Tag: Democracy and Rule of Law
Jus post bellum?
Just war tradition includes questions of jus ad bellum, reasons for going to war, and jus in bello, rules of war, but what about jus post bellum? This question motivated Eric Patterson to write Ending Wars Well: Order, Justice, and Conciliation. Patterson summarized the argument of his book at last week’s event at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs. He wrote the book to provide all parties involved in post-war reconstruction with a basic framework: order, justice and conciliation. It is meant to transcend the divisions between just war and peace theories, political science and philosophy/ethics, and theory and practice.
For Patterson, war is not linear but cyclical. Post-war peace and state-building efforts are part of this cycle. He cited conflict in Rwanda as an example. The genocide sparked in 1994 by the assassination of the president came in the aftermath of the civil war initiated by the invasion of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a group of Tutsi rebels, in 1990. Countries should think of the whole cycle of the war before they get involved and while they are fighting.
How is the war cycle broken? Patterson suggested a focus on establishing order by privileging security and the functioning of basic government institutions. Order is the foundation of work to “end wars well.”
Patterson acknowledged that many think order is not enough, but it is better than what many face. In some conflicts, maybe 20-30%, justice is also possible. He defines justice as “incurring what one deserves.” This is a narrow definition, which is ideal because one must be modest in demands for justice, and it implies that justice must be targeted. In 1991 Iraq, America sought justice through sanctions, an effort that punished the citizens without targeting the political leaders at fault. In 2003 Iraq, the people punished their former leader with targeted justice in a trial that was legal by the laws of their own country.
In rare cases, about 10%, conciliation is also achievable. Conciliation means that enemies put aside their animosity and imagine a shared future, if not a warm one. This is rare because it only happens when it is in the interest of all parties. For this reason, Patterson believes conciliation is not possible with the Taliban. It is not in their interest to work for a shared future with other Afghans. The peace deal between Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian President Sadat in 1979 exemplifies conciliation because of a shared interest in peace.
After Patterson presented, John Gallagher, assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, raised an important question: what if order is not possible? Patterson acknowledged that a shared interest is essential for conciliation, but the same might be true for order. When violence is based on a narrative that equates fighting with a struggle for moral superiority, achieving order (ending killing, establishing a single legitimate authority, strengthening basic government institutions) may not be achievable. A new narrative is required, but how do you get to the point that those involved in the violence are exhausted enough to change to a narrative of peace?
Patterson responded with what he called “raw pragmatism”: there must be a decisive victory. An audience member pressed Patterson on this point in the question and answer period. If the victors successfully “crush” their opponents, might that push both parties past the point where conciliation is possible and, in the case of warfare that is not force on force, only strengthen the narrative of a losing side, enabling it to recruit new adherents to the cause? Patterson cited David Kilcullen’s The Accidental Guerrilla: only a few fighters are adherents to a vision or narrative. Most fighters are involved in the conflict for other reasons and will respond reasonably when it is in their interest to make peace.
Patterson’s book is another call for a clear, simple, and cohesive strategy for all, but the debate suggests it may not fulfill its promise.
No patriot
I enjoyed a pleasant Sunday afternoon walk through Pristina yesterday. Its alleys are crowded. But it also boasts vistas. Variety is one of the things that makes a place interesting. And with variety comes the unexpected, both good and bad.
Normally I wouldn’t comment on what amounts to an individual criminal act. The bad is inevitable. But the wounding Saturday evening of a Serb traveling south of the Ibar river just a few miles from where I am spending a couple of days merits a blog post, because it has broader significance.
The country I am enjoying on my third visit this year is a peaceful one that has established institutions rating a positive EU report suggesting it is ready to negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement. This is a big deal, not only for the benefits that will accrue to Kosovo once the agreement is signed but also for the seal of approval “contractual relations” (i.e. signing an agreement) with the EU will give to Pristina’s still young institutions, which are now more or less at the half-way point of recognition as sovereign by other UN member states.
The safety of Serbs is one of the key ingredients in determining EU attitudes on contractual relations. Brussels wants to know that the Pristina institutions are committed to protecting everyone who lives in or visits the territory under their control, without regard to ethnicity.
Of course 100% security is not possible, and I’ll admit that I am a bit surprised that a former Serb police chief felt free to travel after dark in Kosovo. And there is of course no knowing the ethnicity of his attacker, who was reportedly masked. We’ll have to await the results of the police investigation.
But that is just the point. There should be a serious police investigation and some results, which are far too infrequent in such cases in Kosovo. Too many crimes against Serbs and other minorities go unsolved.
Whoever perpetrated the attack Saturday evening is putting at risk Kosovo’s claim to be ready to negotiate an important first step in its eventual accession to the EU. I don’t know the person’s identity or ethnicity, but this much I do know: he is no Kosovo patriot.
This week’s peace picks
1. Secularism, Islamism, and Women’s Rights in Turkey, Monday November 12, 12:00 PM – 2:00 PM, Georgetown University
Venue: Georgetown University, 37th Street NW and O Street NW, Washington, DC 20057, Edward B. Bunn S.J. Intercultural Center, Room 450
Speaker: Serpil Sancar
Please join us on Monday, November 12 from 12-2pm in ICC 450 for a talk with Professor Serpil Sancar, Visiting Scholar at George Washington University as she discusses Secularism, Islamism and Women’s Rights in Turkey. Lunch will be provided.
Register for this event here.
2. External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities, Monday November 12, 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM, George Mason University
Venue: George Mason University, 3301 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201, Truland Building, Room 555
Speakers: Thomas Flores, Idean Salehyan
While some militant groups work hard to foster collaborative ties with civilians, others engage in egregious abuses and war crimes. We argue that foreign state funding for rebel organizations greatly reduces the incentives of militant groups to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of civilians because it diminishes the need to collect resources from the population. However, unlike the lucrative resources such as minerals and petroleum, foreign funding of rebel groups must be understood in principal-agent terms. Some external principals – namely, democratic states with strong human rights lobbies – are more concerned with atrocities in the conflict zone than others.
Rebels backed by states with theses characteristics should engage in comparably less violence than those backed by other states. We also predict that multiple state sponsorsalso lead to abuse, for no single state can effectively restrain the rebel organization. We test these expectations with new disaggregated organization-level data on foreign support for rebel groups and data on one-sided violence against civilians. The results are consistent with our argument. We conclude that principal characteristics help influence agent actions, and that human rights organizations exert a powerful effect on the likelihood of civilian abuse and the magnitude of wartime atrocities.
RSVP for this event to Barre Hussen at carevent@gmu.edu.
3. Public Diplomacy in the Next Four Years: A Post-Election Look at American Strategies and Priorities for Engaging the World, Tuesday November 13, 9:00 AM – 11:00 AM, Elliott School of international Affairs
Venue: The Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
Speakers: James Glassman, Judith McHale, Paul Foldi, P.J. Crowley
The upcoming U.S. Presidential election may have a dramatic impact on American foreign policy. On November 13, an experienced panel of international affairs experts will gather at the George Washington University to discuss the course of U.S. Public Diplomacy for the next four years.
Please register for this event here.
4. The Procedural and Subtantive Elements of Prosecuting Cases of Trafficking in Persons: Comparative, Tuesday November 13, 9:00 AM – 4:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Nitze building, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Kenney Auditorium
Policymakers, attorneys, law professors, and representatives from legal clinics and NGOs will discuss this topic. For a complete agenda, visit bitly.com/Ublfr6.
Please register for this event here.
5. Conflict Prevention and Resolution Forum: “Comedy and Conflict”, Tuesday November 13, 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Rome building, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Rome Building Auditorium
Speakers: Yahya Hendi, Elahe Izadi, Craig Zelizer, S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana
Yahya Hendi, Muslim champlain at Georgetown University; Elahe Izadi, comedian and National Journal reporter; Craig Zelizer, associate director of the Conflict Resolution Program at Georgetown University; and S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana (moderator), visiting assistant professor in the Conflict Resolution Program at Georgetown University, will discuss this topic.
Register for this event here.
6. Yemen and the Fight Against a Resurgent al Qaeda, Tuesday November 13, 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Saul/Zilkha Room
Speakers: Daniel L. Byman, Gregory Johnsen, Ibrahim Sharqieh
Rife with political turmoil, Yemen has proven fertile ground for al Qaeda-linked groups in the post-9/11 era. Until the beginning of 2012, the United States cooperated with the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh, but his departure – orchestrated by the U.S. – raises questions for future counterterrorism cooperation. How much ground has al Qaeda gained in Yemen despite setbacks in Pakistan? Can the United States effectively manage events in Yemen without becoming entangled in another costly ground war? What more can be done to prevent al Qaeda’s influence from spreading further throughout the Arabian Peninsula?
Register for this event here.
7. U.S.-Turkish Relations: A Review at the Beginning of the Third Decade of the Post-Cold War Era, Tuesday November 13, 10:30 AM – 12:00 PM, CSIS
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street NW, Washingto, Dc 20006, B1 Conference Room
Speakers: John Hamre, Bulent Aliriza, Bulent Aras
Please join us on November 13 for the release of “U.S. – Turkish Relations: A Review at the Beginning of the Third Decade of the Post-Cold War Era,’ jointly prepared by the CSIS Turkey Project and the Center for Strategic research (SAM) of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. The report is the product of a year-long study that included workshops in Washington and Ankara. It incorporates U.S. and Turkish perspectives on the evolving relationship, examines the opportunities and challenges the alliance has confronted in the past six decades and looks ahead to those it is likely to face in the coming years.
RSVP for this event to rbeardsley@csis.org.
8. A New Deal? Renegotiating Civil-Military Relations in Egypt, Tuesday November 13, 2:00 PM – 1:30 PM, Elliott School of Interntional Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
Speaker: Yezid Sayigh
Yezid Sayigh is a senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, where his work focuses on the future political role of Arab armies the resistance and reinvention of authoritaian regimes, and the Israel-Palestine conflict and peace process.
Register for this event here.
9. Middle East Institute’s 66th Annual Conference, Wednesday November 14, 8:45 AM – 5:30 PM, Grand Hyatt Washington
Venue: Grand Hyatt Washington, 1000 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20001
The Middle East Institute’s 66th Annual Conference is an opportunity for policymakers, government officials, students, the media, and the interested public to come together to discuss the future of the Middle East. Entitled “New Horizons, New Challenges: The Middle East in 2013,” the conference the conference will convene experts from across the U.S. and the Middle East to examine the momentous political trnsitions underway in the Arab World and forecast the year ahead for a region in flux. The full-day conference will analyze the obstacles impeding democracy in Egypt and Syria, and the reaction of countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia to the shifting regional dynamics brought about by the Arab Awakening. It will also look at evolving U.S. policy in the Middle East in response to the new realities on the ground and to the demands of the Arab revolutions. The conference will include four 90-minute panels on “U.S.-Mideast Diplomacy in Transition: New Era, New Principles”; “Challenges Ahead for Egypt”; “After the U.S. Election: What’s at Stake for Iran?”; and “Syria and the Regional Implications of the Crisis.”
10. Launch of the Asia Foundation’s 2012 Survey of the Afghan People, Wednesday Novembe 14, 9:30 AM – 11:30 AM, The National Press Club
Venue: The National Press Club, 529 14th Street NW, Washington, DC, 20045, 13th Floor
Speakers: Andrew Wilder, Sunil Pillai, Palwasha Kakar, Mark Kryzer
The Asia Foundation will release findings from Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of teh Afghan People – the broades, most comprehensive public opinion poll in the country – covering all 34 provinces with candid data gleaned from face-to-face interviews with nearly 6,300 Afghan citizens on security, corruption, women’s rights, the economy, development, and the Taliban. This marks the eighth in the Foundation’s series of surveys in Afghanistan; taken together they provide a barometer of Afghan public opinion over time.
Register forthis event here.
11. How to Promote Local Order and Property Rights Under Weak Rule of Law?, Wednesdday November 14, 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Bernstein-Offit Building, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 736
Speaker: Chris Blattman
Chris Blattman, assistant professor of international and public affairs and political science at Columbia University’s School of Internatonal and Public Affairs, will discuss this topic.
RSVP for this event to itolber1@jhu.edu.
12. Serbia’s Road to EU Accession: Prospects and Potential Pitfalls, Thursday November 15, 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Bernstein-Offit Building, 1717 Massacusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 500
Speaker: Ljubica Vasic
Ljubica Vasic, member of the Serbian Parliament, will discuss this topic.
Register for this event here.
13. Benghazi and Beyond: What Went Wrong on September 11, 2012 and How to Prevent it from Happening at Other Frontline Posts, Thursday November 15, 10:00 AM, The Rayburn House Office Building
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20515, Room 2172 Rayburn HOB
Speakers: Michael Courts, William Young
14. Protest and Rebellion in the Middle East, Thursday November 15, 12:00 PM – 2:00 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
Speakers: Marc Lynch, Wendy Pearlman, Jillian Schwedler, David Patel
Three leading political scientists will discuss opportunities, resources, and emotions in regional social protest movements. A light lunch will be served.
Register for this event here.
15. The Obama Administration and U.S. Foreign Policy, Thursday November 15, 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Rome Building, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 812
Speaker: James Mann
James Mann, author-in-residence at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and author of The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power, will discuss this topic.
RSVP for this event to reischauer@jhu.edu.
16. Drafting Egypt’s Constitution, Thursday November 15, 1:00 PM – 2:15 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036
The new Egyptian constitution is surrounded by controversy over who should write it, when it should be drafted, and which principles and values it should embody. With a draft already published, debate is as intense as ever.
Register for this event here.
17. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, Thursday November 15, 3:00 PM – 5:00 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speakers: Feroz Khan, George Perkovich, Peter Lavoy
The story of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons developments remains in dispute, with a rich literature of colorful and differing accounts. In his latest book, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2012), Feroz Khan presents a comprehensive picture of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. What internal and external pressures threatened Pakistan’s efforts? What conditions contributed to its attainment of a viable program in the face of substantial political and technical obstacles?
Register for this event here.
18. Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring – A Conversation with Michael Willis, Thursday November 15, 5:30 PM – 7:30 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
Speaker: Michael Willis
Professor Willis will be discussing his new book Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring.
Register for this event here.
19. Lebanon in the Shadow of Syria Civil War, Friday November 16, 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs
Venue: Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, 3307 M Street NW, Washington, DC 20007, Suite 200
Speaker: Irina Papkova
The car bombng that killed Lebanese security chief Wissan al-Hasan last month has raised new concerns that Lebanon is being increasingly drawn into the Syrian civil war. Indeed, predictions that Lebanon would descend into sectarian violence as a result of the Syrian uprising have abounded since the begining of the conflict. Yet, Lebanon – once a byword for religious civil war – has managed so far to avoid that catastrophic scenario. Irinia Papkova, a Berkley Center research fellow now living in Beirut, will address the current political situation in Lebanon and the threats and challenges facing its leaders in the shadow of the Syrian conflict.
Register for this event here.
From silos to networks
Who are peacebuilders? What do they do? Where do they come from? Do they work together, and if so, how? These are the questions that Peacebuilding 2.0: Mapping the Boundaries of an Expanding Field seeks to answer, according to Melanie Greenburg of the Alliance for Peacebuilding. The report, developed by the Alliance with help from the Joan B. Kroc Institute of Peace and Justice and the United States Institute of Peace, will be released this summer. On Friday, representatives of these groups launched the report with a discussion of its highlights.
We have entered a new era of peacebuilding, according to Necla Tschirgi of the Kroc Institute. Over the past decade the world has experienced prolonged conflict and militarization. By some measures, people may be less violent, but tensions have flared over environmental, food and energy issues. The funding for organizations like the United States Institute of Peace is at risk and more and more of the U.S.’s international aid is coming under the Department of Defense’s purview.
The Peacebuilding Mapping Project (PMP) administered two surveys for Peacebuilding 2.0. The first, given to Alliance for Peacebuilding members, received 44 responses and showed that peacebuilders work in 153 different countries in pre-conflict, conflict mediation, and post-conflict. Roughly 90% of the organizations surveyed focus on basic peacebuilding processes, like building trust and social cohesion, and they put these processes to work in a variety of areas, including women’s issues, youth issues, and development. Despite such a wide mandate, 60% of the organizations operate on a budget of less than $500,000 and 25% on a budget of less than $50,000.
The PMP gave the second survey to a wider range of organizations working in many different fields and 75 responded. Fifteen replied that they do not identify directly as peacebuilders, but eleven of these fifteen report that they have peacebuilding projects. Many of the organizations in this survey tend to be older and better endowed. Few have mission statements that include conflict-related language.
There are several important implications of this data. First, there are gaps in our knowledge. There is no clearly identifiable shared body of methodologies or principles. It is not clear how peacebuilding or peacebuilding-related organizations network and work together. Second, changes must be made to improve future peacebuilding efforts. Practitioners, academics, and politicians must recognize the wide range of organizations that are involved in peacebuilding and use a “conflict sensitive lens” for work related to conflict. The field must become more cohesive so that different organizations can easily collaborate.
A panel including Hrach Gregorian of Institute of World Affairs, Joceyln Kelly of Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Sharon Morris of Mercy Corps, John Agoglia of IDS International, and Paul Williams of Public International Law and Policy Group discussed the implications of Peacebuilding 2.0 in their own professional contexts. Morris explained that Mercy Corps projects are most successful where peacebuilding and development work are combined, but collaboration is difficult because the two groups of practitioners do not know how to talk to each other. Agoglia explained the need for greater cooperation between the Department of Defense and peacebuilding organizations. Williams agreed that communication is a problem and added that in conflict situations, there are often a number of organizations interested in helping, but officials are not able to coordinate so many players. Kelly concluded that transitioning from “silos” to “networks” is essential in order to address all of the problems people face in conflict zones.
Gregorian said that in the 80’s, people were wondering if peacebuilding was even a field. Today we are discussing the established field’s boundaries. This shows how far peacebuilding has come, but also shows what we need to work on in the future.
Why riot?
You don’t have to be a foreign affairs expert to see that there are political reasons for the Innocence of Muslims-inspired protests around the Muslim world in what has been termed “the video incident.” America’s recent wars in predominantly Muslim countries have heightened tensions. U.S. support for Israel also contributes.
But this can’t be just about politics. The video offended Muslim sentiments. If these protests were really about politics, why were they not more widespread and why did they not take on a more explicitly political guise?
Americans find it difficult to understand the religious justification for these protests. Either they are reduced to cultural relativism (“things are different in the Muslim world”) 0r they wonder if Muslims are so weak in their faith that any offense to their prophet pushes them to mass violence. Neither produces interesting answers.
What Westerners fail to appreciate is the cultural milieu in which Islam originated and propagated. Islam emerged from a pre-existing oral tradition of poetry. The influence is apparent in the Holy Qur’an, which often reads like poetry:
Say, “I seek refuge in the Lord of mankind,
The Sovereign of mankind,
The God of mankind,
From the evil of the retreating whisperer –
Who whispers [evil] into the breasts of mankind –
From among the jinn [spirits] and mankind.” (Surat an-Nas 114)
Recitation of the Qur’an is art, and those with the Qur’an memorized are respected. In early Islam, that was the only way to experience the Qur’an. It is believed Muhammad was illiterate, so when he received the Qur’an from the Angel Gabriel he memorized it and taught it to his followers. The sunnah, or the large body that encompasses the words and actions of the Prophet and some of his close followers, was also initially memorized and passed along orally.
Memorization and oral transmission were the privileged modes of gaining and disseminating knowledge. How was it to be determined whose oral transmission was legitimate? What would be done if two people remembered something differently? In the case of the sunnah an incredibly complex system developed for evaluating the legitimacy of different ahadith (pieces of the sunnah, particular stories about things the Prophet said or did). Was it possible that a certain transmitter could have had contact with another in order to pass along a hadith? Did both transmitters live in the same era and were they known to have traveled in the same region?
The issue of legitimacy also brought into question each transmitter’s character. Ignoring other variables, one might trust what one transmitter said the Prophet did over another if the first had a reputation for honesty while the second was known to lie. The legitimacy of the information a transmitter passed along was intimately connected to the transmitter’s reputation: how honest he was, how often he prayed, whether his teachings were consistent. Character is vital to legitimacy in the Islamic tradition.
The connection between the legitimacy of the content and the character of the content’s originator or transmitter implies that criticism of the latter calls the former into question. If a transmitter is not of high moral standing, there are implications for whether the ahadith he transmitted are considered legitimate. Insulting the Prophet, the original transmitter, calls into question his message, or all of Islam.
In the Shi’i tradition a religious leader’s character is very important, especially in a Muslim’s choice of Ayatollah. Because of the occultation of the last imam, Ayatollahs are selected to demonstrate how a Muslim should live her life until the last imam returns. The importance of an Ayatollah modeling good character is captured in the title given to a well-respected Ayatollah, marja-e-taqlid, which translates as “source of emulation.”
This is strange from the Judeo-Christian perspective, which privileges text. Jews are exigent about error-free copying of the Torah. Western culture worries about plagiarism. Improperly expropriating text undermines an author’s credibility and may call into question everything she has written. We have little need to worry about an author’s character to decide whether a text is valid or not.
It is therefore not surprising that the Judeo-Christian tradition includes insulting, teasing, or at least recognizing the faults of religious leaders without it negatively reflecting on their mission. In the Jewish tradition, many of the prophets are far from moral perfection, but their character flaws do not affect the sanctity of their purpose. Most Christians had a good laugh at the late-night TV jokes about Jesus’ possible wife. The ancient Greeks often mocked the gods.
There is of course no justification for the killings associated with the recent demonstrations. But the importance of transmitters in preserving the Islamic tradition provides some insight into the anger a number of Muslims are feeling around the world, an anger that so many in the West cannot begin to understand.
Getting it out of the ground is the easy part
Paul Collier brought his big news to SAIS Friday: Africa will find lots more resources in the next decade. The question is whether it can take good advantage of them to transform the continent and its non-resource economy, which is already doing pretty well.
OECD countries have discovered about five times more than Africa in natural resources beneath every square kilometer. But there is no reason to believe resources are so unevenly distributed. So Africa has a lot more to find and exploit.
But in order to do so it needs to master a difficult chain of economic decisions:
- Discovery: to avoid hesitancy about private investment that then turns into “gold rushes” when discoveries are made governments will have to collect and publish relevant geological information to reduce the uncertainty and encourage private companies to explore.
- Taxes: these are especially important in poor countries because the companies and high tech workers are so often foreigners. Society will not gain much unless taxes are collected. But poor countries need to focus on taxing things that can be observed and observing things that can be taxed, which is not their natural inclination.
- Division of revenue with local communities: Local communities should be compensated for environmental and other damage and get a fair share of the revenue, but they should not capture all of it. This requires credible legal mechanisms as well as willingness of the national authorities to resist local capture of the rents (as in the Niger Delta).
- Savings at the national level: Poor countries should be saving at least 30% of the revenue and progressively more as the resource is depleted, thus ensuring a balance between present and future requirements.
- Spending at the national level: That still leaves 2/3 of the revenue for expenditures. When it comes to spending the two-thirds of the revenue that is not saved, health and education are good candidates, as they have very low productivity in Africa.
The Norwegian model, which many hold up as ideal, is a sovereign wealth fund invested entirely outside Norway and only the returns on investment spent. This would not be appropriate for a poor country that lacks adequate capital. African countries should first of all invest in building the capacity to invest well, then invest in increasing the capacity to produce outside the natural resource economy, since it is by definition in long-term decline.
Turning to the politics of natural resources, Collier sees two problems: the coordination of decisions across many governmental units (Ministry of Mines, Finance, Environment, parliament, local governments, courts, etc.) and the need for many decisions over decades when most of these governmental units have short time frames.
There are three answers:
1. Rules to provide guidance for natural resources;
2. Institutions to make the decisions;
3. Citizens who understand the issues and support the rules and the institutions.
The key to citizen understanding is a narrative of stewardship. It is important that natural resource discoveries not be seen as riches to be exploited but rather as opportunities that need stewardship. This is the difference between Nigeria’s “we’re rich!” narrative and Botswana’s “we’re poor and need to save” narrative. The latter is far more likely to produce wise decisions over long periods.
Exploitation of natural resources should build the non-resource economy over a 25-year time horizon. Governments don’t think inter-generationally, but citizens do, as they plan for their children’s future. With the right narrative, they will control the government’s worst impulses through rules and institutions.