Tag: Democracy and Rule of Law
Peace picks, October 5-9
- Toward a “Reaganov” Russia: Assessing trends in Russian national security policy after Putin | Monday, October 5th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | During their recent speeches before the United Nations General Assembly, Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama traded strong words on issues from Ukraine to arms control to Syria. The exchange between the two presidents unfolded as questions about Russia’s long-term foreign policy ambitions and grand strategy return to the forefront of policy debate. To better understand what lies ahead in Russian foreign and security policy, analysts must explore variances between Russian strategic culture and the agenda put forward by President Putin. Disentangling these differences will be crucial for U.S. policy planning of the future. Brookings Senior Fellow Clifford Gaddy joins Michael O’Hanlon, author of “The Future of Land Warfare,” to discuss their research on the issue, focusing on five possible paradigms for the future of Russian grand strategy. Former ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer, presently the director of the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative at Brookings, will also participate in the panel.
- United States and China: Trends in Military Competition | Monday, October 5th | 12:00 – 1:00 | RAND Corporation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Over the past two decades, China has poured resources into upgrading its military. This modernization, coupled with China’s increasingly assertive position in the waters surrounding the mainland, has caused concern in Washington and capitals across Asia. Recently, a team of RAND researchers led by Eric Heginbotham released The U.S.-China Military Scorecard report. This study is the broadest and most rigorous assessment to date of relative U.S. and Chinese military capabilities based entirely on unclassified sources. Join us to discuss the evolution of Chinese military capabilities in specific domains (air and missile, maritime, space, cyber, and nuclear) and the overall trend in the regional military balance over time; how Chinese relative gains could affect the strategic decision-making of Chinese leaders; steps the United States can take to limit the impact of a growing Chinese military on deterrence and other U.S. strategic interests. Eric Heginbotham is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation specializing in East Asian security issues.
- Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East | Tuesday, October 6th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Join The Center for Transatlantic Relations in a discussion on nuclear Middle East. This discussion with feature Yair Evron, professor emeritus, Department of Political Science, Tel-Aviv University and senior research associate for the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel-Aviv. Additionally, Ambassador Robert E. Hunter, senior fellow for Center for Transatlantic Relations will participate in the discussion.
- The Pivotal Moment: How the Iran Deal Frames America’s Foreign Policy Choices | Tuesday, October 6th | 12:00 – 1:00 | The Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | At the core of the debate over the Iran deal are two distinct visions of what American foreign policy should be. In contrast to the politicized efforts to frame foreign affairs as a choice between isolationism, regime change, or some nebulous choice in between, the controversy over the efficacy of the Vienna Agreement represents the real difference between the alternatives being offered to the American people. This discussion aims to frame the distinctions between progressive and conservative foreign policy and the choice they represent for the nation as it considers what kind of statecraft to expect from the next administration. Speakers include: Colin Dueck, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute, and Kim Holmes, Distinguished fellow, The Heritage Foundation.
- Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators | Tuesday, October 6th | 1:00 | Institute of World Politics | REGISTER TO ATTEND |Have you ever wondered what it would be like to be the child of a Stalin or Hitler, a Mao or Castro, or Pol Pot? National Review’s Jay Nordlinger asked himself this. The result is Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators, an astonishing survey of the progeny of 20 dictators. Some were loyalists who admired their father. Some actually succeed as dictator. A few were critics, even defectors. What they have in common, Nordlinger shows, is the prison house of tainted privilege and the legacy of dubious deference.
- India and Pakistan: From Talks to Crisis and Back Again | Wednesday, October 8th | 8:30 – 10:00 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The last few months have witnessed nascent efforts to restart high-level bilateral talks between Delhi and Islamabad dashed again by political maneuvering in both capitals. In addition, there has been an uptick in violence along the Line of Control in Kashmir and muscular signaling from both sides. Why has the latest effort between India and Pakistan to talk about the myriad issues between them fallen apart? What can we discern about the approach of Indian Prime Minister Modi toward Pakistan? How do civil-military politics in Pakistan inform its approach toward India? Are the two states doomed to a perpetual state of ‘not war, not peace,’ or is there hope for a way forward? Huma Yusuf , Wilson Center, and Aparna Pande, Hudson Institute, will discuss. Carnegie’s George Perkovich will moderate.
- What can Myanmar’s Elections tell us about Political Transitions? | Wednesday, October 7th | 9:30- 11:00 | Advancing Democratic Elections and Political Transitions consortium | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Elections are critical junctures in many transitions, providing clarity on whether a political transition is advancing or retreating – and Myanmar’s November 8, 2015 parliamentary elections promise to be such a watershed moment for the country’s potential democratic transition. Speakers Include: John Brandon, Senior Director at The Asia Foundation, Jennifer Whatley, Division Vice President, Civil Society & Governance at World Learning, Robert Herman, Vice President for Regional Programs at Freedom House, Jonathan Stonestreet, Associate Director of the Democracy Program at The Carter Center, Eric Bjornlund, President of Democracy International.
- A Saudi Arabian Defense Doctrine for a New Era | Thursday, October 8th | 10:00 – 11:30 | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Saudi Arabia has in recent years consolidated its place as the preeminent Arab leader, regional stabilizer, and critical bulwark against terrorism and a nuclear Iran. The Kingdom’s growing security responsibilities require rapid and substantial military investments. Prince Sultan bin Khaled Al Faisal and Nawaf Obaid, visiting fellow and associate lecturer at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, will outline a comprehensive Saudi Arabian Defense Doctrine for a new era and explain why the Kingdom is likely to double down on defense and national security capabilities in the next decade.
- The EU Migration Crisis | Thursday, October 8th | 2:30 – 4:00 |Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND |Dean Vali Nasr and The Human Security Iniative of the Foreign Policy Insitute Invite you to a panel discussion on The EU Migration Crisis. Speakers include: Michel Gabaudan, president, Refugees International, Reka Szemerkeny, Ambassador, Hungary, Peter Wittig, Ambassador, Germany.
- Democracy Rebooted: The Future of Technology in Elections | Friday, October 9th | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As technology plays an increasingly dominant part of our lives, its role in elections has come under scrutiny. We are at a crucial moment to review the policies that influence elections and the technology we use to execute them. Why can we call a car, book a hotel, and pay bills on our phones, yet elections are often still implemented with pen and paper? Legitimacy, access, credibility, and trust are the issues that will require policymakers and technologists to carefully script the implementation of technology in our elections. Speakers include: Governor Jon Huntsman, Chairman Atlantic Council, Secretary Madeline Albright, David Rothkopf, CEO and Editor-in-Chief FP Group, Pat Merloe, Director, Electoral Programs, National Democratic Institute, Mark Malloch Brown, Former Deputy Secretary General, UN, Matthew Masterson, Commissioner, Electoral Assistance Commission, Tadjoudine Ali-Diabacte, Deputy Director, Electoral Assistance Division, UNDPA, Justice Jose Antonio Dias Toffolio, President, Supreme Electoral Court, Brazil, Manish Tewari, Former Minister of Information, India.
Transition matters
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a panel on Thursday entitled “Searching for Answers to Troubled Democratic Transitions,” co-sponsored by the National Endowment for Democracy, the Inter-American Dialogue, and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). The panel gave Abraham Lowenthal, professor emeritus of International Relations at USC, and Sergio Bitar, non-resident senior fellow and project director at Inter-American Dialogue, the opportunity to present their new book, Democratic Transitions: Conversations with World Leaders, an edited volume of lengthy interviews the two editors conducted with leaders who oversaw the gradual and successful transition of their countries from autocracy to democracy, as well as with some opposition figures from those countries.
The aim of conducting the interviews was to determine whether lessons can be drawn from earlier transitions in ‘Third Wave’ countries such as Indonesia, Chile, and Ghana and applied during what some have termed a democratic recession. After their overview, the president of the National Endowment for Democracy, Carl Gershman, contributed comments, while the audience also heard from two experts on countries currently on the cusp of transitions: Priscilla Clapp, senior advisor at the US Institute of Peace and the Asia Society, discussed Myanmar, while Moisés Naím, distinguished fellow at Carnegie, discussed Venezuela.
Carnegie’s vice president for Studies, Thomas Carothers, introduced the panel, remarking that the world has not seen a single new democracy emerge in the past decade. The Arab Spring was a period of hope, but with transitions thwarted in many of those countries, we have also been observing worrying global trends that would seem to suggest the push for democracy has slowed or even begun to reverse. Carothers still believes that the arc of history bends toward democracy, however, and the panelists would appear to agree.
Lowenthal underlined that the aim of the book was not to produce a work of theoretical comparative politics, but to try to distil best practices and recurrent issues for democratic transitions from the experiences of leaders who had lived and struggled through them. The narrative of prior experience can provide general principles that politicians in developing democracies can apply to local problems. Through their interviews, Lowenthal and Bitar observed that a set of issues cropped up in each case, apparently inherent to the process of transitioning. These included the problems of unifying oppositions while marginalizing destabilizing elements within them, preventing violence while separating a legitimate police force from the armed forces, and fighting corruption and impunity, among others.
Lowenthal and Bitar came up with ten imperatives for transition:
- Move gradually and take every opportunity, not waiting for a ‘better’ choice
- Maintain a hopeful vision about the process
- Build coalitions between political parties and social movements
- Protect the spaces of open dialogue
- Build a constitution that represents all members of society and institutes a system for problem-solving
- Enhance and reinforce political parties, or create them if necessary
- Separate the police from the armed forces and ensure the latter is subject to the government
- Ensure transitional justice
- Manage the political economy of transition, to provide the basic conditions for governance
- and manage external support, so that it converges with domestic forces
Gershman found the book instructive. Despite apparent autocratic resurgence and a crisis of confidence or political dysfunction in many advanced democracies, he thought what is currently occurring should not be understood as a democratic recession, but rather a ‘third reverse wave’ following on the Third Wave of the late 20th century. He offered steps that ought to be taken by advanced democracies to shepherd democratic transitions elsewhere, including a call to regain the will to fight the political and intellectual battle for liberal democratic values.
Gershman was uncompromising; he diverged from Lowenthal and Bitar in rejecting gradualism, saying that we cannot accept hybrid regimes as better than dictatorships. The editors, however, confirmed that all the interviewees had come out strongly in favor of gradual transitions. That is often how transitions transpired successfully.
Clapp found much similarity between the cases described in the book and the situation in Myanmar today, although the transition there is still in early stages and needs to be further developed. The international community entertains very high expectations given Myanmar’s specific history and context: it has been for so long a repressed society and still faces significant challenges in its transition, in military-civilian relations, an economy thoroughly controlled by an oligarchy, and exclusion of ethnic minorities.
Naím presented a dissent. By interviewing leaders only, the book presents one perspective on the transition process. Valuable as this work is, there are significant differences with many of the countries today on the cusp of transitioning, as opposed to the Third Wave countries covered in the book. These ignored factors include the phenomenon of states incorporating crime into their behaviour, as ‘mafia states’ (like Russia or Venezuela); the crucial role oil plays in oil-producing autocracies, shoring up regimes; the outsized influence of foreign actors; the role of social media; and expanding middle classes. Naím also thought it a simplification that militaries are treated as unified institutions, when really within militaries there are numerous factions competing for power.
A key issue remained unresolved: whether the experiences of Third Wave democracies could be applied to countries in North Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere in the future.
Something is rotten
I had the satisfaction yesterday of sending around yesterday a paper (now available in the local language) by Srdjan Blagovcanin and Boris Divjak on How Bosnia’s Political Economy Holds It Back and What To Do About It. They have done something I have wanted to see for some time: a chapter and verse description of how politicians are ripping off the country’s citizens. They can’t of course name names, but they cite specific instances and elucidate the mechanisms used. The responsible parties know who they are. So does everyone else in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
This paper should be read with the German/British initiative for “reform” in mind. That effort blocked a nascent American initiative to try once again to fix the Dayton constitution, which empowers ethnic nationalists and enables the rip-off. The Germans and British have convinced the European Union to focus initially on labor market reforms, in order to generate growth and presumably in preparation for privatization of state-owned companies. I’m not against it, but there are two obvious problems with that approach:
- Serious labor market reform will worsen social conditions, and privatization will eventually lead to redundancies that will worsen them more;
- Past privatization efforts have put state assets into the hands of crony capitalists, who manage not only to strip assets but also sell the shells back to the state.
It is only by acute awareness of the political/economic context and close international supervision that such perversities can be avoided. But it is definitely time to move ahead with serious reform efforts. Some political leaders are blatantly ripping off the citizens and enriching themselves. Citizens get little or nothing in the way of state services. I only ask that the Europeans not settle for Potemkin villages. It is time to build a state in Bosnia that serves the real needs of its citizens.
How do we get there from here? Srdjan and Boris suggest starting where the problems are: in the political parties and their leadership. They want internal democracy in the parties, which today are controlled by their leadership, without any serious input from the membership. In Italy this is called “partitocracy.” It isn’t any prettier in the Balkans. They also want to see red tape cut and serious judicial efforts mounted against corruption, including international asset freezes and travel bans for guilty parties, who should be pursued by the judicial system with international assistance. They are attentive also to the need for a broader civil society effort to create a context in which corrupt practices are not tolerated.
None of this in my way of thinking substitutes for constitutional reform, which however has failed at least twice (I am counting the close-call 2006 April package as well as the ill-begotten 2009 Butmir initiative), despite high-level international engagement. The EU is now very much in the lead in Bosnia, with the Dayton-created High Representative taking a backseat. Boris and Srjdan like it that way, as does Brussels. And Brussels is following the British/German lead. So constitional reform, essential though it may be, will have to wait a while.
If the current reform effort does anything useful, it shouldn’t have to wait long. Once the political economy in Bosnia is reconstructed and citizens can begin to expect some services, they won’t long put up with the ethnic nationalists who have stood in the way of progress for 20 years. I won’t hold my breath for that to happen, but we’ll know soon enough.
If the current reform effort fails, the country will return to demands for constitutional changes. I only hope they will be in the direction of strengthening the state government and its ability to negotiate and implement the requirements of EU membership. The route Milorad Dodik prefers–towards partition–is one that would set Bosnia back to wartime issues and block its road to the EU. That’s not the way to go.
Reconcilation and stability
Dragan Aleksic of Serbia’s Tanjug news service asked some questions. I replied:
Q: We would like to have your comment on Serbian Prime Minister Vucic’s initiative to declare a Remembrance Day for all of the victims in the 1990s war in former Yugoslavia. This initiative has not been well received neither in Kosovo (it was criticized by Prime Minister Thaci) nor in Croatia. The argument is more or less that Serbia is guilty for the war so this initiative is not welcome.What is your view of the initiative to establish a common Day of Remembrance for all of the victims of the 1990s wars in former Yugoslavia?
A: I think it is up to the people of former Yugoslavia, especially the victims, to react to the proposal, not a foreigner like me.
Q: Does the attitude toward Serbia as the culprit justify the rejection of a legitimate initiative aimed at reconciliation?
A: A proposal of this sort works best if it is the result of reconciliation rather than having reconciliation as its objective. Would Serbs have reacted well had the proposal come from Hashim Thaci or Bakir Izetbegovic?
I am reminded of the Recom initiative, which seeks first to establish the facts of what happened in a way that engages everyone concerned. It too has had difficulty being accepted at the governmental level, but it seems to me correct to start with a broad fact-finding strategy, like the one used by the Scholarly Initiative (an effort to get agreement among academics on what happened in the 1990s in the Balkans and why). I recommend all concerned read its Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies, which goes a long way toward developing a common narrative.
Q: Does this mean that Serbia does not have the right to launch positive initiatives?
A: Serbia has every right to launch positive initiatives, but other people have the right to react the way they want. It is not only in the Balkans that prior consultation and mutual understanding is important to the success of an initiative.
Q: How do you see the relations in the region, especially when it comes to stability?
A: None of the states in the region have either the desire or the means to create the kind of instability that dominated the 1990s. All but Serbia are either already NATO members or want to become NATO members. The requirement that they first establish democratic institutions is an important barrier to any further conflict among them.
But there are still unresolved issues, especially about the state structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as about mutual recognition and exchange of ambassadors between Serbia and Kosovo. My email tells me Serbs think I am crazy to talk about that: they say it will never happen. I say it has to happen before Serbia can enter the European Union. Belgrade has already accepted the constitutional authority of the Pristina government on the whole territory of Kosovo, as well as the idea that Kosovo will qualify for and enter the EU separately, which implies that Kosovo will be a sovereign state. It is not such a big step to UN membership, which makes bilateral recognition almost irrelevant, and even exchange of ambassadors.
Anyone concerned about stability in the Balkans should be thinking hard about undermining radicalization among the region’s Muslims by quickly resolving these issues in Bosnia and Kosovo. They should also want Greece to lift its veto on Macedonia’s NATO membership and EU prospects.
PS: Let me add something I forgot to say to Tanjug. Reconciliation begins with acknowledgement of harm done, by those whose leadership did it. This starts a mutual process. We aren’t quite there in the Balkans, yet.
That’s not easy
The Kosovo parliament yesterday mounted the two-thirds margin needed to approve constitutional amendments required to allow creation of an internationally-staffed Special Court that will meet outside the small country to consider cases that date from after the end of the Kosovo war and may include some in which the crimes actually occurred in Albania. It will likely be years before the court reaches any verdicts.
It took courage for Hashim Thaci, who is rumored to be the subject of at least some of the cases in question, to dragoon his political party into providing the votes necessary to reach the two-thirds threshold. The constitutional amendments had failed just a few weeks ago, due to defections by Kosovo Liberation Army enthusiasts. They regard the creation of the Special Court as an attack on the legitimacy of their liberation struggle and the sovereignty of the state it created.
The international community saw things differently. Kosovo’s friends in Washington and Brussels might have preferred the country’s own courts to take up the cases in question. But Kosovo is too small and too interconnected for its still nascent court system to be able and willing to try such cases, which require foolproof witness protection. In any event, it would not have been possible for the Kosovo courts to deal with those involving crimes that allegedly occurred in Albania, including murder and organ trafficking.
It is unfortunately not clear that the internationals can manage the feat either. The European Union Rule of Law mission in Kosovo (EULEX) has been bumbling at best, incompetent and even corrupt at worst. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which lacks jurisdiction in the cases the Special Court will hear, hasn’t been a lot better. Its trials have dragged on for years, with inconsistent and difficult to account for outcomes. Its main virtue was that it removed notorious alleged war criminals from circulation in their own countries and thereby muted their political currency and relevance.
It was supposed to do better than that. International justice was intended to hold individuals accountable, remove the presumption of guilt from ethnic groups, and provide a just foundation on which to build real reconciliation and a warm peace. Judged by those expectations, the alphabet soup of international efforts to make law the rule rather than the exception has to be judged a miserable failure. While the military potential to wreck havoc in the Balkans is today greatly reduced, ethnic tensions still prevail over moderation, mutual disdain over common interests and hatred over good sense.
My one fear about this new court, whose creation has to be counted as a big step forward, is that it may fail like other international justice efforts to hold perpetrators accountable. Bringing people to trial for crimes allegedly committed 15 or 16 year ago is challenging. Evidence goes missing or is destroyed, witnesses become unavailable or unwilling, memories fade. The organ-trafficking allegations will be particularly difficult to prove. Perhaps the single biggest challenge in Kosovo is intimidation: I wouldn’t want to live in a country of less than 2 million people where most of the population would consider me a traitor. Testifying means a lifetime in exile in some other country’s witness protection program.
So I do hope the internationals understand the big responsibilities they have taken on with the creation of this Special Court: assembling airtight cases from aging evidence and testimony, conducting trials expeditiously and transparently, convincing not only the accused but two whole countries that the process is fair and unbiased, avoiding the besmirching of reputations without ample proof, assigning responsibility in a way that avoids harming innocent people.
That’s not easy.
Insider views on ISIS in Iraq
On Thursday, Stimson hosted a discussion in cooperation with the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani (AUIS) entitled Threat Of ISIS In Iraq: Views From The Ground. Speakers included: Stimson Middle East Fellow Geneive Abdo, , Brookings Non-resident Fellow Christine van den Toorn, AUIS Director of the center for Development and Natural Resources Bilal Wahab. Three AUIS students, Noaf, Anas, and Khusai were featured in recorded videos. Lukman Faily, Iraqi Ambassador to the US, also spoke. Stimson President Ellen Laipson moderated.
AUIS was founded in 2006. Students come from many religious backgrounds and Iraqi regions, as well as from neighboring countries.
Van den Toorn, explained that Iraq is more complicated than the discourse in DC. The students from AUIS explained the situation in their regions.
Noaf is from Sinjar. He and his 6 brothers all finished college. He was supposed to study in Mosul after high school but had worked as a translator for US troops and is Yazidi, so he feared for his safety. He got a scholarship to study at AUIS and graduated with a degree in Business Administration.

ISIS still threatens Sinjar and tried to take back his village, Hanasour, two days ago. The northern part of Sinjar was liberated from ISIS five months ago and many different actors are defending the area. Military leaders believe a unified force could liberate the rest of Sinjar in 3-4 days. Noaf wants autonomy for Sinjar with NATO protection. The people of Sinjar have lost trust in both Iraqi and KRG security forces; an international force would allow the IDPs to return. Sinjar has agriculture and oil, so it could have its own economy.
Anas was born in Samarra, Saladin Governorate. His father had refused to join the Ba’ath Party, was forced into the military, and died. He graduated with an engineering degree from AUIS.

The economy in Samarra is bad because Samarra is controlled by the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs). Last year, ISIS entered half of the city, but left the next day. ISIS is now 20 km away. Samarra is 100% Sunni, but about 90% of the security forces are Shia. Some PMUs are good; others are criminals. Locals are hesitant to join the PMUs because some of those who fought Al Qaeda in 2006 were later arrested by the government. The PMUs should transfer control to the local police. Tikrit has been liberated, but most residents haven’t returned because the PMUs have arrested some returnees. The PMUs, not the government, decide who can and cannot return to liberated areas. Returnees to some villages have found homes and shops destroyed and Shia flags flying. There is a misconception that Sunnis support ISIS, but ISIS destroyed Sunni regions. ISIS killed two of his uncles. The problem is that Iraq’s central government treats Sunnis as enemies.
Khusai was raised in Baghdad, but his parents are from Najaf. He finished high school in 2008 when the security situation was terrible. He went to AUIS to study in a safe environment. He works in finance in Baghdad.

The security situation was very bad before Ramadan in Baghdad. During Ramadan, the situation improved and the curfew was lifted. ISIS will not invade Baghdad because it is protected by the PMUs. But Baghdadis fear the PMUs because they are armed criminals. Fortunately, their presence in the city center has recently decreased.
Southern Iraq remains safe, but some residents resent the costly war. Additionally, the IDPs in the south are causing higher prices and competition for jobs. But most southerners still believe in one Iraq, and want to liberate the northern cities, because of Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa.
Wahab said that centralization in Iraq has been a failure. There have been attempts to create an Iraqi identity, through both force and co-optation using oil wealth. The 2003 invasion offered the opportunity to decentralize, but centralization has been stronger. In response, the KRG is pushing for statehood. Basra is also looking for more autonomy and some in Kirkuk talk of a distinct Kirkuk region.
The government controls 50% of the economy. The economic power of the executive branch makes it hard to hold it accountable. The collapse of oil prices hurt the economy, which suffers if the government cannot inject enough cash into it. Government expenses have also increased because of military costs.
Without a comprehensive, international strategy to defeat ISIS, regional powers and domestic players will continue to use the crisis to their advantage, e.g., the PMUs. Kurdish society is less united than before as it argues over who deserves the credit for holding back ISIS. Within Iraq, both political and economic reform are needed.
Abdo spoke about how religious identity in Iraq has nearly replaced the identity of Iraqi citizenship. The fight for a united Iraq is true more in theory than in reality. Religion is being used for political gain in Iraq, as it has been in Lebanon and Bahrain. Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa asking his followers to take up arms is rare in Shi’ism and shows urgency, but Sistani can no longer control the PMUs. The Shia have been radicalized too.

Ambassador Faily noted that all sides in Iraq blame others. This is a vicious cycle, with no magic solution. Everyone has agreed to decentralization, but getting there necessitates a dialogue towards a common strategy. ISIS is an existential threat to Iraq and is a problem for all of Iraq’s communities. Dealing with ISIS will take time, but respect for the integrity of the state is key. Those who want power at the state’s expense will harm everyone. The US plays an important supportive role but should give Iraq breathing space to improve its politics.