Tag: Democracy and Rule of Law
Tyranny’s gradations
There’s a funny story behind the July 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler, Waller Newell suggested at the Heritage Foundation on Friday. A suitcase packed with explosives had been placed under his table, killing several of his top advisors. Stumbling out of the conference room unharmed, his clothes tattered, Hitler reportedly said “That’s it. No more mister nice guy.”
Because tyrants can be almost comically grotesque, they make for easy targets of humor and ridicule. At bottom, however, they are twisted and cruel, and should be opposed by anyone who supports democracy and freedom. Right?
Sometimes, Newell said, the choice is not between democracy and tyranny. It is between gradations of despotism. Americans would do well to consider if, by overthrowing one dictator, an even worse tyrant is waiting in the wings.
Americans believe that inside every Egyptian or Iraqi, a little Tocquevillian democrat is waiting to emerge. Even today, many still cling to the idea that all people secretly desire to live under the banner of liberal democracy. But what if the choice is not really between tyranny and democracy, but different types of tyranny? Newell explores this question in his new book, Tyranny: A New Interpretation.
Tyrants can be divided into three categories. The first is the “garden-variety tyrant.” These are men who dispose of entire countries for their own amusement. They rule for their own profit, without regard to their people. Nero, Mubarak, Gaddafi are a few examples.
He called second type the “tyrant as reformer.” Like the first category, these men seek to amass wealth, but they are also interested in state building. They embark on large-scale projects of public renewal. They are more restrained in their personal lives and in their cruelty. These so-called “benevolent despots” include Julius Caesar, Alexander the Great, Napoleon and Ataturk.
The final, and most dangerous, type is the millenarian. These men want to destroy the social order completely and rebuild it according to their collectivist, utopian vision. Examples include Stalin, Robespierre, Hitler, and today’s jihadists. They argue that the suffering of thousands of men is justified when weighed against the future happiness of millions. The Ba’athists attempted to mimic this type, but most were in fact garden-variety tyrants. The genuine millenarian tyrant wants to destroy today’s society to bring about communism, the thousand-year Reich, or a global caliphate.
The French and Iranian Revolutions began as reformist movements, but were quickly hijacked by authoritarian factions. Many new rulers, instead of transforming into democrats, will simply end up oppressing those who oppressed them. Former Egyptian president Morsi’s government was headed in this direction. Newell described Morsi’s ascent to power as a legal, Islamicizing coup, adding that al Sisi’s government is marginally preferable.
Like most Americans, Newell said he is tempted to side with Iran against ISIS in Iraq, or with the Syrian rebels against Assad. However, he cautioned against American military involvement in any of these conflicts. The Sunni and Shi’a were once united by mutual hatred for Israel and the United States. American involvement in the Syrian conflict could allow a sectarian alliance to resurface. He suggested that the recent kidnappings of three Israeli teens was an attempt by Iranian-led groups to change the subject.
An independent Kurdistan could be one of the few tangible positive consequences of the US invasion of Iraq. The Kurds tend to be friendly towards the US and Israel. Very few of them support the installation of a global caliphate.
The fall of the Soviet Union was supposed to herald the end of tyranny and usher in a new era of democracy. In fact, it unleashed a Pandora’s box of tribalism and religious warfare. Most terrorists, Newell argued, are simply tyrants in waiting. Should we undermine dictators who aren’t declared enemies of the United States, when an even worse tyrant might be waiting to take his place?
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The verdict and the Obama administration
Secretary of State Kerry in Cairo Sunday suggested that Egypt was in a critical moment of transition. On Tuesday, an Egyptian court handed down draconian sentences for Al Jazeera journalists accused of crimes allegedly committed in the pursuit of their profession. While standards vary around the world, I think it fair to say that in no democracy on earth is spreading of false rumors, even if they help “terrorists,” punishable by seven years in prison. Most of what the journalists were accused of would not make it into a courtroom even in many autocracies.
Egypt is not of course a democratic society. But the American administration has been pretending it is on course to becoming one. Nothing could be further from the truth. Egypt is on course towards restoration of the autocracy, this time dressed in civilian garb (only recently acquired). Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have bought and paid for this counter-revolution. They want the full metal jacket, not blanks. General Sisi is giving it to them.
The problem for the Americans is that they want to continue aid to Egypt, which is not permitted by US law unless the administration can credibly claim that there is a transition to democracy in progress. The verdict gives the lie to that assertion. No doubt the Egyptian government will say it is a consequence of their independent judiciary. Both Foreign Minister Fahmy and presidential advisor Amr Moussa said as much about judicial decisions when they were in Washington a couple of months ago. But that is nonsense. The Egyptian judiciary was part and parcel of the military regime under Hosni Mubarak, and it remains the same today.
There are really only two serious options now for the US Government:
- Go to Congress and explain why at least some of the aid needs to continue, despite the law, and seek legislative relief of some sort;
- Cut off the aid, sending the Egyptians into the arms of the Saudis, Emiratis and Russians.
To me, the former course of action is more sensible than the latter. It might, for example, lead to reshaping the assistance package more in the direction of aid to the Egyptian people, as Michelle Dunne has suggested. But even that will offend the powers that be in Cairo, where there seems to be an insatiable appetite for American military hardware that gets put into storage and (thankfully) never used. One can only imagine what some of the motives behind that are.
The Administration may well prefer to try to continue to muddle through. After all, it has Iraq and Syria to worry about at the moment, never mind Ukraine. But failing to seek clarity on Egypt, with either option 1. or 2., will do nothing to improve an image of foreign policy hesitation and drift that is hurting a president once upon a time lauded as having deprived the Republicans of their traditional advantage on national security issues.
Egypt’s attempt to repress its way out of the chaotic revolution its now jailed activists launched more than three years ago is unlikely to succeed. Extremist violence is on the upswing, especially in Sinai. The Muslim Brotherhood has gone underground, where it survived and even thrived for decades in the past and will again now. The Obama Administration has said all the right things about the need for more inclusive governance. Now it is time to do something, one way or the other.
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Politics first
The American philosopher Alfred North Whitehead talked of the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” which is like putting the emPHAsis on the wrong syLLAble. We are at risk these days of doing that in Syria, Iraq and Libya.
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) rapid advance toward Baghdad is getting a lot of attention, as it should. But Sunni-based ISIS is not a military threat to a city of nearly 4 million people, most of them Shia. ISIS might target the western outskirts near Baghdad International Airport and Abu Ghraib prison, which will grab big headlines. But ISIS is not going to march into what used to be called the Green Zone.
Nor did ISIS take Mosul, Tikrit and other Sunni-majority towns in the north and west solely because of its military prowess. Its success is due to broad Sunni support for action against Prime Minister Maliki, who proved his popularity among the Shia in April’s election but has governed in an increasingly authoritarian and sectarian way. That’s why President Obama has made assistance to him conditional on taking a more inclusive approach. Yesterday’s meeting and declaration of support from a broad cross-section of Iraqi politicians was meant to be Maliki’s response.
What we are facing in Iraq is not merely a military challenge but rather a political challenge to a fragile state.
The outcome of this challenge may well be determined by neither Sunni nor Shia, the prime protagonists of the current fighting. Kurdish peshmerga under the command of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have already filled the vacuum left in Kirkuk by the evaporation of the Iraqi Army. The Kurds have long claimed Kirkuk as their own and won’t leave it without a fight. It is a major oil-producing area that could bring the KRG to the breakeven point: 100% of the oil produced within KRG control could generate as much revenue as the 17% of all of Iraq’s oil that Baghdad is supposed to provide. But Maliki has cut off KRG revenue for months, due to a dispute over accounting for it and over the KRG’s authority to decide on the export and sale of oil independent of Baghdad.
In the past, Kurdistan’s political independence seemed impossible because of Turkish opposition. But Turkish attitudes are changing. Ankara this year received oil directly from Kurdistan, allowing it to be stored and then sold without Baghdad’s permission. Prime Minister Erdogan has appreciated the KRG’s cooperation in tamping down Kurdish violence inside Turkey. Even the Turkish military might think an independent and relatively secular Kurdistan would be a more attractive neighbor than either an ISIS-run Sunnistan or a Shia-run autocracy.
The Kurds will not want to go their own way until ISIS is defeated or contained. But KRG President Barzani even before the latest ISIS advance was promising Kurds a referendum on independence. If he ever follows through, the vote will be overwhelmingly in favor. It is hard to picture the Sunnis staying in an even vaguely democratic Iraq that would then be 60-70% Shia. Sunnistan under ISIS control would be a real threat to the United States and to Iran, which is why Tehran and Washington are trying to make nice these days even as they compete for influence with Maliki while trying to keep Iraq unified.
Focusing exclusively on Iraq would be another fallacy of misplace concreteness. ISIS does not confine its ambitions to a single country. Iraq, Syria and Lebanon are already a single theater of operations. The place to attack an enemy is where he is weakest. That might well be inside Syria rather than in Iraq. The Obama administration was unwise to let ISIS get as strong as it has in western Syria. It is late to beef up support to its competitors or help them succeed against Bashar al Asad, but it is still worth a bolder try than Washington has made so far. The issue is not just a military one in Syria either: one of the key shortcomings of the Syrian Opposition Coalition there is its inability to deliver services in liberated areas. That is a political and governance issue, not only a military one.
The same is true in Libya. I’m delighted Ahmed Abu Khattalah is in US custody and will be tried in a civilian court. But whatever role he played in Libya’s Ansar al Sharia will be filled quickly by another jihadist. The problem in Libya, as in Iraq and Syria, is a weak state that lacks legitimacy with its people and is unable to maintain even a modicum of law and order. Dealing with this problem only by training up a General Purpose Force and leaving the governance and political issues unresolved is one more fallacy of misplaced concreteness.
PS: On Iran, best to listen to Randa Slim on NPR this morning:
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Peace picks June 16-20
1. Fifth Annual Conference on Turkey Monday, June 16 | 9:00 am – 5:00 pm National Press Club 529 14th Street, NW, Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Center for Turkish Studies at The Middle East Institute presents its Fifth Annual Conference on Turkey. This year the conference will assemble three exceptional panels to discuss the country’s tumultuous domestic politics following recent elections, the future of democracy in the country, and Turkish foreign policy. The event will feature a keynote speech by Efkan Ala, Turkey’s Minister of the Interior. SPEAKERS Amb. Robert Ford, Ibrahim Kalın, Amb. Robert Pearson, Judith Yaphe, Gönül Tol, and more.
2. What to Expect from the Al-Sisi PresidencyMonday, June 16 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Woodrow Wilson Center 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was sworn in on June 8. In his inauguration speech, al-Sisi spoke of his intent to lead Egypt in an inclusive manner. Following the resignation of the interim cabinet, al-Sisi will form a new cabinet. Marina Ottaway of the American University in Cairo and Emad Shahin of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace will share their opinions of what the future of Egypt will hold.
3. U.S. Middle East Policy and the Region’s Ongoing Battle over the Muslim Brotherhood Monday, June 16 | 12:30 pm – 2:00 pm Center for American Progress 10th floor, 1333 H St. NW, Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND In the three years since popular uprisings swept across the Middle East, the status of the Muslim Brotherhood has become a deep point of contention among regional states. Key countries in the Middle East and North Africa are sharply divided over the status of the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam. During this time, U.S. policy has been hesitant as the United States has sought to define its position in reaction to both the uprisings themselves and the new era of competition among regional states they produced. The uneven U.S. responses to the Arab uprisings and the regional competition that has been sparked offers several important lessons learned for U.S. policy in the future. SPEAKERS Peter Mandaville, Professor, George Mason University, Haroon Ullah, State Department Policy Planning Staff, and Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress.
4. Transparency, Oversight and Accountability in the UN System: Problems and How to Fix Them Monday, June 16 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm Heritage Foundation; 214 Massachusetts Ave NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Associated Press reported this year that that the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services failed to pursue a number of cases of corruption over the last five years. How emblematic are these incidents of the UN system? What has changed, what still needs doing, and what levers are effective in pushing reform? SPEAKERS Robert Appleton, former Chairman of the United Nations Procurement Task Force, and Special Counsel to the UN Iraqi Oil for Food investigation, Edward Patrick Flaherty, Senior Partner, Schwab Flaherty & Associates, and James Wasserstrom, Senior Advisor on Anticorruption, U.S. Embassy in Kabul.
5. How to Unwind Iran Nuclear Sanctions Monday, June 16 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm Atlantic Council; 1030 15th St NW, Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND With the deadline for an Iran deal fast approaching, a key element will be how to coordinate US and European sanctions relief with Iranian confidence building measures. The Atlantic Council’s Iran Task Force invites you to the launch of two papers outlining options for unwinding nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. Authors Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service and Cornelius Adebahr of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace will explore US and EU sanctions, respectively, looking at the evolution of sanctions over the past decade and the most feasible path to providing meaningful relief in the event that Iran agrees to significant curbs on its nuclear program.
6. Whistleblowers: A Critical Anti-Corruption Tool & Challenge Tuesday, June 17 | 11:45 am – 2:15 pm AU Washington College of Law; 4801 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Whistleblower laws, incentives and protections are critical to fighting corruption, but implementation in practice is a challenge. Professor Robert Vaughn, noted scholar and author of “The Successes and Failures of Whistleblower Laws” and James Wasserstrom, Anti-corruption Advisor, US Embassy Kabul Afghanistan and a whistleblower on corruption in Kosovo, will discuss best practices and pitfalls.
7. Is the US AWOL in the ‘war on drugs’ in Latin America? Tuesday, June 17 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm AEI; 1150 17th Street, NW Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND Mexico and Central America are struggling with rampant organized crime, fueled by US demand for illegal drugs. Central American nations are too weak or too complicit in criminality to confront the powerful, multibillion-dollar criminal enterprises that collaborate with Colombian cocaine smugglers, a Venezuelan narcostate, illegal arms smugglers, and Hezbollah to threaten the security and well-being of the Americas. Rep. Matt Salmon (R-AZ), chairman of the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, will assess the threat to US interests and recommend policy options, and a panel of experts will discuss. SPEAKERS Jerry Brewer Sr., Criminal Justice International Associates LLC, Richard J. Douglas, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global Threats, and Iñigo Guevara, CENTRA Global Access.
8. 2014 Global Peace Index: Measuring Country Risk and Opportunity Wednesday, June 18 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am Center for Strategic and International Studies; 1616 Rhode Island Ave NW, Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND What is the state of global peace in 2014? What are the risks that threaten the peacefulness of nations and communities? How can our foreign policy and aid interventions better prioritize the mitigation of risk? The 2014 Global Peace Index discussion will explore these questions, detailing recent trends in militarization, safety and security, and ongoing conflict. It will also include a presentation of a new country risk framework, which quantifies current knowledge around the structural drivers of peace and conflict to identify countries most at risk today of falls in peacefulness. SPEAKERS Gary J. Milante, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Paul B. Stares, Council on Foreign Relations, Alexandra I. Toma, Peace and Security Funders Group, Daniel Hyslop, Institute for Economics and Peace. Moderated by Robert Lamb, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
9. Assessing Threats Facing the U.S.-Korea Alliance Wednesday, June 18 | 12:00 pm – 6:00 pm Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel will deliver the keynote address of the second annual U.S.-Korea dialogue hosted jointly by the Wilson Center and the East Asia Foundation of Seoul. Register for this half-day conference, where opinion leaders from Korea and the United States will discuss their concerns for the future and seek ways to increase cooperation and mutual political, economic, diplomatic, and security benefits. SPEAKERS Daniel Russel, Jane Harman, Ro-Myung Gong, Thomas Fingar, Cheol-hee Park, and more.
10. Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War Thursday, June 19 | 10:00 am – 11:00 am Heritage Foundation; 214 Massachusetts Ave NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Pakistan’s army has dominated the state for most of its 66 years, locking the country in an enduring rivalry with India over Kashmir. To prosecute these dangerous policies, the army employs non-state actors under the security of its ever-expanding nuclear umbrella. Based on decades of the army’s own defense publications, Christine Fair’s book argues that the Pakistan military is unlikely to shift its strategy anytime soon, and thus the world must prepare for an ever more dangerous future Pakistan. Other speakers include David Sedney, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, and Michael G. Waltz, President of Metis Solutions and former Special Advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney.
11. Mideast Shi’ites Defy Iranian Domination? Thursday, June 19 | 12:00 pm – 2:15 pm American Enterprise Institute; 1150 17th Street NW, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Iran’s Islamic Revolution unleashed a wave of sectarianism, which has flooded the Middle East. But while many have characterized Middle Eastern Shi‘ites as under the sway of the Islamic Republic, Shi‘ites from countries like Lebanon, Bahrain, Iraq, and Azerbaijan have worked to resist Iranian influence. Join analysts from the United States and across the Middle East to discuss strategies to preserve communal independence and how the United States can successfully work with Shi‘ite communities outside Iran. This event will coincide with the release of a new report based on firsthand fieldwork in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and Azerbaijan. SPEAKERS Abbas Kadhim, Brenda Shaffer, Michael Rubin, Ahmed Ali, Ali Alfoneh, Kenneth M. Pollack, and more.
12. How to Bring a Dictator to Justice: The Hissen Habré Trial Thursday, June 19 | 3:00 pm – 4:00 pm National Endowment for Democracy; 1025 F Street NW, Suite 800, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND From 1982 to 1990, Chad witnessed thousands of political killings under the regime of its former president, Hissen Habré. Twenty-four years after the end of his rule, litigation against Habré has finally gained critical momentum in Dakar. As a member of the international team of lawyers prosecuting the case, Delphine Djiraibe is well placed to tell the story of how Habré was brought to trial and to explore the potential impact on transitional justice in Chad. She will reflect on the legal process thus far, discuss where the trial stands today, and consider next steps in Senegal and beyond. Her presentation will be followed by comments by Dave Peterson, of the National Endowment for Democracy; the discussion will be moderated by Sally Blair of the International Forum for Democratic Studies.
13. The Solution to the Cyprus Problem: Famagusta, Energy, and Public Relations Friday, June 20 | 12:00 pm – 1:45 pm Hudson Institute; 1015 15th Street NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND 2014 marks the 40th anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Following numerous failed attempts to reach a settlement, a Joint Declaration agreed to in February has galvanized new reunification efforts. The Hudson Institute hosts an important conversation on this situation with Alexis Galanos, Mayor of the city of Famagusta and former Speaker of the Cyprus House of Representatives. As the mayor of a city in the northern, Turkish-occupied part of the island, Galanos will share his unique perspective on current and future prospects for the reunification of Cyprus. Hudson Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for American Seapower, Seth Cropsey, will moderate the discussion.
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A candidate speaks
With the epidemic of violence sweeping through Iraq and Pakistan, Afghanistan has remained surprisingly calm as it enters the second of round of elections today. The first round of voting in April saw Afghanistan’s highest turnout in history, which was especially remarkable in light of the security situation. However, there has been speculation that the second round of election will be marred by apathy and security concerns. In a telediscussion Thursday sponsored by Atlantic Council, Afghan presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah rejected this notion, expressing confidence that turnout today would surpass the numbers seen in April. He acknowledged that fraud continues to be an issue, but one that election monitors can mitigate.
US-Afghan relations have deteriorated under President Karzai, who is believed to have supported Zalmai Rassoul for president. Abdullah promised to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) if elected, noting this was crucial to Afghanistan’s future. The Afghan government should have signed the BSA long ago, he said, adding that a lot of damage has been done by the uncertainty created in the absence of any agreement. “Iraq refused to sign a similar agreement,” he noted, vowing not to make the same mistake. The government exists to protect its citizens, not to “sacrifice the rights of citizens under the shadow of peace.” Political stability would pave the way for economic stability: a stable Afghanistan will provide incentives for a wealthy Afghan diaspora to reinvest in the country.
Karzai’s refusal to sign the BSA, coupled with uncertainty surrounding the timeline for US troop withdrawal, has fueled corruption, Abdullah said. The lack of political will among Afghans politicians to tackle fraud was also a major problem. An anti-corruption bill is currently languishing in Parliament; if it is not passed in the next few days, Afghan banks will be blacklisted from the international system. Rule of law has not been a priority in Afghanistan. Abdullah promised to change this by reaching out to those who have not been tainted by corruption.
He also promised to improve his country’s strained relationship with Pakistan. Both nations are struggling to combat terrorism, and both stand to benefit from improved cooperation on security and economic issues. The fact that the two countries will soon be under new leadership presents a unique opportunity to improve what has been contentious relationship.
Abdullah was asked to address the exchange of the five Taliban prisoners for American prisoner of war Bowe Bergdahl. He expressed concern that those who have been released will rejoin the battlefield, noting that a number of prisoners released under similar circumstances quickly returned to combat. He would not speak to the possibility of transferring militants like Mullah Fazlullah to Pakistan, saying only that he opposed the presence of terrorists of any nationality on Afghan soil.
Although his father was Pashtun, Abdullah is usually identified as Tajik, the dominant ethnic group of the Northern Alliance. The Taliban, meanwhile, tend to be composed of ethnic Pashtuns. However, he rejected the notion that his election could aggravate tension between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns as outdated. “People should not start equating Pashtuns with the Taliban,” he warned, noting that many of the terrorists who occupied Afghanistan did not belong to any major Afghan ethnic group, including Osama bin Laden. He pointed out that he won Herat, a largely Pashtun province, by more than 60%.
One lesson from Iraq is that sectarian policies simply do not work. He promised that his administration would include all tribal and ethnic groups. He said that the difference between Iraq and Afghanistan is that in Afghanistan, Talibanization has been rejected. Afghanistan, he maintains, does not face the levels of sectarianism seen in Iraq.
He also dismissed the findings of poll showing a tightening of the race between rival Ashraf Ghani and himself. It nonetheless appears that Ghani, an ethnic Pashtun, may have gained some supporters from Afghanistan’s Uzbek population after choosing Uzbek General Abdurrashid Dostum as one of his running mates.
Asked why Afghanistan should matter to the US, Abdullah said Americans should consider what brought them to Afghanistan in the first place. The US should not forget that in 2001, the Taliban controlled 80% to 90% of the country, and had turned it into an al Qaeda safe haven. While Obama has promised to complete the withdrawal of American troops by 2016, Abdullah said he hopes that “zero option will not mean zero cooperation.”
The international community has invested a great deal of blood and treasure in Afghanistan. Abdullah argued that best way to honor these sacrifices would be to sustain the achievements that have been made over the last ten years. Whether or not Afghanistan’s first democratic transition can survive endemic corruption, or the Taliban’s attempts to disrupt it, remains to be seen.
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What will beat al Qaeda
My piece was published today on The Hill:
The trade of five Taliban leaders held at Guantanamo Bay for American Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl has again underlined the fraught question of how to end the war on terror. Afghanistan was a main theater for that war, but American troops will be drawn down to fewer than 10,000 by the end of this year and completely withdrawn by the end of 2016. Al Qaeda, the organization that attacked the United States on Sept. 11, 2001, is mostly gone from there already.
You have to go here for the rest.
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