Tag: Democracy and Rule of Law
Peace picks June 9-13
1. Shaping the Future? The Role of Regional Powers in Afghanistan and Pakistan Monday, June 9 | 9:00 am – 10:00 am Woodrow Wilson Center, Fifth Floor; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The withdrawal of international troops from Afghanistan and the presidential election there are taking place in a context of growing internal political and economic instability. Roberto Toscano, former Public Policy Scholar of the Wilson Center and former Ambassador to Iran and India, as well as Emma Hooper and Eduard Soler i Lecha, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, will discuss the reasons why the regional perspective on Afghanistan and Pakistan is relevant, and particularly so at this point in time.
2. Youth and Violence: Engaging the Lost Generation Monday, June 9 | 9:00 am – 11:00 am US Institute of Peace; 2301 Constitution Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND This talk explores the factors that are pushing young people towards participation in various forms of violence, including participation in extremism or political violence. It will challenge pre-existing assumptions about youth peace building work and discuss policy changes necessary for new interventions that steer youth away from violence. SPEAKERS Anne Richard, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Department of State, Maryanne Yerkes, Senior Civil Society and Youth Advisor, US Agency for International Development, Rebecca Wolfe, Director, Conflict Management & Peacebuilding Program, Mercy Corps, Marc Sommers, Consultant & Visiting Researcher, African Studies Center, Boston University, and Steven Heydemann, Vice President, Applied Research on Conflict, USIP.
3. Re-Thinking Democracy Promotion Amid Rising Authoritarianism Monday, June 9 | 9:30 am – 5:00 Kenney Auditorium, Paul H. Nitze Building; 1740 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The crisis caused by Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the threat to freedom posed by kleptocratic autocracies. The world is watching how the democratic community of nations responds to Putin’s brazen attack not only against Ukraine, but against the very concept of freedom and the ability of people to choose their own political destiny. Much is at stake, for authoritarian regimes pose a danger not only to their own populations through suppression of human rights but to others as well. This requires a re-examination of democracy promotion, the threats it faces, and how best to advance it. SPEAKERS Charles Davidson, Francis Fukuyama, Walter Russell Mead, Elliott Abrams, Michael Mandelbaum, Richard Haass, and more.
4. Nuclear Flashpoints: US-Iran Tensions Over Terms and Timetables Tuesday, June 10 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND This event will explore key conflicts and possible trade-offs with Iran as the third round discussion hosted by a coalition of eight Washington think tanks and organizations. It will assess how many years an agreement could last, the breakout time, and when and how the U.S. will act. SPEAKERS Stephen J. Hadley, Chairman of the Board, USIP, Jon Wolfsthal, Deputy Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association, and Robert S. Litwak, Vice President for Scholars and Academic relations, Director for International Security Studies.
5. Rhythms at the Intersection of Peace and Conflict: The Music of Nonviolent Action Tuesday, June 10 | 9:30 am – 1:00 pm United States Institute of Peace; 2301 Constitution Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND This event brings together three individuals whose work meets at the nexus of music and nonviolent action: Arash Sobhani, an underground musician from Iran, Timothy O’Keefe, a music producer and co-founder of Freedom Beat Recordings, and Dr. Maria Stephan, one of the world’s leading scholars on strategic nonviolent action and Senior Policy Fellow at USIP. These three individuals will guide us through an exploration of nonviolent action, both past and present, through a musical lens.
6. WWI and the Lessons for Today Tuesday, June 10 | 12:30 pm – 1:30 pm Allison Auditorium, Heritage Foundation; 214 Massachusetts Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Victor Davis Hanson, Martin and Illie Anderson Senior Fellow in Residence at Stanford University, will explore the lessons that the U.S. has learned since World War I and how the lead-up to the Great War has affected our government’s policies over the past 100 years. This event will be hosted by James Jay Carafano, Vice President for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, and E. W. Richardson Fellow.
7. Researching the Middle East Tuesday, June 10 | 2:00 pm – 4:00 pm Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND This panel will discuss the challenges of researching and writing on recent international Middle East history and U.S. policy in the region. Trudy Huskamp Peterson, Consulting Archivist, David Palkki, Council on Foreign Relations, Gregory D. Koblentz, Associate Professor at George Mason University, Michael Eisenstadt, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Kevin M. Woods, Institute for Defense Analyses, will all discuss their own experiences and substantive findings studying conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq War, and the War in Afghanistan.
8. After Snowden: The Road Ahead for Cybersecurity Thursday, June 12 | 8:45 am – 1:15 pm American Enterprise Institute, Twelfth Floor; 1150 17th Street, NW, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Internet has been a remarkable force for freedom and prosperity, but it has faced challenges from individuals and governments intent on abusing its openness and interconnectivity. This conference will kick-start a national debate on America’s role in protecting and promoting free enterprise, personal security, and individual liberty in cyberspace. Jeffrey Eisenach, AEI, Michael Hayden, Chertoff Group, and Mike Rogers, Chairman of the US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, will share their insights into the future of cybersecurity policy, and will be moderated by Mike Daniels.
9. The Many Faces of Tyranny: Why Democracy Isn’t Always Possible Thursday, June 12 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Heritage Foundation, Lehrman Auditorium; 214 Massachusetts Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. History has not ended. Across the world today, we are witnessing both a heroic struggle for democracy and reform and the disturbing strength of tyrannical regimes and movements. Whether it be the Arab Spring, the Syrian civil war, the aggressiveness of Putin’s Russia or the increasing bellicosity of China, the forces of democracy and the forces of tyranny are in a dead heat. Waller R. Newell, Carleton University, examines how the West should respond and how we should make the difficult choice between better and worse kinds of non-democratic authority when overthrowing today’s dictatorship may only bring about a much worse totalitarian alternative tomorrow.
10. Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy Thursday, June 12 | 12:00 pm Hayek Auditorium, Cato Institute; 1000 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND In his new book, Barry R. Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of Security Studies Program at MIT, explains why the dominant view among the nation’s foreign policy elites, what he calls “liberal hegemony,” has proved unnecessary, counterproductive, costly, and wasteful. His alternative – restraint – would resist the impulse to use U.S. military power, and focus the military’s and the nation’s attention on the most urgent challenges to national security. This discussion features comments by Justin Logan, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute, Blake Hounshell, Deputy Editor of POLITICO Magazine, and is moderated by Christopher Preble, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute.
11. Center for a New American Security Debate: War with Iran? Friday, June 13 | 9:00 am – 12:00 pm Willard Intercontinental Hotel; 1401 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Center for a New American Security and the Civis Institute invite you to attend a public debate featuring two of the country’s top collegiate debate programs – Georgetown University and the University of Michigan. The teams will discuss whether or not the United States should use military force against Iran if nuclear diplomacy fails. The debate will be followed by comments from Dr. Colin Kahl, senior fellow and director of the Middle East Security Program at CNAS, and a moderated Q&A with the debate teams.
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Triage again
President Obama gave an intellectually vigorous response to his foreign policy critics today, in a commencement speech at West Point:
He made clear that the US would use military force, if necessary unilaterally, to defend its core interests. But at the same time he made it clear that crises that do not directly threaten the US do not merit the same response. Then, he suggests, nonmilitary efforts and multilateral military action are more appropriate and more effective.
Terrorism he identifies as the current top priority threat. But he wants to deploy the US military less and partner more with the countries where terrorists find haven. The now diffuse threat requires a more networked response, with other countries’ security forces taking the lead, as is soon to happen in Afghanistan. He wants $5 billion for training and equipping others. In Syria, he pledged to step up support to the neighbors and to the Syrian opposition, with the objective of reaching a political solution. In undertaking direct strikes against terrorists, the President cites the need for a continuing imminent threat and near certainty of no civilian casualties, so as not to create more enemies than we eliminate. He pledges to explain what we do publicly, asking the military to take the lead.
The second priority the President cites is protection of the international order, including multilateral international institutions. World opinion and international institutions blocked a Russian invasion of Ukraine and gave the country a chance to elect a new president, with America “firing a shot.” Sanctions on Iran, and the ongoing nuclear negotiations, are another example. We hope to achieve something better than what could have been achieved using force. These are signs of American strength and leadership, not weakness or hesistancy. So too is strengthening the forces of countries that contribute to international peacekeeping.
Cybersecurity, the South China Sea and climate change require a multinational approach. The President said we need to lead by example, subjecting ourselves to the same rules that apply to everyone else, including the still unratified Law of the Sea Convention. America is made exceptional by affirming international law and its own values, not by flouting it. This means closing Guantanamo and putting rules in place to regulate intelligence collection.
American leadership also requires acting in favor of human dignity. This means support for democracy, open economies and human rights, even where security interests come first, as in Egypt. Everyone’s best example these days is Burma (despite the many equivocal aspects of its still ongoing transition). But the President also squeezed in helping with electricity in Africa and education in Nigeria. “Human dignity” is a category that encompasses a lot of things.
It wasn’t a particularly stirring speech, but it was a logical one. I still wish he would do more about Syria, which threatens to collapse the neighboring states and provide haven to international terrorists. But he is into triage, not retreat, trying to limit American commitments and conserve America’s strength for whatever serious threats lie ahead. That’s what any smart president would want to do.
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There is more thankless work to be done
Lakhtar Brahimi, the UN special envoy for Syria during the better part of the last two years, resigned yesterday, with appropriate apologies to the Syrian people. In many obvious senses, the UN has been a colossal failure in Syria:
- it has failed to bring about a political settlement between the regime and its opposition,
- it has not prevented 150,000 deaths and millions of people displaced,
- it hasn’t even managed more than local ceasefires,
- it delivers humanitarian aid mostly behind regime lines, and
- it has been unable to get concerted regional or great power action to end the war.
But looked at from a different angle it has also managed to do quite well: even before Brahimi’s appointment, it put forward a plan for an end to the fighting, it deployed international monitors, it withdrew them when it became apparent they weren’t doing any good, it managed two Geneva conferences (the first in 2012 at least produced a joint US/Russian plan and the second got the warring parties to the same table), it has helped managed the process of eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons, it has documented human rights abuses, and it has provided absolutely vital humanitarian assistance to large numbers of vulnerable civilians.
The UN is only as good as its member states allow it to be. It is not a miracle worker. But it is also not finished yet, even if Brahimi deservedly wants to withdraw.
So what should it do next? Given the failure of the Geneva 2 talks, and the apparent fruitlessness of further efforts along those lines, what should the UN and its specialized agencies do to alleviate suffering, protect civilians, increase the odds of an eventual political settlement (or hasten its arrival) and reduce the likelihood of a burdgeoning conflict that engulfs Lebanon, Iraq and maybe even Turkey and Jordan?
There are several options, not mutually exclusive:
- Deliver 360 degree aid: The bulk of UN humanitarian assistance has gone people in need in regime-controlled territory. The UN agencies could join many nongovernmental organizations in providing ample humanitarian assistance across borders from Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan, thus enabling it to deliver more to rebel-held areas.
- Facilitate regional dialogue: While they have embassies in each others’ capitals, the Saudis and Iranians are barely on speaking terms and conducting a proxy war in Syria; refocusing them on common interests like countering violent extremists and maintaining state structures in the Levant could improve the situation. It is a good sign that the Saudis yesterday invited the Iranian foreign minister for a visit.
- Begin planning for post-war reconstruction and transition: When the war ends, as it inevitably will, the UN will be called upon to support reconstruction; it should be thinking about that now, helping to negotiate local ceasefires where possible and to build the local governing structures and civil society that can support the reconstruction process. Efforts of this sort are vital to improving the prospects for a democratic transition in Syria.
- Provide a moral compass: the UN could do more to publicize war crimes and crimes against humanity, it could take a strong position against the presidential “election” Assad is planning to conduct under thoroughly unfair and unfree conditions June 3, it could insist more loudly on protection of civilians and humanitarian access, it could get religious leaders to insist on observance of the laws of war.
- Cut off regime and terrorist financing: The sanctions on the Syrian regime are not nearly as tight as they might be, and terrorist organizations like ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) as well as Jabhat al Nusra are still receiving international funds as well as arms and other assistance from abroad. A more concerted effort to reduce the availability of resources could help de-escalate the conflict and reduce the harm to civilians.
There are arguments against all these propositions. The UN generally requires the permission of the host country to deliver aid from any direction. The regime could conceivably boot the UN from Damascus if it tries without permission. It is not easy for the UN to get the Saudis talking, as they tend to be both secretive and hierarchical. Local level reconstruction efforts to establish a minimum of governance and civil society require a capillary international presence in rebel-held areas, where security is dicey. He who holds a moral compass will not always be welcomed by those–on both sides of the war–who don’t.
But the UN is a reflection of ourselves. If we want these things done, the organization will find at least some people and means to get them done. The soft-spoken and precise Brahimi, well-suited to the high political level he has been dealing at, would not have necessarily been the best person for these tasks. The US needs to lead an effort to ensure that Brahimi’s departure does not end the UN’s focus on Syria. There is more thankless work to be done.
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Still righting the balance
These are my speaking notes for the talk I gave last night at the DC World Affairs Council on my book,
Righting the Balance (Potomac, 2013). I’ve added a bit about Ukraine, which is in part an instance of state weakness. It also illustrates the limited usefulness of conventional military instruments in meeting asymmetrical challenges, a key theme in the book. Click there on the right to order your own copy!
1. It is truly an honor to present here at the World Affairs Council. The 98 World Affairs Councils throughout this country play a key role in generating and sustaining the kind of citizen engagement in foreign policy that I think is so important in today’s increasingly interconnected world.
2. As I am going to say some harsh things about the State Department and USAID, and even suggest they be abolished in favor of a single Foreign Office, I would like to emphasize from the first that I have enormous respect for the Foreign Service and the devotion of its officers to pursuing America’s interests abroad. I feel the same way about the US military.
3. But I don’t think the Foreign Service is well served by the institutions that hire, pay and deploy our diplomats and aid workers. And I don’t think our military should be called upon to make up for civilian deficiencies.
4. My book, Righting the Balance, is aimed at correcting those imbalances. But it does not start there.
5. It starts with the sweep of American history, which has given our military a leading role in America’s foreign affairs since at least the French and Indian war.
6. Americans think of their country as a peaceful one, but in fact we have had troops deployed in conflict zones for more than a quarter of our history—not even counting wars against native Americans and pirates—and every year since the fall of the Berlin Wall.
7. With each of those wars, we improved our technology and expanded our reach, becoming by the end of the 20th century the world’s only remaining superpower.
8. We have a strong, well-exercised military arm for projecting power. It is so strong that it is reaching a point of diminishing returns: every additional dollar buys miniscule improvement.
9. But our civilian capacities are more limited. This was glaringly apparent in Iraq and Afghanistan, where State and AID struggled, and all too often failed, to meet the requirements.
10. It has also been glaringly apparent during the Arab uprisings, which not only caught our diplomats by surprise but left them puzzled about what to do.
11. These failures are more important than ever before. The enemies who cause us problems today are not often states: Saddam Hussein’s Iraq fell quickly, as did the Taliban government in Afghanistan.
12. We won the wars. We lost the peace.
13. The main threats to America today come not from other strong states but from non-state actors who find haven and support in fragile, weak and collapsing states.
14. Even in Ukraine, the Russians are not using the full weight of their armed forces but rather relying on disruption in challenging the legitimacy of Kiev’s government and its control over territory in the east and south.
15. National security, always more than a military mission, now requires conflict prevention and state-building capacities that are sorely lacking in both State and AID. They have scrambled hard to meet the needs in Bosnia, Kosovo, South Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan, but they are not much better configured than when I arrived in Sarajevo for the first time in November 1994.
16. Some of you will be thinking, that’s OK, because we never want to do this state-building stuff again.
17. It’s not only my colleague Michael Mandelbaum who thinks that way. Each and every president since 1989 has resisted getting involved in other countries’ internal politics, and each one has discovered that it is far easier to go to war and kill enemies than it is to withdraw, leaving behind a collapsed state that will regenerate those enemies.
18. Unless you are willing to fight on forever—even longer than the “long war”—you need to build capable states that protect their citizens reasonably well.
19. We are discovering this today in Yemen, where the drone war appears to have created more terrorists than it has killed. This is one of the main reasons President Obama has avoided military intervention in Syria, but the post-war effort there will still be a major one, even if is not primarily a U.S. responsibility. The same is true in eastern DRC and in Colombia, where peace is threatening to break out after decades of war.
20. America won’t be able to avoid being engaged when North Korea or Cuba collapses. Nor will we stay aloof if nuclear-armed Pakistan starts coming apart. Let’s not even think about Iran. If Ukraine is to be kept whole and independent, it will need a far better state than the one that has performed so badly since the Orange Revolution of 2005.
21. So my view is that we need to prepare for the day, not continue to delude ourselves that we will never do it again.
22. But I would be the first to admit that post-war state-building, a subject I teach at SAIS, is hard and expensive. Anticipation is cheaper and better. We need civilian foreign policy instruments that will take early action to prevent states from collapsing and help initiate reforms.
23. We’ve been reasonably successful at allowing this to happen in much of Latin America and East Asia, where recent decades have seen many countries turn in the direction of democratic transition. Brazil, Chile, South Korea, Indonesia are sterling examples of transitions that the United States allowed, nurtured and encouraged.
24. That’s what we failed to do effectively in the Arab world, with consequences that are now on the front pages every day. We failed to anticipate the revolution in Tunisia. In Libya we failed to help the new regime establish a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence. That failure cost us an ambassador and three of his colleagues and has left Libya adrift.
25. In Egypt, we’ve been inconstant, supporting whoever gains power. The result, as I observed during the constitutional referendum in January, is a restoration of the military autocracy, with voters intimidated into staying home rather than voting against the new constitution and human rights advocates imprisoned along with the Muslim Brotherhood leadership.
26. In Syria, we failed to support moderates, only to see them displaced and replaced by extremists. The result is a daily catastrophe of truly genocidal dimensions.
27. The specific areas I describe as lacking in today’s State and AID are these:
• Mobilizing early, preventive action
• Reforming security services
• Promoting democracy
• Countering violent extremism
• Encouraging citizen and cultural diplomacy
28. These are all efforts at the periphery of traditional diplomacy, and I readily admit that the last three are better done mainly outside government while the first two are more inherently governmental.
29. But I don’t think we can get them done with our current institutions, which were designed for different purposes in other eras. Inertia and legacy are too strong.
30. The State Department, originally the Department of the State, is now a conventional foreign ministry with a 19th century architecture: most Foreign Service personnel serve abroad in static embassies and other missions servicing agencies of the US government other than the State Department. Legacy and inertia, not current needs, dictate where it has people stationed and a good deal of what they are doing.
31. USAID was founded with a poverty alleviation and economic development mission to help fight the Cold War. Few of us still think that US government programs can fix poverty at home, much less overseas.
32. There have been a lot of proposals for reform. Let’s recall Condoleezza Rice’s transformational diplomacy and Hillary Clinton’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, now being reprised. None of these efforts have gained more than temporary traction.
33. What we need to do is conduct what scientists call a thought experiment: knowing what we do about the challenges we now face, what kind foreign policy instruments do we need?
34. The answer is nothing like what we’ve got.
35. My book doesn’t offer a detailed design, but it does suggest that we need a single Foreign Office with a national security focus as well as a much-enhanced nongovernmental effort, operated at arms’ length from officialdom but with much greater Congressional funding than it has today.
36. I am not however prepared to propose, as so many have before me, that this new Foreign Office be funded by passing up an F22 or two. I think State and AID have the resources needed, but unfortunately tied up in those elephantine embassies supporting other US government agencies.
37. Shrinking these dramatically would provide the funds for a much sleeker and more effective Foreign Office, including a corps of several thousand people able and willing to deploy, with or without US troops, to difficult environments to take on the hard work of conflict prevention and state-building where required.
38. What we need is a far more agile, anticipatory and mobile Foreign Service, one built for a world in which virtually everyone will soon be connected to worldwide communications at reasonable cost and ordinary citizens, including you, count for much more than ever before in world history.
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Ukraine: expect worse
After many declarations of its intentions, Kiev is now trying to reassert by force its authority in eastern and southern Ukraine. It is moving gradually and slowly, trying to avoid both a popular backlash and intervention by Moscow, which has massed troops and has threatened to use them to protect Russian-speakers inside Ukraine.
This map from the Washington Post illustrates the military deployments, which heavily favor Moscow in both quantity and quality:
But those smooth curvy lines with arrows at the end are misleading. A conventional force-on-force conflict has not started, yet. Moscow is trying to achieve its purposes with more or less local forces, who have been setting up checkpoints and seizing government centers. A clash at one of these Friday killed dozens of insurgents when their Kiev-loyal antagonists set the building they took refuge in on fire. This followed the downing of two Ukrainian military helicopters, at least one by a surface to air missile not available at your local grocery, President Obama averred. Another Ukrainian helicopter was shot down yesterday.
What we’ve got here are escalating low intensity clashes between the Kiev government’s forces and local insurgents backed by Russia.
What counts in a clash of this sort is legitimacy. War is always politics by other means, but especially so when major conventional armed clashes are avoided. Moscow is denying the legitimacy of the Kiev government, claiming it was installed in a coup (even if approved in parliament) and trying to demonstrate that it lacks control over the national territory. Kiev is denying the legitimacy of Moscow’s complaints about treatment of Russian-speakers in eastern and southern Ukraine and trying to reassert territorial control.
The Odessa fire, which killed dozens, is significant even beyond the number of lives lost because it undermined Kiev’s claims that Russian-speakers are safe in Ukraine and supported Moscow’s complaints. I have no reason to believe the fire was set by government authorities. It seems to have been the act of people supporting Kiev, provoked by attacks earlier in the day. But the inability of the government to protect all its citizens detracts substantially from Kiev’s claim of legitimacy.
Still, the situation of Russian speakers in Ukraine is nowhere near what would be required to justify foreign intervention. Moscow has made virtually no effort to ensure their safety and security by non-military means. The OSCE observers sent with that mission were held captive and not allowed to observe anything but the facilities they were held in against their will. They have now been released, on orders from Vladimir Putin, which suggests how independent of Moscow the insurgents in Ukraine really are.
Kiev’s best hope for a restoration of its legitimacy may lie in the May 25 presidential election. Petro Poroshenko, a billionaire “Chocolate King” who has served as Foreign Minister Minister as well as Minister of Trade and Economic Development and Chair of the central bank, is the current front runner in the polls. With more than two dozen candidates, a second round may well be needed for someone to get over the 50% threshold. Yulia Tymoshenko, a former prime minister, is trailing and thought to be trying to get the election postponed until the fall.
The Russians will not want a successful election in eastern and southern Ukraine that would confirm Kiev’s legitimacy. We can expect a concerted effort to prevent it from happening, and to disrupt it where it does. While the administrative apparatus of the Ukrainian state still appears to be operating in many Russian-speaking areas, Moscow has already shown that it can shut down what it wants pretty much when it wants. It would be prudent to expect a crescendo of violence and disruption as the election approaches, with Kiev trying to use its forces to restore order and ensure the election can proceed and Moscow plus Russian-speaking Ukrainians trying to prevent it.
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Freedom of the press in 2014
Today is World Press Freedom Day. So here is an appropriate post:
Thursday morning Freedom House released Freedom of the Press 2014, its annual report assessing media freedom around the world. The event featured a panel discussion with Karin Karlekar (Freedom of the Press project director), Scott Shane (New York Times national security reporter), and Sue Turton (Al Jazeera correspondent). Jim Sciutto, CNN chief national security correspondent, moderated.
Jim Sciutto asked panelists why they thought global press freedom has fallen in the past year. Karin Karlekar said that technology can be a source for good that enables a large audience to publish and access information. However in many countries, particularly ones with authoritarian governments, governments are increasingly cracking down. In some cases governments have used new tactics. In others, their methods are just an extension of the traditional media censorship methods they have used in the past. Governments are using tools that are supposed to empower people to track and follow them instead.
In China, some of the search engines and social media outlets employ more people to censor them than they do to produce them. They have a large, widespread mechanism for controlling online content. But even governments that don’t have that technological capability have found ways to clamp down online. They pursue people after the material has been produced. That has been the case in some countries like Ethiopia, where they just imprisoned 6 bloggers.
Sciutto asked Scott Shane to put into context leaks and prosecutions. How much of that is a threat to freedom of exchange in the US and how the White House is covered?
Scott commended Freedom House for being objective on the issue of press freedom. It saddened him to see the US downgraded from 21 points last year to 18 points in this year’s report. This has to do with the fact that in all of American history until 2009, there were three government officials prosecuted for leaking classified information to the press. We are now up to eight with Obama. This affects the willingness of government officials to talk even on unclassified but sensitive issues. It affects the reporting that national security journalists do. The US is now ranked lower in press freedom than Estonia and the Czech Republic.
Sciutto: Has it reached a point where our leaders are not under the same level of oversight we expect them to be or that they were ten or twenty years ago?
Shane: In 1971 the New York Times Washington bureau chief Max Frankel wrote a memorandum about the Pentagon Papers arguing that covering secret, classified information is critical to informing the public. Some people take the attitude that it is secret; therefore, it should not be talked about. But that would make the White House and diplomacy impossible to write about.
As an example Shane mentioned how in 2011 the US deliberately hunted down and killed an American citizen in Yemen, the Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al Awlaki. There was a long legal opinion justifying the unilateral killing of an American citizen. That was classified opinion, so Shane made a Freedom of Information Act request for that document in 2010. Four years later, after filing a lawsuit, an appeals court ordered the government to release it. If he is lucky, Shane says he might receive a redacted form of this legal opinion 5 years later. When the president has the right to order the killing of an American citizen is a fairly fundamental question. Americans, Shane argues, have the right to know the legal basis.
Torton explained that she is being tried in absentia for aiding and abetting the Muslim Brotherhood. She left Cairo on November 6, which was a month and a half before the Muslim Brotherhood was accused of terrorism. Her Al Jazeera colleagues were arrested three days after the Muslim Brotherhood was proscribed a terrorist organization. They have been in jail for 126 days. Originally, she believed that the three judges were independent of the state and that they would see the situation for what it is. It is a politically motivated trial and she hoped they would throw the case out. As the sessions go on, however, and the judges refuse bail, she is frightened of the outcome.
Sciutto: Did the Arab Spring fail on the issue of freedom of information?
Turton: Each country has its own situation and different outcomes. Broadly speaking, the Arab Spring did not deliver what Western governments were probably hoping it was going to, which was perfectly packaged democracy. Access to information and the media is freer in some countries. Tunisia has had a sophisticated reaction to the Arab Spring. Libya is still a mess. At the beginning, optimism was enormous and the situation improved, but since then Libya has backtracked. But Egypt has failed. Talking to people on the ground, you get a sense that conditions are worse than under Mubarak.
Sciutto: How much of its moral high ground in terms of pushing for internet freedom has the US lost with the existence of the NSA and other interference on the internet?
Karlekar: I think it is affecting our moral high ground. Many governments use surveillance and other repressive tactics. The US used to be able to say that they should not be doing that. Now it is becoming much more difficult to say that. It is particularly ironic because the US government is trying to sell itself as an open, transparent government, but it is not.
Sciutto asked, are your Al Jazeera colleagues more scared now when they work?
Turton: We have had to change how we operate. This is not just Al Jazeera; it is the media in general. In Egypt it is not just journalists being thrown in jail, but anyone with opposing views.
Sciutto: When you get into issues like coverage of leaks and you worry about your sources and your own legal situation, does that affect the overall quality of reporting?
Shane: I think it has chilled reporting on national security. What is interesting is the crackdown under Obama. There seems to be a random quality to it. All of the cases have involved electronic trails; emails or Internet chat logs. In the past the FBI would say that they would like to investigate this leak, but there are 1,000 people with security clearance. They had no good way of finding out who was responsible. Now, they can go into the government email system and find out exactly who has been talking to the reporter whose byline is on that story.
In fairness, technology is driving leakers as well. Two of the cases, Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden, are unique in American history. The volume of classified information out there is unprecedented. If our government is tracking leaks to the press in the US, it is obviously happening on an exponentially greater scale in countries like China or Russia.
Karlekar: The fear is that these issues will lead to self-censorship. What stories are not getting covered out of fear?
The entire Freedom House report can be viewed here.
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