quasi-nongovernmental organizations). That is what I would call the Local Administration Council Unit (LACU) and the Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU), which are creations of the Syrian Opposition Council that predate the SIG.

Sorry for the acronyms. War generates them. It’s not only the Pentagon.

It is easy enough sitting in Washington to hear the worst about the SIG, SOC, LACU and ACU. President Obama himself has several times stated baldly that the Syrian opposition is incapable of taking over the country. The Syrian NGOs and quangos also come in for a great deal of disdain, as they are heavily dependent on US and European funding.

I can’t say the skeptics are entirely wrong. But they are definitely focusing on the empty part of the glass. What I’ve happily found here are serious people doing serious things with minimal resources and a great deal of commitment and optimism, despite the vagaries of international support.

Let me start with the SIG. It was created by the Syrian Opposition Coalition, a quasi-legislative body recognized by the US and other governments as the political (as distinct from the legal) representative of the Syrian people. The SIG looks like a government in exile: it has a prime minister, a deputy prime minister and ten ministries.

Some of these ministries have impact on the ground inside Syria. The education ministry approves curriculum and administers school examinations in “liberated” areas. The health ministry is said to have mobilized thousands of volunteers inside Syria. If you are an ordinary Syrian unable or unwilling to leave, it is no small thing that your kids are still going to school (even if not likely in a school building, as the regime has bombed most of those). And getting them vaccinated against polio is a big deal since the outbreak in eastern Syria a couple of years ago.

But the SIG has little traction with the armed groups fighting both the Assad regime and extremist groups like Jabhat al Nusra (an Al Qaeda affiliate) and the Islamic State. No one I met pretends that the Defense Ministry plays much of a role in the ongoing warfare. Located outside Syria without a defined and stable relationship with the fighting groups, the SIG looks to some like a Potemkin government sketched on flimsy paper with little governing authority.

I found at the top of the SIG a strong desire–even commitment–to move inside Syria, an ambition that has existed however for years without being realized. I was told an order to relocate the Education Ministry into an opposition-controlled area of northern Syria is already in effect. The best prospect for moving the rest of the SIG into Syria–until the Russians entered the war in recent days–was an area Turkey calls “the rectangle,” a 98-kilometer stretch of its border about 60-70 kilometers deep into Syria that the SIG was expecting to see cleared of its current IS rulers and protected from air and ground bombardment by the regime.

Civilians in Gaziantep, both Syrians and internationals, have been actively planning to move quickly into this area, once IS is cleared from it, with the essentials of post-war reconstruction: security, rule of law, governance, economic activities and humanitarian relief. Local councils for the main population centers already operate outside the “rectangle” but inside Syria. Plans for local police forces and border control are being drawn up. The SIG is surveying public facilities and potential economic activities in the area as well as planning to build accommodations for returning refugees on state-owned land. The Americans have hosted a “table top” simulation for civilian agencies to identify needs and capabilities, Syrian and international. Europeans are hoping that liberating the “rectangle” will help to stem the flow of Syrians out of Turkey into the Union.

No one yet knows whether the Russian air attacks will cancel these plans, but at the very least they are complicating the situation. How can the “rectangle” be protected from Russian attacks, which have focussed not on IS but on the Free Syrian Army? The Russian bombardment is driving younger Syrian fighters towards the Islamic State rather than away from it.

Moderate opposition Syrians are dismayed. In their eyes, what Putin has done merits a strong reaction. He is attacking the people America has said it supports. While they nod knowingly at President Obama’s assertion that Syria will be a quagmire for the Russians, Syrians think American failure to respond looks weak and vacillating. It will lengthen the war. I find it hard to disagree.

The Syrians I spoke with are also concerned about UN envoy De Mistura’s effort to set up four working groups to discuss issues that would have to be resolved in any peace settlement. They question the composition of the working groups and view the effort as a step backwards from the UN’s own Geneva 1 communique, which called for a mutually agreeable transitional governing body with full executive authority.

Few in the opposition would agree to any transition in which Bashar al Assad is not deprived of presidential powers early in the game.  Most believe opposition fighters, especially but not only the more extremist ones, will continue the war if Bashar remains in place. The SOC is considering withdrawing from the UN effort, though it will come under a lot of international community pressure to participate. Many Syrians here want a negotiated solution, but not one that perpetuates the dictatorship and denies the country’s citizens the right to govern themselves.

Next up: the local administrative councils, the assistance coordination unit and the nascent Free Syria University,  which represent perhaps the best the Syrian opposition has to offer.

 

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Peace picks, October 5-9

  1. Toward a “Reaganov” Russia: Assessing trends in Russian national security policy after Putin | Monday, October 5th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | During their recent speeches before the United Nations General Assembly, Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama traded strong words on issues from Ukraine to arms control to Syria. The exchange between the two presidents unfolded as questions about Russia’s long-term foreign policy ambitions and grand strategy return to the forefront of policy debate. To better understand what lies ahead in Russian foreign and security policy, analysts must explore variances between Russian strategic culture and the agenda put forward by President Putin. Disentangling these differences will be crucial for U.S. policy planning of the future. Brookings Senior Fellow Clifford Gaddy joins Michael O’Hanlon, author of “The Future of Land Warfare,” to discuss their research on the issue, focusing on five possible paradigms for the future of Russian grand strategy. Former ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer, presently the director of the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative at Brookings, will also participate in the panel.
  2. United States and China: Trends in Military Competition | Monday, October 5th | 12:00 – 1:00 | RAND Corporation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Over the past two decades, China has poured resources into upgrading its military. This modernization, coupled with China’s increasingly assertive position in the waters surrounding the mainland, has caused concern in Washington and capitals across Asia. Recently, a team of RAND researchers led by Eric Heginbotham released The U.S.-China Military Scorecard report. This study is the broadest and most rigorous assessment to date of relative U.S. and Chinese military capabilities based entirely on unclassified sources. Join us to discuss the evolution of Chinese military capabilities in specific domains (air and missile, maritime, space, cyber, and nuclear) and the overall trend in the regional military balance over time; how Chinese relative gains could affect the strategic decision-making of Chinese leaders; steps the United States can take to limit the impact of a growing Chinese military on deterrence and other U.S. strategic interests. Eric Heginbotham is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation specializing in East Asian security issues.
  3. Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East | Tuesday, October 6th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Join The Center for Transatlantic Relations in a discussion on nuclear Middle East. This discussion with feature Yair Evron, professor emeritus, Department of Political Science, Tel-Aviv University and senior research associate for the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel-Aviv. Additionally, Ambassador Robert E. Hunter, senior fellow for Center for Transatlantic Relations will participate in the discussion.
  4. The Pivotal Moment: How the Iran Deal Frames America’s Foreign Policy Choices | Tuesday, October 6th | 12:00 – 1:00 | The Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | At the core of the debate over the Iran deal are two distinct visions of what American foreign policy should be. In contrast to the politicized efforts to frame foreign affairs as a choice between isolationism, regime change, or some nebulous choice in between, the controversy over the efficacy of the Vienna Agreement represents the real difference between the alternatives being offered to the American people. This discussion aims to frame the distinctions between progressive and conservative foreign policy and the choice they represent for the nation as it considers what kind of statecraft to expect from the next administration. Speakers include: Colin Dueck, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute, and  Kim Holmes, Distinguished fellow, The Heritage Foundation.
  5. Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators | Tuesday, October 6th | 1:00 | Institute of World Politics | REGISTER TO ATTEND |Have you ever wondered what it would be like to be the child of a Stalin or Hitler, a Mao or Castro, or Pol Pot? National Review’s Jay Nordlinger asked himself this. The result is Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators, an astonishing survey of the progeny of 20 dictators. Some were loyalists who admired their father. Some actually succeed as dictator. A few were critics, even defectors. What they have in common, Nordlinger shows, is the prison house of tainted privilege and the legacy of dubious deference.
  6. India and Pakistan: From Talks to Crisis and Back Again | Wednesday, October 8th | 8:30 – 10:00 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The last few months have witnessed nascent efforts to restart high-level bilateral talks between Delhi and Islamabad dashed again by political maneuvering in both capitals. In addition, there has been an uptick in violence along the Line of Control in Kashmir and muscular signaling from both sides. Why has the latest effort between India and Pakistan to talk about the myriad issues between them fallen apart? What can we discern about the approach of Indian Prime Minister Modi toward Pakistan? How do civil-military politics in Pakistan inform its approach toward India? Are the two states doomed to a perpetual state of ‘not war, not peace,’ or is there hope for a way forward? Huma Yusuf , Wilson Center, and Aparna Pande, Hudson Institute, will discuss. Carnegie’s George Perkovich will moderate.
  7. What can Myanmar’s Elections tell us about Political Transitions? | Wednesday, October 7th | 9:30- 11:00 | Advancing Democratic Elections and Political Transitions consortium | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Elections are critical junctures in many transitions, providing clarity on whether a political transition is advancing or retreating – and Myanmar’s November 8, 2015 parliamentary elections promise to be such a watershed moment for the country’s potential democratic transition. Speakers Include: John Brandon, Senior Director at The Asia Foundation, Jennifer Whatley, Division Vice President, Civil Society & Governance at World Learning, Robert Herman, Vice President for Regional Programs at Freedom House, Jonathan Stonestreet, Associate Director of the Democracy Program at The Carter Center, Eric Bjornlund, President of Democracy International.
  8. A Saudi Arabian Defense Doctrine for a New Era | Thursday, October 8th | 10:00 – 11:30 | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Saudi Arabia has in recent years consolidated its place as the preeminent Arab leader, regional stabilizer, and critical bulwark against terrorism and a nuclear Iran. The Kingdom’s growing security responsibilities require rapid and substantial military investments. Prince Sultan bin Khaled Al Faisal and Nawaf Obaid, visiting fellow and associate lecturer at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, will outline a comprehensive Saudi Arabian Defense Doctrine for a new era and explain why the Kingdom is likely to double down on defense and national security capabilities in the next decade.
  9. The EU Migration Crisis | Thursday, October 8th | 2:30 – 4:00 |Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND |Dean Vali Nasr and The Human Security Iniative of the Foreign Policy Insitute Invite you to a panel discussion on The EU Migration Crisis. Speakers include: Michel Gabaudan, president, Refugees International, Reka Szemerkeny, Ambassador, Hungary, Peter Wittig, Ambassador, Germany.
  10. Democracy Rebooted: The Future of Technology in Elections | Friday, October 9th | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As technology plays an increasingly dominant part of our lives, its role in elections has come under scrutiny. We are at a crucial moment to review the policies that influence elections and the technology we use to execute them. Why can we call a car, book a hotel, and pay bills on our phones, yet elections are often still implemented with pen and paper? Legitimacy, access, credibility, and trust are the issues that will require policymakers and technologists to carefully script the implementation of technology in our elections.  Speakers include: Governor Jon Huntsman, Chairman Atlantic Council, Secretary Madeline Albright, David Rothkopf, CEO and Editor-in-Chief FP Group, Pat Merloe, Director, Electoral Programs, National Democratic Institute, Mark Malloch Brown, Former Deputy Secretary General, UN, Matthew Masterson, Commissioner, Electoral Assistance Commission, Tadjoudine Ali-Diabacte, Deputy Director, Electoral Assistance Division, UNDPA, Justice Jose Antonio Dias Toffolio, President, Supreme Electoral Court, Brazil, Manish Tewari, Former Minister of Information, India.
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