Tag: Democracy and Rule of Law
Macedonia and Europe
In addition to the remarks of Ambassador Alexandros Mallis and me, last weekend’s conference of the Democratic Union for Integration in Skopje heard from Pieter Feith, now associated with the European Institute of Peace. Here are his speaking notes:
1. Salute President Ahmeti. Thank you for fourteen years of friendship and your responsible leadership following the signature of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Thank Artan [Grubi] for inviting us and for organizing the convention. We are together in the midst of national controversy and possible upheaval. Time for serious, but also constructive forward looking discussion. Ready to advise and help all political forces in the country.
2. Europe is facing serious, existential threats. We therefore have a collective responsibility to maintain stability and prosperity in this neighborhood. MK [Macedonia] not on top of the international agenda, which in a way is a good sign. But if anything, Europe doesn’t need another crisis in the Balkans right now.
3. After 23 years independence and thanks to the leadership of this party and its chairman, Macedonia achieved number of successes:
• Dealt with serious ethnic divide in 2001, successfully avoided sustained ethnic violence.
• Started with low socio-economic base, progressively applied reforms and was recognized as EU candidate.
The perspective of membership of NATO and EU is still open.
Now time for looking ahead in the interest of the country and the contribution the party can make.
4. Today, Macedonia faces number of challenges:
1. resolving the name issue hampering Euro-Atlantic Integration efforts. This is urgent and justified, but not an excuse to slow down domestic reform process; remind that in 2012 Štefan Füle proposed accession negotiations to start running in parallel to name dispute negotiations.
Opportunities to close the matter were missed in the past – by both sides. Given the internal situation in Greece and Macedonia, the outlook for making progress in the short term seems, realistically speaking, less than promising. Please do not link this issue with the reform process, in the interest of your country and people.
2. dealing with institutional weaknesses common to neighborhood;
3. improving inter-ethnic relations as tensions persist;
4. as of late, serious weaknesses in rule of law, democratic governance and parliamentary dialogue. The institutions of the country, in particular an independent judiciary and the Parliament, should deal with this.
5. Current political situation is:
• Followed with concern by international community, including the three EU institutions – Council, Commission and the European Parliament – and of course by the US; they are aware of the need for outside help.
• On the international side, there is willingness to facilitate an inclusive national dialogue in order to revamp the democratic process. Inclusive means with the participation of your party, DUI. The Parliament must resume its democratic functions without boycott or other forms of obstruction and, together with an independent judiciary, exercise democratic oversight over an accountable executive.
In the longer term, Brussels will expect from the Macedonian political leadership strong national commitment to integration and good neighborhood policies. This should be done, as a matter of priority, by removing remaining domestic challenges to accession talks. President Ahmeti’s remarks reassured me that he is ready to do so.
6. Let us look once again at the October 2014 EC Progress Report:
• Recognized high level of alignment with legislative acquis; and recommended opening accession negotiations.
• Outlined three serious challenges:
o “increasingly divisive political culture”;
o “fragile inter-ethnic situation”;
o “politicization” and government control over state institutions and media.
7. Under the present circumstances, removing technical obstacles to accession negotiations should be the strategic priority for the short and medium term;
Include particular attention to Copenhagen criteria:e.g. democracy, rule of law, human rights, respect for minorities and media freedom.
• Continue to secure the support of the international community.
• In so doing and tactically, Macedonia can narrow down the constraints to moving towards opening accession negotiations.
• Let me highlight two issues:
8. Gaps in implementation of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement:
• Decentralization process requires funding and effort to strengthen administrative capacity of some municipalities:
• Education reforms require increased political support and state funding:
• Another census or administrative registry is needed, at the appropriate moment.
• The OFA Review – stocktaking of implementation of all requirements needs to be finalized and published.
• We, the European Institute of Peace (EIP), stand ready to assist the government, the communities and civil society in their efforts to improve the Commission’s assessment in its next Progress Report.
• We also need to prevent the current crisis spilling over into the ethnic divide. The EU has given EIP its full support in helping facilitate the inter-ethnic dialogue.
9. Good neighborly relations:
o Good relations with Western Balkan neighbors, but relations with Greece and Bulgaria remain strained.
o Positive developments towards finalizing the bilateral treaty with Bulgaria.
o Agreed are questions related to protection of minorities and use of languages;
o Outstanding is the issue of shared historic narrative.
10. In closing: Need for national unity and consensus:
As the president of DUI said just now: The party faces a dilemma. Co-governance in a coalition will help ensure respect for the Ohrid requirements. Justifiably, you are keen to preserve the Ohrid legacy. But it also imposes responsibility and accountability for the whole range of government policies. You cannot remain silent. Therefore I urge you to continue to speak up on the democratic values, norms and principles for which you stand. For inter-ethnic tolerance and reconciliation. And to make sure the government works on the basis of consensual democracy in accordance with the Constitution.
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Justice, justice you shall pursue
Albatrit Matoshi of Pristina daily Zeri asked me some questions Monday. My answers were published today:
Q: Is there a legal basis to establish the United Nations Special Court for crimes in Kosovo if Kosovo institutions fail to do such a thing?
A: I suppose the international community could try to impose a new court, as it did with ICTY. But I doubt that would happen. In principle, I would like to see the Kosovo institutions handle as much of the process of investigating and prosecuting war crimes as possible. But the will and means seem to be lacking.
Q: Do you think it is clear the role of the Special Court and the fact that who will work on it, which will be the role of the current judges of EULEX or even of international judges?
A: Nothing is clear to me about the Special Court yet, as so far as I know many issues have yet to be decided and publicized. Ask the EU, which has taken on this issue.
Q: Do you think that eventually the special court will clean Kosovo’s political scene?
A: I’m not sure what “clean Kosovo’s political scene” means, but the purpose of the court will presumably be justice, not political cleansing.
Q: What is the significance of this Court for Kosovo?
A: The important thing for Kosovo’s citizens to appreciate is that there are rules that apply in any armed conflict. Even in an entirely justified war, war crimes may occur. In the first instance, every country is responsible for the behavior of its own fighters. There is nothing unusual about the international community expectation that Kosovo fighters be held responsible. I wouldn’t want my liberation war stained with war crimes.
Q: How do you think this process will last and how many people will be involved?
A: How would I know? The process usually lasts much longer than anyone expects.
Q: Was there any possibility to avoid the creation of this Court if the Kosovo judiciary will have done its job better or has been inevitable process?
A: Yes. Had the Kosovo judiciary pursued war crimes cases more aggressively and effectively, there would be little need for this Special Court.
But there are also limitations. I’m not sure the Kosovo courts can be expected to pursue crimes that may have occurred in a neighboring country.
Q: Do you think the Kosovo political scene will be affected more by the creation of this Court?
A: There are obviously political differences over the creation of the Special Court. Those need to be resolved within Kosovo’s political institutions. That is what they are for.
Q: Can establishment of this court have negative effects on the situation in Kosovo and how?
A: I know creation of the court is hard. But it is important for Kosovo to demonstrate its willingness to see war crimes allegations investigated and prosecuted in a fair and objective way.
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The Gulf beyond oil
Elizabeth Kiefer, a master’s student at SAIS, reports on the Carnegie Endowment discussion this week of the Chatham House report Future Trends in the Gulf.
Panelists:
Jamil De Dominicis, Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Program, Chatham House
Kristen Smith Diwan, Visiting Scholar, Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University and lecturer at American University’s School of International Service
Jane Kinninmont, Deputy Head and Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Program, Chatham House
Matar Ebrahim Matar, Former Member of Parliament, Kingdom of Bahrain
Moderator:
Frederic Wehrey, Senior Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Jane Kinninmont provided a brief summary of the new Chatham House report. While the Gulf States are often seen as a bastion of stability, a number of factors that have generated tensions between civil society and Gulf governments such as high population growth, increased internal migration, lavish economic spending, government nepotism, the public’s dissatisfaction with current land ownership policies, lack of employment opportunities for women, and the uneven distribution of wealth. The proliferation of information via Twitter and satellite television has created the expectation among Gulf citizens of greater government transparency and generated calls that citizens be included in international and domestic policy debates.
While the Gulf States were originally receptive to change in the wake of the Arab Spring, these regimes are now less likely to accommodate local demands for openness as a result of the turmoil that has accompanied transitioning states. Governments are now repressing civil dissent and resisting calls for political transformation. Some of the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, have increased social spending in an effort to buy off local dissent, but this strategy is not sustainable in the long-term due to declining oil revenues and poor economic policies.
Kinninmont argued that these regimes must pursue economic policies that move beyond oil to create knowledge-based economies. Such a shift must be accompanied with parallel public discussion about what a “new deal” with a state that provides fewer subsidies and expects greater inputs from its citizens entails.
Western countries are sending mixed messages to Gulf states. Continued military and security assistance, without pushes for democratic reforms or increased social spending, have reinforced negative Gulf behaviors.
Jamil De Dominicis noted the space for constructive political dialogue in the Gulf States has decreased since 2011. He is particularly alarmed about the practice that many states are pursuing of revoking the citizenship of political dissidents. Dominicis advocates that Gulf states take a long-term approach towards transition that redefines the relationship between the state and citizen beyond the accumulation of wealth.
Kristen Smith Diwan noted that the West needs to view its strategy with Gulf states beyond the lens of oil and gas. The new security environment in the Middle East will make Western political concerns in the Gulf more difficult to address. Many Gulf states are using new legal frameworks and media laws, enacted under the guise of anti-terrorism efforts, to crack down on peaceful opposition. She highlighted the use of such tactics in Kuwait and Bahrain, where several moderate clerics who spoke out against government policies were sentenced to prison. The parliaments in many Gulf States are now less representative of the region’s political landscape due to free speech restrictions.
Diwan echoed Dominicis‘ concerns about taking away citizenship, noting that revoking citizenship is a highly effective and symbolic tactic to repress dissent. Policies that drive peaceful political dissent underground risk creating violent extremist groups in the coming years.
Matar Ebrahim said Gulf youth are increasingly following economic, human rights, and democracy issues on Twitter. Their governments are increasingly committing human rights abuses and even torture against those who protest. The current political environment is not sustainable and is driving foreign companies out of the region due to security concerns.
Ebrahim said that there were three scenarios that could play out in the region. The first is continuation of the status quo, which he believes is not sustainable and would ultimately precipitate inevitable but difficult political transitions in Gulf states. The second scenario involves a political “opening up” in Saudi Arabia, which would have ripple effects in the region. The third and most likely scenario is a political transition in a small country such as Bahrain, which could serve as a model for others. Ebrahim noted that the time for change was now, as the economic outlook for Bahrain is particularly bleak.
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Serbia: media and government
I recently asked a knowledgeable friend about media freedom in Serbia. His lengthy reply is below. I’ll of course be prepared to publish other well-reasoned perspectives on this issue.
Here is my theory on the Serbian media scene.
Media freedom activists (MFA) who claim there is censorship imposed directly by the Serbian government or even Prime Minister Vučić himself – and who consist of both journalists and nongovernmental organization representatives – constitute a small fraction of people working in the media sector overall. Most journalists do not complain about censorship and perform their jobs normally.
Of course, being a minority does not mean being wrong. But in the case of the MFA, the problem is the argumentation they use in their attempts to prove that there is censorship. What they emphasize as their “ultimate proof” is that a vast majority of mainstream media never, or at most rarely, criticize Vučić.
It is true that most media treat Vučić in a positive way, but that does not necessarily have to be due to censorship by him or the government as a whole. The media do not operate in a vacuum; they are an integral part of broader society. As such, they reflect the general mood of the public. If Vučić enjoys huge support from people, it is not surprising that most media might be reluctant to write or speak against him, even if they have grounds. They do not want to risk alienating their readers and followers, both actual and potential.
Even though Vučić is today far more popular than Tadić ever was during his presidency (and certainly holds more power than Tadić did), when you compare the number and percentage of mainstream media that are currently pro-Vučić with the number of those that were pro-Tadić when he was in power, you’ll see that, strangely, more media then favored Tadić than now favor Vučić.
Another two factors that I believe contribute a great deal to sycophantic behavior of some media toward those in power (at any given time, not just at present) are opportunism and cowardice. An example of cowardice is when a journalist refrains from criticizing a politician in power not because someone influential warned them not to, but because of perceived fear of getting into trouble if they did. An example of opportunism is when a journalist (or editor) flatters powerful figures in hopes of earning privileges in return. Albeit different, both can be regarded as cases of self-censorship.
In terms of their attitude toward the ruling elite, Serbian mass media can be roughly classified into three basic categories. Read more
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Libya: the difference between east and west
I spent the better part of an hour Thursday on an Al-Arabiya program discussing Libya.The main issue was US and British resistance to lifting the UN arms embargo. The anchor questioned why Washington and London are so concerned with weapons falling into the “wrong hands” and whether that problem can’t be solved by transferring them only to the Libyan army under close supervision. I said I thought the Americans want to see some progress toward unifying the government authorities first. I got this email this morning from a Libyan, which I think merits airing:
I am watching a TV program. Even if I may agree with some of your views, what concerns me is the confusion you have about the reality in Libya. You and others get their information from politicians who have been out of Libya for decades and have lost touch with reality. You do not make distinctions between what happened in the eastern part of Libya and the western part.
In the east there is an army. It is a small number but it is on the ground and fighting all kinds of terrorism (Islamic factions and ISIS) as well as those who are really just gangs of outlaws. I and other Libyans in the east do not understand how the West has denied the Libyan army weapons because of fear that those weapons may fall in the wrong hands. There are no wrong hands. There is an army and there are gangs.
In the western part of Libya there are many factions, militias, gangs, and some of the remaining of Qaddafi army. In fact you can say there is a war among all those factions. It is really a civil war.
As for the government, it has been formed by a freely elected parliament, whether we agree with its decisions or not. Many in the West ignore or do not realize that Islamists, and their allied militias, lost the election. The forming of the Libyan army will cause those militias to vanish gradually. The Islamist faction denies the presence of ISIS in Libya and insists that the government has been formed by Qaddafi’s followers.
Forming a national unity government is a nice idea, so long as there is a power that will protect citizens and enforce the laws, enabling the government to work. That power is a state army, which already exists in eastern Libya, but there are diplomats who see only what they want to see. This is our country and we will defend it with all means.
The West started this process in 2011 but you did not finish your assignment. Your countries have a moral responsibility toward the Libyan people to assist in establishing democracy and securing for the nation growth and development again. For this you need to recognize the very important difference between what is happening in the eastern and the western parts of Libya. If you make this distinction, your judgment will change.
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Corruption continues to erupt
Twenty years have passed since Moses Naim coined the phrase, “the corruption eruption.” As Sarah Chayes outlined this week in a talk at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, there is no sign of the eruption ending anytime soon. Promoting her book Thieves of State, Sarah outlined the push and pull factors driving corruption’s omnipotence in conflict environments. Systemic corruption is not merely the byproduct of war, but often an accelerant of conflict.
She opened the discussion with two common misperceptions of corruption:
1. Corruption is not merely “chump-change” siphoning off small amounts of money. It has real economic significance and implications for the social wellbeing of society. In Afghanistan for example, corruption amounts to a daily attack on people’s dignity. It creates an atmosphere of hopelessness and despondency that often leads to rage and violence.
2. There is a tendency to think of corruption as a sort of corrosion eating away at government. She turns this theory on it’s head: corruption is in fact a system created by the government. The levers of state power are put into the service of vertically integrated kleptocratic networks. It is not merely that state weakness can give space for corruption to seep in. Corrupt networks purposefully weaken institutions that will not work with them.
The policy community in Washington needs to wake up and realize that pervasive corruption has real and dangerous security implications. By enabling corruption, as the US has done in Afghanistan, it is only making the security problem more severe.
Sarah spent seven years living there. She helped Afghans rebuild homes and established a cooperative that aimed at encouraging Afghan farmers to produce flowers, fruits and herbs instead of opium poppies. It is through this work, and through her interactions with the American aid establishment, that she became aware of the extent to which corruption is destroying American efforts for peace in Afghanistan.
Anti-corruption assistance aimed at civil society can help build the expertise of local reformers who are challenging the government. But if the bulk of the US government interaction with a country reinforces corruption then these programs don’t stand a chance. Chayes believes that not enough emphasis is put on good-governance strategies, which are too often trumped by strategic considerations.
A survey conducted by the US military in Kabul asked captured Taliban prisoners why they joined the insurgency. The most common response was not anger at the US presence in their country, or a religious claim, but rather that the Afghan government was irreversibly corrupt. This sense of grievance and hopelessness has the power to fill ordinary citizens with feelings even worse than anger. They want revenge.
Intelligence collection and analysis should play a major role in fighting corruption, but that is not now the situation. She suggests subjecting intelligence agency payments to key members of corrupt governing networks to high level interagency debate, increasing the number of personnel assigned to study the structure, manning and other characteristics of corrupt governing networks (including corruption in annual assessments of security risks compiled by intelligence communities), and to design new collection requirements to fill knowledge gaps regarding corrupt networks, especially the ways in which Western governments and private-sector actors enable such systems.
The solutions are not simple or straightforward, but a better understanding of the nature of corruption and it’s implications for international security would contribute to improved policy and practice in government, civil society and business.
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