Tag: Democracy and Rule of Law
The Kosovo Serbs need a hug
Kosovo is a young country, born from repression of Albanian peaceful protest and subsequent/consequent armed rebellion against Serbia. American-led NATO intervention made its travails shorter and less deadly than those of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has also made Kosovo perhaps the most pro-American, pro-EU country on earth.
But it is suffering a period of estrangement from both the US and EU. I first met its current prime minister, Albin Kurti, when he was a university student. He was working with Adem Demaci, who did not advocate Kosovo independence but rather a Balkan confederation. That would have included Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro. Albin in the past has advocated union with Albania. Day dreams of the past.
Today Albin is a vigorous advocate of Kosovo independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. I would even describe him as a “sovereigntist,” meaning that he prioritizes Kosovo behaving like a sovereign state, despite its lack of universal recognition and UN membership. He often seems unconcerned with the consequences.
What Albin wants
Many Kosovo Serbs still regard themselves as citizens of Serbia and do not want to acknowledge the Kosovo state, especially those who live in its northern municipalities. Those four are contiguous with Serbia and have Serb majorities. Albin insists the Kosovo Serbs use Kosovo license plates and pay their Kosovo electricity bills. He contests Serbia’s still dominant institutions in the north, the presence of Serb security forces there, the organized crime networks that Belgrade exploits, and Belgrade’s control there of education and health services.
He also wants to see transparency and accountability for the resources that flow from Belgrade to Serb majority municipalities throughout Kosovo. That is one reason the Central Bank is saying it will enforce the law requiring transactions in Kosovo in the legal currency (the euro). The police have confiscated cash and records of Serbian government shipments to Serbs in Kosovo.
Frictions
All this puts Albin at odds not only with many Kosovo Serbs but also with the Europeans and Americans. They worry about keeping Belgrade on side and stability in Kosovo. That means preferring the ad hoc arrangements that have allowed Serbs there, especially in the north, to live as if they are in Serbia. Albin’s inclination to act without consulting Brussels and Washington aggravates the situation. The Americans and Europeans aren’t used to a Kosovo leader who acts as if his country really is sovereign. They may or may not doubt the wisdom of insisting on euros for transactions, but in any event they want to be consulted and discuss the issues before implementation.
That may sound reasonable. But from Albin’s perspective, it is just as much an infringement on Kosovo sovereignty as the transactions in euros. A sovereigntist won’t want to comply, especially if his unilateralism garners popular support. That it does in Kosovo, which is far more democratic than Serbia has ever been. American diplomats can be certain that if they displace Albin again, as they did during the Trump Administration, that he will be back after the next elections with an even stronger mandate.
Winning hearts and minds
All this argues for a much better understanding of why the Kosovo Serbs are important to Kosovo and what can be done to win over those who are still resisting. Modern statehood in a democracy depends on popular support. The American constitution’s first three words say it well: “we the people.” There are not a lot of Serbs left in Kosovo–perhaps less than 6% of the population, as Kurti claims. But they are a key factor in Kosovo statehood.
They and their church and culture are a distinct characteristic of Kosovo that distinguishes it from Albania. Their attachment to Belgrade is a clear threat to Kosovo security. The Serbs have an outsized impact on Kosovo’s sovereignty and potentially its territorial integrity. Without their loyalty, Kosovo statehood will always be under threat.
Winning them over sounds like an impossible task, but it is not. The euro is a far better currency than the Serbian dinar, even if the latter is pegged to the former. Any reasonable person would much rather be using and receiving a currency managed from Brussels and accepted throughout the EU.
The Belgrade-inspired mass resignation of Serb judges, prosecutors, and administrative staff from their jobs and continuing boycott has seriously damaged the judicial system in northern Kosovo, to the detriment of the Serbs and others who live there. The Belgrade-instigated boycott of municipal elections in April 2023 was likewise damaging to Serbs, not Albanians.
Serbia’s security officials and organized crime gangs Belgrade directs impose indignities on Serbs in the north every day. Kosovo Serbs who join the Kosovo Security Force face intimidation and violence, not just targeted against themselves but also of their families.
Making peace
Much of the Serb population south of the Ibar River has made its peace with Pristina. They don’t love it. But many tolerate it and some are coming to appreciate at least its largesse if not its sovereignty.
Protection of the Serb church and private property is particularly important. Most of the important religious sites are in the south. The refusal so far of the Pristina authorities to implement a 2016 decision on the Decan/i monastery property has damaged their credibility in the Serb community. A unilateral decision to proceed would give Pristina an important patch of moral high ground to stand on.
But Kurti needs to go further. His government should work as closely as possible with the northern communities to win their acceptance and eventual loyalty. He has good cards to play. The Kosvo Serbs need a hug. Give it to them.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Time to turn the policy around
There is no exaggeration in what Albin is saying. President Vucic financed, supported, and orchestrated the terrorist attack of September 24. The Kosovo police the EU wanted (and continues to want) withdrawn from northern Kosovo responded professionally, killed three of the perpetrators, and prevented worse from happening. Washington and Brussels know this but won’t say it. They prefer to allow Vucic to get off scot-free.
They are likewise allowing him to avoid responsibility for the unfair national and fraudulent Belgrade elections of December 27. The European Parliament has called for a commission to investigate. But so far the European Commission, the Council, and most of the Member States are keeping their mouths shut about an election that wouldn’t pass muster in any EU country. It didn’t come close to the relatively free and fair elections in recent years in Kosovo, including two that installed Kurti in office.
See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil
Why this “see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil” approach to someone who is taking an EU candidate country into ever closer alignment with Russia and China? Many tell me the ammunition Serbia supplies to Ukraine is a factor. But Belgrade surely ships as much ordnance or other military supplies to Moscow as it does to Kyiv. It is unlikely Vucic would cut off Kyiv out of spite for Western criticism. Inat only goes so far when it is a question of profits for your arms manufacturer friends.
Support for “stability” is another possible explanation. But Vucic has no viable opposition, either on the liberal democratic side of Serbian politics or the ethnic nationalist side. Serbia’s problem is a lack of political competition, not an excess of it. He is the destabilizing force both in his country’s politics and in its relations with its neighbors.
The internationals are part of the problem
Lack of international political horsepower is another explanation. EU negotiator Miroslav Lajcak is exhausted and at the end of his rope. The dialogue he has led for more than three and a half years has played out. Belgrade has repeatedly and loudly renounced supposed “legally binding” agreements reached there. Yesterday he refused to sign them at the Security Council. Without real progress on de facto if not de jure recognition, Pristina refuses to create the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities that Lajcak and American negotiator Gabe Escobar unwisely made their top priority.
Many hope things will improve with Assistant Secretary of State O’Brien in charge. He has been appropriately blunt with the Bosnians. But it is not clear whether he is prepared to dial up the heat on Vucic about the Serbian elections, the dialogue with Pristina, Belgrade’s September 24 terrorist attack, or the kidnapping of three policemen on Kosovo territory. Jim recognizes the difficulty of any political settlement and tries to steer his efforts in the economic direction, hoping to flank the recognition issue.
So who cares?
None of this is a big problem, at least as seen from Washington or Brussels. But it isn’t a big problem until it is. Vucic is increasingly serious in his efforts to destabilize the neighboring countries with irredentist and self-victimizing claims on behalf of their Serb populations. The Russians will be pushing him in that direction, to echo and amplify their own claims in Ukraine. The atmosphere in Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo is increasingly tense. It would not take much effort to provoke instability even in all three, then justify the movement of Serbian tanks to protect the local Serb population from false rumors of ethnic cleansing and genocide.
Even without revanchist moves into his neighbors, Vucic can exploit the Serbian domestic scene to promote violence. His security forces have been arresting and beating dissenters who dare to apologize for Serb atrocities in the 1990s. They have even lain flowers on the grave of a young girl killed by Serb security forces in Kosovo. The repression intimidates the Serbian opposition and ensures it will not retreat from hard-line Serbian nationalism on Kosovo. It is admittedly inclined not to do so anyway, but Vucic wants to make sure no one gets any fancy ideas about acknowledging the malfeasance of the Milosevic era. As Information Minister then, he was a mainstay of that regime.
What is to be done?
The right approach to this situation is to recognize failure and turn the policy around. I thought when he first came to power Vucic might be the guy to take Serbia in a democratic direction. He has chosen not to be. He instead decided not to befriend the West but rather to ally with the East. He dishes out just enough goodies to Washington and Brussels to keep them from calling his bluff. It doesn’t take much.
It is time to call him out, loudly and clearly. The US should insist on the transfer of the September 24 perpetrators to Kosovo for trial. As the European Parliament has proposed, the EU should stop its ample financing of Serbian efforts to prepare for accession until new elections are held, at least in Belgrade. The dialogue should be refocused on the economic issues O’Brien prefers. The EU and US should call out high-level corruption in Belgrade. The EU should lift the “consequences” it levied on Kosovo and acknowledge Pristina’s anti-corruption efforts. That would be a Balkans policy worthy of President Biden’s claims to supporting democracy.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
How to counter the Serbian world
Last week I said Europe will not be whole and free anytime soon. Serbia has chosen to be on the eastern side of a line that will be drawn through the Balkans. The question then is how keep the other Balkan countries on the western side of the line.
This is in part a question of what they should do about the ethnic Serb populations within their borders. Serbia is pursuing a “Serbian world” strategy intended to gain as much leverage on the neighbors as possible. Belgrade is also positioning itself so that it could demand secession of neighboring Serbs if geopolitical conditions in the region and the rest of the world would permit it.
Bosnia on the spot
This puts Bosnia and Herzegovina in a difficult spot. Forty-nine per cent of its territory constitutes “Republika Sprska” (RS). Serbs make up perhaps 37% of Bosnia’s population, most of them in the RS. Many of their political leaders since the 1992-5 war have promised to separate, either de facto or de jure, from the other 51% of the territory. Milorad Dodik, who currently holds the presidency of the RS, has dominated the entity’s politics for more than 15 years. He has salami-sliced RS to within a centimeter of independence. He has also stolen a lot of its revenue and sought to cooperate with Belgrade in making the “Serbian world” a reality.
Dodik also cooperates with ethnic nationalist Bosnian Croats, in particular Dragan Covic, in his anti-constitutional political, and corrupt economic, enterprises. The Bosnian Croat political leadership seeks to echo the RS. It wants a “Third Entity” that would provide to Croats whatever de facto or de jure separation the RS achieves. This would split the Bosniak-Croat “Federation,” which occupies 51% of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory. It would also leave a rump Muslim entity that would create serious problems for its neighbors, Europe, and the US.
The risk is clear: if either Dodik or Covic secedes, the Bosnian state would be fragmented in three. Instabiliity and likely war would decide the lines between them. The State Department’s Assistant Secretary for Europe, Jim O’Brien, has made it crystal clear that the US opposes these secession ambitions. He hopes the latest European Union cash will prevent it and promote meaningly reform. But there is a long history of ethnic nationalists in the Balkans pocketing the money and doing the opposite of what the EU would like. We’ll have to wait and see whether future implementation can match O’Brien’s clarity and forcefulness on the main issue. Bosnia must remain a single, multiethnic, democratic state.
Montenegro is already in Serbia’s maw
Close to 30% of Montenegro’s population regards itself as Serb. Belgrade has successfully parlayed recent elections there into formation of pro-Serbia national governments. This has happened despite the country’s entry into NATO in 2017. The trick was to use avowedly pro-EU politicians against a dominant political party and politician, former President Djukanovic, who had governed for too many decades, with support from ethnic minority allies. The Serbian Orthodox Church and Russia’s security agencies pitched in to help. They have reaped handsome rewards, the former church property and the latter influence.
Though much-criticized for supposed corruption, President Djukanovic presided with dignity over the alternation in power. His successors have not proven their corruption accusations against him. It remains to be seen whether the more liberal democratic coalition that he formed can revive and regain power. Its pro-EU credentials were stronger than those who are now participating in a coalition that includes explicitly pro-Serbian and pro-Russian politicians, who improbably claim also to be pro-EU. Their failure to deliver what Jim O’Brien terms “benefits to citizens” could lead to another alternation in power.
Kosovo needs its Serbs
In Kosovo, the Serb population is the largest minority, but only constitutes at most 6% of the population. The Kosovo constitution provides the Serb minority with extensive protection and powersharing arrangements. But most Kosovo Serbs remain separate from the majority Albanians. Their languages (unlike the dominant languages in Bosnia and Montenegro) are incompatible. The Serbs south of the Ibar River live mostly in Serb-majority enclaves. But they appear to have made their peace, at least for now, with the Albanian-dominated institutions in Pristina. Like Albanian-majority municipalities, Serb-majority ones have extensive powers over local governance.
The northern four Serb-majority municipalites contiguous with Serbia are far less integrated than those south of the Ibar. Using its military, economic, and political leverage, including intimidation by its secret services and their organized crime partners, Belgrade has successfully ensured that they refuse to accept Pristina’s authority. The northern Serbs have boycotted municipal elections and withdrawn from Kosovo institutions.
Serbia wants the Serb-majority municipalities to form an Association. That would enable them to govern jointly and separately from Pristina, as in the RS. In the right geopolitical environment, the Association might also act as a vehicle for the four northern municipalities to secede from a state Belgrade still does not recognize. It was a similar association of provincial authorities that led to the formation of the RS before its attempted secession in 1992 from Bosnia.
What to do about Kosovo
Countering this requires a difficult maneuver from Pristina. It needs to convince the northern Serbs that they will be better off as Kosovo citizens (even if they retain their Serbian citizenship as well). Some are moving in that direction, as suggested by their increased willingness to get Kosovo license plates, identity papers, and passports. But many of the Serbs in the north have been among the most belligerent, and sometimes violent, opponents of Pristina. Belgrade has succeeded in making outreach to the northern Serbs far harder than outreach to Serbs in the municipalities not contiguous with Serbia.
Prime Minister Kurti is making a point of speaking more in his fluent Serbian. All Pristina authorities should be more careful than they have been in the past to display the country’s ethnically neutral flag, rather than the ethnic Albanian flag (also the flag of Albania) many of them prefer. Implementing the many power-sharing arrangements in the constitution is not easy, but still necessary. So too is financial support for the Serb communities and implementation of the Constitutional Court decision on the Decan/i monastery, which Pristina has refused so far.
While I don’t know the merits of the specific issues cited here, it certainly sounds like the police action described is counterproductive:
What to do in Montenegro
In Montenegro, only the constitutional political process can decide whether to allow Serbia to continue to dominate political outcomes. But NATO will need to protect itself if Russian penetration of Podgorica’s security establishment continues. With war still raging in Ukraine, the US and EU need to be far more attentive than in the past to Moscow’s use of Montenegro to compromise NATO security. The West should redouble support to truly independent civil society in Montenegro, ensuring that it exercises the same vigilance over the current government that it did over the previous one.
What to do in Bosnia in Herzegovina
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is no substitute for ridding the political leadership of those who oppose the country’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The EU and US have waited too long for the Bosnians to do it on their own. They need help. No more international funding should go the RS while Dodik is in charge. The High Represenatative should be ready to remove him from office if he continues illegal RS moves. Brussels and Washington should be pressuring Zagreb to facilitate bringing Dragan Covic to justice for corruption. Strengthening EUFOR’s troop presence in the northeastern town of Brcko is also vital. No Serb secession can occur without Brcko.
Bolder and better are the right directions for the international judges in Bosnia and the High Representative. While maintaining the Dayton peace settlement is vital, it will not suffice for EU accession. A recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights is where Bosnia should aim to go: towards a civic state rather than ethnonationalist powersharing. Moving it in that direction should be the EU and US objective.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, September 26
– Peter Baker sees a divided America. Note this point:
In an increasingly tribal society, Americans describe their differences more personally. Since Mr. Trump’s election in 2016, according to the Pew Research Center, the share of Democrats who see Republicans as immoral has grown from 35 percent to 63 percent while 72 percent of Republicans say the same about Democrats, up from 47 percent. In 1960, about 4 percent of Americans said they would be displeased if their child married someone from the other party. By 2020, that had grown to nearly four in 10. Indeed, only about 4 percent of all marriages today are between a Republican and a Democrat.
– WSJ says US warned Iran in advance of suicide bombers.
– WSJ says US will meet with China about Red Sea– Vox sees more war going on.- Analyst says Iraq is falling apart
– FP questions Biden’s Venezuela policy
– FP reports European reactions to Trump
-WaPo says US foreign military training has inconsistencies
– Europe has different models of conscription
– Think tank reports on Chinese FDI in Latin America
– Experts see North Korea readying for military action
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The sun is not setting on the US
Pantelis Ionomou asked “has the sunset of the West begun?” My own answer to this question is “no.” But that requires some explication.
The problem is real
There is no doubt but that electoral autocracies are rising while liberal democracies are declining:
The question is whether this trend will continue, where, and for how long.
2024 will see an unusual number of elections, including in big countries. Two merit particular attention: the US presidential and Congressional contests and India’s parliamentary election. The Economist rates both as “flawed democracies,” though India’s is more flawed than America’s.
Prime Minister Modi is favored to win another parliamentary majority, perhaps with a reduced number of seats. The big question is whether he will use a new mandate to further restrict Indian democracy. I wouldn’t bet against that. Modi has turned many of India’s Hindus against its massive Muslim population, the largest Muslim minority in any country on earth.
The US is particularly important
In the US, polling suggests that former President Donald Trump has a good chance of returning to the White House. As in India, the odds are he would use a second term to do additional damage to American democracy. Trump has pledged to use the Justice Department against political opponents and fire large numbers of experienced and law-abiding civil servants. He has even claimed in court absolute immunity for actions taken as president, including assassination of a political opponent. He has also avowed the intention to use dictatorial powers on “day 1” to close the border and drill, presumably for oil and gas:
The question is whether Trump will win in November against Joe Biden.
It will be tight
I doubt it. He will certainly not win the popular vote, which he lost by 7 million in 2020. It is hard to imagine any New Yorker or Californian who voted for Biden last time around who will turn out to vote for Trump this time. But one of America’s democratic flaws is its presidential election procedures. Its 18th-century constitution gives the presidency to someone who wins a majority of votes in the Electoral College, regardless of the popular vote. There it is state “electors” who determine the outcome.
Each state gets a number of electors equivalent to its number of members in Congress (plus three for the District of Columbia, which is not a state). This indirect system favors smaller states since all states (but not the District) have two members of the upper house, regardless of population. It enables a candidate with strong support in less populous states to win.
Trump has that going for him. Without it, the Republicans would be permanently out of power, or forced to change their politics. They have lost the popular vote in all but one election (2004) since 1992.
The 2024 election will come down to a contest in only a handful of states. Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin are particularly competitive. Polling shows Biden trailing Trump in the first two, as well as in the Nevada, Georgia, and Arizona “battlegrounds.” If this polling pans out, Biden is toast.
But don’t count Biden out
So why do I think the US will not continue in that direction? Polling is notoriously unreliable this far out from an election. Many of the current polls are showing improbable shifts of minorities away from Biden, whose record on their issues is far better than Trump’s. They may be signaling unhappinesss with being taken for granted, but in the polling booth I don’t know many traditional Democrats who will make the mistake of voting against their own interests.
Muslim Americans are particularly important in Michigan. All the Arabs I know (none of whom are in Michigan I should note) are deeply disappointed in Biden’s unqualified support for Israel’s war on Gaza. Ditto my Bosnian Muslim friends with his policies both in Gaza and in the Balkans. But they will in November face a choice between Biden, who has at least tried to moderate Israel’s approach and steer it towards saving Palestinian lives and establishing a Palestinian state, and a profoundly Islamophobic, race-baiting Trump. Last time around, Trump completely abandoned Palestinian concerns, moved the US embassy to Jerusalem, and gave Prime Minister Netanyahu far more unqualified support than Biden has done.
The polling is also showing a surprising shift of Black voters to Trump, but women are heading in the other direction. This is despite record low unemployment among Blacks and a narrowing of the gap with whites. Biden has appointed an unusual number of Black judges and other officials, as well as an unprecedented number of women. Young people would like a younger candidate than Biden. But Trump is only a few years younger. He is also more addled than Biden:
Trump’s white supremacist and anti-abortion advocacy may not loom large today. But any decent electoral campaign on Biden’s part will remind the electorate of both.
Trump will be a crook and Biden’s economy will look good
I hardly need even mention the many criminal indictments and civil cases against Trump, some of which will result in ignominous outcomes for him before November. He will likely be a convicted felon by then. He will also have lost control of many of his businesses. That won’t deprive him of his base, which is oblivious to his wrongdoing and convinced he is being persecuted, but it will repulse some independents and encourage at least as much turnout among Democrats as among Trumpistas.
The Republicans are pursuing Biden’s son Hunter, but they haven’t really pinned anything unknown on him. Nor have they connected their allegations to the President.
The continuing strength of the American economy, which is going uncredited to Biden among much of the citizenry, has been a problem for him. It has caused high inflation, increased interest rates and home prices, and pushed up gasoline prices. But many of these important consumer issues will be in the rear-view mirror by November. Another ten months should bring inflation close to the Fed’s 2 per cent target, enabling reduction of interest rates. Gasoline prices are not likely to rise much as the economy softens a bit. US energy production is higher than ever and gasoline prices are falling. Interest rates appear to have peaked and consumer confidence last month jumped.
Bottom line
Absent any big surprises between now and November, Biden is far more likely to be gaining than losing against Trump in the key states. I can’t be sure it will suffice. But I am more hopeful than discouraged. The sun is not setting on the West, at least not in the US.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, December 19
– US sets up a Red Sea task force
–Germany deploys troops abroad
– Election interference by several countries
– Reuters forecasts Trump foreign policy
– GOP voters support law-breaking
– Gaza hurts Biden with voters
– 118th Congress hasn’t done much
WaPo has new interactive showing DC area flood risks
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
RSS - Posts
